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In security-typed programming languages, types statically enforce noninterference between potentially
conspiring values, such as the arguments and results of functions. But to adopt static security types, like
other advanced type disciplines, programmers face a steep wholesale transition, often forcing them to refactor
working code just to satisfy their type checker. To provide a gentler path to security typing that supports
safe and stylish but hard-to-verify programming idioms, researchers have designed languages that blend
static and dynamic checking of security types. Unfortunately most of the resulting languages only support
static, type-based reasoning about noninterference if a program is entirely statically secured. This limitation
substantially weakens the benefits that dynamic enforcement brings to static security typing. Additionally,
current proposals are focused on languages with explicit casts, and therefore do not fulfill the vision of
gradual typing, according to which the boundaries between static and dynamic checking only arise from the
(im)precision of type annotations, and are transparently mediated by implicit checks.
In this paper we present GSLRef, a gradual security-typed higher-order language with references. As a
gradual language, GSLRef supports the range of static-to-dynamic security checking exclusively driven by type
annotations, without resorting to explicit casts. Additionally, GSLRef lets programmers use types to reason
statically about termination-insensitive noninterference in all programs, even those that enforce security
dynamically. We prove that GSLRef satisfies all but one of Siek et al.’s criteria for gradually-typed languages,
which ensure that programs can seamlessly transition between simple typing and security typing. A notable
exception regards the dynamic gradual guarantee, which some specific programs must violate if they are to
satisfy noninterference; it remains an open question whether such a language could fully satisfy the dynamic
gradual guarantee. To realize this design, we were led to draw a sharp distinction between syntactic type
safety and semantic type soundness, each of which constrains the design of the gradual language.
CCS Concepts: • Security and privacy→ Information flow control; • Theory of computation→ Type
structures; Program semantics;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Noninterference, language-based security, gradual typing
1 INTRODUCTION
Gradual typing is typically viewed as a means to combine the agility of dynamic languages, like
Python and Ruby, with the reliability of static languages, like OCaml and Scala [Siek and Taha
2006]. But static and dynamic are merely relative notions, and several researchers have explored
a more relativistic view. For example, Disney and Flanagan [2011] and Fennell and Thiemann
[2013] develop languages where only information-flow security properties are enforced using both
dynamic and static checking; Bañados Schwerter et al. [2014, 2016] develop a language where
only computational effect capabilities are gradualized; Lehmann and Tanter [2017] gradualize
only the logical assertions of refinement types; and Jafery and Dunfield [2017] gradualize only
refinements of sum types. In each of these cases, the “fully-dynamic” corner of the gradual language
is not dynamic by typical standards, but rather simply typed. Nonetheless, each language supports
migration toward a richer typing discipline that subsumes simple typing.
This paper revisits gradual information-flow security typing, with a particular focus on the
strong information-flow guarantees that security types have historically implied. We describe a
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new language, GSLRef, that introduces a type-driven conception of gradual security. Unlike most
prior work, GSLRef supports the same static, type-based reasoning about information-flow for
gradually-typed programs as SSLRef, its purely static counterpart. To explain this innovation, we
review the power of static security types and then show what it means to preserve type-based
reasoning power in a gradual language.
Static security typing. Consider a program that processes employee data:1
1 let age = 31
2 let salary = 58000
3 let intToString : Int→ String = ...
4 let print : String→ Unit = ...
5 print(intToString(salary ))
The program is well-typed, but it has a significant error that simple types do not catch: if salaries
are confidential and printing is publicly observable, then this program leaks confidential data.
Information-flow security typing lets a programmer statically classify program entities according
to a lattice of security labels [Denning 1976] and rely on type-checking to prevent information leaks.
One exemplar security lattice, which we use as a running example, is the U.S. Dept of Defense
classification scheme: Unclassified ≼ Confidential ≼ Secret ≼ Top Secret, which we simplify to
⊥ ≼ L ≼ H ≼ ⊤, denoting minimum, low, high, and maximum security respectively [Zdancewic
2002]. To inform static type checking, each type constructor is statically annotated with a security
label (e.g. Int L ); source program values are also annotated to unambiguously determine their static
security (e.g. 58000H has type IntH ). Security label ordering induces a natural subtyping relation
(e.g. Int L <: IntH and IntH → L String L <: Int L →H StringH ), which denotes security-respecting
substitutability. An attacker or observer at level ℓo can discriminate values that have security level
at most ℓo . Armed with security types and subtyping, an information-flow security type system
statically ensures that high-confidence data may not flow directly or indirectly to low-confidence
channels [Volpano et al. 1996].
In the example above, if we annotate the salary as high-security data (of type IntH ), and specify
that print takes a low-security argument (of type String L ), then our operational intuition tells us
that the program cannot satisfy these directives: it should be rejected. Before the type system can
confirm our intuitions, though, we must determine the security levels of every type in the program.
In SSLRef, our static language, this means that every type and value must be annotated. While
security label inference and polymorphism [Myers and Liskov 2000] can reduce this burden, one
cannot experiment with some security levels without first determining all security levels. Once
all security types are assigned, the static type system forbids passing a high-security value to a
function that expects a low-security argument, so the type checker rejects the program. GSLRef
conservatively extends this model to support incremental and localized adoption of security types.
Security types induce free noninterference theorems. The employee data example demon-
strates a simple security leak, where high-security data flows directly to a low-security channel.
But security types must also contend with sophisticated leaks, where low-security variables may
change control-flow through high-security code and mutable state can enable implicit security
leaks [Denning 1976]. To combat this, information-flow security languages enforce a general prop-
erty called noninterference, which guarantees that high-security inputs do not affect low-security
results [Goguen and Meseguer 1982]. Noninterference clearly subsumes our simple security leak,
but it also prevents implicit and control-based leaks, where an attacker attempts to use low-security
inputs and outputs to learn about high-security data.
1Adapted from [Disney and Flanagan 2011].
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In security-typed languages, higher-order security types denote modular guarantees about
noninterference [Heintze and Riecke 1998]. In particular, they use Reynold’s theory of parametric-
ity [Reynolds 1983] to ensure that a typing judgment dictates how replacing inputs can affect the
resulting output [Abadi et al. 1999]. For example, consider a hypothetical function:
let mix : IntL →L IntH →L IntL = fun pub priv => ...
At first sight, it appears to “mix” its arguments pub and priv to produce some result. However,
the security annotations on its type guarantee that the integer result cannot leak information
about priv, no matter what value is given to pub. The key to this result is how the relevant typ-
ing judgment is interpreted. The body of the mix function, t , must satisfy the typing judgment
pub : IntL, priv : IntH ⊢ t : IntL. To endow this judgment with meaning, a logical relation-based se-
mantic model is defined directly in terms of the language’s dynamic semantics. According to this
semantic typing judgment, changing the value of priv has no effect on the final value of t . This
guarantee holds even if mix uses mutable state [Zdancewic 2002]. The end result is that an attacker
with no direct access to a high-security channel cannot manipulate the value of pub to uncover the
value of priv, even by modifying mix’s implementation.
In a static security language, these noninterference guarantees follow from the type structure
of the language. No runtime checks are required, and the security labels applied to values and
types are simply static annotations.2 In essence, static security types induce free theorems about
the noninterference behaviors of computations, just as parametric polymorphic types induce free
theorems about data abstraction [Wadler 1989]. Free noninterference theorems provide enormous
benefits to programmers. First, they support modular reasoning about noninterference: a program-
mer who implements a higher-order function with type (IntL →L IntH →L IntL) →L BoolH knows
that the function’s body can safely call its argument with high-security data as the second argu-
ment: the provided function cannot leak that data. Second, type-based reasoning is compositional:
the syntactic typing rules precisely specify how the security properties of subprograms (e.g. a
function-typed expression and a potential argument) compose to determine security properties of
a larger program (e.g. via function application). Finally, this reasoning is static: one need not reason
directly about operational behavior or data flow to understand security. That reasoning was done
once-and-for-all in the type-driven noninterference proof. Instead, type structure guides reasoning.
These properties are especially useful for partial programs like software libraries. Below we show
that GSLRef preserves these advantages while introducing new flexibility by dynamically enforcing
some type guarantees.
Relaxing security typing. Like any static type discipline, security typing has its downsides.
As discussed above, security typing cannot be checked until all types are given a security level,
through ascription, polymorphism, or inference. One cannot incrementally add security levels
and observe the consequences. In addition, verifying noninterference is in general undecidable, so
static security checking is necessarily conservative, and as a result programmers must sometimes
refactor perfectly safe and clear code simply to appease the type checker.
To address these shortcomings, researchers have explored ways to combine static and dynamic
security checking. These approaches can be classified roughly as hybrid or gradual. Hybrid ap-
proaches, e.g. [Buiras et al. 2015; Chandra and Franz 2007; Shroff et al. 2007; Zheng and Myers
2007], blend various static analysis and runtime monitoring techniques to make analyses more
precise, to incorporate dynamically-defined policies, and to target safe executions rather than just
safe programs. Gradual approaches [Disney and Flanagan 2011; Fennell and Thiemann 2013, 2016],
2Like type annotations, security labels appear in dynamic semantics solely to prove type safety: they are erased in a practical
runtime.
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inspired by gradual typing, focus on type systems for static analysis and add the extra goal of
enabling seamless incremental evolution from programs with no information-flow control whatso-
ever to programs with security-type based static enforcement, while fulfilling the goals of hybrid
approaches.
To clearly understand the contribution of the present work, it is important to clarify that the prior
work in this space, hybrid and gradual alike, take a check-driven approach to analysis: the core of
the security model is based on associating a security level to each value in a program and managing
security levels using two distinct operations: security upgrades and checks. A security upgrade
elevates a value’s security label, e.g. (IntH!)5L −→ 5H. A security check signals an error if the
checked label is not at least as high as the value’s tag, e.g. (IntH?)5L −→ 5L, but (IntL?)5H −→ error.
Upgrades and checks have different dynamic behavior, but with help from static typing, gradual
security languages combine them into type-based upcasts and downcasts, e.g. (IntL)t , which checks
t if L is lower than t ’s static security and upgrades t otherwise. This approach easily detects direct
flows of high-security values to low-security channels, but preventing implicit flows through
control transfer requires extra care, including prophylactic upgrades to program values [Chandra
and Franz 2007] and policies to restrict upgrades [Fennell and Thiemann 2013]. As we will see, our
development similarly requires careful treatment of assignments.
Check-driven approaches break free theorems. Dynamic security casts give flexibility to
programmers, but fundamentally cripple the ability to reason statically using security types. In
particular, if security downcasts are added to the language, although noninterference is still pre-
served, static type judgments no longer imply free theorems about security of programs, as was
discussed above. As a result, programmers must reason about the dynamic semantics—dynamic
labels, dynamic upgrades, and dynamic checks—to uncover which values do not interfere with one
another. In particular, a function’s type no longer denotes noninterference properties about its
arguments and results. For example, consider the function:
let mix : IntL →L IntH →L IntL =
fun pub priv => if pub < (IntL)priv then 1L else 2L
This program is statically accepted by languages that only check for compatibility of base
types [Disney and Flanagan 2011; Fennell and Thiemann 2013]. The type of mix, while fully static,
does not guarantee that mix never reveals information about its second argument. Rather, the
type merely guarantees that the second argument’s security level is at most H and the result is at
most L. But upper-bounds on security labels do not suffice to make definitive assertions about the
noninterference behavior of this function.3 Indeed, the program mix 1L 5L successfully reduces to
1L. In order to avoid such behavior, the programmer must explicitly upgrade the dynamic security
level of the value passed as second argument at each call site. Alternatively, one can upgrade mix to
its own type, thereby forcing the second argument to be upgraded before executing the function
body (and hence preventing any information leak about that argument). This highlights the fact
that types alone do not denote noninterference properties: the two versions of the mix function
behave differently although they have the same type.
This phenomenon, that adding dynamic checking to a static system may weaken type-based
reasoning principles, is not unique to security typing. Prior work on cast calculi with parametric
polymorphism observes that adding runtime type tests to System F preserves type safety—i.e. that
programs do not crash—but sacrifices type soundness—i.e. that polymorphic types denote strong
data abstraction guarantees via parametricity [Ahmed et al. 2011, § 5.1].
3Recent work by Fennell and Thiemann [2016] on LGJS addresses this particular problem, as described in Sec. 7.
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Contribution: type-driven gradual security typing. Modular, compositional, and type-based
reasoning are hallmark benefits of type systems. Thus, to facilitate the seamless transition toward
static security typing, the typing judgment of a gradual type system should imply the same semantic
invariants that its fully-static counterpart does. To that end, this paper presents GSLRef, a type-driven
gradual security language that extends a static security type discipline with gradual security labels
and corresponding notions of gradual type precision and consistent subtyping. To secure GSLRef
programs, one just adds static security labels: dynamic checks arise automatically and implicitly, as
needed to enforce the noninterference guarantees denoted by static types.
Unlikemost prior work, GSLRef’s static security types denote the same noninterference guarantees
as its fully static counterpart language SSLRef. As such, GSLRef’s security types enable modular and
compositional type-based reasoning about noninterference, just like the fully static SSLRef, whereas
security types in most prior gradual languages do not. GSLRef’s type system supports reasoning
about termination-insensitive noninterference because it is sound with respect to a security logical
relation defined directly in terms of type structure. This result is standard for a purely-static security
language [Heintze and Riecke 1998], but novel for a gradual security language with imprecise types
supported by dynamic checks. In fact the dynamics are guided by the needs of the noninterference
proof.
To summarize, this work makes the following contributions:
• We present GSLRef, a gradual security language that supports seamless transition between
simply-typed and security-typed programming. Security typing annotations alone drive the
balance between static and dynamic information flow checking. (Sec. 4)
• We prove that GSLRef’s type discipline enforces termination-insensitive noninterference:
GSLRef’s types reflect strong information-flow invariants that hold even in code that contains
gradually-typed subexpressions. (Sec. 5)
• We prove the static gradual criteria of Siek et al. [2015]. Interestingly, in order to ensure
noninterference in presence of references (and hence implicit flows through the heap), GSLRef
sacrifices the dynamic gradual guarantee.
• We contribute more generally to the foundations of gradual typing for advanced type disci-
plines. We find that GSLRef’s security invariants require separate consideration of syntactic
type safety and semantic type soundness, each of which constrains the design of the gradual
language.
• This work also represents a particularly challenging application of the Abstracting Gradual
Typing (AGT) methodology [Garcia et al. 2016]. AGT is a framework that uses abstract
interpretation [Cousot and Cousot 1977] at the type level to systematically construct gradually-
typed languages from pre-existing statically typed ones. We report on our experience with
a number of important considerations that complement the original presentation of AGT.
In addition, we highlight the limitation of AGT when applied to semantically-rich type
disciplines. (Sec. 6)
Before diving into the development of GSLRef, Sec. 2 informally introduces the type-driven
approach to gradual security typing through examples. Then, Sec. 3 presents SSLRef, the fully-static
security type language from which GSLRef is derived. Supplementary definitions can be found in
the Appendix. Complete definitions, as well as the proofs of all the results stated in the paper, can
be found in the companion technical report [Toro et al. 2018]. An interactive executable model of
GSLRef is available online at https://pleiad.cl/gradual-security/.
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2 TYPE-DRIVEN GRADUAL SECURITY TYPING IN ACTION
Static security type systems impose a burdensome all-or-nothing adoption model: all security types
must be determined before the type system can check security. Even then, some secure programs
have no statically-checkable type assignment, or may require substantial refactoring to satisfy the
type checker. Gradual security typing addresses these shortcomings by enabling a programmer to
incrementally add security information to the program, progressively introducing dynamic and
static checks and guarantees.
Let us consider how gradual security typing can progressively introduce security guarantees
and help detect and fix bugs in our first example from Sec. 1. Recall the problem with the program:
salary is a high-security value, but print is a low-security channel. We can statically reflect these
intentions:
1 let age = 31?
2 let salary = 58000H
3 let intToString : Int? →? String? = ...
4 let print : String L →? Unit? = ...
5 print(intToString(salary ))
In practice the programmer just marks the value of salary and the input type of print: all omitted
security annotations desugar to the unknown security label ?. Under our gradual security semantics,
this program type checks, but triggers a runtime check failure at line 5. If the highlighted annotations
were omitted or ?, then the program would check and run exactly as a simply-typed one, because it
would not impose, and thus not enforce, any security invariants.
How do we repair this program? Simply adding more annotations cannot fix it. Case in point,
adding a reasonable security annotation to line 3 escalates the runtime failure to a static type error.
3 let intToString: Int L → String = ...
If the security annotations are as intended, however, then the runtime error must be due to some
behavioral bug in the program (e.g. the programmer might have intended to print the employee’s
age instead).
Reasoning with imprecision. The gradual type checker statically enforces the invariants it
can, deferring checks to runtime when the static type information is insufficient. Rather than
introducing dynamic casts, as in the check-driven approach, our type-driven approach to gradual
security typing builds on foundations laid by prior research on gradual typing. Siek and Taha [2006]
observe similar difficulties as in the check-driven approach when trying to use subtyping to combine
dynamic and simple type checking. This inspired gradual typing, which extends static types with
an unknown type to form gradual types, relating them to one another using consistency and precision
relations [Siek et al. 2015]. Since these notions are conceptually orthogonal to subtyping, they
blend well with pre-existing subtyping disciplines [Siek and Taha 2007]. Our type-driven approach
adapts these concepts to gradual security and its natural notion of subtyping.
In this model, the unknown label ? represents imprecise security information. Precision ⊑ is
a partial order from more-precise labels to less-precise labels: static security labels are perfectly
precise, e.g. H ⊑ H, while ? denotes utter imprecision, e.g. H ⊑ ?. Precision extends covariantly to
security types, e.g. IntH → IntL ⊑ Int? → Int?, in contrast to subtyping.
The ordering on security labels ≼ consequently extends to consistent ordering ≼˜ on gradual
labels. Consistent ordering preserves every order relation among precise labels (e.g. ⊥ ≼˜ ⊤ and
⊤ ̸≼˜ ⊥), but mathematically, it is not an ordering relation (e.g. both ? ≼˜ ⊤ and ⊤ ≼˜ ?). Rather, it
reflects consistent reasoning in the face of imprecise information: since we do not know what label
? represents, either static order is plausible. Consistent ordering induces an analogous notion of
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consistent subtyping, e.g. Int⊤ ≲ Int? and Int? ≲ Int⊥, which is not transitive, e.g. Int⊤ ̸≲ Int⊥, so
it is not a subtyping relation, but embodies imprecise reasoning about static subtyping [Siek and
Taha 2007]. An attacker or observer at level ℓo can now also observe values that have unknown
security levels, as long as the dynamic security information about the value is observable at ℓo .
This is formally explained in Section 5.
Flexibility. As we have seen, GSLRef lets programmers write statically secure programs by first
writing the simply-typed version and progressively adding labels. But gradual typing also provides
flexibility, so that safe programs that veer from the static type discipline can strategically revert to
dynamic checking. GSLRef’s type-driven approach provides this flexibility. Consider an example
adapted from Fennell and Thiemann [2013].4
1 let infoH : RefLReportH = ...
2 let sendToFacebook : RefLReportL
L−→LUnitL = ...
3 let sendToManager : RefLReportH
H−→LUnitL = ...
4 let addPrivileged : Bool?
H−→? (RefLReport ?
?−→LUnitL) H−→?RefLReport ?
?−→?UnitL =
5 fun isPrivileged worker report =>
6 if isPrivileged then report := !report + !infoH else ();
7 worker report
8 let sendHi : RefLReportH
L−→LUnitL = addPrivileged true sendToManager
9 let sendLow : RefLReportL
L−→LUnitL = addPrivileged false sendToFacebook
The program starts with the creation of a public reference to a private report, infoH. It then
defines two routines for submitting reports: sendToFacebook publishes data publicly, and sendToManager
publishes data privately. The addPrivileged function decides dynamically whether to add high-
security information to the sent report, and is used to implement the sendHi and sendLow functions.
This code is secure, but SSLRef, our static security system, cannot type check addPrivileged because
of its dynamic choice.
Interestingly, GSLRef can type check this program, thanks to a few well-placed ? labels (line 4),
and it dynamically ensures that the program does not leak data. Case in point, the following
gradually-typeable function is poised to leak private data:
let sendFail : RefLReportL
L−→LUnitL = addPrivileged true sendToFacebook
but if called, GSLRef’s dynamic security monitor signals an error when sendToFacebook dereferences
the report, thereby preventing the leak.
Type-based reasoning in GSLRef. Like prior work, GSLRef supports smooth migration to static
security and flexible programming idioms. Its most significant innovation is that GSLRef retains the
type-based reasoning power of static security typing.
Consider again the example mix function of Sec. 1. In GSLRef, the function body cannot violate the
noninterference property implied by its type, just as in its fully static counterpart language SSLRef.
In particular, the following definition is rejected statically as expected:
let mix : IntL →L IntH →L IntL = fun pub priv => if pub < priv then 1L else 2L
In fact, no function body can satisfy this type signature and use its second argument to determine
the result. To do so, we must change the type signature, and with it the implied security invariants:
let mix : IntL →L Int ? →L IntL = fun pub priv => if pub < priv then 1L else 2L
4Security labels above function arrows track mutation effects (Sec. 3).
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The second argument now has statically unknown security. This definition is accepted statically
because the function might respect the static security invariants of its clients. Consider two such
clients, which only differ in the security level of the second argument:
mix 1L 5H
Client 1
mix 1L 5L
Client 2
Both type check because the security level of the second argument is consistent with the expected,
unknown level. Client 2 returns 1L without incident, because its second argument is public, so
applying mix does not leak private information. Client 1, however, signals a runtime security error:
the function’s intended result would implicitly leak information from a private input, but the
impending leak is trapped and reported. Treating static security levels as precise requirements
rather than upper-bounds, and supporting imprecision, provides the same flexibility as the check-
driven approach, as demonstrated in the reporting example above. The key difference is that
dynamicity manifests as imprecision in a function’s static type, so precise types can preserve their
static security interpretation. The interaction between types of different precision is transparently
guarded by implicit runtime checks.
If we changed the type signature of mix to IntL →L IntH →L Int ? , making the return type
imprecise, then the definition would type check as well. Nonetheless, GSLRef’s dynamic enforcement
ensures that the returned value could never leak to a public channel, be it a variable or a heap
location, because the result is dynamically secured.
The type-drivenmodel lets programmers use type ascriptions to impose static security guarantees
on code that is built from imprecisely typed components. Gradual typing automatically introduces
dynamic checks to soundly enforce these invariants. Consider a function called smix that has a fully
static signature but is implemented using the imprecisely-typed mix function:
let mix : IntL →L Int ? →L IntL = fun pub priv => if pub < priv then 1L else 2L
let smix : IntL →L IntH →L IntL = fun pub priv => mix pub priv
Type-based reasoning about noninterference dictates that smix cannot reveal any information about
its second argument (regardless of the actual security label of the second argument). For instance,
consider the clients:
smix 1L 5H
Client 1
smix 1L 5L
Client 2
In GSLRef, both clients type check, but both fail at runtime! Client 2 fails because smix’s type
dictates a strong noninterference property, independent of the client’s dynamic security levels. To
see why, observe that smix accepts as second argument any integer value that has a security level
no higher than H. When 5L is substituted in the body of smix, its runtime security information is
upgraded to H. This new security level in turn strengthens the confidentiality of the value returned
by mix, which contradicts the static return type of mix (L), hence resulting in a runtime error. This
behavior preserves local type-based reasoning about the behavior of components, regardless of
how they are composed.
To summarize, in GSLRef different gradual security types denote different security guarantees.
Most importantly, the flexibility introduced by imprecise security types cannot be abused to violate
the type-based noninterference guarantees imposed by static security types.
References and implicit flows. In the presence ofmutable references, information-flow security
faces the classic problem of implicit flows through the heap [Denning 1976]. Consider the following
program, adapted from Austin and Flanagan [2009]:
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1 fun x: BoolH =>
2 let y: RefL BoolL = ref trueL
3 let z: RefL BoolL = ref trueL
4 if x then y := falseL else unit
5 if !y then z := falseL else unit
6 !z
This program attempts to downgrade the security of it’s input. A static security type system easily
rejects it because the first branch of the first conditional (line 4) assigns a low-security reference
under a high-security boolean condition. Indeed, in GSLRef this program is statically rejected as
well.
This program is tricky for dynamic information flow monitors, however, and has inspired many
approaches, e.g. [Austin and Flanagan 2009, 2010, 2012; Hedin and Sabelfeld 2012a]. Since gradual
security typing includes both static and dynamic security checking, GSLRef must also address the
challenge of dynamically detecting implicit flows. Consider the same program as above but with
some imprecise annotations:
1 fun x: BoolH =>
2 let y: Ref? Bool ? = ref true ?
3 let z: RefL BoolL = ref trueL
4 if x then y := false ? else unit
5 if !y then z := falseL else unit
6 !z
This gradually-typed variant type checks because the reference bound to y now has an unknown
security level. But if x is bound to trueH at runtime, then the program fails with an error at the
assignment on line 4, because it cannot replace the contents of a reference in a manner that violates
the security context H imposed by the conditional expression x. This restriction, and its motivation,
is analogous to the “no-sensitive-upgrade” approach of Austin and Flanagan [2009].
Now suppose we make y’s type have unknown static security but force its initial contents to
have high security, i.e.:
2 let y: Ref? Bool? = ref trueH
Then at runtime the assignment on line 4 succeeds because the assignment on line 2 already refined
y’s dynamic security to H, which satisfies the security context. Now if x is falseH then this program
fails at the assignment on line 5, because z’s security level violates the dynamic security context
introduced by branching on the contents of y.
To sum up, GSLRef ensures termination-insensitive noninterference, gradually, even in the
presence of references.
3 STATIC SECURITY TYPINGWITH REFERENCES
This section introduces SSLRef, a higher-order static security-typed language with references, which
serves as the static extreme of our gradual language. The language is a straightforward adaptation
of prior information-flow security typing disciplines [Fennell and Thiemann 2013; Heintze and
Riecke 1998; Zdancewic 2002]. The most significant novelties include a syntax-directed type system
and a dynamic semantics that tracks security levels but performs no security checks: the type
system alone guarantees noninterference.
Syntax. Fig. 1 presents the syntax of SSLRef, at heart a simply-typed higher-order language with
references: it includes booleans, functions, unit, mutable references, and type ascription. Each value
and type constructor is annotated with a security label ℓ ∈ Labelwith partial order ≼, where ⊤ and
⊥ denote the greatest and least labels respectively. Function abstractions, and their corresponding
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S ::= Boolℓ | S ℓ−→ℓS | Refℓ S | Unitℓ (types)
b ::= true | false (Booleans)
r ::= b | (λℓx : S .t) | unit | o (raw values)
v ::= rℓ | x (values)
t ::= v | t t | t ⊕ t | if t then t else t | refS t | !t | t :=t | t :: S | protℓ(t) (terms)
⊕ ::= ∧ | ∨ (operations)
(Sx) x : S ∈ Γ
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ x : S (Sb) Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ bℓ : Boolℓ (Su) Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ unitℓ : Unitℓ
(So) o : S ∈ Σ
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ oℓ : Refℓ S (Sλ)
Γ, x : S1; Σ; ℓ′ ⊢ t : S2
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ (λℓ′x : S1.t)ℓ : S1
ℓ′−→ℓS2
(Sprot)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ t : S
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ protℓ(t) : S ≺ ℓ
(S ⊕)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 : Boolℓ1
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t2 : Boolℓ2
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 ⊕ t2 : Bool(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2)
(Sapp)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 : S11
ℓ′−→ℓS12 Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t2 : S2
S2 <: S11 ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓ′
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 t2 : S12 ≺ ℓ (S if)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : Boolℓ Γ; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ ti : Si
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ if t then t1 else t2 : (S1 <: S2) ≺ ℓ
(Sasgn)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 : Refℓ S1 Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t2 : S2
S2 <: S1 ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ label(S1)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 := t2 : Unit⊥ (Sref)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : S ′ S ′ <: S
ℓc ≼ label(S)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ refS t : Ref⊥ S
(Sderef)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : Refℓ S
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ !t : S ≺ ℓ (S ::)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : S1 S1 <: S2
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t :: S2 : S2
Fig. 1. SSLRef: Syntax and Static Semantics
types, are annotated with an additional security label called the latent security effect: we explain its
static semantics below. Two forms arise only at runtime (highlighted in gray): mutable locations o
and a protection term protℓ(t), which restricts the security effects of its subterm t .
Statics. Fig. 1 also presents the type system of SSLRef, which is technically a type-and-effect
system [Gifford and Lucassen 1986]. The judgment Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : S says that the term t has type S
under type environment Γ, store type Σ, and security effect ℓc ∈ Label. A type environment Γ is
a finite map from variables to types. A store type Σ is a finite map from locations to types. The
security effect, sometimes called the program counter label [Denning 1976], is a security label that
denotes the least security level of those references that a given termmay allocate or mutate [Heintze
and Riecke 1998]. The security effect prevents high-security computations—e.g. the branch of an if
expression that is chosen based on a high-security Boolean—from leaking information by assigning
to low-security references. An SSLRef source program t is well-typed if ·; ·;⊥ ⊢ t : S .
• Rule (Sx) and rule (So) type variable and location references as usual. Simple values are also
typed as usual, but their types inherit their labels from the values themselves (Sb/Su).
• Rule (Sλ) annotates the type of a function with the latent security effect of its body, as is
standard for type-and-effect systems. The greatest (i.e. best) security effect can be inferred
from the function body, but for simplicity this type system consults an explicit annotation ℓ′.
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• Rule (Sprot) imposes a lower bound ℓ on the security effect of the subterm t . This restriction
is captured by stamping the label ℓ onto the type [Heintze and Riecke 1998]–e.g. Boolℓ ≺ ℓ′ =
Bool(ℓ ≺ℓ′), where ℓ ≺ ℓ′ represents the least upper-bound, or join, of security levels ℓ and ℓ′.• Rule (S⊕) types Boolean operations, yielding a result with the join of the operand security
levels.
• Rule (Sapp) is mostly standard, but also enforces security restrictions. First, to prevent
mutation-based security leaks, the operator’s latent effect ℓ′ must upper-bound its security
level as well as the latent security effect of the entire expression. Both restrictions are captured
with a single label comparison in the premise. Second, to prevent value-based security leaks,
the security level of the entire expression must upper-bound the level ℓ of the operator—this
is done by stamping label ℓ onto the type. Rule (Sapp) also appeals to the subtyping relation
induced by ordering the security labels. Subtyping is driven by security labels: it is invariant
on reference types, covariant on security labels, and contravariant on latent effects [Pottier
and Simonet 2003]:
ℓ ≼ ℓ′
Boolℓ <: Boolℓ′
ℓ ≼ ℓ′
Unitℓ <: Unitℓ′
ℓ ≼ ℓ′
Refℓ S <: Refℓ′ S
S ′1 <: S1 S2 <: S ′2 ℓ1 ≼ ℓ′1 ℓ′2 ≼ ℓ2
S1
ℓ2−→ℓ1S2 <: S ′1
ℓ′2−→ℓ′1S ′2
• Rule (Sif) incorporates the standard structure for a subtype discipline: the type of the ex-
pression involves the subtyping join <: of its branches. To protect against explicit information
flows, the expression type is stamped to incorporate the security level ℓ of the predicate.
Additionally, to prevent effect-based leaks, each branch is type checked with a security effect
that incorporates the security level of the predicate.5
• Rules (Sref) and (Sasgn), which perform write effects, are constrained by the security effect
of the typing judgment to prevent leaks through the store.
Rule (Sref) honors the effect discipline by requiring the current security effect to lower-bound
the security level of the stored value. The resulting reference has least security ⊥ because it
is newly minted and cannot leak information: the type of the stored content is known and its
security level prevents further prying.
Rule (Sasgn) ensures that the security level of the location and current security effect lower-
bound the assigned value. The result of assignment has ⊥ security because unit cannot leak
information. Rule (Sderef) stamps the security level of the reference onto the resulting type.
• Finally, Rule (S ::) is typical for ascription, requiring the ascribed type to be a supertype of the
subterm’s type.
Dynamics. With fully static security typing, programs execute on a standard runtime with
no additional security-enforcing machinery. Type safety—well-typed terms do not get stuck—
is guaranteed by the underlying run-of-the-mill simple type discipline. However, to establish
the soundness of security typing—high-security computations have no effect on low-security
observations—one must characterize computations and their resulting values with respect to
their security levels. To this end, the SSLRef dynamic semantics explicitly tracks security labels as
programs evaluate, but never checks them. The noninterference proof demonstrates that no such
5Note that SSLRef does not have an explicit effect ascription form t :: ℓc [Bañados Schwerter et al. 2014], but this can be
encoded using the expression (λℓc x : Unit⊥ .t )⊥ unit⊥.
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t | µ ℓc−→ t | µ Notion of Reduction
b1ℓ1 ⊕ b2ℓ2 | µ
ℓc−→ (b1 J⊕K b2)(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2) | µ (λℓ′x : S .t)ℓ v | µ ℓc−→ protℓ([v/x]t) | µ
if trueℓ then t1 else t2 | µ
ℓc−→ protℓ(t1) | µ if falseℓ then t1 else t2 | µ
ℓc−→ protℓ(t2) | µ
protℓ(v) | µ
ℓc−→ v ≺ ℓ | µ refS v | µ ℓc−→ o⊥ | µ [o 7→ v ≺ ℓc ] where o < dom(µ )
!oℓ | µ
ℓc−→ v ≺ ℓ | µ where µ (o) = v oℓ :=v | µ
ℓc−→ unit⊥ | µ [o 7→ v ≺ ℓc ≺ ℓ]
v :: S | µ ℓc−→ v ≺ label(S) | µ
t | µ ℓc7−→ t | µ Reduction
(R→) t1 | µ1
ℓc−→ t2 | µ2
t1 | µ1 ℓc7−→ t2 | µ2
(Rf )
t1 | µ1 ℓc7−→ t2 | µ2
f [t1] | µ1 ℓc7−→ f [t2] | µ2
(Rprot)
t1 | µ1 ℓc ≺ℓ7−→ t2 | µ2
protℓ(t1) | µ1
ℓc7−→ protℓ(t2) | µ2
Fig. 2. SSLRef: Label Tracking Dynamic Semantics
checks are required: static typing suffices. Tracking labels provides weak security guarantees that
are exploited in the proof of the stronger noninterference result.
Fig. 2 presents the rules of the label-tracking dynamic semantics. The judgment t1 | µ1
ℓc7−→t2 | µ2
says that a term t1 and store µ1 step to t2 and µ2 respectively, in security effect ℓc . Reduction of
terms is specified using term frames f :
f ::= □ ⊕ t | v ⊕ □ | □ t | v □ | □ :: S | if □ then t else t | !□ | □:=t | v :=□ | refS □
The core semantics is typical, so we focus on tracking security. The runtime security effect ℓc ,
which reflects its static counterpart, affects the security level of reads from and writes to the store,
as well as the security level of values returned from high-security contexts to low-security ones.
Protection terms protℓ(t) control the current program counter label. Apart from prot, all expres-
sions propagate the current program counter to subterms. Rule (Rprot) upgrades ℓc for the dynamic
extent of t . The resulting value is stamped with the protected label ℓ, in case the contents leak
information to a context that lacks the confidentiality of ℓ. Values are stamped much like types:
rℓ ≺ ℓ′ = r(ℓ ≺ℓ′). Protection terms do not exist in source programs: they are introduced by control
operations, i.e. function calls and conditionals. The intuition is that calling a function or destructing
a Boolean of security level ℓ may leak information about the identity of the function or Boolean
respectively. As such, the context of the resulting computation should communicate (via mutation)
only with reference cells that have high-enough security, and the result of the computation is clas-
sified as well.6 Function calls ignore the operator’s latent effect ℓ′, which promises the type system
6Zdancewic [2002] observes that e.g. if x then eL else eL leaks no information about Boolean x : BoolH so could be deemed
low-security, but security type systems must be conservative for the sake of tractability.
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that the ensuing computation will not violate the stated confidentiality. However the operator’s
security label determines the confidentiality of the ensuing computation.
When stored, a value inherits confidentiality from both the current security effect and the location
itself. This behavior tracks both the confidentiality of the location and the induced security effect.
Properties. SSLRef is type safe: we establish this result via a standard progress and preservation
argument [Toro et al. 2018]. Since the runtime semantics includes no security checks, progress
mirrors the corresponding argument for the underlying simple type discipline. To prove preserva-
tion, we must show that after each reduction step the resulting term still has the same security
according to the typing rules of Fig. 1, modulo subtyping.
Proposition 3.1 (Type Safety). If ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : S then either
• t is a value v
• for any store µ such that Σ ⊢ µ and any ℓ′c ≼ ℓc , we have t | µ
ℓ′c7−→ t ′ | µ ′ and ·; Σ′; ℓc ⊢ t ′ : S ′
for some S ′ <: S , and some Σ′ ⊇ Σ such that Σ′ ⊢ µ ′.
The store typing judgment Σ ⊢ µ holds if and only if dom(µ) = dom(Σ) and ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ µ(o) : Σ(o)
for all o ∈ dom(µ), ℓc ∈ Label.
The most important property of a security-typed language like SSLRef is the soundness of security
typing, i.e. that well-typed programs have no forbidden information flows. We formally state and
prove noninterference using step-indexed logical relations (see the companion technical report [Toro
et al. 2018]).We do not include the definitions of the logical relations and noninterference statement
here because proving that SSLRef is secure is not the main focus of this work, and the full treatment
of noninterference for the gradual language (Sec. 5) subsumes them.
4 GSLRef: TYPE-DRIVEN GRADUAL SECURITY TYPING
This section presents the static and dynamic semantics of GSLRef, and addresses its type safety and
gradual guarantees. We show that GSLRef enforces noninterference in Sec. 5.
The reader might (understandably!) wonder how some of the definitions presented in this
section were conceived. This section largely appeals to intuition to justify these definitions, but in
practice they were obtained by following the Abstracting Gradual Typing methodology [Garcia
et al. 2016], which exploits principles of abstract interpretation [Cousot and Cousot 1977] to
systematically derive a gradual language from a static one. In fact, this work can be seen as a
particularly challenging case study for AGT—which has led us to identify the limits of the AGT
approach when applied to disciplines where type safety (i.e. “well-typed terms do not get stuck”)
does not imply type soundness (i.e. “well-typed terms do not leak”). The gradual language obtained
by a straightforward application of AGT is type safe, but does not ensure noninterference because
of subtle interactions between security typing imprecision and heap-based flows. We discuss the
key elements, pitfalls, and discoveries of this systematic derivation process in Sec. 6.
To aid the reader, Fig. 3 indicates where important terms, operations and relations are presented,
along with their notation.
4.1 Static semantics
Fig. 4 presents the syntax and static semantics of GSLRef.7 A gradual security label g ∈ GLabel is
either a static label ℓ or the unknown label ?, which represents any label whatsoever. Each value
and gradual type constructor is now annotated with a gradual security label.
7In GSLRef, the o and protg(t ) forms and typing rules merely serve to induce corresponding GSLεRef forms (Sec 4.2).
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Term Notation Ref Operation/Relation Notation Ref
Gradual Type U F 4 Consistent subtyping (U ) ≲ P 14
Gradual label g F 4 Consistent join (U ) ˜<: P 16
Term t F 4 Consistent meet (U ) ˜<: F 18
Interval ı P 17 Gradual meet (U ) ⊓ P 16
Evidence for labels ε P 17 Evidence join (ε on types) ˜≺ F 25
Evidence for types ε P 17 Evidence meet (ε on types) ˜≺ F 25
Evidence term t P 18 Gradual meet (ε on types) ⊓ F 25
Frames f ,h P 23 Initial evidence (U ) I F 29
Operation/Relation Notation Ref Reflexive initial evidence (U ) I⟳ F 5
Consistent label ordering (g) ≼˜ P 14 Transitivity (ε on types) ◦<: F 25
Consistent label join (g) ˜≺ P 15 Evidence inversion label (ε) ilbl F 26
Consistent label meet (g) ˜≺ P 15 Evidence inversion ref (ε) iref F 26
Gradual meet (g) ⊓ P 16 Evidence inversion dom (ε) idom F 26
Evidence join (ε on labels) ˜≺ F 24 Evidence inversion cod (ε) icod F 26
Evidence meet (ε on labels) ˜≺ F 24 Evidence inversion latent (ε) ilat F 26
Gradual meet (ı) ⊓ P 21 Label Stamping (S ≺ ℓ) ≺ P 49
Gradual meet (ε on labels) ⊓ F 24 Subtyping join (S) <: F 13
Lower-bound-comparison (ε) ⌊≤⌋ P 23 Subtyping meet (S) <: F 13
Initial evidence (g) I F 28
Reflexive initial evidence (g) I⟳ F 5
Transitivity (ε on labels) ◦≼ P 21
Fig. 3. Index of terms, operations and relations used in this article, along with their notation, and reference
to corresponding Figure (F) or Page (P).
The typing judgment Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t : U says that the term t has gradual type U under type
environment Γ, store environment Σ, and gradual security effect gc . The typing rules are analogous
to the static typing rules presented in Fig. 1 except that security labels, types, type functions and
predicates are all replaced by their gradual counterparts. For instance, static label ordering ≼ is
replaced with consistent label ordering ≼˜ :
? ≼˜ g g ≼˜ ?
ℓ1 ≼ ℓ2
ℓ1 ≼˜ ℓ2
Intuitively, if consistent label ordering between two gradual labels holds, then it means that the
static relation holds for some static labels represented by the gradual labels. It is always plausible
in the presence of ?, since the unknown label represents any label. Similarly, subtyping is lifted to
consistent subtyping ≲, whose definition is analogous to static subtyping, but using consistent label
ordering:
g ≼˜ g′
Boolg ≲ Boolg′
g ≼˜ g′
Unitg ≲ Unitg′
g ≼˜ g′ U1 ≲ U2 U2 ≲ U1
Refg U1 ≲ Refg′ U2
U ′1 ≲ U1 U2 ≲ U ′2 g1 ≼˜ g′1 g′2 ≼˜ g2
U1
g2−→g1U2 ≲ U ′1
g′2−→g′1U ′2
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U ::= Boolg | U
g−→gU | Refg U | Unitg (gradual types)
g ::= ℓ | ? (gradual labels)
b ::= true | false (Booleans)
r ::= b | (λgx : U .t) | unit | o (base values)
v ::= rg | x (values)
t ::= v | t t | t ⊕ t | if t then t else t | refU t |!t | t :=t | protg(t) | t :: U (terms)
⊕ ::= ∧ | ∨ (operations)
(U x) x : U ∈ Γ
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ x : U (U b) Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ bg : Boolg (U u) Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ unitg : Unitg
(Uo) o : U ∈ Σ
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ og : Refg U (U λ)
Γ, x : U1; Σ; g′ ⊢ t : U2
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ (λg′x : U1.t)g : U1
g′−→gU2
(U prot)
Γ; Σ; gc ˜≺ g ⊢ t : U
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ protg(t) : U ˜≺ g (U ⊕)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 : Boolg1
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t2 : Boolg2
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 ⊕ t2 : Bool(g1˜ ≺g2)
(U app)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 : U11
g′−→gU12
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t2 : U2
U2 ≲ U11 ‰ g ≺ gc ≼ g′
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 t2 : U12 ˜≺ g (U if)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t : Boolg
Γ; Σ; gc ˜≺ g ⊢ t1 : U1 Γ; Σ; gc ˜≺ g ⊢ t2 : U2
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ if t then t1 else t2 : (U1 ˜<:U2) ˜≺ g
(U asgn)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 : Refg U1 Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t2 : U2
U2 ≲ U1 Â g ≺ gc ≼ label(U1)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1:=t2 : Unit⊥ (U ref)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t : U ′
U ′ ≲ U gc ≼˜ label(U )
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ refU t : Ref⊥ U
(U deref)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t : Refg U
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ !t : U ˜≺ g (U ::)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t : U1
U1 ≲ U2
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t :: U2 : U2
Fig. 4. GSLRef: Static Semantics
The label join and meet operators are replaced with consistent join and consistent meet respec-
tively:
⊤ ˜≺ ? = ? ˜≺ ⊤ = ⊤ g ˜≺ ? = ? ˜≺ g = ? if g , ⊤ ℓ1 ˜≺ ℓ2 = ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2
⊥ ˜≺ ? = ? ˜≺ ⊥ = ⊥ g ˜≺ ? = ? ˜≺ g = ? if g , ⊥ ℓ1 ˜≺ ℓ2 = ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2
These operators recover precise label information when the unknown label interacts with the
relevant boundary element (⊤ for˜≺, and⊥ for˜≺ ), otherwise the result is always unknown. Intuitively,
this is because any label ℓ joined (resp. met) with ⊤ (resp. ⊥), yields ⊤ (resp. ⊥), so imprecise
arguments do not perturb the results. But when the relevant boundary is not involved, then varying
ℓ can vary the results, a possibility that is captured by using the unknown label as result.
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The join operators for subtyping and label ordering are replaced with consistent join ˜<: and
consistent label join ˜≺ respectively:
Boolg ˜<: Boolg′ = Bool(g˜ ≺g′) Unitg ˜<: Unitg′ = Unit(g˜ ≺g′) Refg U <: Refg′ U ′ = Ref(g˜ ≺g′) U ⊓U ′
(U11
g′1−→g1U12) ˜<: (U21 g′2−→g2U22) = (U11 ˜<: U21)g′1˜≺ g′2−→ (g1˜ ≺g2)(U12 ˜<:U22)
U ˜<:U undefined otherwise
The consistent subtyping meet operator is defined dually (definition in Appendix A.4).
Consistent subtyping join appeals to a gradual meet operator ⊓ on the referent types. This
gradual meet arises because static subtyping is invariant for the contents of references, so static
subtype join is only defined for references with equal referent types. The gradual meet operator
can be understood as the gradual counterpart of a static type equality partial function equate
(i.e. equate(S, S) = S , undefined otherwise) [Garcia et al. 2016]. Intuitively, if the ⊓ of two gradual
entities is defined, then it means that they are possibly equal. For instance, H ⊓ L is undefined, but
H ⊓ ? = H. Formally:
g ⊓ g =g
g ⊓ ? = ? ⊓ g =g
Boolg ⊓ Boolg′ =Boolg⊓g′
Unitg ⊓ Unitg′ =Unitg⊓g′
Refg U ⊓ Refg′ U ′ =Refg⊓g′ U ⊓U ′
U1
g2−→g1U2 ⊓U ′1
g′2−→g′1U ′2 =(U1 ⊓U ′1 )
g2⊓g′2−→ g1⊓g′1 (U2 ⊓U ′2 )
Finally, The SSLRef rules (Sapp) and (Sasgn) from Fig. 1 have compound premises that combine
both label join and label ordering, e.g. ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓ′. One subtlety we discovered while applying
the AGT methodology is that these premises lose precision when lifted compositionally: simply
replacing join with consistent join and label ordering with consistent label ordering yields different
results than when lifted in aggregate; we discuss this further in Sec. 6. Therefore rules (U app) and
(U asgn) use the consistent bounding predicate,which is defined algorithmically as:Â g1 ≺ g2 ≼ g3 ⇐⇒
g1 ≼˜ g3 ∧ g2 ≼˜ g3. Technically, we could have used this definition to split each premise, but treating
the predicate atomically matters when we consider the dynamic semantics.
4.2 Dynamic semantics
To present the dynamic semantics of GSLRef, we first define a reduction relation for an internal
language GSLεRef that directly mirrors GSLRef, except that all terms are augmented with some
evidence information that justifies why the term is well-typed according to the gradual type system.
During reduction steps, units of evidence are combined to form new evidence that supports type
preservation between a term and its contractum. If the combination succeeds, reduction goes on;
if the combination fails, a runtime error is raised. We first explain what evidence is, then how
GSLRef programs are elaborated with evidence information into GSLεRef, and finally how evidence
is combined, yielding the GSLεRef reduction rules.
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Evidence for consistent judgments. Evidence captures why a consistent judgment holds. To
explain this concept, we begin with consistent judgments about security labels, then consider the
more complex consistent judgments about types.
We use the metavariable ε to range over evidence, and write ε ⊢ g1 ≼˜ g2 to say that evidence ε
supports the plausibility that g1 ≼˜ g2 holds.
For instance, consider the consistent ordering judgment ? ≼˜ L. Even though the unknown
label generally denotes any security label, consistent ordering insists that this ? can only denote
labels that are bounded from above by L. Furthermore, this consistent ordering judgment yields
no additional information about the right-hand side, which is already precise. We capture this
learned information by representing evidence as a pair of static label intervals, noted ⟨ı1, ı2⟩, where
ı = [ℓ, ℓ′]. If ⟨ı1, ı2⟩ ⊢ g1 ≼˜ g2 then ı1 and ı2 represent inferred range restrictions for g1 and g2
respectively. Therefore,
⟨[⊥, L], [L, L]⟩ ⊢ ? ≼˜ L
By analogous reasoning, the consistent judgment H ≼˜ ? is initially justified by the evidence
⟨[H,H], [H,⊤]⟩, gaining precision about the right-hand side. Interval precision is defined as con-
tainment over intervals, i.e. [ℓ1, ℓ2] ⊑ [ℓ′1, ℓ′2] if and only if ℓ′1 ≼ ℓ1 and ℓ2 ≼ ℓ′2. Precision between
interval pairs ⟨ı1, ı2⟩ ⊑ ⟨ı ′1, ı ′2⟩ is defined pointwise.
We represent evidence as pairs of intervals, rather than pairs of labels, essentially because pairs
of labels are not precise enough to support gradual security. The formal rationale is involved, so we
defer it to Sec. 6. For some intuition, though, consider the program true? :: BoolH :: Bool? :: BoolL.
Evaluating it ultimately involves combining evidence for three consecutive judgments:8 ε1 ⊢ ? ≼˜ H,
ε2 ⊢ H ≼˜ ?, and ε3 ⊢ ? ≼˜ L. The program should fail at runtime because an H security value should
not be coerceable to L, so these three evidences should not compose. Unfortunately, pairs of labels
are not precise enough to ensure this: they forget the intermediate step through H. In contrast,
pairs of label intervals retain enough precision to warrant the expected runtime failure.
To justify consistent judgments about types like consistent subtyping, we lift label evidence to
type evidence ε by naturally lifting intervals to types: type constructors are now marked with label
intervals instead of labels. For instance:
⟨Bool[⊥,L],Bool[L,L]⟩ ⊢ Bool? ≲ BoolL
The syntax of evidence is as follows:
E ∈ GEType, ı ∈ Interval, ε ∈ Evidence
ı ::= ⟨ℓ, ℓ⟩ (intervals)
E ::= Boolı | E ı−→ıE | Refı E | Unitı (type evidences)
ε ::= ⟨E, E⟩ | ⟨ı, ı⟩ (evidences)
Note that we use the same metavariable ε to represent both label evidence and type evidence, since
which kind of evidence is meant is always clear from the context.
Terms with evidence. Each well-typed term of GSLRef is recursively elaborated into a GSLεRef
term by decorating it with evidence for the consistent judgments used to establish its well-typedness.
8in a way that we make precise below.
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The syntax of GSLεRef terms follows:
t ::= v | εt @ε εt | εt ⊕ εt | if εt then εt else εt |
refUε εt | !εt | εt :=ε εt | protεgεg(εt) | εt (terms)
r ::= b | (λgx : U .t) | unit | o (base values)
u ::= rg | x (raw values)
v ::= u | εu (values)
During reduction, the actual type of a subtermmay evolve to a consistent subtype of the statically-
determined type. For this reason, each term is augmented with evidence for their immediate sub-
redexes (i.e. all subterms that have to be reduced to a value for computation to proceed), justifying
why the subterms are consistent subtypes of the types demanded statically by the outer term
constructor. For instance, in the term ε1t1 ⊕ ε2t2, ε1 justifies t1 being a consistent subtype of Boolg1 ,
the type deduced during type checking. In particular, t1 could be such a consistent subtype because
it is a value that was ascribed type Boolg1 using an explicit ascription. In fact, GSLRef ascriptions
are represented simply as evidence-augmented terms εt in GSLεRef: the evidence ε holds all the
computationally-relevant information about consistent subtyping. For instance, the GSLRef term
(10L :: Int?) :: IntH is translated to ε2(ε110L), where ε1 ⊢ IntL ≲ Int? and ε2 ⊢ Int? ≲ IntH.
Note that in addition, some terms carry extra evidences that are needed during reduction to
justify type preservation. A conditional if ε1t1 then ε2t2 else ε3t3 carries evidences ε2 and ε3 that
justify that the type of each branch t2 and t3 is a consistent subtype of the type of the conditional
expression. For instance, ifU2 andU3 are the types of t2 and t3 respectively, then ε2 ⊢ Â U2 <: U2 <:U3,
where Â U1 <: U2 <:U3 is the consistent lifting of the ternary static judgmentT1 <: T2 <:T3. Similarly, a
protection term protε1g1ε2g2(ε3t) carries a security effect g2 (and its evidence ε2), which represents
the security effect of the subterm t ; specifically, g2 is the join of g1 and the current security effect.
Values are either raw values u or evidence-augmented raw values εu. The latter correspond to
ascribed values v :: U in GSLRef: the evidence ε confirms that the u’s type is a consistent subtype of
the ascribed typeU .
Several terms—applications, references, assignment, and protection—have evidence in addition
to that of their subterms. This extra evidence supports the consistent label ordering judgments
of their corresponding typing rule, which relate to the current latent effect label. For instance, in
the term refUε ′ εt , the evidence ε ′ supports the consistent label ordering judgment gc ≼˜ label(U ).
For uniformity, we overload the metavariable ε to denote both label and type evidence, since the
difference is always clear from the context. Evidence attached to subterms is type evidence, and
evidence attached to the security effect or to an expression symbol (@, ref, := , or prot) is label
evidence.
Introducing evidence. Fig. 5 presents rules for elaborating GSLRef source terms to evidence-
augmented GSLεRef terms. This elaboration is akin to a cast insertion translation [Siek and Taha 2006],
but simpler because it inserts evidence uniformly [Garcia et al. 2016]. Basically, each consistent
label and type judgment in Fig. 4 is replaced by an evidence-computing partial function called an
initial evidence operator (I). An initial evidence operator computes the most precise evidence that
can be deduced from a given judgment. For instance, given a consistent label ordering judgment
g1 ≼˜ g2, the initial evidence for it is computed as follows:
IJg1 ≼˜ g2K = intr(bounds(g1), bounds(g2))
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Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t { t ′ : U
(T x)
Γ(x) = U
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ x { x : U (T b) Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ bg { bg : Boolg
(T u)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ unitg { unitg : Unitg (T λ)
Γ; Σ; g′ ⊢ t { t ′ : U2
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ (λg′x : U1.t)g { (λg′x : U1.t ′)g : U1
g′−→gU2
(T ⊕)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 { t ′1 : Boolg1 Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t2 { t ′2 : Boolg2
ε1 = I⟳JBoolg1K ε2 = I⟳JBoolg2K
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 ⊕ t2 { ε1t ′1 ⊕ ε2t ′2 : Boolg1˜ ≺g2
(T app)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 { t ′1 : U11
g′−→gU12 Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t2 { t ′2 : U2
ε1 = I⟳JU11 g′−→gU12K ε2 = IJU2 ≲ U11K ε3 = IJ‰ gc ≺ g ≼ g′K
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 t2 { ε1t ′1 @ε3 ε2t ′2 : U12 ˜≺ g
(T if)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 { t ′1 : Boolg g′c = gc ˜≺ g Γ; Σ; g′c ⊢ t2 { t ′2 : U2 Γ; Σ; g′c ⊢ t3 { t ′3 : U3
ε1 = I⟳JBoolgK ε2 = IJÂ U2 <: U2 <:U3K ε3 = IJÂ U3 <: U2 <:U3K
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ if t1 then t2 else t3 { if ε1t1 then ε2t2 else ε3t3 : (U2 ˜<:U3) ˜≺ g
(T assgn)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 { t ′1 : Refg U1 Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t2 { t ′2 : U2
ε1 = I⟳JRefg U1K ε2 = IJU2 ≲ U1K ε3 = IJ Â gc ≺ g ≼ label(U1)K
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1:=t2 { ε1t ′1 :=ε3 ε2t ′2 : Unit⊥
(T ref)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t { t ′ : U ′
ε1 = IJU ′ ≲ U K ε2 = IJgc ≼˜ label(U )K
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ refU t { refUε2 ε1t ′ : Ref⊥ U
(T deref)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t { t ′ : Refg U
ε = I⟳JRefg U K
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ !t { !εt ′ : U ˜≺ g
(T ::)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t { t ′ : U1 ε = IJU1 ≲ U2K
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t :: U2 { εt ′ : U2
where I⟳JgK = IJg ≼˜ gK and I⟳JU K = IJU ≲ U K
Fig. 5. GSLRef: elaboration to GSL
ε
Ref terms
The bounds function produces the label interval that corresponds to a given gradual label, i.e.
bounds(?) = [⊥,⊤] and bounds(ℓ) = [ℓ, ℓ]. The interior operator intr computes the smallest sub-
intervals of its arguments that include all plausible orderings.9 Given two intervals ı1 and ı2,
intr(ı1, ı2) yields the greatest pair of sub-intervals ⟨ı ′1, ı ′2⟩ ⊑ ⟨ı1, ı2⟩ such that each label ℓ1 in the
interval ı ′1 is less than some label ℓ1 in ı ′2, and each label in ı ′2 is greater than some label in ı ′1.
Formally:
intr([ℓ11, ℓ12], [ℓ21, ℓ22]) = ⟨[ℓ11, ℓ12 ≺ ℓ22], [ℓ11 ≺ ℓ21, ℓ22]⟩
9In Garcia et al. [2016], the interior and initial evidence operators coincide under the name “interior” because both operate
on pairs of gradual types. By distinguishing between intervals and labels, the present development induces a corresponding
distinction between these notions.
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This operation only changes the upper-bound of the lower interval and the lower-bound of the
upper interval. The resulting intervals are well-defined because we only use this operator in I
after consistent label ordering is already known to hold.
Similarly, the initial evidence of a consistent judgmentÂ g1 ≺ g2 ≼ g3 is computed as
IJÂ g1 ≺ g2 ≼ g3K = intr(bounds(g1) ≺ bounds(g2), bounds(g3))
This definition uses join of intervals, defined as [ℓ1, ℓ2] ≺ [ℓ′1, ℓ′2] = [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ′1, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ′2]. For instance,
the initial evidence for consistent judgment ‚ ? ≺ H ≼ ? is:
IJ‚ ? ≺ H ≼ ?K =intr(bounds(?) ≺ bounds(H), bounds(?))
=intr([H,⊤], [⊥,⊤])
=⟨[H,⊤], [H,⊤]⟩
A generalized definition of I , considering any consistent bounding judgment can be found
in Fig. 28. The definition of I extends naturally to compute the initial evidence for consistent
subtyping judgments (the complete definition can be found in Fig. 29). For instance, in the (Tif)
rule, IJÂ U2 <: U2 <:U3K computes the initial evidence for the consistent lifting of the fact that the
type of the first branch is a subtype of the type of the entire conditional expression.
Rule (T ::) recursively translates the subterm t , and the consistent subtyping judgmentU1 <: U2
from (S ::) is replaced with IJU1 ≲ U2K, which computes evidence ε for consistent subtyping. This
evidence is eventually placed next to the translated term t ′. The ascription itself is erased because
it does not affect the results of the computation.
Rule (T app) works similarly. Since t1 is not constrained by a consistent subtyping judgment, the
rule generates evidence for reflexive consistent subtyping: that the type is a consistent subtype
of itself, I⟳JU11 g′−→gU12K. This seemingly vacuous evidence evolves nontrivially as a program
reduces. Evidence for the judgment ‰ gc ≺ g ≼ g′ is computed as IJ‰ gc ≺ g ≼ g′K, and placed next to
the @ symbol, since it does not logically belong to any subterm.
The rest of the translation rules are analogous: each term is translated recursively, judgments
are replaced by functions that determine the corresponding initial evidence, and the evidence for
reflexive consistent subtyping I⟳<: is associated to otherwise unconstrained types.
As an example, consider the GSLRef program x :=true?, with current security effect L and envi-
ronment Γ ≜ x : Ref? BoolH. It elaborates to GSLεRef as follows:
(Tassgn)
Γ; .; L ⊢ x { x : Ref? BoolH Γ; .; L ⊢ true? { true? : Bool?
ε1 = I
⟳JRef? BoolHK = ⟨Ref[⊥,⊤] Bool[H,H],Ref[⊥,⊤] Bool[H,H]⟩
ε2 = IJBool? ≲ BoolHK = ⟨Bool[⊥,H],Bool[H,H]⟩
ε3 = IJ‚ L ≺ ? ≼ HK = ⟨[L,H], [H,H]⟩
Γ; .; L ⊢ x :=true? { ε1x :=ε3 ε2true? : Unit⊥
Evolving evidence. During reduction, evidence for consistent judgments must be combined to
justify each reduction step. This combination is realized by two operators: consistent transitivity for
label ordering and consistent join monotonicity.
The consistent transitivity operator ◦≼ attempts to combine evidence for g1 ≼˜ g2 and g2 ≼˜ g3
to produce evidence for g1 ≼˜ g3. Since ≼˜ is not in general transitive, ◦≼ is partial, giving rise to
runtime errors. For instance, both H ≼˜ ? and ? ≼˜ L hold, but can they be combined to deduce that
H ≼˜ L? Of course not, otherwise high-confidence data could flow to low-confidence positions. To
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understand this failure of consistent transitivity, consider the initial evidence for these judgments,
⟨[H,H], [H,⊤]⟩ and ⟨[⊥, L], [L, L]⟩. They cannot be combined because “they do not meet in the
middle”, i.e. the middle intervals [H,⊤] and [⊥, L] share no labels in common, which would justify
transitivity. This intuition is formalized as follows:
⟨ı1, ı21⟩ ◦≼ ⟨ı22, ı3⟩ = △≼(ı1, ı21 ⊓ ı22, ı3)
where [ℓ1, ℓ2] ⊓ [ℓ′1, ℓ′2] = [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ′1, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ′2] if ℓ1 ≺ ℓ′1 ≼ ℓ2 ≺ ℓ′2
and △≼([ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ′1, ℓ′2], [ℓ′′1 , ℓ′′2 ]) =
⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ′2 ≺ ℓ′′2 ], [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ′1 ≺ ℓ′′1 , ℓ′′2 ]⟩ if ℓ1 ≼ ℓ′2, ℓ′1 ≼ ℓ′′2 , ℓ1 ≼ ℓ′′2
The meet operator ⊓ denotes the intersection of two intervals. Given three intervals ı1, ı2, ı3, the
△≼ operator calculates, if possible, a pair of intervals ⟨ı ′1, ı ′3⟩ ⊑ ⟨ı1, ı3⟩ such that transitivity of label
ordering through elements of ı2 is always plausible. Both operators are undefined if their side
conditions do not hold.
The consistent join monotonicity operator ˜≺ reflects another facet of reasoning about consistent
ordering relationships. Recall from Fig. 2 that during reduction, labels are sometimes joined, either
for stamping values or for augmenting the security effect. Similarly, in GSLεRef evidence must be
combined to support new consistent judgments that involve these joined labels. Consistent join
monotonicity combines evidence for g1 ≼˜ g2 and g3 ≼˜ g4 to produce evidence for Â g1 ≺ g3 ≼ g2 ≺ g4,
the consistent lifting of the static judgment ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3 ≼ ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4.
⟨ı1, ı2⟩ ˜≺ ⟨ı ′1, ı ′2⟩ = ⟨ı1 ≺ ı ′1, ı2 ≺ ı ′2⟩
In contrast to consistent transitivity, this operator is total.
Lifting these label operators to types is direct, albeit verbose, and can be found in Appendix A.6.
These type operators inherit properties from the label operators, e.g. consistent transitivity of
subtyping ◦<: is partial just like consistent transitivity of label ordering.
Reduction rules. Fig. 6 presents reduction semantics for GSLεRef. Reduction operates on config-
urations C, which consist of a term and a store, and a security effect. Specifically, t1 | µ1 εgc7−→ t2 | µ2
denotes the reduction of term t1 in store µ1 to term t2 in store µ2 under security effect gc ; the label
evidence ε confirms that the runtime security effect is a sublabel of the label that was used statically
to type check the original term (and is preserved by reduction).
The semantics is defined using two notions of reduction, −→ and −→<:. The rules directly mirror
the rules of SSLRef (Fig. 2), except that they also manage evidence at subexpression borders and
combine evidence as needed to justify the preserved typing of the contractum. If evidence fails to
combine, the program ends with an error.
A word about notation: to select evidences for sub-components of types, we use evidence
inversion functions [Garcia et al. 2016]. For instance, given a function type evidence ε , idom(ε)
(resp. icod(ε)) retrieves the type evidence of the domain (resp. co-domain). Similarly, ilat retrieves
latent effect evidence from the evidence for a function type, and iref performs likewise for reference
types. Finally, given type evidence ε , ilbl(ε) yields the corresponding label evidence.
We now describe each reduction rule in turn.
• Rule (r1) reduces a binary operation by joining the evidence of both operands to confirm
that type preservation holds.
• Rule (r2) reduces a protected value by stamping the security effect of the prot on the value
and joining both evidences accordingly. We stamp g1 on the value to prevent it from leaking
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εgc−→ : C × (C ∪ { error })
(r1) ε1(b1)g1 ⊕ ε2(b2)g2 | µ
εgc−→ (ε1 ˜≺ ε2)(b1 J⊕K b2)(g1˜ ≺g2) | µ
(r2) protε1g1ε2g2(ε3u) | µ
εgc−→ (ε3 ˜≺ ε1)(u ˜≺ g1) | µ
(r3) ε1(λg′x : U .t)g @ε3 ε2u | µ
εgc−→
®
protilbl(ε1)gε
′
1g
′
1(icod(ε1)([ε ′2u/x]t)) | µ
error if ε ′1 or ε ′2 are not defined
where:
ε ′1 = (ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1)) ◦≼ ε3 ◦≼ ilat(ε1)
ε ′2 = ε2 ◦<: idom(ε1)
g′1 = (gc ˜≺ g)
(r4) if ε1bg1 then t2 else t3 | µ
εgc−→
®
protilbl(ε1)g1ε
′g′(ε2t2) | µ if b = true
protilbl(ε1)g1ε
′g′(ε3t3) | µ if b = false
where:
ε ′ = ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1)
g′ = gc ˜≺ g1
(r5) refUε2 ε1u | µ
εgc−→
{
o⊥ | µ [o 7→ ε ′(u ˜≺ gc )]
error if (ε ◦≼ ε2) is not defined
where:
o < dom(µ )
ε ′ = ε1 ˜≺ (ε ◦≼ ε2)
(r6) !ε1og | µ
εgc−→ protilbl(ε1)gε ′g′(iref (ε1)v)
where:
µ (o) = v
ε ′ = ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1)
g′ = gc ˜≺ g
(r7) ε1og :=ε3 ε2u | µ
εgc−→
{
unit⊥ | µ [o 7→ ε ′(u ˜≺ (gc ˜≺ g))]
error if ε ′ is not defined, or ε ⌊≤⌋ ilbl(ε ′′)does not hold
where:
µ (o) = ε ′′u ′
ε ′ = (ε2 ◦<: iref (ε1)) ˜≺ ((ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1)) ◦≼ ε3 ◦≼ ilbl(iref (ε1)))
ε1(ε2u) −→<:
®(ε2 ◦<: ε1)u
error if not defined
−→<:: EvTerm × (EvTerm ∪ { error })
Fig. 6. GSLεRef: Dynamic semantics
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information to the current context when g1 is more confidential than the current security
effect gc . Note that g2—which represents the join between g1 and the current security effect
gc—is not used in this rule; it is used during reduction of the protected subterm.
• Rule (r3) reduces a function application either to a protected body or to an error. The
term reduces to an error if consistent transitivity fails to justify that the type of the actual
argument is a consistent subtype of the formal argument type. This prevents an evident
invalid information flow from the actual argument to the formal argument. Also, to prevent
implicit flows via the store, an error is signaled if consistent transitivity fails to confirm that
the latent effect of the function is greater than both the current security effect and that of the
function. If the function application is valid, then the body is protected at the security level
of the function. Label g′1 represents the security effect that is used to reduce the body, where
ε ′1 confirms that g′1 is no more confidential than the latent effect g′.
• Similarly, rule (r4) reduces a conditional expression by protecting the chosen branch. The
resulting prot term is constructed using the dynamic information of the conditional.
• Rule (r5) reduces a reference term to a fresh location. To prevent invalid implicit flows,
the current security effect is stamped on the stored value. The term reduces to an error
if consistent transitivity fails to confirm that the current security effect is lower than the
statically-determined security level of the reference contentU .
• Rule (r6) reduces a dereference term. In the dynamic semantics of SSLRef, dereferencing a
store location causes the actual security of the location to be stamped on the resulting value.
Here, the term reduces instead to a protected expression, which is equivalent but simplifies
the proofs.
• Rule (r7) is critical to ensuring noninterference. It can reduce to an error, and thereby
preventing either implicit or explicit invalid flows, for three reasons:
(1) the security level of the stored value should be no more confidential than the statically-
determined security level of the reference content (explicit flow).
(2) both the current security effect and the actual security level of the reference should be no
more confidential than the static security level of the reference content (implicit flow).
(3) the evidence of the current security effect must denote possible labels that are necessarily
lower than those denoted by the evidence of the stored value (implicit flow).
The third condition above, highlighted in gray in Fig. 6, is expressed with the lower-bound
comparison operator ⌊≤⌋ between evidences:
⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ3, ℓ4]⟩ ⌊≤⌋ ⟨[ℓ′1, ℓ′2], [ℓ′3, ℓ′4]⟩ ⇐⇒ ℓ3 ≼ ℓ′3
This check is necessary to ensure noninterference, and as explained in Sec. 6.3, it arises not
from the type preservation argument, but from the noninterference argument. In Sec. 4.3 we
illustrate each of these three scenarios.
The −→<: reduction rule uses consistent transitivity to combine, if possible, strings of evidence
that accumulate on a raw value. It fails with a runtime error if the evidence cannot be combined.
Sec. 4.3 presents an example of such a reduction.
Finally, contextual term reduction is specified using term frames f and evidence frames h:
f ::= h[ε[]]
h ::= □ ⊕ εt | εu ⊕ □ | □@ε εt | εu @ε □ | ε □ | if □ then εt else εt | !□ | □ :=ε εt | εu :=ε □ | refUε □
The reduction rules for frames are presented in Fig. 7. Rule (Rf ) reduces under term frames. Rule
(R−→) reduces a term to either a term or error, using −→ from Fig. 6. Similarly Rules (Rh) and
(Rproth) reduce the subterm using the evidence-combining reduction −→<:. Rule (Rprot) allows
the protected subterm to step under a higher security level, which may be a sublabel of the one
24 Matías Toro, Ronald Garcia, and Éric Tanter
(R−→) t | µ
εgc−→ r r ∈ C ∪ { error }
t | µ εgc7−→ r
(Rf )
t | µ εgc7−→ t ′ | µ ′
f [t] | µ εgc7−→ f [t ′] | µ ′
(Rprot)
t | µ ε
′g′c7−→ t ′ | µ ′
protε1g1ε
′g′c (εt) | µ
εgc7−→ protε1g1ε ′g′c (εt ′) | µ ′
(Rh)
εv −→<: ε ′u
h[εv] | µ εgc7−→ h[ε ′u] | µ
(Rproth)
εv −→<: ε ′u
protε1g1ε
′g′c (εv) | µ
εgc7−→ protε1g1ε ′g′c (ε ′u) | µ
(Rf err)
t | µ εgc7−→ error
f [t] | µ εgc7−→ error
(Rherr)
εv −→<: error
h[εv] | µ εgc7−→ error
(Rproterr)
t | µ ε
′g′c7−→ error
protε1g1ε
′g′c (εt) | µ
εgc7−→ error
(Rprotherr)
εv −→<: error
protε1g1ε
′g′c (εv) | µ
εgc7−→ error
Fig. 7. GSLεRef: Evaluation frames and reduction
determined statically. Finally, rules (Rf err) and (Rproterr) propagate errors when the subterm
reduces to an error, and rules (Rherr) and (Rprotherr) propagate errors when evidence fails to
combine.
4.3 Examples of Reduction
To illustrate the runtime semantics of GSLRef we first illustrate the three scenarios for which an
assignment can fail, as per Rule (r7).
(1) Consider the following program, which attempts to assign a high-confidentiality value into a
low-confidentiality reference, and its translation (under security effect ⊥):
⊥ ⊢ refIntL 20L:=(10H :: Int?) { t : Unit⊥
Abbreviating [⊥,⊤] as ?, [ℓ, ℓ] as ℓ, ⟨ı, ı⟩ as ⟨ı⟩, and _ for irrelevant evidence, we have:
t
_⊥7−→∗ε1o⊥ :=_ ε210H
where ε1 = ⟨Ref⊥ IntL⟩ ⊢ Ref⊥ IntL ≲ Ref⊥ IntL, ε2 = ⟨IntH, Int[H,⊤]⟩ ⊢ IntH ≲ Int?. Then as
(ε2 ◦<: iref (ε1)) = ⟨IntH, Int[H,⊤]⟩ ◦<: ⟨IntL⟩ is not defined, the term reduces to an error, as
expected.
(2) The following program attempts to update a low-confidentiality reference under a high-
confidentiality security effect. Considering a security effect ⊥, a location ⊢ o⊥ : Ref⊥ IntL,
the program and its translation are:
⊥ ⊢ if trueH :: Bool? then o⊥:=10L else unit { t : Unit?
The conditional reduces to the first branch under a security effect H.
t
_⊥7−→∗prot_Hε1H(_(ε2o⊥ :=ε3 _10L))
where ε1 = ⟨H, [H,⊤]⟩ ⊢ Â ⊥ ≺ H ≼ ⊥ ≺ ? and ε2 = ⟨Ref⊥ IntL⟩ ⊢ Ref⊥ IntL ≲ Ref⊥ IntL. Also,
because the static security effect of the assignment is ?, we have ε3 = ⟨[⊥, L], L⟩ ⊢ ‚ ? ≺ ⊥ ≼ L.
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Then as ((ε1 ˜≺ ilbl(ε2)) ◦≼ ε3 ◦≼ ilbl(iref (ε2))) = ⟨H, [H,⊤]⟩ ◦≼ ⟨[⊥, L], L⟩ ◦≼ ⟨L⟩ is not defined,
the term reduces to an error, successfully preventing an invalid implicit flow.
(3) Consider a program fragment similar to the previous one, with security effect ⊥, a variable
x : BoolH, and a location ⊢ o⊥ : Ref⊥ Int ? :
⊥ ⊢ if x :: Bool? then o⊥:=10H else unit? { t : Unit?
Suppose as well that µ(o) = ε20?, where ilbl(ε2) = ⟨[⊥,⊤], [⊥,⊤]⟩ ⊢ ? ≼˜ ? (i.e. the stored num-
ber and heap cell have not acquired any security commitments yet). If x is trueH, then the
first branch is taken:
t
_⊥7−→∗prot_Hε1H(_(_o⊥ :=_ _10H))
where ε1 = ⟨H, [H,⊤]⟩ ⊢ Â ⊥ ≺ H ≼ ⊥ ≺ ?. Since ε1 ⌊≤⌋ ilbl(ε2) is not defined, because H /˜≼ ⊥,
the program reduces to an error. The problem is that if x were changed to falseH, then the
unchanged imprecisely labeled contents of o could be treated as low-security and thereby
used to leak information about x , using for instance a test of !o that conditionally assigns to
some other low-security reference (for more see the example of Sec. 2, and Sec. 6.3).
Type-based reasoning. Finally, we revisit the mix and smix functions from Sec. 2, which illus-
trate how GSLRef preserves type-based reasoning principles in the gradual setting. The desugared
GSLRef program follows:10
mix = (λpub : L.(λpriv : ?.(if pub < priv then 1L else 2L) :: L)L)L
smix =mix :: L→ H→ L
smix 1L 5L
This program elaborates to the following GSLεRef program:
mix = (λpub : L.(λpriv : ?.⟨[⊥, L], L⟩(if ⟨?⟩(⟨L⟩pub < ⟨?⟩priv) then ⟨L⟩1L else ⟨L⟩2L))L)L
smix = ⟨L→ [H,⊤] → L, L→ H→ L⟩mix
⟨H→ L⟩(⟨L→ H→ L⟩smix @⟨[L,⊤]⟩ ⟨L⟩1L) @⟨[L,⊤]⟩ ⟨L,H⟩5L
A trace of the program is given in Fig. 8. As before, we abbreviate [⊥,⊤] as ?, [ℓ, ℓ] as ℓ, and ⟨ı, ı⟩
as ⟨ı⟩. We omit the security effect of the reduction, which is always ⟨⊥⟩⊥, as well as the heap, since
the program is pure. The program fails as expected because low-security evidence is attached to
the conditional term by a static ascription, which fails to combine with the high-security evidence
of the value produced by the conditional. In other words, reduction fails to prove that H ≼ L.
4.4 GSLRef: Safety and Graduality
GSLRef satisfies a standard type safety property, whose proofs are in the companion technical
report [Toro et al. 2018]. More precisely, type safety is formulated for the evidence-augmented
language GSLεRef, and hence appeals to a corresponding typing judgment. As expected, this typing
judgment, denoted Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ t : U , is based on the GSLRef typing judgment.11 The only difference is
that the security effect gc is enriched with evidence ε . This evidence accounts for how the runtime
security effect can evolve to (consistently) lower levels than the security effect originally determined
by the type system.
10For brevity, we only show the labels of base types, and omit latent effect annotations on pure functions.
11The full definition of the GSLεRef type system can be found in Appendix A.4; the (straightforward) theorem that elaboration
preserves typing is in the companion technical report [Toro et al. 2018] .
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⟨H→ L⟩( ⟨L→ H→ L⟩⟨L→ [H,⊤] → L, L→ H→ L⟩mix @⟨[L,⊤]⟩ ⟨L⟩1L) @⟨[L,⊤]⟩ ⟨L,H⟩5L
7−→⟨H→ L⟩( ⟨L→ [H,⊤] → L, L→ H→ L⟩mix @⟨[L,⊤]⟩ ⟨L⟩1L ) @⟨[L,⊤]⟩ ⟨L,H⟩5L
7−→⟨H→ L⟩( prot⟨L⟩Lϕ ′(⟨[H,⊤] → L,H→ L⟩u) ) @⟨[L,⊤]⟩ ⟨L,H⟩5L
where u = (λpriv : ?.⟨[⊥, L], L⟩(if ⟨?⟩(⟨L⟩⟨L⟩1L < ⟨?⟩priv) then ⟨L⟩1L else ⟨L⟩2L))L
and ϕ ′ = ⟨L,⊤⟩L
7−→ ⟨H→ L⟩(⟨[H,⊤] → L,H→ L⟩u) @⟨[L,⊤]⟩ ⟨L,H⟩5L
7−→ ⟨[H,⊤] → L,H→ L⟩u @⟨[L,⊤]⟩ ⟨L,H⟩5L
7−→prot⟨L⟩Lϕ ′(⟨L⟩⟨[⊥, L], L⟩(if ⟨?⟩( ⟨L⟩⟨L⟩1L < ⟨?⟩⟨L, [H,⊤]⟩5L) then ⟨L⟩1L else ⟨L⟩2L))
7−→prot⟨L⟩Lϕ ′(⟨L⟩⟨[⊥, L], L⟩(if ⟨?⟩(⟨L⟩1L < ⟨?⟩⟨L, [H,⊤]⟩5L ) then ⟨L⟩1L else ⟨L⟩2L))
7−→prot⟨L⟩Lϕ ′(⟨L⟩⟨[⊥, L], L⟩(if ⟨?⟩( ⟨L⟩1L < ⟨L, [H,⊤]⟩5L ) then ⟨L⟩1L else ⟨L⟩2L))
7−→prot⟨L⟩Lϕ ′(⟨L⟩⟨[⊥, L], L⟩(if ⟨?⟩(⟨L, [H,⊤]⟩trueL) then ⟨L⟩1L else ⟨L⟩2L))
7−→prot⟨L⟩Lϕ ′(⟨L⟩⟨[⊥, L], L⟩( if (⟨L, [H,⊤]⟩trueL) then ⟨L⟩1L else ⟨L⟩2L ))
7−→prot⟨L⟩Lϕ ′(⟨L⟩⟨[⊥, L], L⟩ prot⟨L,[H,⊤]⟩Lϕ ′(⟨L⟩1L) )
7−→prot⟨L⟩Lϕ ′(⟨L⟩ ⟨[⊥, L], L⟩⟨L, [H,⊤]⟩1L )
7−→error ⟨L, [H,⊤]⟩ ◦≼ ⟨[⊥, L], L⟩ is undefined
Fig. 8. GSLεRef: Example reduction
Proposition 4.1 (Type Safety). If ·; Σ; εgc ⊢ t : U , and consider µ, such that Σ ⊢ µ, then either:
• t is a value v
• t | µ εgc7−→ error
• t | µ εgc7−→ t ′ | µ ′ and ·; Σ′; εgc ⊢ t ′ : U for some Σ′ ⊇ Σ such that Σ′ ⊢ µ ′
Additionally, by design, the type system of GSLRef is crisply and smoothly connected to that
of SSLRef. First, the two typing judgments are crisply connected in that the GSLRef judgment
conservatively extends the SSLRef one.
Proposition 4.2 (Static conservative extension). Let ⊢S denote SSLRef’s type system. Then
for any static language term t ∈ Term, ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢S t : S if and only if ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : S .
Second, the two typing judgments are smoothly connected in that each well-typed GSLRef
program (thus each SSLRef one) preserves well-typing as its security information is made less
precise, a property known as the static gradual guarantee [Siek et al. 2015]. Precision orders the
static information content of gradual type or labels from most to least. Type and label precision are
defined as follows:
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Definition 4.3 (Type and label precision).
g ⊑ ? g ⊑ g
g1 ⊑ g2
Boolg1 ⊑ Boolg2
g1 ⊑ g2
Unitg1 ⊑ Unitg2
U11 ⊑ U21 U12 ⊑ U22 g11 ⊑ g21 g12 ⊑ g22
U11
g12−→g11U12 ⊑ U21
g22−→g21U22
g1 ⊑ g2 U1 ⊑ U2
Refg1 U1 ⊑ Refg2 U2
Type and label precision are naturally lifted to term precision.
Proposition 4.4 (Static gradual guarantee). Suppose gc1 ⊑ gc2 and t1 ⊑ t2.
If ·; ·; gc1 ⊢ t1 : U1 then ·; ·; gc2 ⊢ t2 : U2 whereU1 ⊑ U2.
This guarantee is best understood in reverse: if a simply-typed program (where all security labels
are ?) has a security-typed counterpart (where all security labels are precise), then GSLRef statically
accepts every intermediate security typing of that program: type checking is continuous with respect
to security precision, so security information can be added in any order and at any rate [Siek et al.
2015].
Siek et al. [2015] also present a dynamic gradual guarantee, which relates the execution behavior
of programs that only differ in their precision. Specifically, if a program takes a step, then the same
program with less precise (or fewer) type annotations also takes a step, i.e. reducing precision
does not introduce new runtime errors. The formal statement of the guarantee can be found in the
companion technical report [Toro et al. 2018]. Unfortunately, we have uncovered a tension between
the dynamic gradual guarantee and noninterference. To ensure noninterference, the dynamic
semantics of GSLRef includes a specific runtime check (highlighted in gray in Fig. 6) which breaks
the dynamic gradual guarantee. Dually, without this check, GSLRef satisfies the dynamic gradual
guarantee, but does not enforce noninterference for all programs. We discuss this subtlety in more
detail in Sec. 6.3.
Nevertheless, an interesting conservative extension result holds for the dynamic semantics.
Specifically, static GSLRef terms never produce errors at runtime.
Proposition 4.5 (Static terms do not fail). Let StaticTerm be the static subset of GSLεRef
terms, i.e. with fully-static annotations, and StaticStore the set of stores whose codomains are subsets
of StaticTerm. Then consider t ∈ StaticTerm, µ ∈ StaticStore, and εℓc such that ε = IJℓc ≼˜ ℓ′cK.
If ·; Σ; εℓc ⊢ t : U , then either t is a value, or t | µs
εℓc7−→ t ′s | µ ′s , with t ′ ∈ StaticTerm and
µ ′ ∈ StaticStore.
4.5 Prototype Implementation
We have implemented GSLRef in an interactive prototype available online at:
https://pleiad.cl/gradual-security/.
The implementation, realized in Scala, supports all of GSLRef plus let-bindings. Given a source
program, it either shows the result of the elaboration to GSLεRef, or reports a static type error. If the
source program is well-typed, the evidence-augmented term can be explored interactively, either
collapsing or expanding premises of its well-typedness, including evidences. The user can then
reduce the term step by step, similarly to PLT Redex’s trace facility. At each step, the full typing
derivation of the term can again be explored. The reduction shows how evidences are combined by
consistent subtyping transitivity, eventually ending up in a value or a runtime security error.
All examples presented in this paper are available as pre-loaded source examples.
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5 GSLRef: NONINTERFERENCE
This section establishes the type soundness of GSLRef, i.e. that gradual security types ensure nonin-
terference. Noninterference formalizes the intuition that low-security observers of a computation
cannot detect changes in high-security inputs. Therefore noninterference inherently reflects a
relationship between different runs of the same programwith different inputs.We establish noninter-
ference for GSLRef using logical relations [Heintze and Riecke 1998; Zdancewic 2002]. More precisely,
because general references introduce nontermination, we apply step-indexed relations [Ahmed
2004]. As standard, we focus on termination-insensitive noninterference: interference between two
executions is only acknowledged when both terminate in values that are observably different. In
line with prior work on gradual security [Disney and Flanagan 2011; Fennell and Thiemann 2013],
we consider runtime check errors to be akin to non-termination, because in principle the semantics
could deal with errors by diverging and directly reporting the error through a secure channel.
Observing values. The security type of a value dictates both an observation protocol and the
clearance required to observe it. Consider a value ⊢ v : U1 →g U2, and an observer with security
level ℓo : Can ℓo observe the value? If so, what observations can it make? First, ℓo cannot make
any observations if its security level does not subsume that of the function (g /˜≼ ℓo ). If clearance is
granted (g ≼˜ ℓo ), then ℓo may make observations in accordance with the structure of v’s type: it
may construct another value v ′ : U1 and apply it to the function; the observations that ℓo can make
of the result are then dictated by the typeU2 ˜≺ g.
The predicate obsValℓo , defined formally below, intuitively captures what it means for a valuev of
typeU to be observable at ℓo : ℓo must be consistently greater than the security label ofU . To account
for the gradual security setting, we need to extend this intuitive notion in two ways. First, observa-
tion must deal with the potential for values to carry type ascriptions, such asv = trueH :: Bool?. An
observer at security level L must not observe the underlying high-security value. The key intuition
is that the observation should ultimately be equivalent to applying the source language context
if □ :: BoolL then trueL else falseL to the value, thereby asserting credentials and then using them.
Doing so would trigger a runtime check error, which amounts to a non-observation. In GSLεRef,
v would be represented as an evidence value εtrueH, where ε confirms that BoolH ≲ Bool?. We
capture the observability of the underlying value by defining the notion of observable evidence at a
given observation level. Then, an evidence value v = εu is observable if its label evidence (ilbl(ε))
is observable.
Definition 5.1 (Observable evidence). Suppose observation level ℓo and an evidence judgment
ε ⊢ g ≼˜ g′ for some g and g′. For the evidence ε to be observable at ℓo , it must be possible to
confirm g ≼˜ ℓo using consistent transitivity of label ordering through g′. Formally:
obsEvg
′
ℓo
(ε) ⇐⇒ ε ◦≼ IJg′ ≼˜ ℓoK is defined
Second, observation must account for dynamic security effect clearance: observation leaks a
value from its context, so the observer must have the proper credentials. Recall that execution
happens under a dynamic security effect g that, at runtime, can be consistently lower than the
security effect originally determined by the type system. Therefore the dynamic security effect
is accompanied by evidence ε that confirms that g ≼˜ g′, where g′ is the static security effect.
Observation is allowed if such evidence is observable, i.e. g ≼˜ ℓo .
Adding these two refinements of observability to the original notion of observable value yields
the following definition.
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Definition 5.2 (Observable value). Given an observation level ℓo , we define that a value v , typed
asU , is observable as:
obsValUℓo (v) ⇐⇒ g ≼˜ ℓo ∧
Ä
(v = ε1u) =⇒ obsEvgℓo (ilbl(ε1))
ä
where g = label(U )
Security logical relations. We define logical relations between both computations and values
in Figs. 9 and 10. The notions of related values and related computations are mutually recursive,
as explained below. Note that the logical relations are only defined for pairs of GSLεRef terms that
have the same typeU , so simple type safety ensures that the behaviors dictated byU will produce
defined behavior (including runtime error). To make the relations well-defined in the presence
of nontermination, we index them on the number of steps k that the observer ℓo may take. If no
inequivalent observations are made after k steps, the terms are deemed equivalent. Ultimately
we require that ℓo observes equivalence for any arbitrary number of steps, which implies that
nonterminating computations also respect the noninterference guarantees. This is the essence of
step-indexing [Ahmed 2004].
The definition of related values is presented in Fig. 9. We use notation gˆi to denote the evidence-
augmented security context εigi . The notation Σ; gc ⊢ ⟨gˆ1,v1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨gˆ2,v2, µ2⟩ : U indicates that
the triple of security context gˆ1, value v1 and store µ1, is related to the triple of dynamic security
context gˆ2, value v2 and store µ2 at type U for k steps under store typing Σ and static security
context gc when observed at the security level ℓo . For two such triples to be related, four conditions
must be satisfied:
(1) The security effects must be related under security effect gc , meaning they denote execution
contexts that are either both above ℓo (high-security), or both below (low-security). Formally,
two security effects are related if their underlying evidences are either both observable or
both not observable:
gc ⊢ε1g1 ≈ℓo ε2g2 ⇐⇒ (obsEvgcℓo (ε1) ∧ obsEv
gc
ℓo
(ε2)) ∨ (¬obsEvgcℓo (ε1) ∧ ¬obsEv
gc
ℓo
(ε2))
where εi ⊢ gi ≼˜ gc .
(2) The stores must be related for k steps under store typing Σ, notation Σ ⊢µ1 ≈kℓo µ2. This
means that, for locations that are common to both stores,12 the stored values are related at
j < k steps. Formally:
Σ ⊢µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 ⇐⇒ ∀gc ,gˆi , εi ⊢ gi ≼˜ gc , gc ⊢gˆ1 ≈ℓo gˆ2, j < k, Σ ⊢ µi ,
∀o ∈ dom(µ1) ∩ dom(µ2), Σ; gc ⊢ ⟨gˆ1, µ1(o), µ1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨gˆ2, µ2(o), µ2⟩ : Σ(U )
In particular, stored values must be related at all related security effects gˆ1, gˆ2. This generality
is necessary because all reference operations involve stamping the current security effect (and
its evidence) onto the stored value, and doing so must preserve relatedness. For instance, two
runs of a program can update a store location with different values under a high-security effect
because both will be stamped high-security, and thus indistinguishable by a low-security
observer ℓo .
(3) The values must both have the same type U under an empty type environment and valid
store type.
(4) The values must be either both observable or both not observable. If the values are not
observable, they are deemed equivalent. If they are observable, then they must be related at
their specific type, as specified by the auxiliary relation obsRelΣ;gcUk ,ℓo , defined by case analysis
onU . If U is either Boolg, Unitg or Refg U ′, two values are related simply if their raw values
12 For simplicity and without loss of generality, like Austin and Flanagan [2009], we assume that a new reference in two
related executions is allocated at the same address.
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Σ; gc ⊢ ⟨gˆ1,v1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨gˆ2,v2, µ2⟩ : U ⇐⇒ gc ⊢gˆ1 ≈ℓo gˆ2 ∧ Σ ⊢ µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 ∧ ·; Σ; gˆi ⊢ vi : U∧
(obsValUℓo (vi ) ∨ ¬obsValUℓo (vi )) ∧
((obsValUℓo (vi ) ∧ obsEvg′iℓo (εi )) =⇒ obsRelΣ,gc ,Uk ,ℓo (gˆ1,v1, µ1, gˆ2,v2, µ2))
obsRelΣ,gc ,Uk ,ℓo (gˆ1,v1, µ1, gˆ2,v2, µ2) ⇐⇒ rval(v1) = rval(v2) ifU ∈ {Boolg,Unitg,Refg U
′}
obsRel
Σ,gc ,U1
g32−→g31U2
k ,ℓo
(gˆ1,v1, µ1, gˆ2,v2, µ2) ⇐⇒ ∀j ≤ k,∀U ′ = U ′1
g′32−→g′31U ′2 ,∀U ′′1 ,
∀g′c ,∀gˆ′i = ε ′ig′i , where ε ′i ⊢ g′i ≼˜ g′c , s.t. gˆi ≤ℓo gˆ′i ,
ε11 ⊢ U1
g32−→g31U2 ≲ U ′, ε12 ⊢ U ′′1 ≲ U ′1 , and ε3i ⊢ Â g′c ≺ g′31 ≼ g′32, we have:
∀v ′i , µ ′i , Σ′,Σ ⊆ Σ′,Σ′; gc ⊢ ⟨gˆ1,v ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨gˆ2,v
′
2, µ
′
2⟩ : U ′′1 , dom(µi ) ⊆ dom(µ ′i ),
Σ′; gc ⊢ ⟨gˆ1, (ε11v1 @ε31 ε12v ′1), µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨gˆ2, (ε11v2 @ε32 ε12v
′
2), µ ′2⟩ : C(U ′2 ˜≺ g′31)
Fig. 9. Related values
Σ; gc ⊢ ⟨gˆ1, t1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨gˆ2, t2, µ2⟩ : C(U ) ⇐⇒ gc ⊢gˆ1 ≈ℓo gˆ2 ∧ Σ ⊢µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 ∧ ∀gˆ′i , s.t. gˆi ≤ℓo gˆ′i and
·; Σ; gˆ′i ⊢ ti : U ,∀j < k,
(
ti | µi
gˆ′i7−→ j t ′i | µ ′i =⇒ ∃Σ′, Σ ⊆ Σ′
Σ′ ⊢µ ′1 ≈k−jℓo µ
′
2 ∧ ((irred(t ′1) ∧ irred(t ′2)) =⇒ Σ′; gc ⊢ ⟨gˆ1, t ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−jℓo ⟨gˆ2, t
′
2, µ
′
2⟩ : U )
)
Fig. 10. Related computations
are equal (rval strips away checking-related information such as labels and evidences). Two
functions are related if their application to two related argument values, in related stores, for
j ≤ k steps, are related computations, as explained below.
The definition of related computations is presented in Fig. 10. First, two triples of security effect,
term, and store are related computations for k steps at typeU if the security effects and the stores
are related, as defined previously. Second, the terms must have type U under any observationally
higher security effect gˆ′.13 We say gˆ′ = ε ′g′ is observationally higher than gˆ = εg, notation
gˆ ≤ℓo gˆ′ if ¬obsEvgcℓo (ε) ⇒ ¬obsEv
g′c
ℓo
(ε ′), where ε ⊢ g ≼˜ gc and ε ′ ⊢ g′ ≼˜ g′c . For instance, in the
static language it is the case that for any ℓ, H ≤ℓo H ≺ ℓ, because by monotonicity of the join
H /≼ ℓo ⇒ H ≺ ℓ /≼ ℓo . Additionally, for any j < k , if both terms can be reduced for at least j steps under
security effect gˆ′i , then the resulting stores should be related for the remaining k − j steps. Finally,
if the resulting terms are irreducible, they must be related values for the remaining k − j steps at
typeU , as defined previously. The logical relation relates computations that do not terminate as
long as the stores are also related after k steps.
Noninterference. Armed with these logical relations, we can state a semantics-driven notion of
noninterference, and prove that well-typed terms of the internal language are sound with respect to
it. The judgment Γ; Σ; gˆ |= t : U says that term t is semantically well-typed, meaning that it respects
the security protocolU for all observers, substitutions, stores, and steps [Ahmed 2004].
13This requirement is motivated by the proof, in order to obtain a stronger induction hypothesis [Toro et al. 2018].
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Definition 5.3 (Semantic Security Typing).
Γ; Σ; gˆ |= t : U ⇐⇒ ∀ ℓo ∈ Label,k ≥ 0, ρ1, ρ2 ∈ Subst and µ1, µ2 ∈ Store,∀gc , gˆ = εg,
ε ⊢ g ≼˜ gc , such that Σ ⊢ µi and Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ ⟨gˆ, ρ1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨gˆ, ρ2, µ2⟩ ,
we haveΣ; gc ⊢ ⟨gˆ, ρ1(t), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨gˆ, ρ2(t), µ2⟩ : C(U )
The definition above appeals to a notion of related substitutions. Indeed, the term t may have free
variables, indicating “input parameters”. The term is semantically well-typed if applying related
substitutions (and stores) yields related computations at type U , for any number of steps k , and
for any observer ℓo . Two substitutions are related if they map each variable in the term to related
closed values:
Definition 5.4 (Related substitutions). Tuples ⟨gˆ1, ρ1, µ1⟩ and ⟨gˆ2, ρ2, µ2⟩ are related on k steps
under Γ, Σ and gc , notation Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ ⟨gˆ1, ρ1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨gˆ2, ρ2, µ2⟩, if ρi |= Γ, Σ ⊢µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 and
∀x ∈ dom(Γ).Σ; gc ⊢ ⟨gˆ1, ρ1(x), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨gˆ2, ρ2(x), µ2⟩ : Γ(x)
Note that because a low-security observer equates all high-security values, the actual substitu-
tions and stores can be wildly different, up to the strictures that the logical relation imposes on
their types.
Finally, Security Type Soundness says that the syntactic type system enforces noninterference.
Proposition 5.5 (Security Type Soundness). Γ; Σ; gˆ ⊢ t : U =⇒ Γ; Σ; gˆ |= t : U
6 DERIVING GSLRef WITH AGT (ALMOST)
So far the presentation of GSLRef has focused on describing the language as it is and its properties,
without explaining how it came to be designed that way. Several definitions in both the static
and dynamic semantics may seem to come out of nowhere, and hard to accept without further
justification.
This work originated in part from our desire to apply the Abstracting Gradual Typing (AGT)
methodology [Garcia et al. 2016] in a challenging setting. Indeed, AGT has been shown to be
effective in different contexts: records and subtyping [Garcia et al. 2016], static semantics of gradual
effects [Bañados Schwerter et al. 2014, 2016], gradual unions [Toro and Tanter 2017], as well as
refinement types [Lehmann and Tanter 2017] and set-theoretic types [Castagna and Lanvin 2017].
But AGT has never been applied to a type discipline that denotes a relational property over multiple
executions.
Therefore, we have systematically derived GSLRef from SSLRef using AGT. This methodology,
which starts from considering gradual types as abstractions of static types, drove the entire design
of GSLRef. The abstract interpretation framework of AGT provides definitions—semantically-defined
notions—which may be hard to implement directly. From these definitions, we devise equivalent
algorithmic characterizations—easily implementable, but hard to convincingly justify informally.
AGT also explains how to derive the dynamic semantics of a gradual language based on the type
safety argument of the static language. In Sec. 4 we try to convey guiding intuitions, but in this
section we show how the definitions are not driven by intuition, but rather formally justified by
AGT. Each algorithmic characterization from Sec. 4 is equivalent to its semantic definition, obtained
using AGT and presented hereafter. These equivalences are proven in the companion technical
report [Toro et al. 2018].
Before diving into the subtleties of applying AGT to security typing, we quickly describe the
main elements of the AGT approach as spelled out by Garcia et al. [2016]: its inputs, steps, and
outputs.
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AGT in a nutshell. The AGT methodology proposes to derive the static and dynamic semantics
of a gradual language in the following manner:
(1) Deriving the statics.
(a) Start from a language with a fully-static typing discipline, including the particulars of its
type safety proof.
(b) Define the syntax of gradual types, and give them meaning via a concretization function,
which maps gradual types to sets of static types; then define the corresponding most precise
abstraction function, forming a Galois connection.
(c) Lift type predicates and functions used in the type system of the static language through
the Galois connection to obtain the gradual type system.
(2) Deriving the dynamics.
(a) Define the structure of evidence for consistent judgments, which represents justification for
why such a judgment holds; this representation depends on a Galois connection—usually
the same as the one used for deriving the static semantics.
(b) Reduce gradual programs by reducing gradual typing derivations decorated with evidence,
mirroring reasoning steps of the static language’s type safety proof, hence exploiting the
correspondence between proof normalization and term reduction [Howard 1980].
Therefore, the “inputs” to AGT are only the static language, and the Galois connection(s) that
give meaning to gradual types and evidences. As “output”, one obtains the static and dynamic
semantics of the gradual language, together with the guarantee that it is type safe, is a conservative
extension of the static discipline, and satisfies the gradual guarantees.
Note that, as alluded to above, in order to achieve an implementation one must also provide
algorithmic characterizations of the operators obtained through the abstract interpretation frame-
work. Often these algorithms can be calculated by induction on types, but sometimes it requires
trial-and-error. In any case, the AI-based definition provides the baseline against which to formally
validate such characterizations.
Applying AGT to security typing. As mentioned above, applying AGT ensures by construction
that the derived gradual language is type safe and satisfies the gradual guarantees. In prior work,
we applied AGT to a pure language with security typing, and found the resulting language to
satisfy noninterference [Garcia and Tanter 2015]. However, in this work, where the languages
support mutable references, applying AGT to SSLRef yielded a gradual language that violates
noninterference! By applying AGT, we surely obtained a gradual language that was type safe
and satisfied the gradual guarantees, but unfortunately, the crucial semantic property of security
types was broken. In brief, we had to apply two refinements. The first was proposed in the AGT
methodology, though not needed in prior work. The second is novel, but conflicts with the dynamic
gradual guarantee.
This section reports on these wrinkles and refinements so that future efforts to apply AGT to
rich type disciplines can build on our experience. In particular:
• Sec. 6.1 sets up the basics to derive the static semantics of GSLRef with AGT, which was a
successful endeavor. In the process, we identified one subtlety (about compositional lifting)
that is worth highlighting.
• Sec. 6.2 explains the AGT approach to deriving the dynamic semantics of the gradual language.
Here, we discover that evidence must use a more precise abstraction than the one used in the
static semantics. While this possibility is briefly mentioned in [Garcia et al. 2016], it was not
necessary in other applications of AGT.
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• Sec. 6.3 discusses a crucial point related to enforcing noninterference in the presence of
references, and hence potential implicit flows. This observation led us to add an extra check
to GSLRef’s dynamic semantics. The check ensures noninterference, but breaks the dynamic
gradual guarantee.
6.1 Deriving the Statics
Following the AGT approach, we give meaning to gradual security labels directly in terms of the
original static security labels. The driving intuition is that the unknown label ? represents any label
whatsoever, while a gradual label ℓ represents a single static security label. We formalize this with
a concretization function.
Definition 6.1 (Label Concretization). γ : GLabel→ P(Label)
γ (ℓ) = { ℓ }
γ (?) = Label
Concretization immediately induces the notion of precision, which orders the static information
content of gradual labels from most to least:
Definition 6.2 (Label Precision). g1 ⊑ g2 if and only if γ (g1) ⊆ γ (g2).
In order to exploit AGT to gradualize SSLRef, we also require an abstraction function to precisely
summarize a set of static labels as a single gradual label (round hats Ûx denote sets of x ):
Definition 6.3 (Label Abstraction). α : P(Label)⇀GLabel:
α({ ℓ }) = ℓ
α(∅) is undefined
α(Ûℓ) = ? otherwise
The γ and α functions are tightly connected by two properties that together form a Galois
connection [Cousot and Cousot 1977].
Proposition 6.4 (α is Sound and Optimal). If Ûℓ , ∅ then,
(i) Ûℓ ⊆ γ (α(Ûℓ)).
(ii) If Ûℓ ⊆ γ (g) then α(Ûℓ) ⊑ g.
Soundness (i)means thatα always produces a gradual label whose concretization over-approximates
the original set. Optimality (ii) means that α always yields the best (i.e. least) sound approximation
that gradual labels can represent.
The meaning of gradual security types is derived from the meaning of gradual security labels.
Therefore, we naturally define a Galois connection for gradual security types (see Appendix A.4.1).
Lifting predicates and functions. Following AGT, we exploit the Galois connections to lift
all predicates and functions over labels and types from SSLRef to obtain the definition of their
counterparts in GSLRef. In essence, each gradual entity (label, type) represents some set of static
entities, so a consistent predicate holds among gradual entities so long as the underlying static
predicate could plausibly hold. For instance, consistent ordering on gradual labels is defined as
follows:
Definition 6.5 (Consistent label ordering). g1 ≼˜ g2 ⇐⇒ ℓ1 ≼ ℓ2 for some (ℓ1, ℓ2) ∈ γ (g1) × γ (g2).
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Consistent ordering conservatively extends static label ordering because each static label, when
treated as a gradual label, concretizes to a singleton set that contains only itself; conservative
extension is central to the concept of graduality [Siek et al. 2015]. On the other hand, consistent
ordering holds universally for the unknown label ?, since it concretizes to all possible static labels.
Similarly, the join of two gradual labels is defined by lifting static label join:
Definition 6.6 (Gradual label join). g1 ˜≺ g2 = α({ ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2 | (ℓ1, ℓ2) ∈ γ (g1) × γ (g2) })
The gradual join of two gradual labels is the best abstraction of the set of all plausible static joins.
For more insight, recall its equational characterization in Sec. 4: the unknown label disappears
when joined with ⊤, while it otherwise survives all joins. This is an emergent property of lifting:
we did not anticipate it.
Compositional vs. aggregate lifting. One unanticipated subtlety observed in Sec. 4 involves
the compound premises of the (Sapp) and (Sref) rules, such as ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓ′. One might be tempted
to lift this premise compositionally as gc ˜≺ g ≼˜ g′. But Garcia et al. [2016] explicitly warn against
blindly lifting static predicates compositionally: compositional lifting must be proven (for instance,
they show that lifting their subtyping premises compositionally yields the same result as lifting
them aggregately). Here it matters! Consider the definition induced by AGT:
Definition 6.7 (Consistent bounding).Â g1 ≺ g2 ≼ g3 ⇐⇒ ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2 ≼ ℓ3 for some (ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ3) ∈ γ (g1) × γ (g2) × γ (g3)
This definition is not equivalent to compositional lifting. For instance, the relation H ˜≺ ? ≼˜ L
holds, but we know that no static label ℓ satisfiesH ≺ ℓ ≼ L (becauseH ≺ ℓ must be at least as high as
H).14 In fact, precise lifting becomes critical when we reason about combining such lattice relations
in the dynamic semantics. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first instance of aggregate lifting
affecting the application of AGT.
6.2 Deriving the Dynamics
Garcia et al. [2016] derive the dynamic semantics of a gradual language by reduction of gradual
typing derivations (augmented with evidence), thereby exploiting the correspondence between
proof normalization and term reduction [Howard 1980]. This approach, which directly exploits the
proof of syntactic type safety for the static language (SSLRef in our case), provides the direct runtime
semantics of gradual programs, instead of the usual approach by translation to some internal cast
calculus [Siek and Taha 2006].
Since writing down reduction rules over (two-dimensional) derivation trees is unwieldy, Garcia
et al. [2016] use intrinsically-typed terms [Church 1940] as a convenient flat notation for derivation
trees. Intrinsic terms are heavy notationally because they carry all type annotations, yielding to
reduction rules that are hard to read. To alleviate this burden, we have chosen to present the dynamic
semantics by reducing evidence-augmented terms, which are more lightweight notationally, and
establish a more direct connection with the traditional translational approach. The counterpart of
this choice is that we had to present a translation from source GSLRef terms to evidence-augmented
GSLεRef terms. Apart from this cosmetic difference, the central approach to reduction is the same:
evidence is combined during reduction, producing either new evidence to support the plausibility
of the contractum, or a runtime error if no evidence remains, thereby refuting type safety.
14To be honest, despite the warning of Garcia et al., we first overlooked the issue and applied compositional lifting, assuming
it would hold. We then observed that the resulting design loses enough precision to miss some evident inconsistencies, with
dramatic consequences for security.
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In essence, GSLεRef terms are intrinsic terms from which computationally irrelevant static an-
notations have been erased. Proofs of theorems about GSLRef’s dynamic semantics need these
annotations, so they use intrinsic terms. The companion technical report formalizes the relationship
between intrinsic terms and evidence-augmented terms by giving a translation from intrinsic terms
to evidence-augmented terms [Toro et al. 2018]. We show that, intrinsic terms can always be erased
to GSLεRef terms, and that the process can be reversed for well-typed GSL
ε
Ref terms. Furthermore,
related intrinsic and GSLεRef terms either reduce to related terms or yield errors. Therefore the
theorems about intrinsic terms transfer to GSLεRef terms.
Reduction and consistent deductions. All instances of combining evidence in the reduction
rules are dictated by SSLRef’s type safety proof. To illustrate this deep connection, we now analyze
a case of the SSLRef type safety proof and describe how to lift the argument to GSLRef. Consider the
assignment case of SSLRef’s preservation proof, which in essence reduces a type derivation D to a
new one and updates the program counter ℓc and store µ .
D =
o : S ∈ Σ
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ oℓ : Refℓ S
D1
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v : S2 S2 <: S ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ label(S)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ oℓ :=v : Unit⊥
The relevant reduction rule (Fig. 2) follows:
oℓ :=v | µ
ℓ′c−→ unit⊥ | µ[o 7→ v ≺ ℓ′c ≺ ℓ].
The fact that D reduces to ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ unit⊥ : Unit⊥ is immediate, but we must also prove that the
stored value v ≺ ℓ′c ≺ ℓ respects the store type, i.e. S2 ≺ ℓ′c ≺ ℓ <: S . Since ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v : S2 and S2 <: S ,
it suffices to show that ℓ′c ≺ ℓ ≼ label(S). We do so as follows. Since ≺ is monotone with respect
to ≼ in both arguments, we can combine ℓ′c ≼ ℓc (assumed in the statement of preservation) and
ℓ ≼ ℓ (deduced by ≼ reflexivity) to deduce ℓ′c ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓc ≺ ℓ. Finally, since ≼ is transitive, we combine
the above with the ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ label(S) to deduce ℓ′c ≺ ℓ ≼ label(S). To recap, this “reduction” applies
reasoning steps with a computational flavor: it composes ≼ relations to deduce new ones, using
both join monotonicity and order transitivity.
In the gradual setting, transitivity of ordering of gradual labels does not always hold: e.g. H ≼˜ ?
and ? ≼˜ L but H ̸≼˜ L. As such, transitivity of consistent ordering is plausible but not definite, so
we have to check. How? Here is the key intuition: recall that a consistent judgment like H ≼˜ ?
means that ℓ1 ≼ ℓ2 holds for some pair of labels (ℓ1, ℓ2) drawn from the concretizations γ (H) = {H }
and γ (?) = Label respectively. We do not know which pair, so we must consider all plausible ones,
i.e. { (H,H), (H,⊤) }: the rest are surely wrong so we discard them. Similarly, the plausible pairs
for ? ≼˜ ⊤ are { (ℓ,⊤) | ℓ ≼ ⊤ }. Now, given these two sets of plausible orderings, is transitivity
plausible? Yes, because two plausible deductions arise: 1) H ≼ H and H ≼ ⊤ implies H ≼ ⊤;
and 2) H ≼ ⊤ and ⊤ ≼ ⊤ implies H ≼ ⊤. When collected, the deduced pairings collapse to the
singular expected result: { (H ,⊤) }. If we replay the same reasoning for H ≼˜ ? and ? ≼˜ L, however,
we deduce ∅, which means that transitivity is not plausible: it has been refuted. An analogous
process applies for join monotonicity, as well as transitivity of consistent subtyping, yielding sets
of pairs of candidate subtypings.
In both of the above deductions, we reason imprecisely yet still deduce definite results: a single
possibility in one, and none in the other. But in general, imprecision begets imprecision. The
main source of complication is that static safety arguments deduce ordering relationships by
interleaving transitivity and monotonicity arguments, so corresponding consistent deductions
must mirror them. Furthermore, it would be especially burdensome to explicitly track sets of pairs
of labels at runtime, let alone the sets of pairs of types that arise when reasoning about consistent
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subtyping. This is where AGT suggests to use an abstraction of the possible static candidates,
evidence. Evidence of a consistent judgment is a pair of abstractions of sets of static entities that
justify a consistent judgment. Which abstraction to use turns out to be a crucial decision in order
to preserve noninterference, as discussed next.
Problems with evidence as gradual labels. The “natural” abstraction of sets of labels are
gradual labels, as used in the static semantics. In fact, Garcia et al. [2016] use the same abstraction
to represent both runtime evidence and static gradual types; we initially followed suit. However,
the first major subtlety we uncovered while deriving GSLRef’s dynamic semantics is that using
gradual labels (and consequently, gradual types) for evidence yields a design that achieves both
type safety and the gradual criteria, but violates noninterference!
This problem manifested in two parts of the noninterference proof. First, the noninterference
proof relies on the associativity of consistent transitivity.15 However, consistent transitivity of label
ordering is not associative if gradual labels are used to represent evidence. Recall the program
true? :: BoolH :: Bool? :: BoolL, introduced in Sec. 4.2, which we expect to fail at runtime, and which
ultimately involves combining three consistent label ordering judgments: ε1 ⊢ ? ≼˜ H, ε2 ⊢ H ≼˜ ?,
and ε3 ⊢ ? ≼˜ L. If we use a pair of gradual labels to represent evidence, eventually we have to
calculate (ε1 ◦<: ε2) ◦<: ε3. But ε1 = ⟨?,H⟩, ε2 = ⟨H, ?⟩, and ε3 = ⟨?, L⟩, then ε1 ◦≼ ε2 = ⟨?, ?⟩ and
⟨?, ?⟩ ◦≼ ε3 = ⟨?, L⟩, so no runtime error is produced. Note that ε1 ◦<: (ε2 ◦<: ε3) fails as expected,
because ε2 ◦<: ε3 is not defined, but this is not the composition order that arises at runtime.
Second, the proof of noninterference relies on the observational completeness of the consistent
join operator:
Lemma 6.8. Suppose ε1 ⊢ g′1 ≼˜ g1 and ε2 ⊢ g′2 ≼˜ g2 such that ε1 ˜≺ ε2 ⊢ Â g′1 ≺ g′2 ≼ g1 ≺ g2.
Then (¬obsEvg1ℓo (ε1) ∨ ¬obsEv
g2
ℓo
(ε2)) ⇐⇒ ¬obsEvg1˜ ≺g2ℓo (ε1 ˜≺ ε2).
The analogous static lemma, i.e. (¬obsEvℓ1ℓo (ℓ1) ∨ ¬obsEvℓ2ℓo (ℓ2)) ⇐⇒ ¬obsEvℓ1 ≺ℓ2ℓo (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2),
holds trivially by the very definition of the join, but this property fails to hold in the presence
of the unknown label. Suppose ε ′1 ⊢ H ≼˜ ? and ε ′2 ⊢ ? ≼˜ ?. If we use a pair of gradual labels to
represent evidence, then ε ′1 = ⟨H, ?⟩, ε ′2 = ⟨?, ?⟩, and ε ′1 ˜≺ ε ′2 = ⟨?, ?⟩ losing information about H .
But ¬obsEv?L(⟨H, ?⟩) and obsEv?L(⟨?, ?⟩), therefore invalidating the lemma.
Representing evidence as intervals. These observations forced us to seek a more precise
abstraction whose composition (through consistent transitivity) is associative and preserves the
observational completeness of consistent join. Since it suffices to know whether the upper- and
lower-bounds of the plausible static labels overlap to deduce the plausibility of consistent ordering,
intervals seem to be a fitting abstraction.16 Indeed, this abstraction is sufficiently precise to guarantee
the desired properties.
15Note that associativity of cast composition is also critical for space-efficient semantics of gradual typing, e.g. Siek and
Wadler [2010]. We conjecture that associativity may be a fundamentally desirable property, and intend to pursue this
question.
16One could design a gradual security language that uses label intervals instead of gradual labels right from the start, including
in the static semantics. While this would unify the abstractions used in the statics and dynamics, it would yield a gradual type
system that rejects more secure programs than GSLRef does. For instance, the program (if falseL :: ? then 1H else 2L) :: L, is
accepted and runs without errors in GSLRef. But if we use intervals in the static semantics, then the security level of the
conditional expression which boils down to the join between ?, H and L, would be [L, H], therefore the program would be
rejected statically. Applying a ? ascription to 1H would fix this program.
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Definition 6.9 (Interval Concretization). γı : Interval→ P(Label), where
Interval = {[ℓ1, ℓ2] ∈ Label2 | ℓ1 ≼ ℓ2}
γı ([ℓ1, ℓ2]) = {ℓ | ℓ ∈ Label, ℓ1 ≼ ℓ ≼ ℓ2}.
Definition 6.10 (Interval Abstraction). αı : P(Label) → Interval
αı (∅) is undefined αı ({ ℓi }) = [≺ ℓi , ≺ℓi ] otherwise
With evidence based on intervals, (ε1 ◦≼ ε2) ◦≼ ε3 and ε1 ◦≼ (ε2 ◦≼ ε3) are equivalent. Back
to the example, now ε1 = ⟨[⊥,H], [H,H]⟩, ε2 = ⟨[H,H], [H,⊤]⟩ and ε3 = ⟨[⊥, L], [L, L]⟩, then
ε1 ◦≼ ε2 = ⟨[⊥,H], [H,⊤]⟩. Because ⟨[⊥,H], [H,⊤]⟩ ◦≼ ε3 is undefined, a runtime error is raised,
avoiding the breach of noninterference. Also, the observational-monotonicity of the join is preserved.
Now ε ′1 = ⟨[H,H], [H,⊤]⟩ and ε ′2 = ⟨[⊥,⊤], [⊥,⊤]⟩, then ε ′1 ˜≺ ε ′2 = ⟨[H,⊤], [H,⊤]⟩ and now
¬obsEv?L(⟨[H,⊤], [H,⊤]⟩) as expected.
Lifting consistent lattice relations. We now explain how the definitions of consistent tran-
sitivity and join monotonicity are semantically justified. As discussed in Sec. 6.1, premises such
as ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓ′ must be lifted as aggregates. In fact, such a judgment is likely the consequence of
similar deductions from earlier reduction steps. For instance ℓ must be some lattice expression
F (ℓi ) comprising joins (and meets) of source program labels ℓi . Therefore, to mirror static type
safety reasoning steps at runtime, and catch inconsistencies if they arise, we must generalize each
ordering premise in a derivation and consider it as some lattice relation F1(ℓi ) ≼ F2(ℓj ). The notion
of evidence must consequently account for the plausibility of consistent lattice relations:
⟨ı1, ı2⟩ ⊢ Â F1(gi ) ≼ F2(gj )
The definitions of consistent join monotonicity and consistent transitivity then follow directly from
AGT by consistent lifting.
Definition 6.11 (Consistent transitivity for label ordering).
◦≼ : Interval2 × Interval2 ⇀ Interval2
⟨ı1, ı21⟩ ◦≼ ⟨ı22, ı3⟩ = α2ı ({⟨ℓ1, ℓ3⟩ ∈ γ 2ı (⟨ı1, ı3⟩) | ∃ℓ ∈ γı (ı21) ∩ γı (ı22).ℓ1 ≼ ℓ ∧ ℓ ≼ ℓ3})
Consistent transitivity produces evidence for all plausible instances of consistent ordering that
can be deduced using transitivity from the plausible instances of ordering represented by the two
inputs. By design, α2ı (∅) is undefined, so consistent transitivity is also undefined if no plausible
pairings remain to support a deduction.
Definition 6.12 (Consistent join monotonicity). ˜≺ : Interval2 × Interval2 ⇀ Interval2
ε1˜≺ε2 = α2ı ({⟨ℓ1, ℓ2⟩) | ∃⟨ℓ11, ℓ12⟩ ∈ γ 2ı (ε1), ⟨ℓ21, ℓ22⟩ ∈ γ 2ı (ε2).ℓ1 = ℓ11 ≺ℓ21, ℓ2 = ℓ12 ≺ℓ22, ℓ1 ≼ ℓ2})
Consistent join monotonicity is analogous, but note that due to lattice and interval properties,
consistent join monotonicity is really a total function. Also, the ℓ1 ≼ ℓ2 condition is superfluous;
we present the definition in this form to preserve the general structure of consistent deduction
definitions.
The algorithmic characterizations from Sec. 4.2 are equivalent to the above definitions. More
importantly, we can prove that these operators indeed yield valid evidence for the combined
consistent judgments.
Proposition 6.13. Suppose ε1 ⊢ Â F11(gi ) ≼ F12(gj ) and ε2 ⊢ Â F21(gi ) ≼ F22(gj )
Then ε1 ˜≺ ε2 ⊢ Â F11(gi ) ≺ F21(gi ) ≼ F12(gj ) ≺ F22(gj )
38 Matías Toro, Ronald Garcia, and Éric Tanter
Proposition 6.14. Suppose ε1 ⊢ Â F1(gi ) ≼ F2(gj ) and ε2 ⊢ Â F2(gj ) ≼ F3(gk ).
If ε1 ◦≼ ε2 is defined, then ε1 ◦≼ ε2 ⊢  F1(gi ) ≼ F3(gk )
From labels to types. Finally, in addition to reasoning about consistent label ordering, the
dynamic semantics must track and check the plausibility of consistent subtyping. Since (consistent)
subtyping is induced by (consistent) ordering, the reasoning in question arises by lifting the same
constructions to gradual security types, consistent subtyping, and consistent subtyping join and
meet.
Just as we extend gradual labels g to gradual security typesU (e.g. Intg) in the source language, so
do we extend label intervals ı point-wise to type intervals E (e.g. Intı ) and corresponding notions of
evidence for consistent subtyping ε (e.g. ⟨Intı1, Intı2⟩), which represent sets of pairs of candidates for
plausible subtyping. We introduce evidence judgments ε ⊢ U1 ≲ U2 to associate runtime evidence
with particular consistent subtyping judgments. The entire development mirrors the one for labels,
and does not convey any new insights (see Appendix D.1).
6.3 Policing Dynamic Heap Updates
Although adopting label intervals for evidence of consistent label judgments addressed some aspects
of the noninterference proof, this refinement alone is not sufficient.
To illustrate the remaining problem, recall the example of implicit flows from Sec. 2, in particular
the second version of the example, which has some missing static annotations.
1 fun x: BoolH =>
2 let y: Ref Bool ? = ref true ?
3 let z: Ref BoolL = ref trueL
4 if x then y := false ? else unit
5 if !y then z := falseL else unit
6 !z
This program is accepted statically and also runs without errors: if x is trueH then the program
reduces to trueL, and if x is falseH it reduces to falseL: a clear breach of noninterference!
To understand the problem, consider what happens for the different values of x. When x is trueH
the assignment in line 4 under security effect H is valid, because H ≼˜ ?. In that moment we know
that the security level of the content of y, must be higher than H. But when x is falseH, in line
5 we assume that the security level of the content of y is lower than L. In other words, under
supposedly-related executions we get contradictory evidence for y. Notice that in the assignment
at line 4, the judgment H ≼˜ ? holds, but so does its negation H /˜≼ ?. To preserve noninterference, we
must ensure that its negation never holds.
To recover noninterference, we add an extra check to the assignment reduction rule (r7) from
Fig. 6:
ε1og :=ε3 ε2u | µ
εgc−→
®
unit⊥ | µ[o 7→ ε ′(u ˜≺ (gc ˜≺ g))]
error if ε ′ is not defined, or ε ⌊≤⌋ ilbl(ε ′′) does not hold
where µ(o) = ε ′′u ′. The highlighted check ensures that if the security effect is not observable, then
the content of the heap to be replaced must also be not observable.17 This concept is formalized in
the following lemma, which is used in the noninterference proof:
17This check is analogous to the no-sensitive-upgrade check introduced by Austin and Flanagan [2009], taken to the gradual
context, and hence involving unknown labels, evidences and consistent judgments.
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Lemma 6.15. Consider ε1 ⊢ g′1 ≼˜ g1 and ε2 ⊢ g′2 ≼˜ g2. Then (¬obsEvg1ℓo (ε1) ∧ ε1 ⌊≤⌋ ε2) ⇒
¬obsEvg2ℓo (ε2).
With the additional check, if x is trueH, the program fails at runtime, preserving noninterference.
The necessity of the check shows up in the noninterference proof for the if case. When two
computations have related non-observable conditionals, the booleans can be different. This may
lead to two related computations that reduce different branches under a high-security context.
At that point, we must enforce that those different executions only write high-security values to
the heap. In other words, as long as both executions reduce under high-security contexts, their
executions can desynchronize only on private information. Formally, the following lemma should
hold:
Lemma 6.16. Consider ·; Σ; εgc ⊢ t : U , g′c and µ such that, ε ⊢ gc ≼˜ g′c , ¬obsEvg
′
c
ℓo
(ε) and Σ ⊢ µ ,
and ∀k > 0, such that t | µ εgc7−→ kt ′ | µ ′,
(1) ∀o ∈ dom(µ ′)\ dom(µ), ¬obsValUℓo (µ ′(o)).
(2) ∀o ∈ dom(µ ′) ∩ dom(µ) where µ ′(o) , µ(o),
(a) ¬obsValUℓo (µ(o)), and
(b) ¬obsValUℓo (µ ′(o)).
Without the additional check in rule (r7), we cannot prove (2.a): before updating a reference, the
current content should be non observable. And as we can see in the example above, without the
check, the reference before the assignment would be observable, hence breaking the Lemma.
In its current formulation [Garcia et al. 2016], AGT derives the dynamic semantics of the gradual
language from the type safety argument of the static language. Here, we are facing a typing
discipline in which type safety does not imply type soundness (i.e. noninterference), and hence, the
methodology falls short of naturally preserving that property. This suggests that extending AGT
to ensure type soundness of the derived gradual language might require adapting the conceptual
framework to take the purely static type soundness proof as a source of design insight.
Noninterference vs. Dynamic gradual guarantee. Although the extra check above allows
GSLRef to ensure noninterference, it sacrifices the dynamic gradual guarantee. Recall that this
guarantee says that removing a static security annotation cannot introduce new runtime errors.
Consider the following example:
1 fun x: BoolH =>
2 let y: Ref BoolH = ref trueH
3 if x then y := falseH else unit
The program is accepted statically and runs without error as it does not break noninterference. If
we remove the type annotations on line 2:
1 fun x: BoolH =>
2 let y: Ref Bool ? = ref true ?
3 if x then y := falseH else unit
then the program is conservatively rejected at runtime, because of the additional check for assign-
ments. This behavior violates the dynamic gradual guarantee.18
To sum up, if decreasing the precision of a type annotation results in performing an assignment
to a reference whose content now has an unknown security label, and that assignment occurs under
a non-public security effect, a runtime error can be raised, whereas the more precise program did
18Removing the additional check on assignments recovers the dynamic gradual guarantee, but it breaks noninterference:
there is no free lunch in presence of mutable references.
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not fail. More precisely, even in such situations, a runtime error will only be raised if the dynamic
security information about the stored value up to the point of the actual assignment is lower than
the current security effect. For instance, in our example above, if we modify the security level of the
boolean in line 2 to H (leaving the type of y as it is), then the program performs a valid assignment
on a reference whose content has a statically-unknown security level, but dynamically H; therefore
no runtime error is raised. Unfortunately, beyond pure and read-only programs, it seems impossible
to provide any useful syntactic characterization of the programs for which the dynamic gradual
guarantee holds, because both the current security effect and the accumulated evidence about a
given value are essentially dynamic information.
7 RELATEDWORK
Static and dynamic information-flow control techniques have been extensively studied in the
literature. The area is too vast to exhaustively review here: we refer to [Hedin and Sabelfeld 2012b;
Russo and Sabelfeld 2010; Sabelfeld and Myers 2003] for broad overviews of the area. This section
first focuses on security type systems, as well as some specific approaches to dynamic information
flow control, given the static-to-dynamic spectrum that gradual security typing covers. We also
discuss existing proposals that combine static and dynamic checking. Finally we relate our work to
other efforts to gradualize advanced type disciplines.
Static information flow control. Volpano et al. [1996] present one of the first type systems
for information flow analysis, developed for a first-order imperative language with conditionals
and loops. They present and formalize the first soundness result for a security-typed language,
namely that altering the initial values of locations cannot affect resulting values of locations with a
lesser security level.
Subsequently, Heintze and Riecke [1998] present a security-typed higher-order language called
the Secure Lambda Calculus (SLam). SLam is a functional language extended with sums, products,
and recursion, that supports both confidentiality and its dual notion, integrity [Biba 1977]. They
introduce the prot expression, which we also use, to increase the ambient security level for the
dynamic extent of evaluating a term. The noninterference proof for SLam is also based on logical
relations. The authors extend SLam with concurrency and references. They prove that the resulting
language is type safe, but they do not prove noninterference, deemed too problematic in a concurrent
setting. SSLRef is also a higher-order languagewith references, but it does not support sums, products,
recursion and concurrency. We prove noninterference for both GSLRef and SSLRef. Extending GSLRef
to richer types and concurrency is a challenge worth addressing in future work.
To consolidate different related efforts, Abadi et al. [1999] develop the Dependency Core Calculus
(DCC), an extension of the lambda calculus that tracks dependencies such as security, partial
evaluation, program slicing and call-tracking. In particular, they show that different languages such
as SLam can be translated to DCC. They present a semantic model of DCC that helps to provide a
simple proof of noninterference. It would be interesting to study the application of AGT to DCC, to
provide a general account of gradual dependency tracking.
JFlow [Myers 1999; Myers and Liskov 1997], which later evolved into Jif [Myers and Liskov
2000], is a practical extension of the Java language that protects both confidentiality and integrity
of sensitive data. Jif supports statically-checked information flow annotations, a decentralized label
model with principals, automatic label inference, and security label polymorphism, all integrated
with object-oriented features like class inheritance, as well as exceptions, among other features. Jif
supports runtime label tests that can be used to encode explicit security casts, although such casts
break type-based reasoning about noninterference. Scaling up GSLRef to cover the feature set of Jif
would open the door to a practical implementation of gradual security typing.
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Zdancewic [2002] proposes λSEC , a simple security language similar to SLam, and proves nonin-
terference using logical relations. He then extends the language with references, yielding λSECREF ,
which was the starting point for our design of SSLRef. Unlike SSLRef, the operational semantics of
λSECREF includes additional checks to control whether it is safe to assign to references; the type system
then makes these checks redundant. In SSLRef, we omit these checks, and the runtime only tracks
security levels. The runtime checks needed in the gradual setting arise as evidence combination.
Also, Zdancewic does not prove noninterference for λSECREF directly, but instead by a CPS translation
to a lower-level imperative language with explicit continuations, for which noninterference is
established [Zdancewic and Myers 2001]. This setting permits studying information flow with
concurrency and as such could be a judicious starting point to study the interaction of gradual
security typing and concurrency.
Much work on static information flow analysis focuses on declassification, which is the limited,
intentional, and controlled release of confidential information. Declassification is outside the scope
of this work, though a very interesting perspective for future work; we refer to [Sabelfeld and
Sands 2009] for an introductory survey.
An important distinction in information flow analysis is whether an analysis is flow-sensitive,
i.e. whether memory cells are allowed to store values of different security levels at different times.
Hunt and Sands [2006] explore families of sound flow-sensitive type systems, indexed by the choice
of the security lattice. In particular, they show that every program typeable in a flow-sensitive
static type system can be translated to an equivalent program typeable in a flow-insensitive type
system. SSLRef is a flow-insensitive purely static analysis; GSLRef inherits flow-insensitivity for its
static semantics. However, at runtime the security level of references is allowed to vary (through
evidence composition) within the bounds imposed by the static type of the reference. This means
that a reference that is created with an unknown security label can store values of any security
level at different times. This leads us to sharing challenges faced by dynamic information-flow
control techniques, discussed hereafter.
Dynamic information flow control. Russo and Sabelfeld [2010] show that static mechanisms
can be more precise than dynamic ones about certain kinds of information flows. Indeed, non-
interference can be characterized as a 2-safety property, meaning that it can only be refuted by
observing two different executions of the same program with different inputs. This makes it par-
ticularly challenging for dynamic information flow control, which traditionally makes decisions
based on a single execution. Most work on dynamic information flow analysis therefore monitors
a 1-safety property that conservatively approximates noninterference, but has the advantage of
being observable in a single execution. Such approximations necessarily introduce false alarms,
especially when mutable references are involved.
To avoid implicit leaks through the heap in a purely dynamic information-flow analysis, Austin
and Flanagan [2009] introduce a no-sensitive-upgrade check to prevent implicit security leaks
through partially-leaked data, i.e. data produced from updates to public heap data that depend on
private information. We adapt this approach to GSLRef, imposing an extra check when assigning to
references. Subsequently, Austin and Flanagan [2010] propose a more permissive analysis, where
partially-leaked data is allowed, but carefully tracked to ensure that it is upgraded before being used
in conditional tests. This allows programmers to iteratively add security upgrades to partially-leak
data only when needed, through multiple executions of a program.
Later, Austin and Flanagan [2012] introduce a completely different approach: faceted execution,
which simulates multiple executions of a program for different security levels in a single run. A
faceted execution yields a faceted value, which in a traditional two-point lattice is a pair of a public
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and a private value. This novel approach enables a characterization of noninterference as a 1-
safety property, without introducing false alarms. It does however raise questions regarding how to
efficiently implement such faceted executions, especially in the presence of complex security lattices.
Faceted execution was recently extended to support dynamic information flow with exceptions,
declassification and clearance [Austin et al. 2017]. It would be interesting to explore whether basing
GSLRef on faceted execution might yield a gradual security language that fully respects the dynamic
gradual guarantee, by avoiding the extra runtime check in assignments.
Stefan et al. [2017] present a dynamic information-flow control system called LIO. Contrary
to most approaches to dynamic information flow, LIO does not modify the underlying language
runtime semantics, being implemented as a Haskell library. LIO supports both mutable references
and exceptions. Exceptions are used to recover from security monitor failures, preserving both
confidentiality and integrity. The possibility of securely recovering from runtime security exceptions
is an interesting perspective to study in the context of gradual security typing. More generally,
recovering from runtime type errors raises a number of questions about the metatheory of gradual
typing, because doing so can directly affect the dynamic gradual guarantee as well as type-based
reasoning (e.g. it becomes possible to encode explicit type tests).
Hybrid information flow control. To resolve the tension between flexibility and soundness of
flow-sensitive analyses, Russo and Sabelfeld [2010] propose a general hybrid approach, in which
a static effect analysis is used to dynamically upgrade the security level of variables of untaken
branches of conditionals, thereby preventing implicit leaks through the heap. This hybrid approach
is developed on top of a (first-order) imperative language. Moore and Chong [2011] later show how
to implement this hybrid approach more efficiently using additional static analyses.
A variety of hybrid information-flow control systems have been investigated, whose designs
combine static and dynamic techniques that buttress one another to balance permissiveness and
efficiency. Note that although gradual typing also combines static and dynamic techniques, hybrid
approaches differ essentially from gradual ones. The key specificity of gradual typing is to smoothly
support the continuum between static and dynamic checking based on the (programmer-controlled)
precision of type annotations [Siek and Taha 2006; Siek et al. 2015]. This central notion of type pre-
cision is absent from hybrid approaches, in which the balance between static and dynamic checking
is often driven by other concerns—such as the (un)decidability of a static predicate [Knowles and
Flanagan 2010], or the need to pre-compute information for enhancing runtime checking.
Chandra and Franz [2007] implement hybrid security information flow control for the Java
Virtual Machine. The operational semantics permits policies to change during execution. To prevent
invalid implicit flows through the heap, they perform a static analysis of effects similar to Russo and
Sabelfeld [2010]. Information about conditionals is gathered ahead of execution, then used to update
labels at runtime, as if all branching alternatives had been taken. They also statically determine
when the current security effect can be lowered again after a conditional. Performing an effect
analysis statically to drive runtime monitoring is appealing as it could obviate the extra assignment
check in GSLRef that compromised the dynamic gradual guarantee. However, in the setting of a
higher-order imperative language, the effect analysis could easily become too conservative or too
demanding for programmers. Combining gradual security and gradual effects [Bañados Schwerter
et al. 2016] may temper this issue, but represents a considerable challenge in itself.
Shroff et al. [2007] present a dynamic information flow system based on runtime tracking of
indirect dependencies between program points, allowing a lazier, hence more flexible, detection
of implicit flows. In particular, they track indirect dependency between dereference points and
branching points. They present two languages, one that captures dependencies statically, and one
that uses multiple executions of a program to record dependencies. This is yet another approach
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to runtime tracking that is worth considering in order to achieve a more flexible gradual security
language that fully respects the dynamic gradual guarantee.
Hybrid approaches can also support programmer-controlled flexibility. Buiras et al. [2015]
propose Hybrid LIO (HLIO), a flexible monadic information-flow control library for Haskell. HLIO
is not gradual in the sense that it does not include an unknown security label; instead, HLIO
provides a primitive to explicitly and selectively defer label-ordering checks to runtime. Their
approach to defer static typing constraints to runtime can even be exploited to postpone type
checks beyond security label constraints, opening the door to hybrid type checking in Haskell. In
contrast, as a gradual security language, GSLRef supports a notion of unknown security information
and implicitly mediates the interactions between static and dynamic security checking.
Gradual security typing. Most directly related to our proposal is prior work on gradual security
typing, which combines static and dynamic checking with the express intent of supporting a smooth
migration between both checking disciplines by introducing a dynamic (i.e. statically unknown)
security label. Disney and Flanagan [2011] and Fennell and Thiemann [2013] pioneered what we
describe in Sec. 1 as a check-driven approach to gradual security typing, starting from dynamic
checking. Both develop notions of blame tracking and prove blame theorems for their semantics. It
is important to recall that these approaches, while dubbed “gradual”, are based on explicit security
casts, and are therefore more akin to cast calculi than to gradual languages. In particular, this
means that these languages do not respect the gradual guarantees by design, including the static
one, because changing the precision of type annotations requires adding/removing explicit casts.
Additionally, as discussed in the introduction, both proposals break type-based reasoning about
noninterference.
Recently, Fennell and Thiemann [2016] extend their prior work on gradual security typing with
references to the object-oriented setting, in a language called LJGS. Like Jif, LJGS performs local
inference of security labels, and supports polymorphic security signatures. Local variables in LJGS
are typed in a flow-sensitive manner, whereas both SSLRef and GSLRef are flow insensitive regarding
security levels. Although LJGS is based on explicit casts like prior work, its semantics differ in
important ways. For instance, recall the example given in Sec. 1:
let mix : IntL →L IntH →L IntL =
fun pub priv => if pub < (IntL ⇐ IntH)priv then 1L else 2L
mix 1L 5L
This example does not type check in LJGS because the target type of a security cast cannot be
less secure than the source type. The only way to write this example is to go through the dynamic
security level explicitly:
let mix : IntL →L IntH →L IntL =
fun pub priv => if pub < (IntL ⇐ Int?) (Int? ⇐ IntH) priv then 1L else 2L
mix 1L 5L
This well-typed program fails at runtime because (Int? ⇐ IntH) upgrades 5L to 5H, but (IntL ⇐
Int?)5H is not defined. This approach to upgrade the security level of values that are cast to the
dynamic label using the statically-determined source label seems to restore type-based reasoning
about noninterference in LJGS. Interestingly, the change in semantics in LGJS is solely motivated
by the design goal to avoid having to dynamically track security labels of statically-typed program
fragments, so the relation with type-based reasoning appears to be accidental.
Similar to the approach of Russo and Sabelfeld [2010] and Shroff et al. [2007] discussed above,
LJGS relies on a side-effect analysis to tracks the updated variables in method bodies. More precisely,
when typing a method, LJGS generates a set of constraints that represent the information flow
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dependencies between parameters and return values, as well as two sets of effects: a local effect that
lists the variables modified in branches of a conditional, used to update local variables of untaken
branches; and a global effect that records the security types whose fields may be updated with
sensitive information. This type analysis and constraint/effect inference is facilitated by the fact
that classes in LJGS are not first-class entities, i.e. all class definitions are top-level and known
ahead-of-time. This means in particular that at every call site, one statically knows the precise
inferred constraints and effects of methods (modulo a standard subsumption criteria to account
for subtyping). In a setting with higher-order types, this information would be more complex to
track. Additionally, the inferred global effect of a method is insufficient information per se for the
dynamic information flow control part of LJGS. Therefore, LJGS also appeals to an external effect
analysis (left opaque) to obtain precise information about heap write effects.
Gradualizing expressive typing disciplines. Since the initial formulation of gradual typ-
ing [Siek and Taha 2006], there has been many efforts to gradualize advanced typing disciplines,
like typestates [Garcia et al. 2014; Wolff et al. 2011], ownership types [Sergey and Clarke 2012],
annotated type systems [Thiemann and Fennell 2014], effects [Bañados Schwerter et al. 2014, 2016;
Toro and Tanter 2015], refinement types [Jafery and Dunfield 2017; Lehmann and Tanter 2017],
parametric polymorphism [Ahmed et al. 2017; Igarashi et al. 2017], and the security type systems
discussed above, among others.
Since the formulation of the refined criteria for gradually-typed languages [Siek et al. 2015],
however, only refinement types [Jafery and Dunfield 2017; Lehmann and Tanter 2017] have been
shown to fully respect such guarantees. This work contributes to the general research agenda of
gradual typing disciplines by explicitly attempting to achieve both the gradual guarantees and a
rich semantic property, like noninterference. Indeed, noninterference is not implied by type safety;
in contrast, soundness of refinement types directly follows from type safety. We have shown that
GSLRef does respect the static gradual guarantee (as opposed to other gradual security type systems);
but GSLRef must sacrifice the dynamic gradual guarantee due to a modification of the runtime
semantics that is necessary to enforce noninterference in the presence of mutable references.
Initial work on gradual parametricity [Igarashi et al. 2017] also suggests that parametricity
may be incompatible with the dynamic gradual guarantee, unless one is willing to tweak the type
precision relation; even then, the dynamic gradual guarantee is left as a conjecture. Ahmed et al.
[2017] prove parametricity for a polymorphic cast calculus—not a source language—and also leave
the gradual guarantees as an open question. Therefore, further work is needed to fully understand
if and how the gradual guarantees can be reconciled with rich semantic typing disciplines, and if
additional design criteria for such gradual languages should be devised.
8 CONCLUSION
We develop a novel, type-driven approach to gradual security typing, in which gradual security
types provide strong security invariants, while admitting flexible programming idioms. This is the
first work to address the gradualization of a rich typing discipline in which type safety does not
imply type soundness, while pursuing the most elaborate formulation of criteria for gradually-typed
languages [Siek et al. 2015], and preserving type-based reasoning principles. This means that the
amount of static checking is entirely driven by the precision of static security annotations, and that
programmers can reason modularly about the noninterference guarantees of program fragments
by just looking at types.
Using the AGT methodology [Garcia et al. 2016] to derive the gradual security language GSLRef,
this work sheds light on key semantic issues in the design of gradual languages. AGT was central
in our endeavor to separate the elements of the design that follow by systematically following the
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methodology from those that require careful consideration. In particular, we identify a tension
between the smooth continuum on the static-to-dynamic spectrum that the gradual guarantees
mandate, and the semantic property of noninterference, which manifests in GSLRef because of
mutable references. This tension also raises interesting questions for the principled design of
gradually-typed languages, whenever the semantics of types has a relational flavor. In particular,
while we have addressed noninterference, relational parametricity remains to be addressed. Overall,
this work suggests that it might be necessary to extend AGT to integrate the purely static type
soundness proof—as opposed to only the type safety proof—as a source for the design of the
dynamic semantics of a gradual language.
Within the context of gradual security typing, our work leaves open the question of whether it is
possible to reconcile both noninterference and the dynamic gradual guarantee. Specifically, it would
be informative to study whether other approaches to sound dynamic information flow control
could help us recover the dynamic gradual guarantee. We believe that there might be an inherent
incompatibility between the strictness required to enforce a hyper-property like noninterference,
and the optimistic flexibility dictated by the dynamic gradual guarantee.
Another interesting track for future work is to explore a “pay-as-you-go” [Siek and Taha 2006]
semantics, which only introduces runtime checks for imprecisely-typed expressions, as well as
scaling the security discipline to other language-based security features such as integrity, flow sen-
sitivity and declassification. Additionally, we want to explore the applicability of Garcia and Cimini
[2015]’s approach to type inference in gradual languages to address security label inference [Pottier
and Simonet 2003] in GSLRef.
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S ::= Boolℓ | S ℓ−→ℓS | Refℓ S | Unitℓ (types)
b ::= true | false (Booleans)
r ::= b | λℓx : S .t | unit | o (raw values)
v ::= rℓ (values)
t ::= v | t t | t ⊕ t | if t then t else t
refS t | !t | t :=t | t :: S | protℓ(t) (terms)
⊕ ::= ∧ | ∨ (operations)
Fig. 11. SSLRef: Syntax
(Sx) x : S ∈ Γ
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ x : S (Sb) Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ bℓ : Boolℓ (Su) Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ unitℓ : Unitℓ
(Sl) o : S ∈ Σ
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ oℓ : Refℓ S (Sλ)
Γ, x : S1; Σ; ℓ′ ⊢ t : S2
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ (λℓ′x : S1.t)ℓ : S1
ℓ′−→ℓS2
(Sprot)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ t : S
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ protℓ(t) : S ≺ ℓ
(S⊕)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 : Boolℓ1 Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t2 : Boolℓ2
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 ⊕ t2 : Bool(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2)
(Sapp)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 : S11
ℓ′−→ℓS12 Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t2 : S2 S2 <: S11 ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓ′
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 t2 : S12 ≺ ℓ
(Sif)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : Boolℓ Γ; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ ti : Si
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ if t then t1 else t2 : (S1 <: S2) ≺ ℓ (Sref)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : S ′ S ′ <: S
ℓc ≼ label(S)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ refS t : Ref⊥ S
(Sderef)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : Refℓ S
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ !t : S ≺ ℓ
(Sasgn)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 : Refℓ S1 Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t2 : S2 S2 <: S1 ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ label(S1)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 := t2 : Unit⊥
(S::)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : S1 S1 <: S2
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t :: S2 : S2
S <: S ℓ ≼ ℓ
′
Boolℓ <: Boolℓ′
ℓ ≼ ℓ′
Unitℓ <: Unitℓ′
S ′1 <: S1 S2 <: S ′2 ℓ1 ≼ ℓ′1 ℓ′2 ≼ ℓ2
S1
ℓ2−→ℓ1S2 <: S ′1
ℓ′2−→ℓ′1S ′2
ℓ ≼ ℓ′
Refℓ S <: Refℓ′ S
Fig. 12. SSLRef: Static Semantics
A FULL DEFINITIONS FOR THE STATIC AND GRADUAL LANGUAGE
In this section we present the full definition of SSLRef (sections A.1 and A.2) and the full definition of
GSLRef (sections A.4 and A.6). Section A.8 presents the full definitions of noninterference presented
in the paper.
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A.1 SSLRef: Static semantics
In this section we present the full definition of the static semantics of SSLRef. Figure 11 presents
the syntax of SSLRef. Figure 12 presents the complete static semantics of SSLRef, where the join
between types and labels is defined as follows
Boolℓ ≺ ℓ′ = Bool(ℓ ≺ℓ′)
(S1 ℓc−→ℓS2) ≺ ℓ′ = S1 ℓc−→(ℓ ≺ℓ′)S2
Refℓ S ≺ ℓ′ = Ref(ℓ ≺ℓ′) S
Figure 13 presents the join and meet type functions.
S <
: S , S
<: S
<
: : Type × Type ⇀ Type
Boolℓ <: Boolℓ′ = Bool(ℓ ≺ℓ′)
(S11 ℓc−→ℓS12) <: (S21
ℓ′c−→ℓ′S22) = (S11
<: S21)
ℓc
≺
ℓ′c−→ (ℓ ≺ℓ′)(S12 <: S22)
Refℓ S <: Refℓ′ S = Ref(ℓ ≺ℓ′) S
S <
: S undefined otherwise
<: : Type × Type ⇀ Type
Boolℓ
<: Boolℓ′ = Bool(ℓ ≺ ℓ′)
(S11 ℓc−→ℓS12)
<: (S21
ℓ′c−→ℓ′S22) = (S11 <: S21)
ℓc ≺ℓ′c−→ (ℓ ≺ ℓ′)(S12
<: S22)
Refℓ S
<: Refℓ′ S = Ref(ℓ ≺ ℓ′) S
S
<: S undefined otherwise
Fig. 13. SSLRef: Join and meet type functions
Definition A.1 (Valid Type Sets).
valid({ Boolℓi })
valid({ Si1 }) valid({ Si2 })
valid({ Si1 ℓc i−→ℓiSi2 })
valid({ Si })
valid({ Refℓi Si })
valid({Unitℓi })
A.2 SSLRef: Dynamic semantics
In this section we present in Figure 14 the full definition of the dynamic semantics of SSLRef.
A.3 SSLRef: Noninterference definitions
In this section we present definitions and properties of noninterference for SSLRef. Figure 15 presents
the full definition of step-indexed logical relations. The proofs can be found in Appendix B.4.
Definition A.2. Let ρ be a substitution, Γ and Σ a type substitutions. We say that substitu-
tion ρ satisfy environment Γ and Σ, written ρ |= Γ; Σ, if and only if dom(ρ) = Γ and ∀x ∈
dom(Γ),∀ℓc , Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ ρ(x) : S ′, where S ′ <: Γ(x).
Definition A.3 (Related substitutions). Tuples ⟨ℓ1, ρ1, µ1⟩ and
⟨ℓ2, ρ2, µ2⟩ are related on k steps, notation Γ; Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, ρ1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, ρ2, µ2⟩, if ρi |= Γ; Σ, Σ ⊢ µ1 ≈kℓo
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t | µ ℓc−→ t | µ Notion of Reduction
b1ℓ1 ⊕ b2ℓ2 | µ
ℓc−→ (b1 J⊕K b2)(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2) | µ (λℓ′x : S .t)ℓ v | µ ℓc−→ protℓ([v/x]t) | µ
if trueℓ then t1 else t2 | µ
ℓc−→ protℓ(t1) | µ if falseℓ then t1 else t2 | µ
ℓc−→ protℓ(t2) | µ
protℓ(v) | µ
ℓc−→ v ≺ ℓ | µ refS v | µ ℓc−→ o⊥ | µ [o 7→ v ≺ ℓc ] where o < dom(µ )
!oℓ | µ
ℓc−→ v ≺ ℓ | µ where µ (o) = v oℓ :=v | µ
ℓc−→ unit⊥ | µ [o 7→ v ≺ ℓc ≺ ℓ]
v :: S | µ ℓc−→ v ≺ label(S) | µ
t | µ ℓc7−→ t | µ Reduction
(R→) t1 | µ1
ℓc−→ t2 | µ2
t1 | µ1 ℓc7−→ t2 | µ2
(Rf )
t1 | µ1 ℓc7−→ t2 | µ2
f [t1] | µ1 ℓc7−→ f [t2] | µ2
(Rprot)
t1 | µ1 ℓc ≺ℓ7−→ t2 | µ2
protℓ(t1) | µ1
ℓc7−→ protℓ(t2) | µ2
Fig. 14. SSLRef: Label Tracking Dynamic Semantics
µ2 and
∀x ∈ Γ.Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, ρ1(x), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, ρ2(x), µ2⟩ : Γ(x)
Definition A.4 (Semantic Security Typing).
Γ; Σ; ℓc |= t : S ⇐⇒ ∀ ℓo ∈ Label,k ≥ 0, ρ1, ρ2 ∈ Subst and µ1, µ2 ∈ Store
such that Σ ⊢ µi and Γ; Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓc , ρ1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓc , ρ2, µ2⟩ , we have
Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓc , ρ1(t), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓc , ρ2(t), µ2⟩ : C(S)
Proposition A.5 (Security Type Soundness). If Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : S ′i =⇒ ∀S, S ′i <: S, Γ; Σ; ℓc |= t : S
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Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2,v2, µ2⟩ : S ⇐⇒ ℓ1 ≈ℓo ℓ2 ∧ Σ ⊢ µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 ∧ Σ; ℓi ⊢ vi : S ′i , S ′i <: S,
∧
Ä
obsℓo (ℓi , S) =⇒ obsRelΣ,Sk ,ℓo (ℓ1,v1, µ1, ℓ2, ,v2, µ2)
ä
obsRelΣ,Sk ,ℓo (ℓ1,v1, µ1, ℓ2,v2, µ2) ⇐⇒ (rval(v1) = rval(v2)) if S ∈ {Boolg,Unitg,Refg S
′}
obsRelΣ,S1
ℓ′−→ℓS2
k ,ℓo
(ℓ1,v1, µ1, ℓ2,v2, µ2) ⇐⇒ ∀j ≤ k .∀Σ ⊆ Σ′, Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ℓ2,v
′
2, µ
′
2⟩ : S1,
Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v1 v ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ℓ2,v2 v
′
2, µ
′
2⟩ : C(S2 ˜≺ g)
Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, t1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, t2, µ2⟩ : C(S) ⇐⇒ ℓ1 ≈ℓo ℓ2 ∧ Σ ⊢ µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 ∧ Σ; ℓi ⊢ ti : S ′i , S ′i <: S,∀j < k(
ti | µi ℓi7−→ j t ′i | µ ′i =⇒ Σ ⊆ Σ′, Σ′ ⊢ µ ′1 ≈k−jℓo µ
′
2∧
(irred(t ′i ) =⇒ Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, t ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−jℓo ⟨ℓ2, t
′
2, µ
′
2⟩ : S)
)
Σ ⊢ µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 ⇐⇒ Σ ⊢ µi ∧ ∀ℓi , ℓ1 ≈ℓo ℓ2, j < k,∀o ∈ dom(µ1) ∩ dom(µ2)
Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, µ1(o), µ1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ℓ2, µ2(o), µ2⟩ : Σ(o)
ℓ1 ≈ℓo ℓ2 ⇐⇒ obsℓo (ℓi ) ∨ ¬obsℓo (ℓi )
µ1 _ µ2 ⇐⇒ dom(µ1) ⊆ dom(µ2)
obsℓo (ℓ, S) ⇐⇒ obsℓo (ℓ) ∧ obsℓo (label(S))
obsℓo (ℓ) ⇐⇒ ℓ ≼ ℓo
Fig. 15. Security logical relations
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g, gc , gr ∈ GLabel, U ∈ GType, x ∈ Var, b ∈ Bool, ⊕ ∈ BoolOp
l ∈ Loc, t ∈ GTerm, r ∈ RawValue v ∈ Value
Γ ∈ Var fin⇀ GType, Σ ∈ Loc fin⇀ GType
U ::= Boolg | U
gc−→gU | Refg U | Unitg (gradual types)
g ::= ℓ | ? (gradual labels)
b ::= true | false (Booleans)
r ::= b | λgc x : U .t | unit | o (base values)
v ::= rg (values)
t ::= v | t t | t ⊕ t | if t then t else t (terms)
refU t | !t | t :=t | protg(t)
⊕ ::= ∧ | ∨ (operations)
Fig. 16. GSLRef: Syntax
Γ; Σ; g ⊢ t : U
(U x) x : U ∈ Γ
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ x : U (U b) Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ bg : Boolg (U u) Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ unitg : Unitg
(Uo) o : U ∈ Σ
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ og : Refg U (U λ)
Γ, x : U1; Σ; g′c ⊢ t : U2
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ (λg′c x : U1.t)g : U1
g′c−→gU2
(U prot)
Γ; Σ; gc ˜≺ g ⊢ t : U
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ protg(t) : U ˜≺ g (U ⊕) Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 : Boolg1 Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t2 : Boolg2Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 ⊕ t2 : Bool(g1˜ ≺g2)
(U app)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 : U11
g′c−→gU12
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t2 : U2
U2 ≲ U11 ‰ g ≺ gc ≼ g′c
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 t2 : U12 ˜≺ g (U if)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t : Boolg
Γ; Σ; gc ˜≺ g ⊢ t1 : U1 Γ; Σ; gc ˜≺ g ⊢ t2 : U2
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ if t then t1 else t2 : (U1 ˜<:U2) ˜≺ g
(U ::)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t : U1
U1 ≲ U2
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t :: U2 : U2 (U ref)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t : U ′
U ′ ≲ U gc ≼˜ label(U )
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ refU t : Ref⊥ U
(U deref)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t : Refg U
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ !t : U ˜≺ g
(U asgn)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 : Refg U1 Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t2 : U2 U2 ≲ U1 Â g ≺ gc ≼ label(U1)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1:=t2 : Unit⊥
Fig. 17. GSLRef: Static Semantics
A.4 GSLRef: Static semantics
In this section we present the syntax and static semantics of GSLRef. The syntax of GSLRef is given
in Figure 16 and is otherwise identical to that of SSLRef. Figure 17 presents the type system of
GSLRef. Each typing rule is derived from a corresponding SSLRef rule (Figure 12) by lifting labels,
types, predicates, and functions to their gradual counterparts. We also present some additional
definitions needed in gradualizing SSLRef which are not included in the paper. Finally we present
some example typing derivations in Figure 19.
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A.4.1 Additional Definitions.
Definition A.6 (Type Concretization). γS : GType→ P(Type)
γS (Boolg) = { Boolℓ | ℓ ∈ γ (g) } γS (U1
g′−→gU2) = γS (U1)
γ (g′)−→γ (g)γS (U2)
γS (Unitg) = {Unitℓ | ℓ ∈ γ (g) } γS (Refg U ) = { Refℓ S | ℓ ∈ γ (g), S ∈ γS (U ) }
Type concretization induces notions of precision and abstraction.
Definition A.7 (Type Precision). U1 ⊑ U2, if and only if γS (U1) ⊆ γS (U2).
Definition A.8 (Type Abstraction). αS : P(Type) → GType
αS ({ Boolℓi }) = Boolα ({ ℓi }) αS ({Unitℓi }) = Unitα ({ ℓi })
αS ({ Si1
ℓ′i−→ℓi Si2 }) = αS ({ Si1 })
α ({ ℓ′i })−→ α ({ ℓi })αS ({ Si2 }) αS ({ Refℓi Si }) = Refα ({ ℓi }) αS ({ Si })
αS (ÛS) is undefined otherwise
Proposition A.9 (αS is Sound and Optimal). Assuming ÛS valid:
(i) ÛS ⊆ γS (αS (ÛS)) (ii) If ÛS ⊆ γS (U ) then αS (ÛS) ⊑ U .
Definition A.10 (Gradual label meet).
g1 ˜≺ g2 = α({ ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2 | (ℓ1, ℓ2) ∈ γ (g1) × γ (g2) }).
Algorithmically:
⊥ ˜≺ ? = ? ˜≺ ⊥ = ⊥ g ˜≺ ? = ? ˜≺ g = ? if g , ⊥ ℓ1 ˜≺ ℓ2 = ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2
U ˜<:U ,U ˜<: U
˜<: : Type × Type ⇀ Type
Boolg ˜<: Boolg′ = Bool(g˜ ≺g′)
(U11
gc−→gU12) ˜<: (U21 g′c−→g′U22) = (U11 ˜<: U21)gc ˜≺ g′c−→ (g˜ ≺g′)(U12 ˜<:U22)
Refg U <: Refg′ U ′ = Ref(g˜ ≺g′) U ⊓U ′
U ˜<:U undefined otherwise
˜<: : Type × Type ⇀ Type
Boolg ˜<: Boolg′ = Bool(g˜≺ g′)
(U11
gc−→gU12) ˜<: (U21 g′c−→g′U22) = (U11 ˜<:U21)gc ˜ ≺g′c−→ (g˜≺ g′)(U12 ˜<: U22)
Refg U
<: Refg′ U ′ = Ref(g˜≺ g′) U ⊓U ′
U ˜<: U undefined otherwise
Fig. 18. GSLRef: consistent join and consistent meet
Definition A.11 (Gradual label join). g1 ˜≺ g2 = α({ ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2 | (ℓ1, ℓ2) ∈ γ (g1) × γ (g2) })
Algorithmically:
⊤ ˜≺ ? = ? ˜≺ ⊤ = ⊤ g ˜≺ ? = ? ˜≺ g = ? if g , ⊤ ℓ1 ˜≺ ℓ2 = ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2
Definition A.12 (Label Meet). g1 ⊓ g2 = α(γ (g1) ∩ γ (g2)).
Algorithmically:
g ⊓ g = g g ⊓ ? = ? ⊓ g = g
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Definition A.13 (Type Meet). U1 ⊓U2 = αS (γS (U1) ∩ γS (U2)).
Algorithmically:
g ⊓ g′
Boolg ⊓ Boolg′
g ⊓ g′
Unitg ⊓ Unitg′
g ⊓ g′ U1 ⊓U2
Refg U1 ⊓ Refg′ U2
U1 ⊓U ′1 U2 ⊓U ′2 g1 ⊓ g′1 g2 ⊓ g′2
U1
g2−→g1U2 ⊓U ′1
g′2−→g′1U ′2
Also, we introduce a function label, which yields the security label of a given type:
label : GType→ Label
label(Boolg) = g label(Unitg) = g label(U1 →g U2) = g label(Refg U ) = g
Definition A.14 (Type Precision (inductive definition)).
g1 ⊑ g2
Boolg1 ⊑ Boolg2
g1 ⊑ g2
Unitg1 ⊑ Unitg2
U11 ⊑ U21 U12 ⊑ U22 g1 ⊑ g2 gc1 ⊑ gc2
U11
gc1−→g1U12 ⊑ U21
gc2−→g2U22
g1 ⊑ g2 U1 ⊑ U2
Refg1 U1 ⊑ Refg2 U2
Definition A.15 (Consistent label ordering (inductive definition)).
? ≼˜ g g ≼˜ ?
ℓ1 ≼ ℓ2
ℓ1 ≼˜ ℓ2
Definition A.16 (Consistent subtyping (inductive definition)).
g ≼˜ g′
Boolg ≲ Boolg′
g ≼˜ g′
Unitg ≲ Unitg′
g ≼˜ g′ U1 ≲ U2 U2 ≲ U1
Refg U1 ≲ Refg′ U2
U ′1 ≲ U1 U2 ≲ U ′2 g1 ≼˜ g′1 g′2 ≼˜ g2
U1
g2−→g1U2 ≲ U ′1
g′2−→g′1U ′2
A.5 GSLεRef: Static semantics
In this section we present the full definition of the static semantics of GSLεRef.
Definition A.17 (Interval). An interval is a bounded unknown label [ℓ1, ℓ2] where ℓ1 is the upper
bound and ℓ2 is the lower bound.
ı ∈ Label2
ı ::= [ℓ, ℓ] (interval)
Definition A.18 (Evidence for labels).
ε ::= ⟨ı, ı⟩
Definition A.19 (Type Evidence). An evidence type is a gradual type labeled with an interval:
E ∈ GEType, ı ∈ Label2
E ::= Boolı | E ı−→ıE | Refı E | Unitı (type evidences)
Definition A.20 (Evidence for types).
ε ::= ⟨E, E⟩
We present the syntax of GSLεRef in Figure 20 and the static semantics in Figure 21.
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... ⊢ pub : IntL ... ⊢ priv : Int?
..·; L ⊢ pub < priv : Int? ..·; ? ⊢ 1L : IntL ...? ⊢ 1L : IntL
.,pub : IntL,priv : IntH; ·; L ⊢ if pub < priv then 1L else 2L : Int?
Int? ≲ IntL
.,pub : IntL,priv : IntH; ·; L ⊢ (if pub < priv then 1L else 2L) :: IntL : Int⊥
.,pub : IntL; .; L ⊢ (λ⊤priv : Int?.(if pub < priv then 1L else 2L) :: IntL)L : Int? ⊤−→LIntL
·; .; L ⊢ (λ⊤pub : IntL.(λ⊤priv : Int?.(if pub < priv then 1L else 2L) :: IntL)L)L :
IntL
⊤−→LInt? ⊤−→LIntL
D
·; .; L ⊢mix 1L : Int? ⊤−→LIntL
·; .; L ⊢ 5L : IntL IntL ≲ Int?
·; .; L ⊢ (mix 1L) 5L : IntL
D
·; .; L ⊢mix 1L : Int? ⊤−→LIntL
·; .; L ⊢ 5H : IntH IntH ≲ Int?
·; .; L ⊢ (mix 1L) 5H : IntL
D
·; .; L ⊢mix ′ 1L : IntH ⊤−→LIntL
·; .; L ⊢ 5L : IntL IntL ≲ IntH
·; .; L ⊢ (mix ′ 1L) 5L : IntL
D
·; .; L ⊢mix ′ 1L : IntH ⊤−→LIntL
·; .; L ⊢ 5H : IntH IntH ≲ IntH
·; .; L ⊢ (mix ′ 1L) 5H : IntL
Fig. 19. GSLRef: Example typing derivations
t ::= v | εt @ε εt | εt ⊕ εt | if εt then εt else εt | refUε εt | !εt | εt :=ε εt | protεgεg(εt) | εt
r ::= b | (λgx .t) | unit | o
u ::= rg | x
v ::= u | εu
Fig. 20. GSLεRef: Syntax
A.6 GSLεRef: Dynamic semantics
In this section we present the full definition of the dynamic semantics of GSLεRef.
We extend the syntax of GSLεRef with frames defined as follows:
f ::= h[ε]
h ::= □ ⊕ et | ev ⊕ □ | □@ε et | ev @ε □ | ε □ | if □ then et else et | !□ | □ :=ε et | ev :=ε □ | refUε □
We present the complete dynamic semantics in Figure 22, and the evaluation frames and reduction
in Figure 23. Auxiliary functions for evidence for labels is presented in Figure 24. Auxiliary functions
for evidence for types is shown in Figure 25, and the inversion functions for evidence in Figure 26.
A.7 GSLRef: Translation to GSLεRef
In this section we present the translation from terms of GSLRef into terms of GSLεRef in Figure 27.
The initial evidence function for consistent label ordering is presented in Figure 28. The initial
evidence function for consistent subtyping is presented in Figure 29 using the following definition
of operation pattern:
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(Ix) x : U ∈ Γ
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ x : U (Ib) Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ bg : Boolg (Iu) Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ unitg : Unitg
(Il) o : U ∈ Σ
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ og : Refg U (Iλ)
Γ, x : U1; Σ; ε ′g′ ⊢ t : U2 ε ′ = I⟳≼ (g′)
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ (λg′x : U1.t)g : U1
g′−→gU2
(Iprot)
Γ; Σ; ε ′g′c ⊢ t : U ′ ε1 ⊢ U ′ ≲ U ε2 ⊢ g′ ≼˜ g
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ protε2g′ε ′g′c (ε1t) : U ˜≺ g (Iε )
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ t : U1
ε1 ⊢ U1 ≲ U2
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ ε1t : U2
(Iapp)
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ ti : Ui ε1 ⊢ U1 ≲ U11
g′−→gU12 ε2 ⊢ U2 ≲ U11 ε3 ⊢ ‰ g′c ≺ g ≼ g′
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ ε1t1 @ε3 ε2t2 : U12 ˜≺ g
(Iif)
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ t1 : U1 ε1 ⊢ U1 ≲ Boolg ε ′g′c = (ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1))(gc ˜≺ g)
Γ; Σ; ε ′g′c ⊢ t2 : U2 ε2 ⊢ U2 ≲ U2 ˜<:U3 Γ; Σ; ε ′g′c ⊢ t3 : U3 ε3 ⊢ U3 ≲ U2 ˜<:U3
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ if ε1t1 then ε2t2 else ε3t3 : (U2 ˜<:U3) ˜≺ g
(I⊕)
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ t1 : U1 ε1 ⊢ U1 ≲ Boolg1
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ t2 : U2 ε2 ⊢ U2 ≲ Boolg2
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ ε1t1 ⊕ ε2t2 : Boolg1˜ ≺g2 (Iref)
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ t : U ′
ε1 ⊢ U ′ ≲ U ε2 ⊢ g′c ≼˜ label(U )
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ refUε2 ε1t : Ref⊥ U
(Ideref)
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ t : U ′ ε ′ ⊢ U ′ ≲ Refg U
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ !ε ′t : U ˜≺ g
(Iassgn)
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ t1 : Refg′ U ′1 ε1 ⊢ Refg′ U ′1 ≲ Refg U1
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ t2 : U2 ε2 ⊢ U2 ≲ U1 ε3 ⊢ Â g′c ≺ g ≼ label(U1)
Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ ε1t1 :=ε3 ε2t2 : Unit⊥
Every type rule has the extra judgment ε ⊢ gc ≼˜ g′c .
Fig. 21. GSLεRef: Static Semantics
Definition A.21 (Operation pattern).
PT ∈ GPattern, P ℓ ∈ LPattern
PT ::= _ | PT opT PT (pattern on types)
opT ::= <: |
<: | ⊓ (operations on types)
P ℓ ::= _ | P ℓ opℓ P ℓ (pattern on labels)
opℓ ::= ≺ | ≺ | ⊓ (operations on labels)
A.8 Noninterference definitions
MT ▶Fix this section with the last version of NI after we send the paper◀ The formal definitions of related
values and related computations are presented in Figures 30 and 31 respectively.
Definition A.22 (Related substitutions). Tuples ⟨gˆ1, ρ1, µ1⟩ and ⟨gˆ2, ρ2, µ2⟩ are related on k steps
under Γ and Σ, notation Γ; Σ ⊢ ⟨gˆ1, ρ1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨gˆ2, ρ2, µ2⟩, if ρi |= Γ, Σ ⊢ µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 and
∀x ∈ dom(Γ).Σ ⊢ ⟨gˆ1, ρ1(x), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨gˆ2, ρ2(x), µ2⟩ : Γ(x)
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εgc−→ : C × (C ∪ { error })
(r1) ε1(b1)g1 ⊕ ε2(b2)g2 | µ
εgc−→ (ε1 ˜≺ ε2)(b1 J⊕K b2)(g1˜ ≺g2) | µ
(r2) protε1g1ε2g2(ε3u) | µ
εgc−→ (ε3 ˜≺ ε1)(u ˜≺ g1) | µ
(r3) ε1(λg′x : U .t)g @ε3 ε2u | µ
εgc−→
®
protilbl(ε1)gε
′
1g
′
1(icod(ε1)([ε ′2u/x]t)) | µ
error if ε ′1 or ε ′2 are not defined
where:
ε ′1 = (ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1)) ◦≼ ε3 ◦≼ ilat(ε1)
ε ′2 = ε2 ◦<: idom(ε1)
g′1 = (gc ˜≺ g)
(r4) if ε1bg1 then t2 else t3 | µ
εgc−→
®
protilbl(ε1)g1ε
′g′(ε2t2) | µ if b = true
protilbl(ε1)g1ε
′g′(ε3t3) | µ if b = false
where:
ε ′ = ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1)
g′ = gc ˜≺ g1
(r5) refUε2 ε1u | µ
εgc−→
{
o⊥ | µ [o 7→ ε ′(u ˜≺ gc )]
error if (ε ◦≼ ε2) is not defined
where:
o < dom(µ )
ε ′ = ε1 ˜≺ (ε ◦≼ ε2)
(r6) !ε1og | µ
εgc−→ protilbl(ε1)gε ′g′(iref (ε1)v)
where:
µ (o) = v
ε ′ = ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1)
g′ = gc ˜≺ g
(r7) ε1og :=ε3 ε2u | µ
εgc−→
{
unit⊥ | µ [o 7→ ε ′(u ˜≺ (gc ˜≺ g))]
error if ε ′ is not defined, or ε ⌊≤⌋ ilbl(ε ′′)does not hold
where:
µ (o) = ε ′′u ′
ε ′ = (ε2 ◦<: iref (ε1)) ˜≺ ((ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1)) ◦≼ ε3 ◦≼ ilbl(iref (ε1)))
ε1(ε2u) −→<:
®(ε2 ◦<: ε1)u
error if not defined
−→<:: EvTerm × (EvTerm ∪ { error })
Fig. 22. GSLεRef: Dynamic semantics
Definition A.23 (Semantic Security Typing).
Γ; Σ; gˆ |= t : U ⇐⇒ ∀ ℓo ∈ Label,k ≥ 0, ρ1, ρ2 ∈ Subst and µ1, µ2 ∈ Store
such that Σ ⊢ µi and Γ; Σ ⊢ ⟨gˆ, ρ1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨gˆ, ρ2, µ2⟩ , we have
Σ ⊢ ⟨gˆ, ρ1(t), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨gˆ, ρ2(t), µ2⟩ : C(U )
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(R−→) t | µ
εgc−→ r r ∈ C ∪ { error }
t | µ εgc7−→ r
(Rf )
t | µ εgc7−→ t ′ | µ ′
f [t] | µ εgc7−→ f [t ′] | µ ′
(Rprot)
t | µ ε
′g′c7−→ t ′ | µ ′
protε1g1ε
′g′c (εt) | µ
εgc7−→ protε1g1ε ′g′c (εt ′) | µ ′
(Rh)
εv −→<: ε ′u
h[εv] | µ εgc7−→ h[ε ′u] | µ
(Rproth)
εv −→<: ε ′u
protε1g1ε
′g′c (εv) | µ
εgc7−→ protε1g1ε ′g′c (ε ′u) | µ
(Rf err)
t | µ εgc7−→ error
f [t] | µ εgc7−→ error
(Rherr)
εv −→<: error
h[εv] | µ εgc7−→ error
(Rproterr)
t | µ ε
′g′c7−→ error
protε1g1ε
′g′c (εt) | µ
εgc7−→ error
(Rprotherr)
εv −→<: error
protε1g1ε
′g′c (εv) | µ
εgc7−→ error
Fig. 23. GSLεRef: Evaluation frames and reduction
ℓ1 ≺ ℓ′1 ≼ ℓ2 ≺ ℓ′2
[ℓ1, ℓ2] ⊓ [ℓ′1, ℓ′2] = [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ′1, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ′2]
⟨ı1, ı2⟩ ⊓ ⟨ı′1, ı′2⟩ = ⟨ı1 ⊓ ı′1, ı2 ⊓ ı′2⟩
⟨ı1, ı2⟩ ˜≺ ⟨ı′1, ı′2⟩ = ⟨ı1 ≺ ı′1, ı2 ≺ ı′2⟩ ⟨ı1, ı2⟩ ˜≺ ⟨ı′1, ı′2⟩ = ⟨ı1 ≺ ı′1, ı2 ≺ ı′2⟩
ℓ1 ≼ ℓ′2 ℓ′1 ≼ ℓ′′2 ℓ1 ≼ ℓ′′2
△≼([ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ′1, ℓ′2], [ℓ′′1 , ℓ′′2 ]) = ⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ′2 ≺ ℓ′′2 ], [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ′1 ≺ ℓ′′1 , ℓ′′2 ]⟩
⟨ı1, ı21⟩ ◦≼ ⟨ı22, ı3⟩ = △≼(ı1, ı21 ⊓ ı22, ı3)
ℓ3 ≼ ℓ′3
⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ3, ℓ4]⟩ ⌊≤⌋ ⟨[ℓ′1, ℓ′2], [ℓ′3, ℓ′4]⟩
Fig. 24. GSLεRef: Auxiliary functions for the dynamic semantics (Labels)
Proposition 5.5 (Security Type Soundness). Γ; Σ; gˆ ⊢ t : U =⇒ Γ; Σ; gˆ |= t : U
Proof. Proof in Appendix E. □
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Boolı ⊓ Boolı ′ = Boolı⊓ı ′ Refı E1 ⊓ Refı ′ E2 = Refı⊓ı ′ E1 ⊓ E2
(E11 ı2−→ı1E12) ⊓ (E21
ı′2−→ı′1E22) = (E11 ⊓ E21)
ı2⊓ı′2−→ı1⊓ı′1 (E12 ⊓ E22) E ⊓ E ′ undefined otherwise
Boolı1 ˜≺ ı2 = Bool(ı1˜ ≺ı2) E1 ı2−→ı1E2 ˜≺ ı3 = E1 ı2−→(ı1˜ ≺ı3)E2 Refı1 E ˜≺ ı2 = Ref(ı1˜ ≺ı2) E
Boolı1 ˜≺ ı2 = Bool(ı1˜≺ ı2) E1 ı2−→ı1E2 ˜≺ ı3 = E1 ı2−→(ı1˜≺ ı3)E2 Refı1 E ˜≺ ı2 = Ref(ı1˜≺ ı2) E
⟨E1, E2⟩ ˜≺ ⟨ı1, ı2⟩ = ⟨E1 ˜≺ ı1, E2 ˜≺ ı2⟩ ⟨E1, E2⟩ ˜≺ ⟨ı1, ı2⟩ = ⟨E1 ˜≺ ı1, E2 ˜≺ ı2⟩
Boolı1 ˜≺ Boolı2 = Bool(ı1˜ ≺ı2) E1 ı2−→ı1E2 ˜≺ E ′1 ı′2−→ı′1E ′2 = E1 ˜≺ E ′1ı2˜
≺
ı′2−→(ı1˜ ≺ı′1)E2 ˜≺ E ′2
Refı1 E1 ˜≺ Refı′1 E ′1 = Ref(ı1˜ ≺ı′1) E1 ⊓ E ′1 Boolı1 ˜≺ Boolı2 = Bool(ı1˜≺ ı2)
E1
ı2−→ı1E2 ˜≺ E ′1 ı′2−→ı′1E ′2 = E1 ˜≺ E ′1ı2˜ ≺ı′2−→(ı1˜≺ ı′1)E2 ˜≺ E ′2 Refı1 E1 ˜≺ Refı′1 E ′1 = Ref(ı1˜≺ ı′1) E1 ⊓ E ′1
⟨E1, E2⟩ ˜≺ ⟨E ′1, E ′2⟩ = ⟨E1 ˜≺ E ′1, E2 ˜≺ E ′2⟩ ⟨E1, E2⟩ ˜≺ ⟨E ′1, E ′2⟩ = ⟨E1 ˜≺ E ′1, E2 ˜≺ E ′2⟩
△≼(ı1, ı2, ı3) = ⟨ı′1, ı′3⟩
△<:(Boolı1 ,Boolı2 ,Boolı3 ) = ⟨Boolı′1 ,Boolı′3 ⟩
△<:(E31, E21, E11) = ⟨E ′31, E ′11⟩ △<:(E12, E22, E32) = ⟨E ′12, E ′32⟩
△≼(ı1, ı2, ı3) = ⟨ı′1, ı′3⟩ △≼(ı13, ı12, ı11) = ⟨ı′13, ı′11⟩
△<:(E11 ı11−→ı1E12, E21
ı12−→ı2E22, E31
ı13−→ı3E32) = ⟨E ′11
ı′11−→ı′1E ′12, E ′31
ı′13−→ı′3E ′32⟩
△≼(ı1, ı2, ı3) = ⟨ı′1, ı′3⟩ E ′1 = E1 ⊓ E2 E ′3 = E2 ⊓ E3
△<:(Refı1 E1,Refı2 E2,Refı3 E3) = ⟨Refı′1 E ′1,Refı′3 E ′3⟩
⟨E1, E21⟩ ◦<: ⟨E22, E3⟩ = △<:(E1, E21 ⊓ E22, E3)
Fig. 25. GSLεRef: Auxiliary functions for the dynamic semantics (Types)
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ilbl(⟨Boolı1 ,Boolı2 ⟩) = ⟨ı1, ı2⟩
ilbl(⟨Unitı1 ,Unitı2 ⟩) = ⟨ı1, ı2⟩
ilbl(⟨Refı1 U1,Refı2 U2⟩) = ⟨ı1, ı2⟩
ilbl(⟨E1 ı2−→ı1E2, E ′1
ı′2−→ı′1E ′2⟩) = ⟨ı1, ı′1⟩
iref (⟨Refı1 E1,Refı2 E2⟩) = ⟨E1, E2⟩
iref (⟨E1, E2⟩) = undefined otherwise
idom(⟨E1 ı2−→ı1E2, E ′1
ı′2−→ı′1E ′2⟩) = ⟨E ′1, E1⟩
idom(⟨E1, E2⟩) = undefined otherwise
icod(⟨E1 ı2−→ı1E2, E ′1
ı′2−→ı′1E ′2⟩) = ⟨E2, E ′2⟩
icod(⟨E1, E2⟩) = undefined otherwise
Fig. 26. GSLεRef: Inversion functions for evidence
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Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t { t ′ : U
(T x)
Γ(x) = U
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ x { x : U (T b) Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ bg { bg : Boolg
(T u)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ unitg { unitg : Unitg (T λ)
Γ; Σ; g′ ⊢ t { t ′ : U2
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ (λg′x : U1.t)g { (λg′x : U1.t ′)g : U1
g′−→gU2
(T ⊕)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 { t ′1 : Boolg1 Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t2 { t ′2 : Boolg2
ε1 = I⟳JBoolg1K ε2 = I⟳JBoolg2K
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 ⊕ t2 { ε1t ′1 ⊕ ε2t ′2 : Boolg1˜ ≺g2
(T app)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 { t ′1 : U11
g′−→gU12 Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t2 { t ′2 : U2
ε1 = I⟳JU11 g′−→gU12K ε2 = IJU2 ≲ U11K ε3 = IJ‰ gc ≺ g ≼ g′K
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 t2 { ε1t ′1 @ε3 ε2t ′2 : U12 ˜≺ g
(T if)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 { t ′1 : Boolg g′c = gc ˜≺ g Γ; Σ; g′c ⊢ t2 { t ′2 : U2 Γ; Σ; g′c ⊢ t3 { t ′3 : U3
ε1 = I⟳JBoolgK ε2 = IJÂ U2 <: U2 <:U3K ε3 = IJÂ U3 <: U2 <:U3K
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ if t1 then t2 else t3 { if ε1t1 then ε2t2 else ε3t3 : (U2 ˜<:U3) ˜≺ g
(T assgn)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 { t ′1 : Refg U1 Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t2 { t ′2 : U2
ε1 = I⟳JRefg U1K ε2 = IJU2 ≲ U1K ε3 = IJ Â gc ≺ g ≼ label(U1)K
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1:=t2 { ε1t ′1 :=ε3 ε2t ′2 : Unit⊥
(T ref)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t { t ′ : U ′
ε1 = IJU ′ ≲ U K ε2 = IJgc ≼˜ label(U )K
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ refU t { refUε2 ε1t ′ : Ref⊥ U
(T deref)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t { t ′ : Refg U
ε = I⟳JRefg U K
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ !t { !εt ′ : U ˜≺ g
(T ::)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t { t ′ : U1 ε = IJU1 ≲ U2K
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t :: U2 { εt ′ : U2
where I⟳JgK = IJg ≼˜ gK and I⟳JU K = IJU ≲ U K
Fig. 27. GSLRef: translation to GSL
ε
Ref terms
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bounds(?) = [⊥,⊤]
bounds(ℓ) = [ℓ, ℓ]
bounds(x1 ≺ x2) = bounds(x1) ≺ bounds(x2)
bounds(x1 ≺ x2) = bounds(x1) ≺ bounds(x2)
bounds(x1 ⊓ x2) = bounds(x1) ⊓ bounds(x2)
bounds(F1(xi ) ≺ F2(xi )) = bounds(F1(xi )) ≺ bounds(F2(xi ))
bounds(F1(xi ) ≺ F2(xi )) = bounds(F1(xi )) ≺ bounds(F2(xi ))
bounds(F1(xi ) ⊓ F2(xi )) = bounds(F1(xi )) ⊓ bounds(F2(ℓi ))
bounds(F1(gi )) = [ℓ1, ℓ2] bounds(F2(gj )) = [ℓ′1, ℓ′2]
I( Â F1(g1, ...gn ) ≼ F2(gn+1, ...gn+m )) = ⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ′2], [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ′1, ℓ′2]⟩
where F1 : GLabeln → GLabel and F2 : GLabelm → GLabel.
I⟳(Â F (g1, ..., gn )) = I( Â F (g1, ..., gn ) ≼ F (g1, ..., gn ))
Fig. 28. GSLεRef: Initial evidence for gradual labels
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liftP(_) = _
liftP(PT1 <: PT2 ) = liftP(PT1 ) ≺ liftP(PT2 )
liftP(PT1
<: PT2 ) = liftP(PT1 ) ≺ liftP(PT2 )
liftP(PT1 ⊓ PT2 ) = liftP(PT1 ) ⊓ liftP(PT2 )
invert(_) = _
invert(PT1 <: PT2 ) = invert(PT1 )
<: invert(PT2 )
invert(PT1
<: PT2 ) = invert(PT1 ) <: invert(PT2 )
invert(PT1 ⊓ PT2 ) = invert(PT1 ) ⊓ invert(PT2 )
tomeet(_) = _
tomeet(PT1 <: PT2 ) = tomeet(PT1 ) ⊓ tomeet(PT2 )
tomeet(PT1
<: PT2 ) = tomeet(PT1 ) ⊓ tomeet(PT2 )
tomeet(PT1 ⊓ PT2 ) = tomeet(PT1 ) ⊓ tomeet(PT2 )
IJ Â liftP(G1)(ℓi ) <: liftP(G2)(ℓj )K = ⟨ı1, ı2⟩
IJ Â G1(Boolgi ) ≼ G2(Boolgj )K = ⟨Boolı1 ,Boolı2 ⟩
IJ Â invert(G2)(Uj1) <: invert(G1)(Ui1)K = ⟨E ′21, E ′11⟩ IJ Â G1(Ui2) <: G2(Uj2)K = ⟨E12, E22⟩
IJ Â liftP(G1)(ℓi1) <: liftP(G2)(ℓj1)K = ⟨ı11, ı12⟩
IJ Â liftP(invert(G2))(ℓj2) <: liftP(invert(G1))(ℓi2)K = ⟨ı22, ı21⟩
IJ Â G1(Ui1 gi2−→gi1Ui2) <: G2(Uj1 gj2−→gj1Uj2)K = ⟨E11 ı21−→ı11E12, E21 ı22−→ı12E22⟩
IJ Â liftP(G1)(ℓi ) <: liftP(G2)(ℓj )K = ⟨ı1, ı2⟩
IJ Â tomeet(G1)(Ui ) <: tomeet(G2)(Uj )K = ⟨E1, E2⟩
IJ Â tomeet(G2)(Uj ) <: tomeet(G1)(Ui )K = ⟨E ′2, E ′1⟩
IJ Â G1(Refgi Ui ) <: G2(Refgj Uj )K = ⟨Refı1 E1 ⊓ E ′1,Refı2 E2 ⊓ E ′2⟩
where G1 : GLabeln → GLabel and G2 : GLabelm → GLabel, and G1(x1, ..., xn ) = PT1 (x1, ..., xn ),
G2(x1, ..., xn ) = PT2 (x1, ..., xm ).
I⟳(Â F (U1, ...,Un )) = IJ Â F (U1, ...,Un ) <: F (U1, ...,Un )K
Fig. 29. GSLεRef: Initial evidence for gradual types
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Σ ⊢ ⟨gˆ1,v1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨gˆ2,v2, µ2⟩ : U ⇐⇒ gˆ1 ≈ℓo gˆ2 ∧ Σ ⊢µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 ∧ ·; Σ; gˆi ⊢ vi : U∧
(obsValUℓo (vi ) ∨ ¬obsValUℓo (vi )) ∧
((obsValUℓo (vi ) ∧ obsEvg′iℓo (εi )) =⇒ obsRelΣ,Uk ,ℓo (gˆ1,v1, µ1, gˆ2,v2, µ2))
where gˆi = εigi , and εi ⊢ gi ≼˜ g′i .
obsRelΣ,Uk ,ℓo (gˆ1,v1, µ1, gˆ2,v2, µ2) ⇐⇒ rval(v1) = rval(v2) ifU ∈ {Boolg,Unitg,Refg U
′}
obsRel
Σ,U1
g32−→g31U2
k ,ℓo
(gˆ1,v1, µ1, gˆ2,v2, µ2) ⇐⇒ ∀j ≤ k .∀U ′ = U ′1
g′32−→g′31U ′2 ,∀U ′′1 ,∀gˆ′i , s.t. gˆi ≤ℓo gˆ′i ,
ε11 ⊢ U1
g32−→g31U2 ≲ U ′, and ε12 ⊢ U ′′1 ≲ U ′1 , ε3i ⊢ Â g′ci ≺ g′31 ≼ g′32 we have:
∀v ′i , µ ′i , Σ′,Σ ⊆ Σ′,Σ′ ⊢ ⟨gˆ1,v ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨gˆ2,v
′
2, µ
′
2⟩ : U ′′1 , dom(µi ) ⊆ dom(µ ′i ),
Σ′ ⊢ ⟨gˆ1, (ε11v1 @ε31 ε12v ′1), µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨gˆ2, (ε11v2 @ε32 ε12v
′
2), µ ′2⟩ : C(U ′2 ˜≺ g′31)
where gˆ′i = ε ′ig′i , and ε ′i ⊢ g′i ≼˜ g′ci .
Fig. 30. Related values
Σ ⊢ ⟨gˆ1, t1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨gˆ2, t2, µ2⟩ : C(U ) ⇐⇒ gˆ1 ≈ℓo gˆ2 ∧ µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 ∧ ∀gˆ′i , s.t. gˆi ≤ℓo gˆ′i and
·; Σ; gˆ′i ⊢ ti : U ,∀j < k,
(
ti | µi
gˆ′i7−→ j t ′i | µ ′i =⇒ ∃Σ′, Σ ⊆ Σ′
Σ′ ⊢µ ′1 ≈k−jℓo µ
′
2 ∧ ((irred(t ′1) ∧ irred(t ′2)) =⇒ Σ′ ⊢ ⟨gˆ1, t ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−jℓo ⟨gˆ2, t
′
2, µ
′
2⟩ : U )
)
Fig. 31. Related computations for intrinsic terms
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B STATIC SECURITY TYPINGWITH REFERENCES
In this section we present the proof of type preservation for SSLRef in Sec. B.1, and the definitions
and proof of noninterference for SSLRef in Sec. B.2.
B.1 SSLRef: Static type safety
In this section we present the proof of type safety for SSLRef.
Definition B.1 (Well typeness of the store). A store µ is said to be well typed with respect to a
typing context Γ and a store typing Σ, written Γ; Σ ⊢ µ , if dom(µ) = dom(Σ) and ∀o ∈ dom(µ),
Γ; Σ;⊥ ⊢ µ(o) : S and S <: Σ(o).
Lemma B.2. If Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : S then ∀ℓ′c ≼ ℓc , Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ t : S .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : S . Noticing that none of the inferred types
of the type rules depend on ℓc .
Case (Sx, Sb, Su, Sl). Trivial because neither the premises and the infered type depend on the
security effect.
Case (S⊕). Then t = b1ℓ1 ⊕ b2ℓ2 and
(S⊕)
(Sb)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ b1ℓ1 : Boolℓ1
(Sb)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ b2ℓ2 : Boolℓ2
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ b1ℓ1 ⊕ b2ℓ2 : Bool(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2)
Suppose ℓ′c such that ℓ′c ≼ ℓc , then by induction hypotheses on the premises:
(S⊕)
(Sb)
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ b1ℓ1 : Boolℓ′1
(Sb)
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ b2ℓ2 : Boolℓ′2
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ b1ℓ1 ⊕ b2ℓ2 : Bool(ℓ′1 ≺ℓ′2)
where ℓ′1 = ℓ1 and ℓ′2 = ℓ2 and the result holds.
Case (Sprot). Then t = protℓ(t) and
(Sprot)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ t : S
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ protℓ(t) : S ≺ ℓ
Suppose ℓ′c such that ℓ′c ≼ ℓc . Considering that ℓ′c ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓc ≺ ℓ, then by induction hypotheses on the
premise:
(Sprot)
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ≺ ℓ ⊢ t : S
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ protℓ(t) : S ≺ ℓ
and therefore the result holds.
Case (Sapp). Then t = t1 t2 and
(Sapp)
(Sλ)
D1
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 : S11
ℓ′′c−→ℓ′S12
D2
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t2 : S2 ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓ′′c S2 <: S11
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 t2 : S12 ≺ ℓ
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Suppose ℓ′c such that ℓ′c ≼ ℓc . Then by using induction hypotheses on the premisess, considering
S ′11
ℓ′′′c−→ℓ′S ′12 <: S11
ℓ′′c−→ℓS12 and S ′2 <: S2. As S2 <: S11 and S11 <: S ′11 then S ′2 <: S ′11. Also, by
definition of the join operator ℓ′c ≺ ℓ′ ≼ ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓ′′c ≼ ℓ′′′c , and then:
(Sapp)
(Sλ)
D1
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ t1 : S ′11
ℓ′′′c−→ℓ′S ′12
D2
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ t2 : S ′2 ℓ′c ≺ ℓ′ ≼ ℓ′′′c S ′2 <: S ′11
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ t1 t2 : S ′12 ≺ ℓ′
Where S ′12 ≺ ℓ′ = S12 ≺ ℓ and the result holds.
Case (Sif-true). Then t = if trueℓ then t1 else t2 and
(Sif)
D0
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ trueℓ : Boolℓ
D1
Γ; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ t1 : S1
D2
Γ; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ t2 : S2
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ if trueℓ then t1 else t2 : (S1 <: S2) ≺ ℓ
Suppose ℓ′c such that ℓ′c ≼ ℓc .As ℓ′c ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓc ≺ ℓ, by induction hypotheses in the premises:
(Sif)
D0
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ trueℓ : Boolℓ
D1
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ≺ ℓ ⊢ t1 : S ′1
D2
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ≺ ℓ ⊢ t2 : S ′2
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ if trueℓ then t1 else t2 : (S ′1 <: S ′2) ≺ ℓ
where S ′1 = S1, S ′2 = S2. Then (S ′1 <: S ′2) ≺ ℓ = (S1 <: S2) ≺ ℓ and therefore the result holds.
Case (Sif-false). Analogous to case (if-true).
Case (Sref). Then t = refS v and
(Sref)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v : S ′ S ′ <: S ℓc ≼ label(S)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ refS v : Ref⊥ S
Suppose ℓ′c such that ℓ′c ≼ ℓc . By using induction hypotheses in the premise, considering ℓ′c ≼ ℓc ≼
label(S):
(Sref)
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ v : S ′ S ′ <: S ℓ′c ≼ label(S)
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ refS v : Ref⊥ S
and the result holds.
Case (Sderef). Then t = !oℓ and
(Sderef)
(Sl) o : S ∈ Σ
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ oℓ : Refℓ S
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ !oℓ : S ≺ ℓ
Suppose ℓ′c such that ℓ′c ≼ ℓc , then by using induction hypotheses in the premise:
(Sderef)
(Sl) o : S ∈ Σ
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ oℓ : Refℓ′ S
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ !oℓ : S ≺ ℓ′
where ℓ′ = ℓ. and the result holds.
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Case (Sassgn). Then t = oℓ :=v and
(Sasgn)
o : S ∈ Σ
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ oℓ : Refℓ S
D
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v : S2
S2 <: S ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ label(S)
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ oℓ :=v : Unit⊥
Suppose ℓ′c such that ℓ′c ≼ ℓc . Considering that ℓ′c ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ label(S), and S ′2 <: S2 <: S , then:
(Sasgn)
o : S ∈ Σ
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ oℓ : Refℓ S
D
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ v : S ′2
S ′2 <: S ℓ′c ≺ ℓ ≼ label(S)
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ oℓ :=v : Unit⊥
but
Unit⊥ <: Unit⊥
and therefore the result holds.
Case (S::). Then t = v :: S and
(S::)
D
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v : S1 S1 <: S
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v :: S : S
Suppose ℓ′c such that ℓ′c ≼ ℓc , then by Lemma B.4
(S::)
D
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ v : S1 S1 <: S
Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ v :: S : S
and the result holds.
□
Lemma B.3 (Substitution). If Γ, x : S1; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : S and Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v : S ′1 such that S ′1 <: S1, then
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ [v/x]t : S ′ such that S ′ <: S .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ, x : S1; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : S . □
Lemma B.4. If Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v : S then ∀ℓ′c , Γ; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ v : S .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v : S observing that for values, there is no
premise that depends on ℓc . □
Proposition B.5 ( −→ is well defined). If ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : S , ·; Σ ⊢ µ and ∀ ℓr , such that ℓr ≼ ℓc ,
t | µ ℓr−→ t ′ | µ ′ then, for some Σ′ ⊇ Σ, ·; Σ′; ℓc ⊢ t ′ : S ′, where S ′ <: S and ·; Σ′ ⊢ µ ′.
Proof.
Case (S⊕). Then t = b1ℓ1 ⊕ b2ℓ2 and
(S⊕)
(Sb) ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ b1ℓ1 : Boolℓ1
(Sb) ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ b2ℓ2 : Boolℓ2
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ b1ℓ1 ⊕ b2ℓ2 : Bool(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2)
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Suppose ℓr such that ℓr ≼ ℓc , then
b1ℓ1 ⊕ b2ℓ2 | µ
ℓr−→ (b1 J⊕K b2)(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2) | µ
Then
(S⊕)
ℓc ⊢ (b1 J⊕K b2)(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2) : Bool(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2)
Case (Sprot). Then t = protℓ(v) and
(Sprot)
·; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ v : S
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ protℓ(v) : S ≺ ℓ
Suppose ℓr such that ℓr ≼ ℓc , then
protℓ(v) | µ
ℓr−→ v ≺ ℓ | µ
But by Lemma B.2, ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v : S .
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v ≺ ℓ : S ≺ ℓ
and the result holds.
Case (Sapp). Then t = (λℓ′cx : S11.t)ℓ v and
(Sapp)
(Sλ)
D1
·, x : S11; Σ; ℓ′c ⊢ t : S12
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ (λℓ′cx : S11.t)ℓ : S11
ℓ′c−→ℓS12
D2
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v : S2 ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓ′c S2 <: S11
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ (λℓ′cx : S11.t)ℓ v : S12 ≺ ℓ
Suppose ℓr such that ℓr ≼ ℓc , and
(λℓ′cx : S11.t)ℓ v | µ ℓr−→ protℓ([v/x]t) | µ
But as ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓ′c then by Lemma B.2, ·; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ t : S ′12, where S ′12 <: S12.
By Lemma B.3 and Lemma B.4, ·; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ [v/x]t : S ′′12, where S ′′12 <: S ′12 <: S12. Then
(Sprot)
D ′1
·; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ [v/x]t : S ′′12
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ protℓ([v/x]t) : S ′′12 ≺ ℓ
Where S ′′12 ≺ ℓ <: S12 ≺ ℓ and the result holds.
Case (Sif-true). Then t = if trueℓ then t1 else t2 and
(Sif)
D0
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ trueℓ : Boolℓ
D1
·; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ t1 : S1
D2
·; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ t2 : S2
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ if trueℓ then t1 else t2 : (S1 <: S2) ≺ ℓ
Suppose ℓr such that ℓr ≼ ℓc , then if
if trueℓ then t1 else t2 | µ ℓr−→ protℓ(t1) | µ
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Then
(Sprot)
D1
·; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ t1 : S1
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ protℓ(t1) : S1 ≺ ℓ
and by definition of the join operator, S1 ≺ ℓ <: (S1 <: S2) ≺ ℓ and the result holds.
Case (Sif-false). Analogous to case (if-true).
Case (Sref). Then t = refS v and
(Sref)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v : S ′ S ′ <: S ℓc ≼ label(S)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ refS v : Ref⊥ S
Suppose ℓr such that ℓr ≼ ℓc , then
refS v | µ ℓr−→ o⊥ | µ[o 7→ v ≺ ℓr ]
where o < dom(µ).
Let us take Σ′ = Σ,o : S and let us call µ ′ = µ[o 7→ v ≺ ℓr ]. Then as dom(µ) = dom(Σ) then
dom(µ ′) = dom(Σ′). Also, as ℓr ≼ ℓc ≼ label(S) then by Lemma B.4, ·; Σ′;⊥ ⊢ v : S ′ ≺ ℓr and
S ′ ≺ ℓr <: Σ(o) = S . Therefore ·; Σ′ ⊢ µ ′.
Then
(Sl) o : S ∈ Σ′·; Σ′; ℓc ⊢ o⊥ : Ref⊥ S
and the result holds.
Case (Sderef). Then t = !oℓ and
(Sderef)
(Sl) o : S ∈ Σ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ oℓ : Refℓ S
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ !oℓ : S ≺ ℓ
Suppose ℓr such that ℓr ≼ ℓc , then
!oℓ | µ ℓr−→ v ≺ ℓ | µ where µ(o) = v
Also ·; Σ ⊢ µ then ·; Σ;⊥ ⊢ µ(o) : S ′ and S ′ <: S . By Lemma B.4, ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v : S ′
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v ≺ ℓ : S ′ ≺ ℓ
But S ′ ≺ ℓ <: S ≺ ℓ and the result holds.
Case (Sassgn). Then t = oℓ :=v and
(Sasgn)
o : S ∈ Σ
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ oℓ : Refℓ S
D
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v : S2
S2 <: S ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ label(S)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ oℓ :=v : Unit⊥
Suppose ℓr such that ℓr ≼ ℓc , then
oℓ :=v | µ ℓr−→ unit⊥ | µ[o 7→ v ≺ ℓr ≺ ℓ]
Let us call µ ′ = µ[o 7→ v ≺ ℓr ≺ ℓ]. Also ·; Σ ⊢ µ then dom(µ ′) = dom(Σ), and ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v : S2 where
S2 <: S . Therefore ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v ≺ ℓr ≺ ℓ : S2 ≺ ℓr ≺ ℓ. But ℓr ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ label(S), then S2 ≺ ℓr ≺ ℓ <: S
and therefore ·; Σ ⊢ µ ′. Also
(Su) ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ unit⊥ : Unit⊥
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but
Unit⊥ <: Unit⊥
and therefore the result holds.
Case (S::). Then t = v :: S and
(S::)
D
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v : S1 S1 <: S
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v :: S : S
Suppose ℓr such that ℓr ≼ ℓc , then
v :: S | µ ℓr−→ v ≺ label(S) | µ
But S1 <: S then S1 ≺ S = S and therefore S1 ≺ label(S) = S . Therefore:
Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v ≺ label(S) : S
and the result holds.
□
Proposition B.6 (Canonical forms). Consider a value v such that ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ v : S . Then:
(1) If S = Boolℓ then v = bℓ for some b.
(2) If S = Unitℓ then v = unitℓ .
(3) If S = S1
ℓ′c−→ℓS2 then v = (λℓ′cx : S1.t2) for some t2 and ℓ′c .
(4) If S = Refℓ S then v = oℓ for some location o.
Proof. By inspection of the type derivation rules. □
Proposition 3.1 (Type Safety). If ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : S then either
• t is a value v
• for any store µ such that Σ ⊢ µ and any ℓ′c ≼ ℓc , we have t | µ
ℓ′c7−→ t ′ | µ ′ and ·; Σ′; ℓc ⊢ t ′ : S ′
for some S ′ <: S , and some Σ′ ⊇ Σ such that Σ′ ⊢ µ ′.
Proof. By induction on the structure of t .
Case (Sb, Su, Sλ, Sl). t is a value.
Case (Sprot). Then t = protℓ(t) and
(Sprot)
·; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ t1 : S1
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ protℓ(t1) : S1 ≺ ℓ
By induction hypotheses, one of the following holds:
(1) t1 is a value. Then by (R→) and Canonical Forms (Lemma B.6). t | µ ℓr7−→ t ′ | µ and by
Prop B.5, ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′ : S ′ where S ′ <: S and the result holds.
(2) Suppose ℓr such that ℓr ≼ ℓc , then
(Rprot)
t1 | µ ℓr ≺ℓ7−→ t2 | µ ′
protℓ(t1) | µ
ℓr7−→ protℓ(t2) | µ ′
As ℓr ≼ ℓc then ℓr ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓc ≺ ℓ. Using induction hypotheses ·; Σ′; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ t2 : S ′1 where S ′1 <: S1
and ·; Σ′ ⊢ µ ′. Therefore
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(Sprot)
·; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ t2 : S ′1
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ protℓ(t2) : S ′1 ≺ ℓ
but S ′1 ≺ ℓ <: S1 ≺ ℓ and the result holds.
Case (S⊕). Then t = t1 ⊕ t2 and
(S⊕)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 : Boolℓ1 ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t2 : Boolℓ2
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 ⊕ t2 : Bool(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2)
By induction hypotheses, one of the following holds:
(1) t1 is a value. Then by induction on t2 one of the following holds:
(a) t2 is a value. Then by Canonical Forms (Lemma B.6)
(R→)
t | µ ℓr−→ t ′ | µ
t | µ ℓr7−→ t ′ | µ
and by Prop B.5, ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′ : S ′, where S ′ <: S , therefore the result holds.
(b) t2 | µ ℓr
′
7−→ t ′2 | µ ′ for all ℓr ′ such that ℓr ′ ≼ ℓc , in particular we pick ℓr ′ = ℓr . Then by
induction hypothesis, ·; Σ′; ℓc ⊢ t2 : Boolℓ′2 , where Boolℓ′2 <: Boolℓ2 and ·; Σ′ ⊢ µ ′.
Then by (Sf ), t | µ ℓr7−→ t1 ⊕ t ′2 | µ ′ and:
(S⊕)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 : Boolℓ1 ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′2 : Boolℓ′2
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 ⊕ t ′2 : Bool(ℓ1 ≺ℓ′2)
but
(ℓ1 ≺ ℓ′2) ≼ (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2)
Bool(ℓ1 ≺ℓ′2) <: Bool(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2)
and the result holds.
(2) t1 | µ ℓr7−→ t ′1 | µ ′ for all ℓr ′ such that ℓr ′ ≼ ℓc , in particular we pick ℓr ′ = ℓr . Then by
induction hypotheses, ·; Σ′; ℓc ⊢ t ′1 : Boolℓ′1 where Boolℓ′1 <: Boolℓ1 , and ·; Σ ⊢ µ ′. Then by
(Sf ), t | µ ℓr7−→ t ′1 ⊕ t2 | µ ′ and:
(S⊕)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′1 : Boolℓ′1 ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t2 : Boolℓ2
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′1 ⊕ t2 : Bool(ℓ′1 ≺ℓ2)
but
(ℓ′1 ≺ ℓ2) ≼ (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2)
Bool(ℓ′1 ≺ℓ2) <: Bool(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2)
and the result holds.
Case (Sapp). Then t = t1 t2, S = S12 ≺ ℓ and
(Sapp)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 : S11
ℓ′c−→ℓS12 ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t2 : S2
S2 <: S11 ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓ′c
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 t2 : S12 ≺ ℓ
By induction hypotheses, one of the following holds:
(1) t1 is a value. Then by Canonical Forms (Lemma B.6), and induction on t2 one of the following
holds:
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(a) t2 is a value. Then by Canonical Forms (Lemma B.6)
(R→)
t | µ ℓr−→ t ′ | µ
t | µ ℓr7−→ t ′ | µ
and by Prop B.5 ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′ : S ′, where S ′ <: S , therefore the result holds.
(b) t2 | µ ℓr
′
7−→ t ′2 | µ ′ for all ℓr ′ such that ℓr ′ ≼ ℓc , in particular we pick ℓr ′ = ℓr . Then by
induction hypothesis, ·; Σ′; ℓc ⊢ t2 : S ′2, where S ′2 <: S2 and ·; Σ′ ⊢ µ ′.
Then by (Sf ), t | µ ℓr7−→ t1 t ′2 | µ ′. But S ′2 <: S2 <: S11 and then:
(Sapp)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 : S11
ℓ′c−→ℓS12 ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′2 : S ′2
S ′2 <: S11 ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓ′c
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 t2 : S12 ≺ ℓ
and the result holds.
(2) t1 | µ ℓr7−→ t ′1 | µ ′ for all ℓr ′ such that ℓr ′ ≼ ℓc , in particular we pick ℓr ′ = ℓr . Then by induction
hypotheses, ·; Σ′; ℓc ⊢ t ′1 : S ′11
ℓ′′c−→ℓ′S ′12 where S ′11
ℓ′′c−→ℓ′S ′12 <: S11
ℓ′c−→ℓS12, and ·; Σ′ ⊢ µ ′. Then
by (Sf ), t | µ ℓr7−→ t ′1 t2 | µ ′. By definition of subtyping, S2 <: S11 <: S ′11, ℓ′c ≼ ℓ′′c and ℓ′ ≼ ℓ.
Therefore ℓc ≺ ℓ′ ≼ ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ ℓ′c ≼ ℓ′′c . Then
(Sapp)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′1 : S ′11
ℓ′′c−→ℓ′S ′12 ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t2 : S2
S2 <: S ′11 ℓc ≺ ℓ′ ≼ ℓ′′c
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′1 t2 : S ′12 ≺ ℓ′
but S ′12 ≺ ℓ′ <: S12 ≺ ℓ and the result holds.
Case (Sif). Then t = if t0 then t1 else t2 and
(Sif)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t0 : Boolℓ
·; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ t1 : S1 ·; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ t2 : S2
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ if t0 then t1 else t2 : (S1 <: S2) ≺ ℓ
By induction hypotheses, one of the following holds:
(1) t0 is a value. Then by Canonical Forms (Lemma B.6)
(R→)
t | µ ℓr−→ t ′ | µ
t | µ ℓr7−→ t ′ | µ
and by Prop B.5, ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′ : S ′, where S ′ <: S , therefore the result holds.
(2) t0 | µ ℓr
′
7−→ t ′0 | µ ′ for all ℓr ′ such that ℓr ′ ≼ ℓc , in particular we pick ℓr ′ = ℓr . Then by
induciton hypothesis, ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′0 : Boolℓ′ , where Boolℓ′ <: Boolℓ and ·; Σ ⊢ µ ′. Then by (Sf ),
t | µ ℓr7−→ if t ′0 then t1 else t2 | µ ′. As ℓc ≺ ℓ′ ≼ ℓc ≺ ℓ, by Lemma B.2, ·; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ′ ⊢ t1 : S ′1 and
·; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ′ ⊢ t2 : S ′2, where S ′1 <: S1 and S ′2 <: S2. Therefore:
(Sif)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′0 : Boolℓ′
·; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ′ ⊢ t1 : S ′1 ·; Σ; ℓc ≺ ℓ ⊢ t2 : S ′2
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ if t ′0 then t1 else t2 : (S ′1 <: S ′2) ≺ ℓ′
but by definition of join and subtyping (S ′1 <: S ′2) ≺ ℓ′ <: (S1 <: S2) ≺ ℓ and the result holds.
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Case (S::). Then t = t1 :: S2 and
(S::)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 : S1 S1 <: S2
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 :: S2 : S2
By induction hypotheses, one of the following holds:
(1) t1 is a value. Then
(R→)
t | µ ℓr−→ t ′ | µ
t | µ ℓr7−→ t ′ | µ
and by Prop B.5, ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′ : S ′, where S ′ <: S , therefore the result holds.
(2) t1 | µ ℓr7−→ t ′1 | µ ′ for all ℓr ′ such that ℓr ′ ≼ ℓc , in particular we pick ℓr ′ = ℓr . Then by induction
hypothesis, ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′1 : S ′1, where S ′1 <: S1 and ·; Σ′ ⊢ µ ′. Then by (Sf ), t | µ
ℓr7−→ t ′1 :: S2 | µ ′.
Also, S ′1 <: S1 <: S2 and therefore:
(S::)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′1 : S ′1 S ′1 <: S2
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′1 :: S2 : S2
and the result holds.
Case (Sref). Then t = refS t and
(Sref)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 : S ′1 S ′1 <: S1 ℓc ≼ label(S1)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ refS1,ℓc t1 : Ref⊥ S1
By induction hypotheses, one of the following holds:
(1) t1 is a value. Then
(R→)
t | µ ℓr−→ t ′ | µ ′
t | µ ℓr7−→ t ′ | µ ′
and by Prop B.5, ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′ : S ′, where S ′ <: S and ·; Σ′ ⊢ µ ′, therefore the result holds.
(2) t1 | µ ℓr7−→ t ′1 | µ ′ for all ℓr ′ such that ℓr ′ ≼ ℓc , in particular we pick ℓr ′ = ℓr . Then by induction
hypothesis, ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′1 : S ′′1 where S ′′1 <: S ′1 and ·; Σ′ ⊢ µ ′. Then by (Sf ), t | µ
ℓr7−→ refS1 t ′1 | µ ′
and:
(Sref)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′1 : S ′′1 S ′′1 <: S1 ℓc ≼ label(S1)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ refS1 t ′1 : Ref⊥ S1
and the result holds.
Case (Sderef). Then t = !t1 and
(Sderef)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 : Refℓ S1
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ !t1 : S1 ≺ ℓ
By induction hypotheses, one of the following holds:
(1) t1 is a value. Then by Canonical Forms (Lemma B.6)
(R→)
t | µ ℓr−→ t ′ | µ
t | µ ℓr7−→ t ′ | µ
and by Prop B.5, ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′ : S ′, where S ′ <: S , therefore the result holds.
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(2) t1 | µ ℓr7−→ t ′1 | µ ′ for all ℓr ′ such that ℓr ′ ≼ ℓc , in particular we pick ℓr ′ = ℓr . Then by
induction hypothesis, ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′1 : Refℓ′ S1 where Refℓ′ S1 <: Refℓ S1 and ·; Σ′ ⊢ µ ′. Then by
(Sf ), t | µ ℓr7−→ t ′ | µ ′ and:
(Sderef)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′1 : Refℓ′ S1
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ !t ′1 : S1 ≺ ℓ′
but S1 ≺ ℓ′ <: S1 ≺ ℓ and the result holds.
Case (Sasgn). Then t = t1 := t2 and
(Sasgn)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 : Refℓ S1 ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t2 : S2
S2 <: S1 ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ label(S1)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 := t2 : Unit⊥
By induction hypotheses, one of the following holds:
(1) t1 is a value. Then by Canonical Forms (Lemma B.6), and induction on t2 one of the following
holds:
(a) t2 is a value. Then by Canonical Forms (Lemma B.6)
t | µ ℓr−→ t ′ | µ ′
t | µ ℓr7−→ t ′ | µ ′
and by Prop B.5, ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′ : S ′, where S ′ <: S and ·; Σ′ ⊢ µ ′, therefore the result holds.
(b) t2 | µ ℓr
′
7−→ t ′2 | µ ′ for all ℓr ′ such that ℓr ′ ≼ ℓc , in particular we pick ℓr ′ = ℓr . Then by
induction hypothesis, ·; Σ′; ℓc ⊢ t2 : S ′2 where S ′2 <: S2 and ·; Σ′ ⊢ µ ′.
Then by (Sf ), t | µ ℓr7−→ t1 := t ′2 | µ ′. As S ′2 <: S2 <: S1, then:
(Sasgn)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 : Refℓ S1 ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′2 : S ′2
S ′2 <: S1 ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ label(S1)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 := t ′2 : Unit⊥
and the result holds.
(2) t1 | µ ℓr7−→ t ′1 | µ ′ for all ℓr ′ such that ℓr ′ ≼ ℓc , in particular we pick ℓr ′ = ℓr . Then by
induction hypotheses, ·; Σ′; ℓc ⊢ t ′1 : Refℓ′ S1, where Refℓ′ S1 <: Refℓ S1 and ·; Σ′ ⊢ µ ′. Then
by (Sf ), t | µ ℓr7−→ t ′1 := t2 | µ ′. As ℓ′ ≼ ℓ then ℓc ≺ ℓ′ ≼ ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ label(S1), and therefore:
(Sasgn)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t ′1 : Refℓ′ S1 ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t2 : S2
S2 <: S1 ℓc ≺ ℓ′ ≼ label(S1)
·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t1 := t2 : Unit⊥
and the result holds.
□
B.2 SSLRef: Noninterference
In this section we present the proof of noninterference for SSLRef. Section B.3 present some auxiliary
definitions and section B.4 present the proof of noninterference.
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Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2,v2, µ2⟩ : S ⇐⇒ ℓ1 ≈ℓo ℓ2 ∧ Σ ⊢ µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 ∧ Σ; ℓi ⊢ vi : S ′i , S ′i <: S,
∧
Ä
obsℓo (ℓi , S) =⇒ obsRelΣ,Sk ,ℓo (ℓ1,v1, µ1, ℓ2, ,v2, µ2)
ä
obsRelΣ,Sk ,ℓo (ℓ1,v1, µ1, ℓ2,v2, µ2) ⇐⇒ (rval(v1) = rval(v2)) if S ∈ {Boolg,Unitg,Refg S
′}
obsRelΣ,S1
ℓ′−→ℓS2
k ,ℓo
(ℓ1,v1, µ1, ℓ2,v2, µ2) ⇐⇒ ∀j ≤ k .∀Σ ⊆ Σ′, Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ℓ2,v
′
2, µ
′
2⟩ : S1,
Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v1 v ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ℓ2,v2 v
′
2, µ
′
2⟩ : C(S2 ˜≺ g)
Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, t1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, t2, µ2⟩ : C(S) ⇐⇒ ℓ1 ≈ℓo ℓ2 ∧ Σ ⊢ µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 ∧ Σ; ℓi ⊢ ti : S ′i , S ′i <: S,∀j < k(
ti | µi ℓi7−→ j t ′i | µ ′i =⇒ Σ ⊆ Σ′, Σ′ ⊢ µ ′1 ≈k−jℓo µ
′
2∧
(irred(t ′i ) =⇒ Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, t ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−jℓo ⟨ℓ2, t
′
2, µ
′
2⟩ : S)
)
Σ ⊢ µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 ⇐⇒ Σ ⊢ µi ∧ ∀ℓi , ℓ1 ≈ℓo ℓ2, j < k,∀o ∈ dom(µ1) ∩ dom(µ2)
Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, µ1(o), µ1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ℓ2, µ2(o), µ2⟩ : Σ(o)
ℓ1 ≈ℓo ℓ2 ⇐⇒ obsℓo (ℓi ) ∨ ¬obsℓo (ℓi )
µ1 _ µ2 ⇐⇒ dom(µ1) ⊆ dom(µ2)
obsℓo (ℓ, S) ⇐⇒ obsℓo (ℓ) ∧ obsℓo (label(S))
obsℓo (ℓ) ⇐⇒ ℓ ≼ ℓo
Fig. 32. Security logical relations
B.3 Definitions
To define the fundamental property of the step-indexed logical relations we first define how to
relate substitutions:
Definition B.7. Let ρ be a substitution, Γ and Σ a type substitutions. We say that substitu-
tion ρ satisfy environment Γ and Σ, written ρ |= Γ; Σ, if and only if dom(ρ) = Γ and ∀x ∈
dom(Γ),∀ℓc , Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ ρ(x) : S ′, where S ′ <: Γ(x).
Definition B.8 (Related substitutions). Tuples ⟨ℓ1, ρ1, µ1⟩ and
⟨ℓ2, ρ2, µ2⟩ are related on k steps, notation Γ; Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, ρ1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, ρ2, µ2⟩, if ρi |= Γ; Σ, Σ ⊢ µ1 ≈kℓo
µ2 and
∀x ∈ Γ.Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, ρ1(x), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, ρ2(x), µ2⟩ : Γ(x)
B.4 Proof of noninterference
Lemma B.9 (Substitution preserves typing). If Γ; Σ; ℓ ⊢ t : S and ρ |= Γ; Σ then Γ; Σ; ℓ ⊢ ρ(t) :
S ′ and S ′ <: S .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ; Σ; ℓ ⊢ t ∈ S . □
Lemma B.10. Consider stores µ1, µ2, µ ′1, µ ′2 such that µi _ µ ′i , and substitutions ρ1 and ρ2, such that
Γ; Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, ρ1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, ρ2, µ2⟩, then if∀j ≤ k , if Σ ⊆ Σ′, Σ′ ⊢ µ ′1 ≈
j
ℓo
µ ′2 then Γ; Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, ρ1, µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo⟨ℓ2, ρ2, µ ′2⟩
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Proof. By definition of related computations and related stores. The key argument is that given
that µi _ µ ′i then µ ′i have at least the same locations of µi and the values still are related as well
given that they still have the same type. □
Lemma B.11 (Substitution preserves typing). If Γ; Σ; ℓ ⊢ t : S then ∀ℓ′ ≼ ℓ, Γ; Σ; ℓ′ ≼ ℓ : S .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ; Σ; ℓ ⊢ t ∈ S . □
Lemma B.12 (Downward Closed / Monotonicity). If
(1) Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2,v2, µ2⟩ : S then
∀j ≤ k, Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v1, µ1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ℓ2,v2, µ2⟩ : S
(2) Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, t1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, t2, µ2⟩ : C(S) then
∀j ≤ k, Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, t1, µ1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ℓ2, t2, µ2⟩ : C(S)
(3) Σ ⊢ µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 then ∀j ≤ k, Σ ⊢ µ1 ≈
j
ℓo
µ2
Proof. By induction on type S and the definition of related stores. □
Lemma B.13. Consider simple values vi : Si and
Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2,v2, µ2⟩ : S .
Then
Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, (v1 ≺ ℓ), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, (v2 ≺ ℓ), µ2⟩ : S ≺ ℓ
Proof. By induction on type S. We proceed by definition of related values and observational-
monotonicity of the join, considering that the label stamping can only make values non observable.
□
Lemma B.14 (Reduction preserves relations). Consider Σ; ℓi ⊢ ti ∈ T[S], µi ∈ Store, Σ ⊢ µi ,
and Σ ⊢ µ1 ≈kℓo µ2. Consider j < k , posing ti | µi
ℓi7−→ jt ′i | µ ′i , Σ ⊆ Σ′, Σ′ ⊢ µ ′i we have
Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, t1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, t2, µ2⟩ : C(S) if and only if Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, t ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈
k−j
ℓo
⟨ℓ2, t ′2, µ ′2⟩ : C(S)
Proof. Direct by definition of
Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, t1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, t2, µ2⟩ : C(S) and transitivity of
ℓ7−→ j . □
Lemma B.15. Consider term Σ; ℓ ⊢ t : S , store µ and j > 0,
such that t | µ ℓ7−→ jt ′ | µ ′. Then µ _ µ ′.
Proof. Trivial by induction on the derivation of t . The only rules that change the store are the
ones for reference and assignment, neither of which remove locations. □
Lemma B.16. Suppose that Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1 ≺ ℓ′1, t1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2 ≺ ℓ′2, t2, µ2⟩ : C(S), and that ℓi ⊢ protℓ′i (t) :
S ′i ≺ ℓ′i , S ′i ≺ ℓ′i <: S ≺ ℓ for i ∈ {1, 2}. If ℓ1 ≈kℓo ℓ2, and ℓ′1 ≈kℓo ℓ′2,
then Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, protℓ′1 (t1), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, protℓ′2 (t2), µ2⟩ : C(S ≺ ℓ)
Proof. Consider j < k , we know by definition of related computations that
ti | µi
ℓi ≺ℓ′i7−→ jt ′i | µ ′i
then µ ′1 ≈jℓo µ ′2, and by Lemma B.15 µi _ µ ′i . If t ′i are reducible after k − 1 steps, then the result
holds immediately by (Rprot()). The interest case if t ′i are irreducible after j < k steps:
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Suppose that after j steps t ′i = vi , then Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1 ≺ ℓ′1,v1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−jℓo ⟨ℓ2 ≺ ℓ′2,v2, µ ′2⟩ : S , for some Σ′
such that Σ ⊆ Σ′.
Therefore:
protℓ′i (ti ) | µ ′i
ℓi7−→ j protℓ′i (vi ) | µ ′i
ℓi7−→ 1 (vi ≺ ℓ′i ) | µ ′i
Let us suppose Σ′; ℓi ⊢ vi : S ′′i , where S ′′i <: S ′i <: S . Then Σ′; ℓi ⊢ vi ≺ℓ′i : S ′′i ≺ℓ′i , and S ′′i ≺ℓ′i <: S ≺ℓ.
If ¬obsℓo (ℓi ≺ ℓ′i ) by monotonicity of the join either ¬obsℓo (ℓ′i ) or ¬obsℓo (ℓi ). If ¬obsℓo (ℓ′i ) then
¬obsℓo (S ≺ ℓ′i ) and the result holds. If ¬obsℓo (ℓi ) the result holds immediately. If obsℓo (ℓi ≺ ℓ′i , S)
then obsℓo (ℓi , S ≺ ℓ′i ), then the result follows by Lemma B.13, and by backward preservation of the
relations (Lemma B.14).
□
Lemma B.17. Consider ℓ, such that ¬obsℓo (ℓ), then then ∀k > 0, such that, Σ; ℓ ⊢ t : S , Σ ⊢ µ
t | µ ℓ7−→ kt ′ | µ ′, then ∀ℓ′,
(1) ∀o ∈ dom(µ ′)\ dom(µ), ¬obsℓo (ℓ′, µ ′(o)).
(2) ∀o ∈ dom(µ ′) ∩ dom(µ) ∧ µ ′(o) , µ(o), ¬obsℓo (label(Σ(o))) .
Proof. We use induction on the derivation of t . The interest cases are the last step of reduction
rules for references and assignments.
Case (t = oℓ′′ :=v). We are only updating the heap so we only have to prove (1) and (2). Then
oℓ′′ :=v
ℓ7−→ unit⊥ | µ[o 7→ (v ≺ (ℓ ≺ ℓ′′))]
Next we have to prove that obsℓo (label(Σ(o))) is not defined. As Σ; ℓ ⊢ t : S , then we know that
ℓ ≺ ℓ′′ ≼ label(Σ(o)), and as ¬(obsℓo (ℓ)) by monotonicity of the join the result holds.
Case (t = refS ′ v). We are extending the heap, so we need to only prove (1). Then
refS
′
v | µ ℓ7−→o⊥ | µ[o 7→ (v ≺ ℓ)]
where o < dom(µ). We need to prove that obsℓo (label(v ≺ ℓ)) does not hold, which follows directly
by monotonicity of the join.
□
Lemma B.18. Consider ℓ, such that obsℓo (ℓ) does not hold, then then ∀k > 0, such that
Σ; ℓ ⊢ ti : Si , and that ti | µi ℓ7−→ kt ′i | µ ′i , then if Σ ⊢ µ1 ≈kℓo µ2, then Σ′ ⊢ µ ′1 ≈kℓo µ ′2 for some Σ′
such that Σ ⊆ Σ′ and that Σ′; ℓ ⊢ t ′i : S ′i , where S ′i <: Si .
Proof. By Lemma B.17 we know three things:
(1) ∀o ∈ dom(µ ′i )\ dom(µi ), obsℓo (ℓ, µ ′i (o)) does not hold, i.e. new locations are not observable
and therefore as Σ′; ℓ ⊢ µ ′i (o) : S and S <: Σ′(o), then ¬obsℓo (label(Σ(o))) .
(2) ∀o ∈ dom(µ ′i ) ∩ dom(µi ) ∧ µ ′i (o) , µ(o), ¬obsℓo (label(Σ(o)))
i.e. for all updated references they have to be previously not observable, and by definition
therefore related, and second they are still non observable after the update, and by definition
those locations are still related under ℓ because Σ(o) = Σ′(o).
Therefore Σ′ ⊢ µ ′1 ≈kℓo µ ′2 and the result holds. □
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Lemma B.19. Suppose that Σ; ℓi ⊢ protℓ′i (ti ) : S ′ ≺ ℓ′i , S ′ ≺ℓ′i <: S for i ∈ {1, 2}, where¬obsℓo (ℓi ≺ℓ′i ).
Also consider two stores µi such that Σ ⊢ µ1 ≈kℓo µ2.
Then Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, protℓ′1 (t1), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, protℓ′2 (t2), µ2⟩ : C(S)
Proof. Suppose that after at least j more steps, where j < k , both subterms reduce to a value :
t | µi
ℓi ≺ℓ′i7−→ j vi | µ ′i
Therefore:
protℓ′i (t) | µ ′i
ℓi7−→ j protℓ′i (vi ) | µ ′i
ℓi7−→ 1 (vi ≺ ℓ′i ) | µ ′i
As the values can be radically different we have to make sure that both values are not observ-
ables. If ¬obsℓo (ℓi ) then the values are not observables because the security context is not ob-
servable. Let us assume that obsℓo (ℓi ) holds, but obsℓo (ℓ′i ) not. Then by monotonicity of the join,
¬obsℓo (label(vi ) ≺ ℓ′i ) and the result follows.
Now we have to prove that the resulting stores are related, for some Σ′ such that Σ ⊆ Σ′. But by
Lemma B.18 the result follows immediately.
□
Next, we present the Noninterference proposition.
Proposition A.5 (Security Type Soundness). If Γ; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : S ′i =⇒ ∀S, S ′i <: S, Γ; Σ; ℓc |= t : S
Proof. We proceed by proving a more general proposition instead:
If Γ; Σ; ℓi ⊢ t : S ′i , S ′i <: S , then ∀µi ∈ Store, Σ ⊢ µi , and ∀k ≥ 0,∀ρi ∈ Subst, Γ; Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, ρ1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo
⟨ℓ2, ρ2, µ2⟩ , we have Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, ρ1(t), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, ρ2(t), µ2⟩ : C(S).
By induction on the derivation of term t . Let us take an arbitrary index k ≥ 0.
Case (x ). t = x and Γ(x) = S . Γ; Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, ρ1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, ρ2, µ2⟩ implies by definition that
Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, ρ1(x), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, ρ2(x), µ2⟩ : S , and the result holds immediately.
——–
Case (b). t = bg. By definition of substitution, ρ1(bg) = ρ2(bg) = bg. By definition, Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,bg, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo⟨ℓ2,bg, µ2⟩ : Boolg as required.
——–
Case (o). t = og1 and Σ(o) = S , where S = Refg1 S1. By definition of substitution, ρ1(og1 ) =
ρ2(og1 ) = og1 . We know that Σ; ℓi ⊢ og1 : Refg1 S1. By definition of related stores, Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,og1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo⟨ℓ2,og1, µ2⟩ : Refg1 S1 as required, and the result holds.
——–
Case (λ). t = (λℓ′′c x : S ′1.t1)ℓ′ . Then S ′i = S ′1
ℓ′′c−→ℓ′iS ′i2, and S = S1
ℓ′c−→ℓS2, where S ′ <: S .
By definition of substitution, assuming x < dom(ρi ), and Lemma B.9:
Γ; Σ; ℓi ⊢ ρi (t) = Γ; Σ; ℓi ⊢ (λℓ′′c x : S1.ρi (t1))ℓ′ : S ′1
ℓ′′c−→ℓ′S ′′i2
where S ′′i2 <: S ′2. Consider j ≤ k , µ ′1, µ ′2 such that µi _ µ ′i and Σ ⊆ Σ′ Σ′ ⊢ µ ′1 ≈jℓo µ ′2, and assume
two values v1 and v2 such that Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v1, µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ℓ2,v2, µ ′2⟩ : S1.
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We need to show that:
Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, (λℓ′′c x : S ′1.ρ1(t1))ℓ′ v1, µ ′1⟩
≈jℓo ⟨ℓ2, (λℓ
′′
c x : S ′1.ρ2(t1))ℓ′ v2, µ ′2⟩ : C(S2)
Then:
(λℓ′′c x : S ′1.ρi (t1))ℓ′ vi | µ ′i
ℓi7−→ protℓ′([vi/x]ρi (t1)) | µ ′i
ℓi7−→
∗
protℓ′([vi/x]ρi (t1)) | µ ′i
We then extend the substitutions to map x to the arguments:
ρ ′i = ρi {x 7→ vi }
We know that Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v1, µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ℓ2,v2, µ ′2⟩ : S1. So as µi _ µ ′i then by Lemma B.10, Γ, x :
S1; Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, ρ ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ℓ2, ρ ′2, µ ′2⟩.
By Lemma B.9, Γ; Σ′; ℓ′′c ⊢ ρ ′i (t1) : S ′′i2 where S ′′i2 <: S ′i2 <: S2. We know that ℓi ≺ ℓ′ ≼ ℓ′′c , therefore
by Lemma B.2, Γ; Σ′; ℓi ≺ ℓ ⊢ ρ ′i (t1) : S ′′i2. Then by induction hypothesis and Lemma B.12:
Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1 ≺ ℓ′, ρ ′1(t1), µ ′1⟩ ≈j−1ℓo ⟨ℓ2 ≺ ℓ′, ρ ′2(t1), µ ′2⟩ : C(S2),
Finally, by Lemma B.16:
Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, protℓ′(ρ ′1(t1)), µ ′1⟩
≈jℓo ⟨ℓ2, protℓ′(ρ ′2(t1)), µ ′2⟩ : C(S2)
and finally the result holds by backward preservation of the relations (Lemma B.14).
——–
Case (!). t = !t ′, where Σ; ℓi ⊢ t ′ : Refℓ′′i S1, where S1 ≺ ℓ′′i <: S = S1 ≺ ℓ .
By definition of substitution:
ρi (t) = !ρi (t ′)
We have to show that
Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, !ρi (t ′), µ1⟩
≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, !ρi (t ′), µ2⟩ : C(S)
By Lemma B.9:
Σ; ℓi ⊢ !ρi (t ′) : S1 ≺ ℓ′′′i
where ℓ′′′i ≼ ℓ′′i ≼ ℓ. By induction hypotheses on the subterm:
Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, ρ1(t ′), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, ρ2(t ′), µ2⟩ : C(Refℓ S1)
Consider j < k , then by definition of related computations
ρi (t ′) | µi ℓi7−→ jt ′i | µ ′i =⇒ Σ ⊆ Σ′, Σ′ ⊢ µ ′1 ≈k−jℓo µ ′2∧(irred(t ′i ) ⇒ Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, t ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈
k−j
ℓo
⟨ℓ2, t ′2, µ ′2⟩ : Refℓ S1)
If terms t ′i are reducible after j = k − 1 steps, then
!ρi (t) | µi ℓi7−→ j !t ′i | µ ′i and the result holds.
If after at most j steps t ′i is irreducible it means that for some j ′ ≤ j, !ρi (t) | µi
ℓi7−→ j′!vi | µ ′i . If
j ′ = j then we use the same same argument for reducible terms and the result holds.
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Let us consider now j ′ < j . Then Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−j
′
ℓo
⟨ℓ2,v2, µ ′2⟩ : Refℓ S1. By Lemma B.6, each vi
is a location oi ℓ′i , such that Σ
′(oi ℓ′i ) = Refℓ′i S1 and ℓ′i ≼ ℓ′. Then:
ρi (t) | µ ℓi7−→ j′+1 !oi ℓ′i | µ ′i
ℓi7−→ 1 protℓ′i (v ′i ) | µ ′i
with ℓ′i ≼ ℓ′′′i ,v ′i = µ ′i (oi ℓ′i ), As Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−j
′
ℓo
⟨ℓ2,v2, µ ′2⟩ : Refℓ S1, then by By monotonicity
of the join either both obsℓo (ℓ′i ) or ¬obsℓo (ℓ′i ). Finally as Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−j
′
ℓo
⟨ℓ2,v ′2, µ ′2⟩ : S1, by
Lemma E.60,
Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, protℓ′1 (v ′1), µ ′1⟩
≈jℓo ⟨ℓ2, protℓ′2 (v ′2), µ ′2⟩ : C(S1 ≺ ℓ)
and finally the result holds by backward preservation of the relations (Lemma B.14).
——–
Case (:=). t = t1:=t2. Then S = Unit⊥.
By definition of substitution:
ρi (t) = ρi (t1):=ρi (t2)
and Lemma B.9:
Σ; ℓi ⊢ ρi (t1):=ρi (t2) : Unit⊥
We have to show that
Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, ρ1(t1):=ρ1(t2), µ1⟩
≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, ρ2(t1):=ρ2(t2), µ2⟩ : C(S)
By induction hypotheses
Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, ρ1(t1), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, ρ2(t1), µ2⟩ : C(S1)
Suppose j1 < k , and that ρi (t1) are irreducible after j1 steps (otherwise, similar to case !, the
result holds immediately). Then by definition of related computations:
ρi (t1) | µi ℓi7−→ j1vi | µ ′i =⇒ Σ ⊆ Σ′, Σ′ ⊢ µ ′1 ≈k−j1ℓo µ ′2 ∧ Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v1, µ ′1⟩ ≈
k−j1
ℓo
⟨ℓ2,v2, µ ′2⟩ : Refℓ S1
By Lemma B.15 µi _ µ ′i , and µ ′1 ≈k−j1ℓo µ ′2 then by Lemma E.41, Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, ρ1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−j1ℓo ⟨ℓ2, ρ2, µ ′2⟩.
By induction hypotheses:
Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, ρ1(t2), µ ′1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, ρ2(t2), µ ′2⟩ : C(S2)
Again, consider j2 = k − j1, if after j2 steps ρ1(t2) is reducible or is a value, the result holds
immediately. The interest case if after j ′2 < j2 steps ρ1(tS2 ) reduces to values v ′i :
ρi (tS2 ) | µ ′i
ℓi7−→ j′2v ′i | µ ′′i =⇒ Σ′ ⊆ Σ′′, Σ′′ ⊢ µ ′′1 ≈k−j1−j
′
2
ℓo
µ ′′2 ∧Σ′′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v ′1, µ ′′1 ⟩ ≈k−j1−j
′
2
ℓo
⟨ℓ2,v ′2, µ ′′2 ⟩ : S2
Then
ρi (tS ) | µi ℓi7−→ j1+j′2vi :=v ′i | µ ′′i ∧ Σ′′ ⊢ µ ′′1 ≈k−j1−j
′
2
ℓo
µ ′′2
As both values vi are related at some reference type, then by canonical forms (Lemma B.6) they
both must be locations oi ℓ′i for some S
′
1 <: S1. We consider when the values are observable and the
locations are identical (otherwise the result is trivial):
vi :=v ′i | µ ′′i
= oℓ′i :=v
′
i | µ ′′i
ℓi7−→ 1 unit⊥ | µ ′′′i
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Where µ ′′′i = µ ′′i [o 7→ (v ′i ≺ (ℓi ≺ ℓ′i ))]. As Σ′′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v ′1, µ ′′1 ⟩ ≈k−j1−j
′
2
ℓo
⟨ℓ2,v ′2, µ ′′2 ⟩ : S2, and as
ℓi ≺ ℓ′i ≼ label(S1), where ℓ′i ≼ ℓ, and label(v ′i ) ≼ label(S1), then Σ′′; ℓi ⊢ v ′i ≺ (ℓi ≺ ℓ′i ) : S ′ and
S ′ <: S1. Then by monotonicity of the join Lemma B.13,
Σ′′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, (v ′1 ≺ (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ′1)), µ ′′1 ⟩
≈k−j1−j′2ℓo ⟨ℓ2, (v ′2 ≺ (ℓ2 ≺ ℓ′2)), µ ′′1 ⟩
But if ¬obsℓo (ℓi ) then by monotonicity of the join ¬obsℓo (v ′i ≺ (ℓi ≺ ℓ′i )). Therefore, ∀ℓ′′i such that
ℓ′′1 ≈kℓo ℓ′′2
Σ′′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ′′1 , (v ′1 ≺ (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ′1)), µ ′′1 ⟩
≈k−j1−j′2ℓo ⟨ℓ′′2 , (v ′2 ≺ (ℓ2 ≺ ℓ′2)), µ ′′1 ⟩
As every values are related at type Unit, we only have to prove that Σ′′ ⊢ µ ′′′1 ≈k−j1−j
′
2−3
ℓo
µ ′′′1 , but
using monotonicity (Lemma E.47), it is trivial to prove that because either both both stores update
the same location o to values that are related, therefore the result holds.
——–
Case (ref ). t = refS1 tS ′1 . Then S = Ref⊥ S1.
By definition of substitution:
ρi (t) = refS1 ρi (t ′)
and Lemma B.9:
ℓi ⊢ refS1 ρi (t ′) : Ref⊥ S1
We have to show that
Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, refS1 ρ1(t ′), µ1⟩
≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, refS1 ρ2(t ′), µ2⟩ : C(S1)
As Σ; ℓi ⊢ ρi (t ′) : S ′i where S ′i <: S1, by induction hypotheses:
Σ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, ρ1(t ′), µ⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, ρ2(t ′), µ⟩ : C(S1)
Consider j < k , by definition of related computations
ρi (t ′) | µi ℓi7−→ jt ′i | µ ′i =⇒ Σ ⊆ Σ′, Σ′ ⊢ µ ′1 ≈k−jℓo µ ′2∧(irred(t ′i ) ⇒ Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, t ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈
k−j
ℓo
⟨ℓ2, t ′2, µ ′2⟩ : S ′1)
If terms t ′i are reducible after j = k − 1 steps, then
refS1 ρi (t ′) | µi ℓi7−→ j refS1 t ′i | µ ′i and the result holds.
If after at most j steps t ′i is irreducible, it means that for some j ′ ≤ j refS1 ρi (t ′) | µi
ℓi7−→ j′refS1 vi | µ ′i .
If j ′ = j then we use the same same argument for reducible terms and the result holds.
Let us consider now j ′ < j. Then:
ρi (t) | µ ℓi7−→ j′+1 refS1 vi | µ ′i
ℓi7−→ 1 o⊥ | µ ′′i
with, µ ′′i = µ ′i [o 7→ (vi ≺ ℓi )]. Also, as Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−j
′
ℓo
⟨ℓ2,v2, µ ′2⟩ : S1, then Σ′′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v1, µ ′′1 ⟩ ≈k−j
′
ℓo⟨ℓ2,v2, µ ′′2 ⟩ : S1, with Σ′′ = Σ′,o : S1. And as label(vi ) ≺ ℓi ≼ label(S1),then by Lemma B.13,
Σ′′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v1 ≺ ℓ1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−j
′
ℓo
⟨ℓ2,v2 ≺ ℓ2, µ ′2⟩ : S1.
If ¬obsℓo (ℓi ) then by monotonicity of the join ¬obsℓo (label(v ′i ≺ ℓi )) and ¬obsℓo (label(Σ′′(o))).
Therefore, ∀ℓ′′i such that ℓ′′1 ≈kℓo ℓ′′2 Σ′′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ′′1 ,v1 ≺ ℓ1, µ ′1⟩ ≈
k−j′
ℓo
⟨ℓ′′2 ,v2 ≺ ℓ2, µ ′2⟩ : S1. By definition of
related stores Σ′′ −µ ′′1 ≈k−j
′
ℓo
µ ′′2 . Then byMonotonicity of the relation (Lemma E.47) Σ′′ −µ ′′1 ≈k−j
′−2
ℓo
µ ′′2 and the result holds.
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——–
Case (⊕). t = t1 ⊕; t2
By definition of substitution:
ρi (t) = ρi (t1) ⊕; ρi (t2)
and Lemma B.9:
Σ; ℓi ⊢ ρi (t1) ⊕; ρi (t2) : S ′′
with S ′′i <: S ′i <: S . We use a similar argument to case := for reducible terms. The interest case is
when we suppose some j1 and j2 such that j1 + j2 < k − 3 where:
ρi (t1) | µi ℓi7−→ j1vi1 | µ ′i =⇒ Σ ⊆ Σ′, Σ′ ⊢ µ ′1 ≈k−j1ℓo µ ′2 ∧ Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v11, µ ′1⟩ ≈
k−j1
ℓo
⟨ℓ2,v21, µ ′2⟩ : S1
ρi (t2) | µ ′i
ℓi7−→ j2vi2 | µ ′′i =⇒ Σ′ ⊆ Σ′′, Σ′′ ⊢ µ ′′1 ≈k−j1−j2ℓo µ ′′2 ∧Σ′′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v12, µ ′′1 ⟩ ≈
k−j1−j2
ℓo
⟨ℓ2,v22, µ ′′2 ⟩ : S2
By Lemma B.6, each vi j is a boolean (bi j )ℓi j then:
ρi (t) | µ ′′i
7−→j1+j2+2 (bi1)ℓi1 ⊕ (bi2)ℓi2 | µ ′′i
7−→1 (bi )ℓ′i | µ ′′i
with bi = bi1J⊕Kbi2, ℓ′i = ℓi1 ≺ ℓi2, and ℓ′i ≼ label(S ′′i ) ≼ label(S). It remains to show that:
Σ′′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, (b1)ℓ′1, µ ′′1 ⟩ ≈k−j1−j2−3ℓo ⟨ℓ2, (b2)ℓ′2, µ ′′2 ⟩ : S
If ¬obsℓo (ℓi ), then the result is trivial because the resulting booleans are also related as they are
not observable.
If obsℓo (ℓi ), and ¬obsℓo (ℓ′i1) or ¬obsℓo (ℓ′i2), then by monotonicity of the join, ¬obsℓo (ℓ′i ) and the
result holds. If obsℓo (ℓi j ) then obsℓo (ℓ′i ) and therefore b11 = b21 and b12 = b22, so b1 = b2, and the
result holds.
——–
Case (app). t = t1 t2, with Σ; ℓi ⊢ t1 : Si1 ℓci−→ℓ′iSi2, and Σ; ℓi ⊢ t2 : S ′′i1. Also Si1
ℓci−→ℓ′iSi2 <: S1
ℓc−→ℓS2,
and S = S2.
By definition of substitution:
ρi (t) = ρi (t1) ρi (t2)
and Lemma B.9:
Σ; ℓi ⊢ ρi (t1) ρi (t2) : S ′i2
with S ′i2 <: Si2 <: S2. We use a similar argument to case := for reducible terms. The interest case
is when we suppose some j1 and j2 such that j1 + j2 < k where by induction hypotheses and the
definition of related computations:
ρi (t1) | µi ℓi7−→ j1vi1 | µ ′i =⇒ Σ ⊆ Σ′, Σ′ ⊢ µ ′1 ≈k−j1ℓo µ ′2 ∧ Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v11, µ ′1⟩ ≈
k−j1
ℓo
⟨ℓ2,v21, µ ′2⟩ : S1
ρi (t2) | µ ′i
ℓi7−→ j2vi2 | µ ′′i =⇒ Σ′ ⊆ Σ′′, Σ′ ⊢ µ ′′1 ≈k−j1−j2ℓo µ ′′2 ∧Σ′′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v12, µ ′′1 ⟩ ≈
k−j1−j2
ℓo
⟨ℓ2,v22, µ ′′2 ⟩ : S2
Then
ρi (t) | µi ℓi7−→ j1+j2vi1 vi2 | µ ′′i
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If obsℓo (ℓi ,vi1) then, by definition of ≈ℓo at values of function type, we have:
Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, (v11 v12), µ ′′1 ⟩
≈k−j1−j2ℓo ⟨ℓ2, (v21 v22), µ ′′2 ⟩ : C(S2 ≺ ℓ)
Finally, by backward preservation of the relations (Lemma B.14) the result holds.
If¬obsℓo (ℓi ,vi1), and we assume by canonical forms thatvi1 = (λℓ′cix .ti )ℓ′′i then, either¬obsℓo (ℓi )
or ¬obsℓo (ℓ′′i ) and
(vi1 vi2) | µ ′′1
= ((λℓ′cix .ti )ℓ′′i vi2) | µ ′′1
ℓi7−→ 1 protℓ′′i (t ′i ) | µ ′′1
If either ¬obsℓo (ℓi ) or ¬obsℓo (ℓ′′i ) then by Lemma B.19 ,
Σ′′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, protℓ′′1 (t ′1), µ ′′1 ⟩
≈k−j1−j2ℓo ⟨ℓ2, protℓ′′2 (t ′2), µ ′′2 ⟩ : C(S2 ≺ ℓ)
Finally, by backward preservation of the relations (Lemma B.14) the result holds.
——–
Case (if). t = if t1 then t2 else t3, with Σ; ℓi ⊢ t1 : S1, Σ; ℓ′i ⊢ t2 : S2, Σ; ℓ′i ⊢ t3 : S3, ℓ′i = ℓi ≺ label(S1),
and S ′ = S2 <: S3 <: S
By definition of substitution:
ρi (t) = if ρi (t1) then ρi (t2) else ρi (t3)
We use a similar argument to case := for reducible terms. The interest case is when we suppose
some j1 and j2 such that j1 + j2 < k where by induction hypotheses and related computations we
have that:
ρi (t1) | µi ℓi7−→ j1vi1 | µ ′i =⇒ Σ ⊆ Σ′, Σ′ ⊢ µ ′1 ≈k−j1ℓo µ ′2 ∧ Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1,v11, µ ′1⟩ ≈
k−j1
ℓo
⟨ℓ2,v21, µ ′2⟩ : S1
By Lemma B.6, each vi1 is a boolean (bi1)ℓi1 , such that Σ′; ℓi ⊢ (bi1)ℓi1 : Boolℓi1 and Boolℓi1 <: S1,
implies S1 = Boolℓ′1 . Then:
ρi (t) | µi ℓi7−→ j1+1if (bi1)ℓi1 then ρi (t2) else ρi (t3) | µ ′i
Let us consider ¬obsℓo (ℓi , (bi1)ℓi1 ). Let us assume the worst case scenario and that both execution
reduce via different branches of the conditional.
Then
ρ1(t) | µ1 ℓi7−→ j1+2protℓ11 (ρ1(t2)) | µ ′1
ρ2(t) | µ2 ℓi7−→ j1+2protℓ21 (ρ2(t3)) | µ ′2
But because ¬obsℓo (ℓi , (bi1)ℓi1 ), then either ¬obsℓo (ℓi ) or ¬obsℓo (ℓi1) and therefore, ¬obsℓo (ℓi ≺ℓi1).
Then by Lemma B.19,
Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, protℓ11 (ρ1(t2)), µ ′1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, protℓ21 (ρ2(t3)), µ ′2⟩
and the result holds by backward preservation of the relations (Lemma B.14).
Now let us consider if obsℓo (ℓi , (bi1)ℓi1 ) holds. Then by definition of ≈ℓo on boolean values,
b11 = b21. Because b11 = b21, both ρ1(t) and ρ2(t) step into the same branch of the conditional. Let
us assume the condition is true (the other case is similar):
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Then by induction hypothesis Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1 ≺ ℓ11, ρ1(t2), µ ′1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2 ≺ ℓ21, ρ2(t2), µ ′2⟩ : S2, and by
Lemma B.16,
Σ′ ⊢ ⟨ℓ1, protℓ11 (ρ1(t2)), µ ′1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ℓ2, protℓ21 (ρ2(t2)), µ ′2⟩ : S
and the result holds by backward preservation of the relations (Lemma B.14).
Case (prot()). Direct by using Lemma B.16.
□
C GRADUALIZING THE STATIC SEMANTICS
In section C.1, we show the proof of optimality and soundness of the abstraction. In section C.2,
we present the proof for the Static Gradual Guarantee.
C.1 From Gradual Labels to Gradual Types
Proposition C.1 (α is Sound). If Ûℓ , ∅ then Ûℓ ⊆ γ (α(Ûℓ)).
Proof. By case analysis on the structure of Ûℓ. If Ûℓ = { ℓ } then γ (α({ ℓ })) = γ (ℓ) = { ℓ } = Ûℓ,
otherwise
γ (α(Ûℓ)) = γ (?) = Label ⊇ Ûℓ. □
Proposition C.2 (α is Optimal). If Ûℓ ⊆ γ (g) then α(Ûℓ) ⊑ g.
Proof. By case analysis on the structure of g. If g = ℓ, γ (g) = { ℓ }; Ûℓ ⊆ { ℓ } , Ûℓ , ∅ implies
α(Ûℓ) = α({ ℓ }) = ℓ ⊑ g (if Ûℓ = ∅, α(Ûℓ) is undefined). If g = ?, g′ ⊑ g for all g′. □
Proposition 6.4 (α is Sound and Optimal). If Ûℓ , ∅ then,
(i) Ûℓ ⊆ γ (α(Ûℓ)).
(ii) If Ûℓ ⊆ γ (g) then α(Ûℓ) ⊑ g.
Proof. Trivial using Prop C.1 and C.2. □
Proposition C.3 (αS is Sound). If ÛS valid, then ÛS ⊆ γS (αS (ÛS)).
Proof. By well-founded induction on ÛS according to the ordering relation ÛS ⊏ ÛS defined as
follows:
d¯om(ÛS) ⊏ ÛS
cˆod(jÛS) ⊏ ÛS
Where d¯om, cˆod : P(GType) → P(GType) are the collecting liftings of the domain and codomain
functions dom, cod respectively, e.g.,
d¯om(ÛS) = { dom(S) | S ∈ ÛS } .
We then consider cases on ÛS according to the definition of αS .
Case ({ Boolℓi }).
γS (αS ({ Boolℓi })) = γS (Boolα ({ ℓi }))
= { Boolℓ | ℓ ∈ γ (α({ ℓi })) }
⊇ { Boolℓi } by soundness of α .
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Case ({ Si1 ℓc i−→ℓiSi2 }).
γS (αS ({ Si1 ℓc i−→ℓiSi2 }))
= γS (αS ({ Si1 })α ({ ℓc i })−→ α ({ ℓi })αS ({ Si2 }))
= γS (αS ({ Si1 }))γ (α ({ ℓc i }))−→ γ (α ({ ℓi }))γS (αS ({ Si2 }))
⊇ { Si1 ℓc i−→ℓiSi2 }
by induction hypothesis on { Si1 } and { Si2 }, and soundness of α .
Case ({ Refℓi Si }).
γS (αS ({ Refℓi Si }))
= γS (Refα ({ ℓi }) αS ({ Si }))
= { Refℓ S | ℓ ∈ γ (α({ ℓi })), S ∈ γS (αS ({ Si })) }
⊇ { Refℓi Si }
by induction hypothesis on { Si } and soundness of α .
□
Proposition C.4 (αS is Optimal). If ÛS valid and ÛS ⊆ γS (U ) then αS (ÛS) ⊑ U .
Proof. By induction on the structure ofU .
Case (Boolg). γS (Boolg) = { Boolℓ | ℓ ∈ γ (g) }
So ÛS = { Boolℓ | ℓ ∈ Ûℓ } for some Ûℓ ⊆ γ (g). By optimality of α , α(Ûℓ) ⊑ g, so αS ({ Boolℓ | ℓ ∈ Ûℓ }) =
Boolα (Ûℓ) ⊑ Boolg.
Case (U1 →g U2). γS (U1 gc−→gU2) = γS (U1)γ (gc )−→γ (g)γS (U2).
So ÛS = { S1i ℓc i−→giS2i }, with { S1i } ⊆ γS (U1),
{ S1i } ⊆ γS (U2), { ℓc i } ⊆ γ (gc ) and { ℓc i } ⊆ γ (g). By induction hypothesis, αS ({ S1i }) ⊑ U1 and
αS ({ S2i }) ⊑ U2, and by optimality ofα ,α({ ℓc i }) ⊑ gc andα({ ℓi }) ⊑ g. HenceαS ({ S1i
ℓc i−→ℓiS2i }) =
αS ({ S1i })α ({ ℓc i })−→ α ({ gi })αS ({ S2i }) ⊑ U1
gc−→gU2.
Case (Refg U ). γS (Refg U ) = { Refℓ S | ℓ ∈ γ (g), S ∈ γ (U ) }
So ÛS = { Refℓ S | ℓ ∈ Ûℓ, S ∈ { Si } } for some { Si } ⊆ γS (U ) and some Ûℓ ⊆ γ (g). By induction
hypothesis αS ({ Si }) ⊑ U and by optimality of α , α(Ûℓ) ⊑ g, so αS ({ Refℓ S | ℓ ∈ Ûℓ, S ∈ { Si } }) =
Refα (Ûℓ) αS ({ Si }) ⊑ Refg U .
□
Proposition A.9 (αS is Sound and Optimal). Assuming ÛS valid:
(i) ÛS ⊆ γS (αS (ÛS)) (ii) If ÛS ⊆ γS (U ) then αS (ÛS) ⊑ U .
Proof. Trivial using Prop C.3 and C.4. □
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C.2 Static Criteria for Gradual Typing
In this section we present the proof of Static Gradual Guarantee for GSLRef.
Proposition 4.2 (Static conservative extension). Let ⊢S denote SSLRef’s type system. Then
for any static language term t ∈ Term, ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢S t : S if and only if ·; Σ; ℓc ⊢ t : S .
Proof. By induction over the typing derivations. The proof is trivial because static types are
given singleton meanings via concretization. □
Definition C.5 (Term precision).
(Px)
x ⊑ x (Pb)
g ⊑ g′
bg ⊑ bg′ (Pu)
g ⊑ g′
unitg ⊑ unitg′ (Pλ)
t ⊑ t ′ g′c ⊑ g′′c
U1 ⊑ U ′1 g ⊑ g′
(λg′c x : U1.t)g ⊑ (λg′′c x : U ′1 .t ′)g′
(Pprot)
t ⊑ t ′ g ⊑ g′
protg(t) ⊑ protg′(t ′)
(P⊕) t1 ⊑ t
′
1 t2 ⊑ t ′2
t1 ⊕ t2 ⊑ t ′1 ⊕ t ′2
(Papp)
t1 ⊑ t ′1 t2 ⊑ t ′2
t1 t2 ⊑ t ′1 t ′2
(Pif)
t ⊑ t t1 ⊑ t ′1 t2 ⊑ t ′2
if t then t1 else t2 ⊑ if t ′ then t1 else t2 (P::)
t ⊑ t ′ U ⊑ U ′
t :: U ⊑ t ′ :: U ′
(Pref) t ⊑ t ′ U ⊑ U ′
refU t ⊑ refU ′ t ′
(Pderef) t ⊑ t ′
!t ⊑ !t ′ (Pasgn)
t1 ⊑ t ′1 t2 ⊑ t ′2
t1:=t2 ⊑ t ′1:=t ′2
Definition C.6 (Type environment precision).
. ⊑ .
Γ ⊑ Γ′ U ⊑ U ′
Γ, x : U ⊑ Γ′, x : U ′
Lemma C.7. If Γ; ·; gc ⊢ t : U and Γ ⊑ Γ′, then Γ′; ·; gc ⊢ t : U ′ for someU ⊑ U ′.
Proof. Simple induction on typing derivations. □
Lemma C.8. IfU1 ≲ U2 andU1 ⊑ U ′1 andU2 ⊑ U ′2 thenU ′1 ≲ U ′2 .
Proof. By definition of ≲, there exists ⟨S1, S2⟩ ∈ γ 2(U1,U2) such that S1 <: S2. U1 ⊑ U ′1 and
U2 ⊑ U ′2 mean that γ (U1) ⊆ γ (U ′1 ) and γ (U2) ⊆ γ (U ′2 ), therefore ⟨S1, S2⟩ ∈ γ 2(U ′1 ,U ′2 ). □
Lemma C.9. IfÂ g1 ≺ g2 ≼ g3, g1 ⊑ g′1, g2 ⊑ g′2 and g3 ⊑ g′3, then Â g′1 ≺ g′2 ≼ g′3.
Proof. By definition of the consistent judgment, there exists ⟨ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ3⟩ ∈ γ 3(g1, g2, g3) such that
ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2 ≼ ℓ3. g1 ⊑ g′1, g2 ⊑ g′2 and g3 ⊑ g′3 mean that γ (g1) ⊆ γ (g′1), γ (g2) ⊆ γ (g′2) and γ (g3) ⊆ γ (g′3)
respectively. Therefore ⟨ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ3⟩ ∈ γ 3(g1, g2, g3). □
Lemma C.10. If g1 ≼˜ g2, g1 ⊑ g′1 and g2 ⊑ g′2, then g′1 ≼˜ g′2.
Proof. Using almost identical argument of Lemma C.9 □
Proposition 4.4 (Static gradual guarantee). Suppose gc1 ⊑ gc2 and t1 ⊑ t2.
If ·; ·; gc1 ⊢ t1 : U1 then ·; ·; gc2 ⊢ t2 : U2 whereU1 ⊑ U2.
Proof. We prove the property on opens terms instead of closed terms: If Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ t1 : U1,
gc1 ⊑ gc2 and t1 ⊑ t2 then Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t2 : U2 andU1 ⊑ U2.
The proof proceed by induction on the typing derivation.
Case (U x,U b,U u). Trivial by definition of ⊑ using (Px), (Pb), (Pu) respectively.
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Case (Uλ). Then t1 = (λg′cx : U ′1 .t)g andU1 = U ′1
g′c−→gU ′2 . By (Uλ) we know that:
(U λ)
Γ, x : U ′1 ; ·; g′c ⊢ t : U ′2
Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ (λg′cx : U ′1 .t)g : U ′1
g′c−→gU ′2
(1)
Consider gc2 such that gc1 ⊑ gc2 and t2 such that t1 ⊑ t2. By definition of term precision t2 must
have the form t2 = (λg′cx : U ′′1 .t ′)′g and therefore
(U λ)
t ⊑ t ′
g′c ⊑ g′′c U ′1 ⊑ U ′′1 g ⊑ g′
(λg′cx : U ′1 .t)g ⊑ (λg′′c x : U ′′1 .t ′)g′
(2)
Using induction hypotheses on the premise of 1, Γ, x : U ′1 ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′ : U ′′2 with U ′2 ⊑ U ′′2 . By
Lemma C.7, Γ, x : U ′′1 ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′ : U ′′′2 whereU ′′2 ⊑ U ′′′2 . Then we can use rule (Uλ) to derive:
(U λ)
Γ, x : U ′′1 ; ·; g′′c ⊢ t ′ : U ′′′2
Γ; .; gc1 ⊢ (λg′′c x : U ′1 .t ′)g′ : U ′′1
g′′c−→g′U ′′′2
WhereU2 ⊑ U ′′2 . Using the premise of 2 and the definition of type precision we can infer that
U ′1
g′c−→gU ′2 ⊑ U ′′1
g′′c−→g′U ′′′2
and the result holds.
Case (Uo). This case can not happen because initial programs do not contain locations.
Case (U prot). Then t1 = protg(t) andU1 = U ˜≺ g. By (U prot) we know that:
(U prot)
Γ; ·; gc1 ˜≺ g ⊢ t : U
Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ protg(t) : U ˜≺ g (3)
Consider gc2 such that gc1 ⊑ gc2 and t2 such that t1 ⊑ t2. By definition of term precision t2 must
have the form t2 = protg′(t ′) and therefore
(Pprot)
t ⊑ t ′ g ⊑ g′
protg(t) ⊑ protg′(t ′)
(4)
By definition of join on consistent labels, gc1 ˜≺ g ⊑ gc2 ˜≺ g′. Using induction hypotheses on the
premises of 3, we can use rule (U prot) to derive:
(U prot)
Γ; ·; gc2 ˜≺ g′ ⊢ t ′ : U ′
Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ protg′(t ′) : U ′ ˜≺ g′
For someU ′, whereU ⊑ U ′. Using the premise of 4 and the definition of join we can infer that
U ˜≺ g ⊑ U ′ ˜≺ g′
and the result holds.
Case (U⊕). Then t1 = t ′1 ⊕ t ′2 andU1 = Bool(g1˜ ≺g2). By (U⊕) we know that:
(U ⊕)
Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ t ′1 : Boolg1 Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ t ′2 : Boolg2
Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ t ′1 ⊕ t ′2 : Bool(g1˜ ≺g2) (5)
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Consider gc2 such that gc1 ⊑ gc2 and t2 such that t1 ⊑ t2. By definition of term precision t2 must
have the form t2 = t ′′1 ⊕ t ′′2 and therefore
(P⊕)
t ′1 ⊑ t ′′1 t ′2 ⊑ t ′′2
t ′1 ⊕ t ′2 ⊑ t ′′1 ⊕ t ′′2
(6)
Using induction hypotheses on the premises of 5, we can use rule (U⊕) to derive:
(U ⊕)
Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′′1 : Boolg′1 Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′′2 : Boolg′2
Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′′1 ⊕ t ′′2 : Bool(g′′1 ˜ ≺g′′2 )
Where g′1 ⊑ g′′1 and g′2 ⊑ g′′2 . Using the premise of 6 and the definition of type precision we can
infer that
(g′1 ˜≺ g′2) ⊑ (g′′1 ˜≺ g′′2 )
Bool(g′1˜ ≺g′2) ⊑ Bool(g′′1 ˜ ≺g′′2 )
and the result holds.
Case (U app). Then t1 = t ′1 t ′2 andU1 = U12 ˜≺ g. By (U app) we know that:
(U app)
Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ t ′1 : U11
g′c−→gU12 Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ t ′2 : U ′2
U ′2 ≲ U11 Â g ≺ gc1 ≼ g′c
Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ t ′1 t ′2 : U12 ˜≺ g (7)
Consider gc2 such that gc1 ⊑ gc2 and t2 such that t1 ⊑ t2. By definition of term precision t2 must
have the form t2 = t ′′1 t ′′2 and therefore
(Papp)
t ′1 ⊑ t ′′1 t ′2 ⊑ t ′′2
t ′1 t ′2 ⊑ t ′′1 t ′′2
(8)
Using induction hypotheses on the premises of 7, Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′′1 : U ′11
g′′c−→g′U ′12 and Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′′2 : U ′′2 ,
whereU ′2 ⊑ U ′′2 ,U11
g′c−→gU12 ⊑ U ′11
g′′c−→g′U ′12. By Lemma C.8,U ′′2 ≲ U ′11. By definition of precision of
types, g′c ⊑ g′′c and g ⊑ g′, therefore by Lemma C.9, Â g′ ≺ gc2 ≼ g′′c . Then we can use rule (U app)
to derive:
(U app)
Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′′1 : U ′11
g′′c−→g′U ′12 Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′′2 : U ′′2
U ′′2 ≲ U ′11 Â g′ ≺ gc2 ≼ g′′c
Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′′1 t ′′2 : U ′12 ˜≺ g′
Using the definition of type precision we can infer that
U12 ˜≺ g ⊑ U ′12 ˜≺ g′
and the result holds.
Case (U if). Then t1 = if t then t ′1 else t2 andU1 = (U ′1 ˜<:U ′2 ) ˜≺ g. By (U if) we know that:
(U if)
Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ t : Boolg
Γ; ·; gc1 ˜≺ g ⊢ t ′1 : U ′1 Γ; ·; gc1 ˜≺ g ⊢ t2 : U ′2
Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ if t then t ′1 else t2 : (U ′1 ˜<:U ′2 ) ˜≺ g (9)
Consider gc2 such that gc1 ⊑ gc2 and t2 such that t1 ⊑ t2. By definition of term precision t2 must
have the form t2 = if t ′ then t ′′1 else t ′′2 and therefore
(Pif)
t ⊑ t ′ t ′1 ⊑ t ′′1 t ′2 ⊑ t ′′2
if t then t ′1 else t ′2 ⊑ if t ′ then t ′1 else t ′2
(10)
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Consider any ℓ′ such that ℓ ⊑ ℓ′. As gc1 ˜≺ g ⊑ gc2 ˜≺ g′ then we can use induction hypotheses on
the premises of 9 and derive:
(U if)
Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′ : Boolg′
Γ; ·; gc2 ˜≺ g′ ⊢ t ′′1 : U ′′1 Γ; ·; gc2 ˜≺ g′ ⊢ t ′′2 : U ′′2
Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ if t ′ then t ′′1 else t ′′2 : (U ′′1 ˜<:U ′′2 ) ˜≺ g′
WhereU ′1 ⊑ U ′′1 andU ′2 ⊑ U ′′2 . Using the definition of type precision we can infer that
(U ′1 ˜<:U ′2 ) ˜≺ g ⊑ (U ′′1 ˜<:U ′′2 ) ˜≺ g′
and the result holds.
Case (U ::). Then t1 = t :: U1. By (U ::) we know that:
(U ::)
Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ t : U ′1 U ′1 ≲ U1
Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ t :: U ′1 : U1
(11)
Consider gc2 such that gc1 ⊑ gc2 and t2 such that t1 ⊑ t2. By definition of term precision t2 must
have the form t2 = t ′ :: U2 and therefore
(P::)
t ⊑ t ′ U1 ⊑ U2
t :: U1 ⊑ t ′ :: U2 (12)
Using induction hypotheses on the premises of 11, Γ; ·; gc ⊢ t ′ : U ′2 whereU ′1 ⊑ U ′2 . We can use rule
(U ::) and Lemma C.8 to derive:
(U ::)
Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′ : U ′2 U ′2 ≲ U2
Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′ :: U2 : U2
WhereU1 ⊑ U2 and the result holds.
Case (U ref). Then t1 = refU t andU1 = Refgc U . By (U ref) we know that:
(U ref)
Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ t : U ′1 U ′1 ≲ U gc1 ≼˜ label(U )
Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ refU t : Ref⊥ U
(13)
Consider gc2 such that gc1 ⊑ gc2 and t2 such that t1 ⊑ t2. By definition of term precision t2 must
have the form t2 = refU
′
t ′ and therefore
(Pref) t ⊑ t ′ U ⊑ U ′
refU t ⊑ refU ′ t ′
(14)
Using induction hypotheses on the premises of 13, we can use rule (U ref) and Lemma C.8 and C.10
to derive:
(U ref)
Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′ : U ′′1 U ′′1 ≲ U ′ gc2 ≼˜ label(U ′)
Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ refU ′ t ′ : Ref⊥ U ′
WhereU ⊑ U ′ andU ′1 ⊑ U ′′1 . Using the the definition of type precision we can infer that
U ⊑ U ′
Ref⊥ U ⊑ Ref⊥ U ′
and the result holds.
Case (U deref). Then t1 = !t andU1 = U ˜≺ g. By (U deref) we know that:
(U deref)
Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ t : Refg U
Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ !t : U ˜≺ g (15)
90 Matías Toro, Ronald Garcia, and Éric Tanter
Consider gc2 such that gc1 ⊑ gc2 and t2 such that t1 ⊑ t2. By definition of term precision t2 must
have the form t2 = !t ′ and therefore
(Pderef) t ⊑ t ′!t ⊑ !t ′ (16)
Using induction hypotheses on the premises of 15, we can use rule (U deref) to derive:
(U deref)
Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′ : Refg′ U ′
Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ !t ′ : U ′ ˜≺ g′
Where g ⊑ g′ and U ⊑ U ′. Using the premise of 16 and the definition of type precision we can
infer that
U ˜≺ g ⊑ U ′ ˜≺ g′
and the result holds.
Case (U asgn). Then t1 = t ′1:=t ′2 andU1 = Unit⊥. By (U asgn) we know that:
(U asgn)
Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ t ′1 : Refg U ′1 Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ t ′2 : U ′2
U ′2 ≲ U ′1 Â g ≺ gc1 ≼ label(U ′1 )
Γ; ·; gc1 ⊢ t ′1:=t ′2 : Unit⊥
(17)
Consider gc2 such that gc1 ⊑ gc2 and t2 such that t1 ⊑ t2. By definition of term precision t2 must
have the form t2 = t ′′1 :=t ′′2 and therefore
(Pasgn)
t ′1 ⊑ t ′′1 t ′2 ⊑ t ′′2
t ′1:=t ′2 ⊑ t ′′1 :=t ′′2
(18)
Using induction hypotheses on the premises of 17, Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′1 : Refg′ U ′′1 and Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′2 : U ′2 ,
where Refg U ′1 ⊑ Refg′ U ′′1 and U ′2 ⊑ U ′′2 . By definition of precision on types and Lemma C.8,
U ′′2 ≲ U ′′1 . Also, as, g ⊑ g′ and U ′1 ⊑ U ′′1 , by Lemma C.9, Â g′ ≺ gc2 ≼ label(U ′1 ). Then we can use
rule (U asgn) to derive:
(U asgn)
Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′1 : Refg′ U ′′1 Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′2 : U ′′2
U ′′2 ≲ U ′′1 Â g′ ≺ gc2 ≼ label(U ′′1 )
Γ; ·; gc2 ⊢ t ′′1 :=t ′′2 : Unit⊥
Using the definition of type precision we can infer that
Unit⊥ ⊑ Unit⊥
and the result holds.
□
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D GRADUALIZING THE DYNAMIC SEMANTICS
In this section we present the formalization of the evidences for GSLRef. Section D.1 presents the
structure of evidence and the abstraction and concretization functions. In section D.2, we show
how to calculate the initial evidence. In particular we give definition for the initial evidence of
consistent judgments for labels and types. In section D.2, we present how to evolve evidence. We
define the consistent transitivity operator, the meet operator and join of evidences. In section D.4,
we present the algorithmic definitions of initial evidence and consistent transitivity. Finally, in
section D.5, we present some of the proofs of the propositions for evidence presented.
D.1 Precise Evidence for Consistent Security Judgments
Definition D.1 (Interval). An interval is a bounded unknown label [ℓ1, ℓ2] where ℓ1 is the upper
bound and ℓ2 is the lower bound.
ı ∈ Label2
ı ::= [ℓ, ℓ] (interval)
Definition D.2 (Interval Concretization). Let γı : Label2 → P(Label) be defined as follows:
γı ([ℓ1, ℓ2]) = {ℓ | ℓ ∈ Label, ℓ1 ≼ ℓ ≼ ℓ2}
We can only concretize valid intervals:
Definition D.3 (Valid Gradual Label).
ℓ1 ≼ ℓ2
valid([ℓ1, ℓ2])
Definition D.4 (Label Evidence Concretization). Let
γεℓ : Label4 → P(Label2) be defined as follows:
γεℓ (⟨ı1, ı2⟩) = {⟨ℓ1, ℓ2⟩ | ℓ1 ∈ γı (ı1), ℓ2 ∈ γı (ı2)}
Definition D.5 (Interval Abstraction). Let α : P(Label) → Label2 be defined as follows:
αı (∅) is undefined
αı ({ ℓi }) = [≺ ℓi , ≺ℓi ] otherwise
Definition D.6 (Label Evidence Abstraction). Let αεℓ : P(Label2) → Label4 be defined as follows:
αεℓ (∅) is undefined
αεℓ ({ ⟨ℓ1i , ℓ2i ⟩ }) = ⟨αı ({ ℓ1i }),αı ({ ℓ2i })⟩ otherwise
Definition D.7 (Type Evidence). An evidence type is a gradual type labeled with an interval:
E ∈ GEType, ı ∈ Label2
E ::= Boolı | E ı−→ıE | Refı E | Unitı (evidence types)
Definition D.8 (Type Evidence Concretization). Let γE : GEType→ P(Type) be defined as follows:
γE (Boolı ) = { Boolℓ | ℓ ∈ γı (ı) }
γE (E1 ı2−→ı1E2) = γE (E1)
γı (ı2)−→γı (ı1)γE (E2)
γE (Refı E) = { Refℓ S | ℓ ∈ γı (ı), S ∈ γE (E) }
where→ is the set of all possible combinations of function types, using each member of the sets
obtained by the γE and γı functions.
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Definition D.9 (Evidence Concretization). Let
γεℓ : GEType2 → P(Type2) be defined as follows:
γεℓ (⟨E1, E2⟩) = {⟨S1, S2⟩ | S1 ∈ γE (E1), S2 ∈ γE (E2)}
Definition D.10 (Type Evidence Abstraction). Let the abstraction function αE : P(Type) →
GEType be defined as:
αE ({ Boolℓi }) = Boolαı ({ ℓi })
αE ({ Si1 ℓci−→ℓiSi2 }) = αE ({ Si1 })
αı ({ ℓci })−→ αı ({ ℓi })αE ({ Si2 })
αE ({ Refℓi Si }) = Refαı ({ ℓi }) αE ({ Si })
αE (ÛS) is undefined otherwise
Definition D.11 (Evidence Abstraction). Let αε : P(Type2) → GEType2 be defined as follows:
αε (∅) is undefined
αε ({ ⟨S1i , S2i ⟩ }) = ⟨αE ({ S1i }),αE ({ S2i })⟩ otherwise
We can only abstract valid sets of security types, i.e. in which elements only defer by security
labels.
Definition D.12 (Valid Type Sets).
valid({ Boolℓi })
valid({ Si1 }) valid({ Si2 })
valid({ Si1 ℓc i−→ℓiSi2 })
valid({ Si })
valid({ Refℓi Si })
valid({Unitℓi })
Proposition D.13 (αı is Sound). If Ûℓ is not empty, then Ûℓ ⊆ γı (αı (Ûℓ)).
Proposition D.14 (αı is Optimal). If Ûℓ is not empty, and Ûℓ ⊆ γı (ı) then αı (Ûℓ) ⊑ ı .
Proposition D.15 (αE is Sound). If valid(ÛS) then ÛS ⊆ γE (αE (ÛS)).
Proposition D.16 (αE is Optimal). If valid(ÛS) and ÛS ⊆ γE (E) then αE (ÛS) ⊑ E .
With concretization of security type, we can now define security type precision.
Definition D.17 (Interval and Type Evidence Precision).
(1) ı1 is less imprecise than ı2, notation ı1 ⊑ ı2, if and only if γεℓ (ı1) ⊆ γεℓ (ı2); inductively:
ℓ3 ≼ ℓ1 ℓ2 ≼ ℓ4
[ℓ1, ℓ2] ⊑ [ℓ3, ℓ4]
(2) E1 is less imprecise than E2, notation E1 ⊑ E2, if and only if γE (E1) ⊆ γE (E2); inductively:
ı1 ⊑ ı2
Boolı1 ⊑ Boolı2
E11 ⊑ E21 E12 ⊑ E22
ı1 ⊑ ı2 ı ′1 ⊑ ı ′2
E11
ı′1−→ı1E12 ⊑ E21
ı′2−→ı2E22
ı1 ⊑ ı2 E1 ⊑ E2
Refı1 E1 ⊑ Refı2 E2
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D.2 Initial evidence
With the definition of concretization and abstraction we can now define the initial evidence of
label ordering and subtyping:
Definition D.18 (Initial Evidence of label ordering). Let F1 : Labeln −→ Label and F2 : Labelm −→
Label be functions over labels. The initial evidence of the judgment Â F1(gi ) ≼ F2(gj ), notation
IJ Â F1(gi ) ≼ F2(gj )K, is defined as follows:
IJ Â F1(g1, ...gn) ≼ F2(gn+1, ...gn+m)K =
αεℓ ({⟨F1(ℓi ), F2(ℓj )⟩ | ⟨ℓi ⟩ ∈ γn(gi [1/n]),
⟨ℓj ⟩ ∈ γm(gi [n+1/m]) | F1(ℓi ) ≼ F2(ℓj )})
Suppose F1 = F11
Definition D.19 (Initial Evidence of subtyping). Let F1 : Typen −→ Type and F2 : Typem −→
Type be functions over types. The initial evidence of the judgment Â F1(Ui ) ≼ F2(Uj ), notation
IJ Â F1(Ui ) <: F2(Uj )K, is defined as follows:
IJ Â F1(U1, ...Un) <: F2(Un+1, ...Un+m)K =
αεℓ ({⟨F1(Si ), F2(S j )⟩ | ⟨Si ⟩ ∈ γnS (Ui [1/n]),
⟨S j ⟩ ∈ γmS (Ui [n+1/m]) | F1(Si ) <: F2(S j )})
Proposition D.20. [Elaboration preserves typing] Consider Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t : U then if Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t {
t ′ : U , and ε = I⟳≼ (ℓc ), then Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ t ′ : U
Proof. Straightforward induction on typeU . □
D.3 Evolving evidence: Consistent Transitivity
Now that we know how to extract initial evidence from consistent judgments, we need a way
to combine evidences to use during program evaluation, i.e. we need to find a way to evolve
evidence. We define consistent transitivity for label ordering and subtyping, ◦≼ and ◦<: respectively,
to combine evidences as follows:
Definition D.21 (Consistent transitivity for label ordering). Let function ◦≼ : Interval2×Interval2 →
Label2 be defined as:
⟨ı11, ı12⟩ ◦≼ ⟨ı21, ı22⟩ = αεℓ ({⟨ℓ11, ℓ22⟩ ∈ γεℓ (⟨ı11, ı22⟩) | ∃ℓ ∈ γı (ı12) ∩ γı (ı21).ℓ11 ≼ ℓ ∧ ℓ ≼ ℓ22})
Proposition 6.14. Suppose ε1 ⊢ Â F1(gi ) ≼ F2(gj ) and ε2 ⊢ Â F2(gj ) ≼ F3(gk ).
If ε1 ◦≼ ε2 is defined, then ε1 ◦≼ ε2 ⊢  F1(gi ) ≼ F3(gk )
Proposition D.22. γı (ı1 ⊓ ı2) = γı (ı1) ∩ γı (ı2).
where ı ⊓ ı ′ = α(γ (ı) ∩ γ (ı ′)).
Proposition D.23. ⟨ı1, ı21⟩ ◦≼ ⟨ı22, ı3⟩ = △≼(ı1, ı21 ⊓ ı22, ı3)
where
△≼(ı1, ı2, ı3) = αε ({⟨ℓ1, ℓ3⟩ ∈ γε (⟨ı1, ı3⟩) | ∃ℓ2 ∈ γı (ı2).ℓ1 ≼ ℓ2 ∧ ℓ2 ≼ ℓ3})
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Definition D.24 (Consistent transitivity for subtyping). Suppose
⟨E11, E12⟩ ⊢ Â F1(Ui ) <: F2(Uj ) ⟨E21, E22⟩ ⊢ Â F2(Uj ) <: F3(Uk )
We deduce evidence for consistent transitivity for subtyping:
⟨E11, E12⟩ ◦<: ⟨E21, E22⟩ ⊢ Â F1(Ui ) <: F3(Uk )
where ◦<: : EType2 × EType2 → EType2 is defined as:
⟨E11, E12⟩ ◦<: ⟨E21, E22⟩ = αε ({⟨S11, S22⟩ ∈ γε (⟨E11, E22⟩) | ∃S ∈ γE (E12) ∩ γE (E21).S11 <: S ∧ S <: S22})
Proposition D.25. γE (E1 ⊓ E2) = γE (E1) ∩ γE (E2).
Then following AGT,
Proposition D.26.
⟨E1, E21⟩ ◦<: ⟨E22, E3⟩ = △<:(E1, E21 ⊓ E22, E3)
where
△<:(E1, E2, E3) = αε ({⟨S1, S3⟩ ∈ γε (⟨E1, E3⟩) | ∃S2 ∈ γı (E2).S1 <: S2 ∧ S2 <: S3})
Definition D.27 (Intervals join).
[ℓ1, ℓ2] ˜≺ [ℓ3, ℓ4] = [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4]
Definition D.28 (Evidence label join).
⟨ı1, ı2⟩ ˜≺ ⟨ı3, ı4⟩ = ⟨ı1 ˜≺ ı3, ı2 ˜≺ ı4⟩
Definition D.29.
Boolı1 ˜≺ ı2 = Bool(ı1˜ ≺ı2)
E1
ı2−→ı1E2 ˜≺ ı3 = E1 ı2−→(ı1˜ ≺ı3)E2
Refı1 E ˜≺ ı2 = Ref(ı1˜ ≺ı2) E
Definition D.30.
⟨E1, E2⟩ ˜≺ ⟨ı1, ı2⟩ = ⟨E1 ˜≺ ı1, E2 ˜≺ ı2⟩
Proposition D.31. If εS ⊢ U1 ≲ U2 and εl ⊢ g1 ≼˜ g2 then εS ˜≺ εl ⊢ U1 ˜≺ g1 <: U2 ˜≺ g2
D.4 Algorithmic definitions
This section gives algorithmic definitions of consistent transitivity and initial evidence for label
ordering and subtyping.
D.4.1 Label Evidences.
Definition D.32 (Intervals join).
[ℓ1, ℓ2] ˜≺ [ℓ3, ℓ4] = [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4]
Definition D.33 (Intervals meet).
[ℓ1, ℓ2] ˜≺ [ℓ3, ℓ4] = [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4]
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Definition D.34. Let F1 : GLabeln → GLabel and F2 : GLabelm → GLabel. The initial evidence
for consistent judgment Â F1(gi ) ≼ F2(gj ) is defined as follows:
bounds(?) = [⊥,⊤]
bounds(ℓ) = [ℓ, ℓ]
bounds(x1 ≺ x2) = bounds(x1) ≺ bounds(x2)
bounds(x1 ≺ x2) = bounds(x1) ≺ bounds(x2)
bounds(x1 ⊓ x2) = bounds(x1) ⊓ bounds(x2)
bounds(F1(xi ) ≺ F2(xi )) = bounds(F1(xi )) ≺ bounds(F2(xi ))
bounds(F1(xi ) ≺ F2(xi )) = bounds(F1(xi )) ≺ bounds(F2(xi ))
bounds(F1(xi ) ⊓ F2(xi )) = bounds(F1(xi )) ⊓ bounds(F2(ℓi ))
bounds(F1(gi )) = [ℓ1, ℓ2] bounds(F2(gj )) = [ℓ′1, ℓ′2]
I( Â F1(g1, ...gn) ≼ F2(gn+1, ...gn+m)) = ⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ′2], [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ′1, ℓ′2]⟩
where F1 : GLabeln → GLabel and F2 : GLabelm → GLabel.
I⟳(Â F (g1, ..., gn)) = I( Â F (g1, ..., gn) ≼ F (g1, ..., gn))
The algorithmic definition of meet:
[ℓ1, ℓ2] ⊓ [ℓ3, ℓ4] = [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4] if valid([ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4])
ı ⊓ ı ′ undefined otherwise
We calculate the algorithmic definition of △≼ :
ℓ1 ≼ ℓ4 ℓ3 ≼ ℓ6 ℓ1 ≼ ℓ6
△≼([ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ3, ℓ4], [ℓ5, ℓ6]) = ⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4 ≺ ℓ6], [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5, ℓ6]⟩
D.4.2 Type Evidences. We define a function liftP() to transform functions over types into func-
tions over labels. Also we define function invert() to invert the operator on types, used in the
domain and latent effect of function types. Finally we define function tomeet() to transform type
operators into meets, given the invariant property of references.
We start defining a pattern of operations:
Definition D.35 (Operation pattern).
PT ∈ GPattern, P ℓ ∈ LPattern
PT ::= _ | PT opT PT (pattern on types)
opT ::= <: |
<: | ⊓ (operations on types)
P ℓ ::= _ | P ℓ opℓ P ℓ (pattern on labels)
opℓ ::= ≺ | ≺ | ⊓ (operations on labels)
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liftP(_) = _
liftP(PT1 <: PT2 ) = liftP(PT1 ) ≺ liftP(PT2 )
liftP(PT1
<: PT2 ) = liftP(PT1 ) ≺ liftP(PT2 )
liftP(PT1 ⊓ PT2 ) = liftP(PT1 ) ⊓ liftP(PT2 )
invert(_) = _
invert(PT1 <: PT2 ) = invert(PT1 )
<: invert(PT2 )
invert(PT1
<: PT2 ) = invert(PT1 ) <: invert(PT2 )
invert(PT1 ⊓ PT2 ) = invert(PT1 ) ⊓ invert(PT2 )
tomeet(_) = _
tomeet(PT1 <: PT2 ) = tomeet(PT1 ) ⊓ tomeet(PT2 )
tomeet(PT1
<: PT2 ) = tomeet(PT1 ) ⊓ tomeet(PT2 )
tomeet(PT1 ⊓ PT2 ) = tomeet(PT1 ) ⊓ tomeet(PT2 )
We use case-based analysis to calculate the algorithmic rules for the initial evidence of consistent
subtyping on gradual security types:
IJ Â liftP(G1)(ℓi ) <: liftP(G2)(ℓj )K = ⟨ı1, ı2⟩
IJ Â G1(Boolgi ) ≼ G2(Boolgj )K = ⟨Boolı1,Boolı2⟩
IJ Â invert(G2)(Uj1) <: invert(G1)(Ui1)K = ⟨E ′21, E ′11⟩ IJ Â G1(Ui2) <: G2(Uj2)K = ⟨E12, E22⟩
IJ Â liftP(G1)(ℓi1) <: liftP(G2)(ℓj1)K = ⟨ı11, ı12⟩
IJ Â liftP(invert(G2))(ℓj2) <: liftP(invert(G1))(ℓi2)K = ⟨ı22, ı21⟩
IJ Â G1(Ui1 gi2−→gi1Ui2) <: G2(Uj1 gj2−→gj1Uj2)K = ⟨E11 ı21−→ı11E12, E21 ı22−→ı12E22⟩
IJ Â liftP(G1)(ℓi ) <: liftP(G2)(ℓj )K = ⟨ı1, ı2⟩
IJ Â tomeet(G1)(Ui ) <: tomeet(G2)(Uj )K = ⟨E1, E2⟩
IJ Â tomeet(G2)(Uj ) <: tomeet(G1)(Ui )K = ⟨E ′2, E ′1⟩
IJ Â G1(Refgi Ui ) <: G2(Refgj Uj )K = ⟨Refı1 E1 ⊓ E ′1,Refı2 E2 ⊓ E ′2⟩
where G1 : GLabeln → GLabel and G2 : GLabelm → GLabel, andG1(x1, ..., xn) = PT1 (x1, ..., xn),
G2(x1, ..., xn) = PT2 (x1, ..., xm).
I⟳(Â F (U1, ...,Un)) = IJ Â F (U1, ...,Un) <: F (U1, ...,Un)K
We calculate a recursive meet operator for gradual types:
Boolı ⊓ Boolı ′ = Boolı⊓ı ′
(E11 ı2−→ı1E12) ⊓ (E21
ı′2−→ı′1E22) = (E11 ⊓ E21)
ı2⊓ı′2−→ı1⊓ı′1 (E12 ⊓ E22)
Refı E1 ⊓ Refı ′ E2 = Refı⊓ı ′ E1 ⊓ E2
U ⊓U ′ undefined otherwise
We calculate a recursive definition for △<: by case analysis on the structure of the second
argument,
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△≼(ı1, ı2, ı3) = ⟨ı ′1, ı ′3⟩
△<:(Boolı1,Boolı2,Boolı3 ) = ⟨Boolı′1,Boolı′3⟩
△<:(E31, E21, E11) = ⟨E ′31, E ′11⟩
△<:(E12, E22, E32) = ⟨E ′12, E ′32⟩
△≼(ı1, ı2, ı3) = ⟨ı ′1, ı ′3⟩
△≼(ı13, ı12, ı11) = ⟨ı ′13, ı ′11⟩
△<:(E11 ı11−→ı1E12, E21
ı12−→ı2E22, E31
ı13−→ı3E32)
= ⟨E ′11
ı′11−→ı′1E ′12, E ′31
ı′13−→ı′3E ′32⟩
△≼(ı1, ı2, ı3) = ⟨ı ′1, ı ′3⟩
E ′1 = E1 ⊓ E2 E ′3 = E2 ⊓ E3
△<:(Refı1 E1,Refı2 E2,Refı3 E3) = ⟨Refı′1 E ′1,Refı′3 E ′3⟩
D.4.3 Evidence inversion functions. The evidence inversion functions are defined as follows
ilbl(⟨Boolı1,Boolı2⟩) = ⟨ı1, ı2⟩
ilbl(⟨Unitı1,Unitı2⟩) = ⟨ı1, ı2⟩
ilbl(⟨Refı1 U1,Refı2 U2⟩) = ⟨ı1, ı2⟩
ilbl(⟨E1 ı2−→ı1E2, E ′1
ı′2−→ı′1E ′2⟩) = ⟨ı1, ı ′1⟩
iref (⟨Refı1 E1,Refı2 E2⟩) = ⟨E1, E2⟩
iref (⟨E1, E2⟩) = undefined otherwise
idom(⟨E1 ı2−→ı1E2, E ′1
ı′2−→ı′1E ′2⟩) = ⟨E ′1, E1⟩
idom(⟨E1, E2⟩) = undefined otherwise
icod(⟨E1 ı2−→ı1E2, E ′1
ı′2−→ı′1E ′2⟩) = ⟨E2, E ′2⟩
icod(⟨E1, E2⟩) = undefined otherwise
D.5 Proofs
Proposition D.13 (αı is Sound). If Ûℓ is not empty, then Ûℓ ⊆ γı (αı (Ûℓ)).
Proof. Suppose Ûℓ = { ℓi }. By definition of αεℓ , αı ({ ℓi }) = [≺ ℓi , ≺ℓi ]. Therefore
γı (αı ({ ℓi })) = {ℓ | ℓ ∈ Label, ≺ ℓi ≼ ℓ ≼ ≺ℓi }
And it is easy to see that if ℓ ∈ { ℓi }, then ℓ ∈ γı (αı ({ ℓi })), and therefore the result holds. □
Proposition D.14 (αı is Optimal). If Ûℓ is not empty, and Ûℓ ⊆ γı (ı) then αı (Ûℓ) ⊑ ı .
Proof. By case analysis on the structure of ı . If ı = [ℓ1, ℓ2], γεℓ (ı) = {ℓ | ℓ ∈ Label, ℓ1 ≼ ℓ ≼ ℓ2};Ûℓ ⊆ {ℓ | ℓ ∈ Label, ℓ1 ≼ ℓ ≼ ℓ2}, Ûℓ , ∅ implies αεℓ (Ûℓ) = [ℓ3, ℓ4], where ℓ1 ≼ ℓ3 and ℓ4 ≼ ℓ2,
therefore [ℓ3, ℓ4] ⊑ ı (if Ûℓ = ∅, αεℓ (Ûℓ) is undefined). □
Proposition D.15 (αE is Sound). If valid(ÛS) then ÛS ⊆ γE (αE (ÛS)).
Proof. By well-founded induction on ÛS . Similar to Prop C.3. □
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Proposition D.16 (αE is Optimal). If valid(ÛS) and ÛS ⊆ γE (E) then αE (ÛS) ⊑ E .
Proof. By induction on the structure ofU . Similar to Prop C.4. □
Proposition D.22. γı (ı1 ⊓ ı2) = γı (ı1) ∩ γı (ı2).
Proof.
γı (ı1 ⊓ ı2) = γı (αı (γı (ı1) ∩ γı (ı1)))
⊆ γı (ı1) ∩ γı (ı1) (soundness of αı )
Let ℓ ∈ γı (ı1) ∩ γı (ı1). We now that γı (ı1 ⊓ ı2) is defined. Suppose ı1 = [ℓ1, ℓ2] and ı2 = [ℓ3, ℓ4].
Therefore ı1 ⊓ ı2 = [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4].
But γı (ı1) ∩ γı (ı1) = {ℓ | ℓ ∈ Label, ℓ1 ≼ ℓ ≼ ℓ2} ∩ {ℓ | ℓ ∈ Label, ℓ3 ≼ ℓ ≼ ℓ4}. Which is
equivalent to {ℓ | ℓ ∈ Label, ℓ1 ≼ ℓ ≼ ℓ2 ∧ ℓ3 ≼ ℓ ≼ ℓ4}, equivalent to {ℓ | ℓ ∈ Label, ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3 ≼
ℓ ≼ ℓ2
≺
ℓ4}. Which is by definition γı ([ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4]), and the result holds.
□
Proposition D.23. ⟨ı1, ı21⟩ ◦≼ ⟨ı22, ı3⟩ = △≼(ı1, ı21 ⊓ ı22, ı3)
Proof. Follows directly from the definition of consistent transitivity and Prop D.22. □
Proposition D.25. γE (E1 ⊓ E2) = γE (E1) ∩ γE (E2).
Proof. By induction on evidence types ε1 and ε2 and Prop D.22. □
Proposition D.26.
⟨E1, E21⟩ ◦<: ⟨E22, E3⟩ = △<:(E1, E21 ⊓ E22, E3)
where
△<:(E1, E2, E3) = αε ({⟨S1, S3⟩ ∈ γε (⟨E1, E3⟩) | ∃S2 ∈ γı (E2).S1 <: S2 ∧ S2 <: S3})
Proof. Follows directly from the definition of consistent transitivity and Prop D.25. □
Proposition D.31. If εS ⊢ U1 ≲ U2 and εl ⊢ g1 ≼˜ g2 then εS ˜≺ εl ⊢ U1 ˜≺ g1 <: U2 ˜≺ g2
Proof. By induction on typesU1 andU2, using the definition of I<: and Proposition 6.13. □
Proposition D.36. [ℓ1, ℓ2] ≺ [ℓ3, ℓ4] = [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4]
Proof. Follows directly by definition of γ and ≺. □
Proposition D.37.
⟨ı1, ı2⟩ ˜≺ ⟨ı ′1, ı ′2⟩ = ⟨ı1 ≺ ı ′1, ı2 ≺ ı ′2⟩
Proof. Follows directly from the definition of consistent join monotonicity and Prop D.36. □
Proposition D.38.
[ℓ1, ℓ2] ⊓ [ℓ3, ℓ4] = [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4] if ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3 ≼ ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4
ı ⊓ ı ′ undefined otherwise
Proof. By definition of meet:
[ℓ1, ℓ2] ⊓ [ℓ3, ℓ4] = αı ({ℓ′ | ℓ′ ∈ γ ([ℓ1, ℓ2]) ∩ γ ([ℓ3, ℓ4])})
But by definition of intersection on intervals, γ ([ℓ1, ℓ2])∩γ ([ℓ3, ℓ4]) = γ ([ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4]) if ℓ1 ≺ℓ3 ≼
ℓ2
≺
ℓ4 (otherwise the intersection is empty), and the result follows by definition of αı . □
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Proposition D.39.
ℓ1 ≼ ℓ4 ℓ3 ≼ ℓ6 ℓ1 ≼ ℓ6
△≼([ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ3, ℓ4], [ℓ5, ℓ6]) = ⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4 ≺ ℓ6], [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5, ℓ6]⟩
Proof. By definition:
△≼([ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ3, ℓ4], [ℓ5, ℓ6]) = αε ({⟨ℓ′1, ℓ′3⟩ ∈ γε (⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ5, ℓ6]⟩) | ∃ℓ′2 ∈ γı ([ℓ3, ℓ4]).ℓ′1 ≼ ℓ′2 ≼ ℓ′3})
It is easy to see that αı ({ ℓ′1i }) = [ℓ1, ℓ′12], for some ℓ′12. We know that ℓ′12 ≼ ℓ2, ℓ′12 ≼ ℓ4 and ℓ′12 ≼ ℓ6,
i.e. ℓ′12 ≼ ℓ2
≺
ℓ4
≺
ℓ6. But ℓ2
≺
ℓ4
≺
ℓ6 ≼ ℓ4 ≼ ℓ6 therefore
⟨ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4 ≺ ℓ6, ℓ6⟩ ∈ {⟨ℓ′1, ℓ′3⟩ ∈ γε (⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ5, ℓ6]⟩) |
∃ℓ′2 ∈ γı ([ℓ3, ℓ4]).ℓ′1 ≼ ℓ′2 ≼ ℓ′3}
and by definition of αı , ℓ2
≺
ℓ4
≺
ℓ6 ≼ ℓ′12, then αı ({ ℓ′1i }) = [ℓ1, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4 ≺ ℓ6]. Similar argument is
used to prove that αı ({ ℓ′3i }) = [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5, ℓ6]. □
Lemma D.40. Let ℓi ∈ Label, then (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2) ≺ (ℓ3 ≺ ℓ4) ≼ (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3) ≺ (ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4).
Proof.
(ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2) ≺ (ℓ3 ≺ ℓ4)
≼ (ℓ1 ≺ (ℓ3 ≺ ℓ4)) ≺ (ℓ2 ≺ (ℓ3 ≺ ℓ4))
≼ ((ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3) ≺ (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ4)) ≺ ((ℓ2 ≺ ℓ3) ≺ (ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4))
≼ (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3) ≺ (ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4)
□
Proposition 6.14. Suppose ε1 ⊢ Â F1(gi ) ≼ F2(gj ) and ε2 ⊢ Â F2(gj ) ≼ F3(gk ).
If ε1 ◦≼ ε2 is defined, then ε1 ◦≼ ε2 ⊢  F1(gi ) ≼ F3(gk )
Proof. Suppose ε1 = ⟨ı11, ı12⟩ and ε2 = ⟨ı21, ı22⟩. Then by definition of initial evidence:
⟨ı11, ı12⟩ = ⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ3, ℓ4]⟩ ⊑ IJ Â F1(gi ) ≼ F2(gj )K = ⟨ı ′11, ı ′12⟩
and
⟨ı21, ı22⟩ = ⟨[ℓ5, ℓ6], [ℓ7, ℓ8]⟩ ⊑ IJ Â F2(gj ) ≼ F3(gk )K = ⟨ı ′21, ı ′22⟩
Suppose that IJ Â F1(gi ) ≼ F3(gk )K = ⟨ı ′1, ı ′3⟩. We have to prove that ⟨ı11, ı12⟩ ◦≼ ⟨ı21, ı22⟩ ⊑ ⟨ı ′1, ı ′3⟩.
If bounds(F1(gi )) = [ℓ′1, ℓ′2], bounds(F2(gj )) = [ℓ′3, ℓ′4], and bounds(F3(gi )) = [ℓ′5, ℓ′6]We know that
IJ Â F1(gi ) ≼ F2(gj )K = ⟨[ℓ′1, ℓ′2 ≺ ℓ′4], [ℓ′1 ≺ ℓ′3, ℓ′4]⟩. Therefore ℓ′1 ≼ ℓ1, ℓ2 ≼ ℓ′2 ≺ ℓ′4, ℓ′1 ≺ ℓ′2 ≼ ℓ3 and
ℓ4 ≼ ℓ′4.
Using the same argument,
IJ Â F2(gj ) ≼ F3(gk )K = ⟨[ℓ′3, ℓ′4 ≺ ℓ′6], [ℓ′3 ≺ ℓ′5, ℓ′6]⟩. Therefore ℓ′3 ≼ ℓ5, ℓ6 ≼ ℓ′4 ≺ ℓ′6, ℓ′3 ≺ ℓ′5 ≼ ℓ7 and
ℓ8 ≼ ℓ′6.
But IJ Â F1(gi ) ≼ F3(gk )K = ⟨[ℓ′1, ℓ′2 ≺ ℓ′6], [ℓ′1 ≺ ℓ′5, ℓ′6]⟩ and
⟨ı11, ı12⟩ ◦≼ ⟨ı21, ı22⟩ = △≼(ı11, ı12 ⊓ ı21, ı22) =
△≼([ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5, ℓ4 ≺ ℓ6], [ℓ7, ℓ8])
= ⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4 ≺ ℓ6 ≺ ℓ8], [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5 ≺ ℓ7, ℓ8]⟩
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we need to prove that
⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4 ≺ ℓ6 ≺ ℓ8], [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5 ≺ ℓ7, ℓ8]⟩ ⊑
⟨[ℓ′1, ℓ′2 ≺ ℓ′6], [ℓ′1 ≺ ℓ′5, ℓ′6]⟩
. But we know that ℓ′1 ≼ ℓ1. Also that ℓ2 ≼ ℓ′2
≺
ℓ′4 and therefore ℓ2 ≼ ℓ′2. The same for ℓ6 ≼ ℓ′6 and
therefore ℓ2
≺
ℓ4
≺
ℓ6
≺
ℓ8 ≼ ℓ′2
≺
ℓ′6, i.e. [ℓ1, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4 ≺ ℓ6 ≺ ℓ8] ⊑ [ℓ′1, ℓ′2 ≺ ℓ′6]. The argument is applied
for the second components and the result holds.
□
Proposition 6.13. Suppose ε1 ⊢ Â F11(gi ) ≼ F12(gj ) and ε2 ⊢ Â F21(gi ) ≼ F22(gj )
Then ε1 ˜≺ ε2 ⊢ Â F11(gi ) ≺ F21(gi ) ≼ F12(gj ) ≺ F22(gj )
Proof. By definition of initial evidence noticing that ε1 ˜≺ ε2 can be more precise than the initial
evidence of judgment
Suppose ε1 = ⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ3, ℓ4]⟩, and ε2 = ⟨[ℓ5, ℓ6], [ℓ7, ℓ8]⟩, then ε1˜≺ε2 = ⟨[ℓ1 ≺ ℓ5, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ6], [ℓ3 ≺ ℓ6, ℓ4 ≺ ℓ8]⟩.
If bounds(F11(gi )) = [ℓ′111, ℓ′112], bounds(F12(gi )) = [ℓ′121, ℓ′122], bounds(F21(gi )) = [ℓ′211, ℓ′212] and
bounds(F22(gi )) = [ℓ′221, ℓ′222].
We know that IJ Â F11(gi ) ≼ F12(gj )K = ⟨[ℓ′111, ℓ′112 ≺ ℓ′122], [ℓ′111 ≺ ℓ′121, ℓ′122]⟩. Therefore ℓ′111 ≼ ℓ1,
ℓ2 ≼ ℓ′112
≺
ℓ′122, ℓ′111 ≺ ℓ′121 ≼ ℓ3 and ℓ4 ≼ ℓ′122. Using the same argument, IJ Â F21(gi ) ≼ F22(gj )K =
⟨[ℓ′211, ℓ′212 ≺ ℓ′222], [ℓ′211 ≺ ℓ′221, ℓ′222]⟩. Therefore ℓ′211 ≼ ℓ5, ℓ6 ≼ ℓ′212 ≺ ℓ′222, ℓ′211 ≺ ℓ′221 ≼ ℓ7 and
ℓ8 ≼ ℓ′222.
But the IJ Â F ′1(gi ) ≼ F ′2(gj )K = ⟨[ℓ′1, ℓ′2 ≺ ℓ′4], [ℓ′1 ≺ ℓ′3, ℓ′4]⟩ where
bounds(F ′1(gi )) = bounds(F11(gi )) ≺bounds(F21(gi )) = [ℓ′111, ℓ′112] ≺[ℓ′211, ℓ′212] = [ℓ′111 ≺ ℓ′211, ℓ′112 ≺ ℓ′212],
and
bounds(F ′2(gi )) = bounds(F12(gi )) ≺bounds(F22(gi )) = [ℓ′121, ℓ′122] ≺[ℓ′221, ℓ′222] = [ℓ′121 ≺ ℓ′221, ℓ′122 ≺ ℓ′222].
We need to prove that [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ5, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ6] ⊑ [ℓ′111 ≺ ℓ′211, ℓ′112 ≺ ℓ′212], i.e. ℓ′111 ≺ ℓ′211 ≼ ℓ1 ≺ ℓ5 and
ℓ2 ≺ ℓ6 ≼ ℓ′112 ≺ ℓ′212. But ℓ′111 ≼ ℓ1 and ℓ′211 ≼ ℓ5, therefore ℓ′111 ≺ ℓ′211 ≼ ℓ1 ≺ ℓ5. Similarly, as
ℓ2 ≼ ℓ′112
≺
ℓ′122 and ℓ6 ≼ ℓ′212
≺
ℓ′222, then ℓ2 ≺ ℓ6 ≼ ℓ′112 ≺ ℓ′212. Therefore [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ5, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ6] ⊑
[ℓ′111 ≺ ℓ′211, ℓ′112 ≺ ℓ′212].
Using analogous argument, we also know that [ℓ3 ≺ ℓ6, ℓ4 ≺ ℓ8] ⊑ [ℓ′121 ≺ ℓ′221, ℓ′122 ≺ ℓ′222]. There-
fore ε1 ˜≺ ε2 ⊑ IJ Â F ′1(gi ) ≼ F ′2(gj )K, and the result holds.
□
Lemma D.41. Let S1, S2 ∈ Type. Then
(1) If (S1 <: S2) is defined then S1 <: (S1 <: S2).
(2) If (S1
<: S2) is defined then (S1
<: S2) <: S1.
Proof. We start by proving (1) assuming that (S1 ≺ S2) is defined. We proceed by case analysis
on S1.
Case (Boolℓ). If S1 = Boolℓ1 then as (S1 <: S2) is defined then S2 must have the form Boolℓ2 for some
ℓ2. Therefore (S1 <: S2) = Bool(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2). But by definition of ≼, ℓ1 ≼ (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2) and therefore we use
(<:Bool) to conclude that Boolℓ1 <: Bool(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2), i.e. S1 <: (S1 <: S2).
Case (S →ℓ S). If S1 = S11 →ℓ1 S12 then as (S1 <: S2) is defined then S2 must have the form
S21 →ℓ2 S22 for some S21, S22 and ℓ2.
We also know that (S1 <: S2) = (S11
<: S21) →(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2) (S12
<: S22). By definition of ≼, ℓ1 ≼ (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2).
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Also, as (S1 <: S2) is defined then (S11
<: S21) is defined. Using the induction hypothesis of (2) on S11,
(S11
<: S21) <: S11. Also, using the induction hypothesis of (1) on S12 we also know that S12 <: (S12
<: S22).
Then by (<:→) we can conclude that S11 →ℓ1 S12 <: (S11
<: S21) →(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2) (S12
<: S22), i.e. S1 <: (S1 <:S2).
The proof of (2) is similar to (1) but using the argument that
(ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2) ≼ ℓ1. □
Lemma D.42. Let S ∈ Type and ℓ ∈ Label. Then S <: S ≺ ℓ.
Proof. Straigthforward case analysis on type S using the fact that ℓ ≼ (ℓ′ ≺ ℓ) for any ℓ′. □
Lemma D.43. Let S1, S2 ∈ Type such that S1 <: S2, and let ℓ1, ℓ2 ∈ Label such that ℓ1 ≼ ℓ2. Then
S1 ≺ ℓ1 <: S2 ≺ ℓ2.
Proof. Straightforward case analysis on type S using the definition of label stamping on types.
□
E GSLεRef: DYNAMIC PROPERTIES
Notice that for convenience, the proofs and properties are defined over intrinsic terms [Garcia et al.
2016] instead of terms of the internal language. They are actually the same as terms of the internal
language, but keeping all static annotations explicitly. First we introduce the static semantics of
intrinsic terms in Sec. E.1. Their dynamic semantics in Sec. E.2. The relation between intrinsic and
evidence-augmented terms in Sec. E.3. Then the proof of type safety is presented Sec. E.4, the proof
of dynamic gradual guarantee for GSLεRef without the specific check in rule (r7) in section E.5, and
the proof of noninterference in Sec. E.6.
E.1 Intrinsic Terms: Static Semantics
Following Garcia et al. [2016], we develop intrinsically typed terms [Church 1940]: a term notation
for gradual type derivations. These terms serve as our internal language for dynamic semantics:
they play the same role that cast calculi play in typical presentations of gradual typing [Siek and
Taha 2006]. Intrinsically-typed terms tU comprise a family T[U ] of type-indexed sets, such that
ill-typed terms do not exist. They are built up from disjoint families xU ∈ V[U ] and oU ∈ L[U ] of
intrinsically typed variables and locations respectively. Unless required, we omit the type exponent
on intrinsic terms, writing tˇ ∈ T[U ].
To each typing rule corresponds an intrinsic term formation rule that captures all the information
needed to ensure that an intrinsic term is isomorphic to a typing derivation. Because intrinsic
variables and locations reflect their typings, intrinsic terms do not need explicit type environments
Γ or store environments Σ; however, the typing judgment depends on a security effect gc , which
intrinsic terms must account for.
Additionally, because intrinsic terms represent typing derivations of programs as they reduce,
they must account for the possibility that runtime values have more precise types than those used
in the original typing derivation. For instance, the term in function position of an application can
be a subtype of the function type used to type-check the program originally. The formation rule of
the application intrinsic term must permit this extra subtyping leeway, justified by evidence. The
same holds for the security information. Therefore, an intrinsic term has the general form ϕ ▷ tˇ
, where the context information ϕ ≜ ⟨εgc , gc ⟩ contains the static program counter label gc used
to type-check the source term, as well as the runtime program counter label gc , along with the
evidence ε ⊢ gc ≼˜ gc .19 For simplicity we define accessors ϕ .gc ≜ gc ,ϕ .gc ≜ gc , and ϕ .ε ≜ ε .
19We use color to make distinctions when is needed: green is for effects and static information; orange is for the runtime
information of the security effect.
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ε ∈ Evidence, et ∈ EvTerm, ev ∈ EvValue, v ∈ Value,
u ∈ SimpleValue,д ∈ EvFrame, f ∈ TmFrame
u ::= xU | bg | (λgxU .tˇ)g | oUg | unitg
v ::= u | εu :: U
f ::= h[ε]
µ := • | µ,oU 7→ v
p ::= xU | oU
q ::= p | εp :: U
ε ::= ⟨E1, E2⟩ | ⟨ı1, ı2⟩
et ::= ε tˇ
ev ::= εu
eℓ ::= εg
ϕ ::= ⟨εg, g⟩
h ::= □ ⊕g et | ev ⊕g □ | □@Uε et | ev @Uε □ | □ :: U | ifg □ then et else et
| !U □ | □ g,U:= ε et | ev g,U:= ε □ | refUε □ | protg,Uεg ϕ ′(εt)
Fig. 33. GSLRef: Syntax of the Intrinsic Term Language
(Ix)
ϕ ▷ xU ∈ T[U ] (Ib) ϕ ▷ bg ∈ T[Boolg] (Iu) ϕ ▷ unitg ∈ T[Unitg]
(Il)
ϕ ▷ oUg ∈ T[Refg U ]
(Iλ)
ϕ ′ = ⟨ε, g′, g′⟩ ϕ ▷ tˇ ∈ T[U2] ε ⊢ g′ ≼˜ g′
ϕ ▷ (λg′xU1 .tˇ)g ∈ T[U1
g′−→gU2]
(Iprot)
ϕ ′ ▷ tˇ ∈ T[U ′]
ε1 ⊢ U ′ ≲ U ε2 ⊢ g′ ≼˜ g
ϕ ▷ protg,Uε2g′ϕ
′(ε1tˇ) ∈ T[U ˜≺ g] (I⊕)
ϕ ▷ tˇ1 ∈ T[U1] ε1 ⊢ U1 ≲ Boolg1
ϕ ▷ tˇ2 ∈ T[U2] ε2 ⊢ U2 ≲ Boolg2
ϕ ▷ ε1tˇ1 ⊕g1˜ ≺g2 ε2tˇ2 ∈ T[Boolg1˜ ≺g2 ]
(Iapp)
ϕ ▷ tˇi ∈ T[Ui ] ε1 ⊢ U1 ≲ U11
g′−→gU12 ε2 ⊢ U2 ≲ U11 ε3 ⊢ Â ϕ .gc ≺ g ≼ g′
ϕ ▷ ε1tˇ1 @
U11
g′−→gU12
ε3 ε2tˇ2 ∈ T[U12 ˜≺ g]
(Iif)
ϕ ▷ tˇ1 ∈ T[U1] ε1 ⊢ U1 ≲ Boolg ϕ ′ = ϕ ˜≺ ⟨ilbl(ε1), label(U1), g⟩
ϕ ′ ▷ tˇ2 ∈ T[U2] ε2 ⊢ U2 ≲ U2 ˜<:U3 ϕ ′ ▷ tˇ3 ∈ T[U3] ε3 ⊢ U3 ≲ U2 ˜<:U3
ϕ ▷ ifg ε1tˇ1 then ε2tˇ2 else ε3tˇ3 ∈ T[(U2 ˜<:U3) ˜≺ g]
(Iref)
ϕ ▷ tˇ ∈ T[U ′]
ε1 ⊢ U ′ ≲ U ε2 ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ label(U )
ϕ ▷ refUε2 ε1tˇ ∈ T[Ref⊥ U ]
(Ideref)
ϕ ▷ tˇ ∈ T[U ′]
ε ⊢ U ′ ≲ Refg U
ϕ ▷ !Refg U ε tˇ ∈ T[U ˜≺ g]
(Iassgn)
ϕ ▷ tˇ1 ∈ T[Refg′ U ′1 ] ε1 ⊢ Refg′ U ′1 ≲ Refg U1
ϕ ▷ tˇ2 ∈ T[U2] ε2 ⊢ U2 ≲ U1 ε3 ⊢ Â ϕ .gc ≺ g ≼ label(U1)
ϕ ▷ ε1tˇ1
g,U1:= ε3 ε2tˇ2 ∈ T[Unit⊥]
(I::)
ϕ ▷ tˇ ∈ T[U1]
ε1 ⊢ U1 ≲ U2
ϕ ▷ ε1tˇ :: U2 ∈ T[U2]
Fig. 34. GSLRef: Gradual Intrinsic Terms
Figure 33, presents the syntax of intrinsic terms. Fig. 34 presents the intrinsic terms formation
rules for GSLRef. In rule (Iprot), labels g and g′ represent the static and dynamic information of the
label used to increase the program counter label in the subterm, respectively. Evidence ε1 justifies
that the type of the subterm is a consistent subtype ofU , the static type of the subterm. ϕ ′ represents
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the context information associated to the subterm tˇ : ϕ ′.gc (resp. ϕ ′.gc) is the program counter label
used to typecheck (resp. evaluate) tˇ .
In the intrinsic term formation rule for applications (Iapp),U1 is the runtime type of the function
term. We annotate the initial static type information with @. The evidence ε2 for the label ordering
premise is also annotated, since it is needed to reconstruct the derivation. The intrinsic term of a
conditional, described in Rule (Iif)20, carries the static information of the label of the conditional
term g. The context information ϕ ′ used for both branches is obtained by joining the term context
ϕ point-wise with the evidence and labels associated with the consistent subtyping judgment of
the conditional. Evidences ε2 and ε3 justify that the type of each branch is a consistent subtype of
the join of both types. Finally, rule (Iassgn) is built similarly to the application rule (Iapp).
E.2 Intrinsic Terms: Dynamic Semantics
Next we present the full definition of the intrinsic reduction rules in Figure 35, and the full definition
of notions of intrinsic reduction in Figure 36.
Because the security context information of a term is maintained at each step, we also adopt the
lightweight notation tˇ1 | µ1 ϕ7−→ tˇ2 | µ2, to denote the reduction of the intrinsic term ϕ ▷ tˇ1 ∈ T[U ]
in store µ1 to the intrinsic term ϕ ▷ tˇ2 ∈ T[U ] in store µ2. We note C[U ] the combination of a term
tˇ ∈ T[U ] (without context) and a store µ . Function applications reduce to to an error if consistent
transitivity fails to justify U2 <: U11 . Conditionals similarly reduce to a new prot term, which is
constructed using the static and dynamic information of the conditional term. Assignments may
reduce to an ascribed unit value. Similarly to references, the stored value is ascribed the statically
determined type U . Therefore consistent transitivity may fail to justify that the actual type of the
stored value is a subtype ofU . As the value is stamped with actual labels, the term may also reduce
to an error if consistent transitivity cannot support the judgment Â ϕ .gc ≺ ℓ ≼ U .
E.3 Relating Intrinsic and Evidence-augmented Terms
In this section we present the translation rules fromGSLRef terms to intrinsic terms in Figure 37. Also
this section presents the erasure function in in Figure 38—highlighting the syntactics differences
between terms in gray—along properties that relates evidence-augmented terms and intrinsic terms.
In particular we identify four important properties. First, that given a source language the
erasure of the translation to intrinsic term is equal to the translation of the source term to an
evidence-augmented term:
Proposition E.1. If Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t { tˇ : U and Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t { t ′ : U , then |tˇ | = t ′.
Proof. By induction on the type derivation of t . □
Second, given a reducible intrinsic term tˇ , if it reduces to an error, then it erasure also reduces to
an error; or, if reduces to an intrinsic term tˇ ′, then the erasure of tˇ ′ also reduces to the erasure of tˇ ′:
Proposition E.2. Consider ϕ = εgc , ϕ ▷ tˇ ∈ T[U ], and ·; Σ; εgc ⊢ t : U , such that Σ |= µ2.
Then if tˇ = t and µ1 = µ
′
1 then either
• tˇ | µ1
ϕ7−→ tˇ ′ | µ2 ⇒ |tˇ | | |µ2 |
εgc7−→ |tˇ ′ | | |µ ′2 |, or
• tˇ | µ1
ϕ7−→ error⇒ |tˇ | | |µ2 |error
Proof. By induction on the type derivation of tˇ .
20Evidence inversion functions (idom, icod, iref , ilbl and ilat) manifest the evidence for the inversion principles on con-
sistent subtyping judgments; e.g. starting from the evidence that U1 ≲ U2, ilbl produces the evidence of the judgment
label(U1) ≼˜ label(U2).
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ϕ7−→: C[U ] × (C[U ] ∪ { error })
(R−→) t
U | µ ϕ−→ r r ∈ C[U ] ∪ { error }
tU | µ ϕ7−→ r
(Rf )
tˇ1 | µ
ϕ7−→ tˇ2 | µ ′
f [tˇ1] | µ
ϕ7−→ f [tˇ2] | µ ′
(Rprot)
tˇ1 | µ
ϕ′7−→ tˇ2 | µ ′
proteℓϕ
′ (ε tˇ1) | µ
ϕ7−→ proteℓϕ ′ (ε tˇ2) | µ ′
(Rh)
et −→c et ′
h[et] | µ ϕ7−→ h[et ′] | µ ′
(Rproth)
et −→c et ′
proteℓϕ
′ (et) | µ ϕ7−→ proteℓϕ ′ (et ′) | µ ′
(Rf err)
tˇ | µ ϕ7−→ error
f [tˇ] | µ ϕ7−→ error
(Rherr)
et −→c error
h[et] | µ ϕ7−→ error
(Rproterr)
tˇ | µ ϕ
′
7−→ error
proteℓϕ
′ (ε tˇ) | µ ϕ7−→ error
(Rprotherr)
et −→c error
proteℓϕ
′ (et) | µ ϕ7−→ error
Fig. 35. GSLRef: Intrinsic Reduction
Case (I::). Then tˇ = ε1tˇ ′ :: U and by (E::), t = ε1t ′ for some t ′ such that tˇ ′ = t ′. Suppose that
ε1 ⊢ U ′ ≲ U . By inspection on the type derivations, ϕ ▷ tˇ ′ ∈ T[U ′] and ·; Σ; εgc ⊢ t ′ : U ′.
Let us suppose that tˇ ′ | µ1
ϕ7−→ tˇ ′′ | µ2, then by induction hypothesis t ′ | µ2
εgc7−→ t ′′ | µ ′2 and
tˇ ′′ = t ′′ and µ ′1 = µ ′2. Then ε1tˇ ′ :: U | µ1
ϕ7−→ ε1tˇ ′′ :: U | µ ′1 and ε1t ′ | µ2
εgc7−→ ε1t ′′ | µ ′2. But as
µ ′1 = µ ′2, and by (E::) ε1tˇ ′′ :: U = ε1t ′′, the result holds.
Let us suppose now that tˇ ′ = ε2u :: U ′. Then as tˇ ′ = t ′, t ′ = ε2u ′, for some u ′ such that
u = u ′. If ε2 ◦<: ε1 is not defined the result holds immediately. Suppose ε2 ◦<: ε1 = ε ′, then
ε1(ε2u :: U ′) :: U | µ1
ϕ7−→ ε ′u :: U | µ1 and ε1(ε2u ′) | µ2
εgc7−→ ε ′u ′ | µ2. But as µ1 = µ2, and by (E::)
ε ′u :: U = ε ′u ′, the result holds.
If tˇ ′ = u, then as tˇ ′ = t ′, t ′ = ε2u ′, for some u ′ such that u = u ′, and the result holds immediately.
The other cases proceed analogous. □
Fourth, if an intrinsic term type checks, then its erasure also type checks to the same type.
Proposition E.3. Consider ϕ ▷ tˇ ∈ T[U ] then, for Γ |= tˇ and Σ |= tˇ , Γ; Σ; |ϕ | ⊢ |tˇ | : U .
Proof. By induction on the type derivation of tˇ . □
Finally, if an evidence-augmented term type checks, then there must exists some intrinsic term
that have the same type and that it erasure is the original evidence-augmented term.
Proposition E.4. Consider Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ t : U . Then ∃tˇ, ∃ϕ such that |tˇ | = t and |ϕ | = εgc and
ϕ ▷ tˇ ∈ T[U ]
Proof. By induction on the type derivation of t .
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Notions of Reduction
ϕ−→ : C[U ] × (C[U ] ∪ { error })
ε1(b1)g1 ⊕g ε2(b2)g2 | µ
ϕ−→ (ε1 ˜≺ ε2)(b1 J⊕K b2)(g1˜ ≺g2) :: Boolg | µ
protg,Uε2g′ϕ
′(ε1u) | µ
ϕ−→ (ε1 ˜≺ ε2)(u ˜≺ g′) :: U ˜≺ g | µ
ε1(λg′2xU11 .t∗)g2 @
U1
g′1−→g1U2
ε3 ε2u | µ
ϕ−→
{
protg1,U2ilbl(ε1)g2ϕ
′(icod(ε1)([(εu :: U11)/xU11 ]t∗)) | µ
error if ε or ε ′ are not defined
where ε = ε2 ◦<: idom(ε1), ε ′ = (ϕ .ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1)) ◦≼ ε3 ◦≼ ilat(ε1)
and ϕ ′ = ⟨ε ′, ϕ .gc ˜≺ g2, g′2⟩
ifg ε1trueg1 then ε2t
U2 else ε3tU3 | µ
ϕ−→ protg,Uilbl(ε1)g1ϕ ′(ε2tU2 ) | µ
where ϕ ′ = ⟨ϕ .ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1), ϕ .gc ˜≺ g1, ϕ .gc ˜≺ g⟩ andU = (U2 ˜<:U3)
ifg ε1falseg1 then ε2t
U2 else ε3tU3 | µ
ϕ−→ protg,Uilbl(ε1)g1ϕ ′(ε3tU3 ) | µ
where ϕ ′ = ⟨ϕ .ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1), ϕ .gc ˜≺ g1, ϕ .gc ˜≺ g⟩ andU = (U2 ˜<:U3)
refUεℓ εu | µ
ϕ−→
{
oU⊥ | µ [oU 7→ ε ′(u ˜≺ ϕ .gc) :: U ] where oU < dom(µ )
error if (ϕ .ε ◦≼ εℓ) is not defined
where ε ′ = ε ˜≺ (ϕ .ε ◦≼ εℓ)
!Refg U εoU ′g′ | µ
ϕ−→ protg,Uilbl(ε )g′ϕ ′(iref (ε)v)
where µ (oU ′) = v and ϕ ′ = ⟨ϕ .ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε), ϕ .gc ˜≺ g′, ϕ .gc ˜≺ g⟩
ε1oUg
g′,U1:= ε3 ε2u | µ
ϕ−→

unit⊥ | µ [oU 7→ ε ′(u ˜≺ (ϕ .gc ˜≺ g)) :: U ]
error if ε ′ is not defined, or
ϕ .ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1) ⌊≤⌋ ilbl(ε) does not hold
where ε ′ = (ε2 ◦<: iref (ε1)) ˜≺ ((ϕ .ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1)) ◦≼ ε3 ◦≼ ilbl(iref (ε1))
and µ (oU ) = εu ′ :: U
−→c : EvTerm × (EvTerm ∪ { error })
ε1(ε2v :: U ) −→c
®(ε2 ◦<: ε1)v
error if not defined
⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ3, ℓ4]⟩ ⌊≤⌋ ⟨[ℓ′1, ℓ′2], [ℓ′3, ℓ′4]⟩ ⇐⇒ ℓ1 ≼ ℓ′1 ∧ ℓ3 ≼ ℓ′4
Fig. 36. GSLRef: Intrinsic Notions of Reduction
Case (ε ′t ′). Then t = ε ′t ′, for some ε ′, t ′. But we know that Γ; Σ; εgc ⊢ ε ′t ′ : U and suppose
ε ′ ⊢ U ′ ≲ U and ε ⊢ gc ≲ gc ′. Then by choosing ϕ = ⟨ε, gc ⟩gc ′ and induction hypothesis on t ′, ∃tˇ ′
such that ϕ ▷ tˇ ′ ∈ T[U ′].
The other cases proceed analogous. □
Lemma E.5. Consider ϕ ▷ tˇ1 ∈ T[U ]. If tˇ1 ⊑ tˇ2 then |tˇ1 | ⊑ |tˇ2 |.
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Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t { tˇ : U
(T x)
Γ(x) = U
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ x { xU : U
(T b)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ bg { bg : Boolg
(T u)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ unitg { unitg : Unitg (T λ)
Γ; Σ; g′ ⊢ t { tˇ : U2
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ (λg′x : U1.t)g { (λg′xU1 .tˇ)g : U1
g′−→gU2
(T ⊕)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 { tˇ1 : Boolg1 Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t2 { tˇ2 : Boolg2
ε1 = I<:(Boolg1 ,Boolg1 ) ε2 = I<:(Boolg2 ,Boolg2 )
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 ⊕ t2 { ε1tˇ1 ⊕g1˜ ≺g2 ε2tˇ2 : Boolg1˜ ≺g2
(T app)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 { tˇ1 : U11
g′−→gU12 Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t2 { tˇ2 : U2
ε1 = I⟳<:(U11
g′−→gU12) ε2 = I<:(U2,U11) ε3 = I≼(gc , g, g′)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 t2 { ε1tˇ1 @U11
g′−→gU12
ε3 ε2tˇ2 : U12 ˜≺ g
(T if)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 { tˇ1 : U1 g′c = gc ˜≺ g Γ; Σ; g′c ⊢ t2 { tˇ2 : U2 Γ; Σ; g′c ⊢ t3 { tˇ3 : U3
ε1 = I<:(U1,Boolg) ε2 = I<:(U2,U2,U3) ε3 = I<:(U3,U2,U3)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ if t1 then t2 else t3 { ifg ε1tˇ1 then ε2tˇ2 else ε3tˇ3 : (U2 ˜<:U3) ˜≺ g
(T assgn)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1 { tˇ1 : Refg U1 Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t2 { tˇ2 : U2
ε1 = I⟳<:(Refg U1) ε2 = I<:(U2,U1) ε3 = I≼(gc , g, label(U1))
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t1:=t2 { ε1tˇ1 g,U1:= ε3 ε2tˇ2 : Unit⊥
(T ref)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t { tˇ : U ′
ε1 = I<:(U ′,U ) ε2 ⊢ I≼(gc , label(U ))
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ refU t { refUε2 ε1tˇ : Ref⊥ U
(T deref)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t { tˇ : Refg U
ε = I⟳<:(Refg U )
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ !t { !Refg U ε tˇ : U ˜≺ g
(T ::)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t { tˇ : U1 ε = I<:(U1,U2)
Γ; Σ; gc ⊢ t :: U2 { ε tˇ :: U2 : U2
where I⟳≼ (g) = I≼(g, g) and I⟳<:(U ) = I<:(U ,U )
Fig. 37. GSLRef: translation to GSLRef intrinsic terms
Proof. By induction on the type derivation of tˇ1 and the definition of | |. □
Lemma E.6. Consider ϕ ▷ tˇ1 ∈ T[U ]. If |tˇ1 | ⊑ t2, then ∃tˇ2, such that tˇ1 ⊑ tˇ2 and that |tˇ2 | = t2.
Proof. By induction on tˇ1 and the definition of | |.
Case (I::). Then tˇ1 = ε1tˇ ′1 :: U , and |tˇ1 | = ε1 |tˇ ′1 |. By definition of ⊑, t2 has the form ε2t ′2, where
ε2 ⊑ ε2 and |tˇ ′1 | ⊑ t ′2. By induction hypothesis, ∃tˇ ′2 such that tˇ ′1 ⊑ tˇ ′2 and that |tˇ ′2 | = t ′2. By definition
of evidence, we can build the term ε2tˇ ′2 :: ?, but we know that ε1tˇ ′1 :: U ⊑ ε2tˇ ′2 :: ? and that
|ε2tˇ ′2 :: ?| = ε2 |tˇ ′2 | = ε2t2 and the result holds.
The other cases proceed analogous. □
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(Ex) |xU | = x (Eb) |bg | = bg (Eu) |unitg | = unitg (Eo) |oUg | = og
(Eλ)
|tˇ | = t
|(λg′xU1 .tˇ)g | = (λg′x : U1.tˇ)g
(Eprot)
|ϕ ′ | = ε2g2 |tˇ | = t
|protg
′
1 ,U
ε1g1 ϕ
′(ε3tˇ)| = protε1g1ε2g2(ε3t)
(E⊕) |tˇ1 | = t1 |tˇ2 | = t2
|ε1tˇ1 ⊕ g1 ˜≺ g2 ε2tˇ2 | = ε1t1 ⊕ ε2t2 (Eapp)
|tˇi | = ti
|ε1tˇ1 @U11
g′−→gU12
ε3 ε2tˇ2 | = ε1t1 @ε3 ε2t2
(Eif)
|tˇi | = ti
|if g ε1tˇ1 then ε2tˇ2 else ε3tˇ3 | = if ε1t1 then ε2t2 else ε3t3
(Eref)
|tˇ | = t
|refUε2 ε1tˇ | = refUε2 ε1t
(Ederef)
|tˇ | = t
|!Refg U ε tˇ | = !εt
(Eassgn)
|tˇi | = t
|ε1tˇ1
g,U1:= ε3 ε2tˇ2 | = ε1t1 :=ε3 ε2t2
(E::)
|tˇ | = t
|ε tˇ :: U2 = εt |
|•| = •
|µ1 | = µ2 |xU | = x |v | = v ′
|µ1, xU 7→ v | = µ2, x 7→ v ′
|⟨ε, g, g′⟩| = εg
Fig. 38. GSLεRef: Equivalence between intrinsic terms and evidence-augmented terms
E.4 Type Safety
In this section we present the proof of type safety for GSLRef.
We define what it means for a store to be well typed with respect to a term. Informally, all free
locations of a term and of the contents of the store must be defined in the domain of that store.
Also, the store must preserve types between intrinsic locations and underlying values.
Definition E.7 (µ is well typed). A store µ is said to be well typed with respect to an intrinsic term
tU , written tU ⊢ µ , if
(1) freeLocs(tU ) ⊆ dom(µ), and
(2) ∀ v ∈ cod(µ),v ⊢ µ and
(3) ∀ oU ∈ dom(µ),∀ϕ, then ϕ ▷ µ(oU ) ∈ T[U ].
Lemma E.8. Suppose ϕ ▷ tU ∈ T[U ], then ∀g′r ,∀ε ′r , such that g′r ≼ ϕ .gc and ε ′r ⊢ g′r ≼ ϕ .gc ,
ϕ ′ = ⟨ε ′rg′r ,ϕ .gc⟩ then ϕ ′ ▷ tU ∈ T[U ].
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ϕ ▷ tU ∈ T[U ]. Noticing that no typing derivation
depends on ε ′rg′r , save for the judgement ε ′r ⊢ g′r ≼ gc which is premise of this lemma. □
Lemma E.9. Suppose ϕ ▷ v ∈ T[U ], then ∀ϕ ′, then ϕ ′ ▷ v ∈ T[U ].
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ϕ ′ ▷ v observing that for values, there is no premise
that depends on the security effect. □
Lemma E.10 (Canonical forms). Consider a value v ∈ T[U ]. Then either v = u, or v = εu :: U
with u ∈ T[U ′] and ε ⊢ U ′ ≲ U . Furthermore:
(1) If U = Boolg then either v = bg or v = εbg′ :: Boolg with bg′ ∈ T[Boolg′] and ε ⊢ Boolg′ ≲
Boolg.
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(2) If U = U1
gc−→gU2 then either v = (λgcxU1 .tU2 )g with tU2 ∈ T[U2] or v = ε(λg′cxU ′1 .tU ′2 )g′ ::
U1
gc−→gU2 with tU ′2 ∈ T[U ′2 ] and ε ⊢ U ′1
g′c−→g′U ′2 ≲ U1
gc−→gU2.
(3) If U = Refg U1 then either v = oU1g or v = εo
U ′1
g′ :: Refg U1 with o
U ′1
g′ ∈ Refg′ U ′1 and ε ⊢
Refg′ U ′1 ≲ Refg U1.
Proof. By direct inspection of the formation rules of gradual intrinsic terms (Figure 34). □
Lemma E.11 (Substitution). If ϕ ▷ tU ∈ T[U ] and ϕ ▷ v ∈ T[U1],then ϕ ▷ [v/xU1 ]tU ∈ T[U ].
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ϕ ▷ tU . □
Proposition E.12 (−→ is well defined). If tU | µ −→ r and tU ⊢ µ , then r ∈ ConfigU ∪{ error }
and if r = t ′U | µ ′ ∈ ConfigU then also t ′U ⊢ µ ′ and dom(µ) ⊆ dom(µ ′).
Proof. By induction on the structure of a derivation of tT˜ | µ −→ r , considering the last rule
used in the derivation.
Case (I⊕). Then tU = b1ℓ1 ⊕g b2ℓ2 . By construction we can suppose that g = g′1 ˜≺ g′2, then
(I⊕)
ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc
ϕ ▷ b1ℓ1 ∈ Boolg1 ε1 ⊢ Boolg1 ≲ Boolg′1
ϕ ▷ b2ℓ2 ∈ Boolg2 ε2 ⊢ Boolg2 ≲ Boolg′2
ϕ ▷ ε1b1ℓ1 ⊕g ε2b2ℓ2 ∈ T[Boolg]
Therefore
ε1(b1)g1 ⊕g ε2(b2)g2 | µ
ϕ−→ (ε1 ˜≺ ε2)(b1 J⊕K b2)(g1˜ ≺g2) :: Boolg | µ
Then
(I⊕)
ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc
ϕ ▷ (ε1 ˜≺ ε2)(b1 J⊕K b2)(g1˜ ≺g2) :: Boolg ∈ T[Boolg]
and the result holds.
Case (Iprot). Then tU = ϕ ▷ protg,Uεg′ ϕ ′(εu) and
(Iprot)
ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc ε ′r ⊢Â gr ≺ g′ ≼ g′c
ϕ ′ ▷ u ∈ T[U ′]
ε ⊢ U ′ ≲ U εℓ ⊢ g′ ≼˜ g
ϕ ▷ protg,Uεg′ ϕ
′(εu) ∈ T[U ˜≺ g]
Therefore
protg,Uεg′ ϕ
′(εu) | µ ϕ−→ (ε ˜≺ εℓ)(u ˜≺ g′) :: U ˜≺ g | µ
But by Lemma E.9, ϕ ▷ u ∈ T[U ′]. Therefore by definition of join ϕ ▷ (u ˜≺ g′) ∈ T[U ′ ˜≺ g′]. Then
using Lemma 6.13
I::
ϕ ▷ (u ˜≺ g′) ∈ T[U ′ ˜≺ g′]
(ε ˜≺ εℓ) ⊢ ‡U ′ ≺ g′ ≲ flU ≺ g
ϕ ▷ (ε ˜≺ εℓ)(u ˜≺ g′) :: U ˜≺ g ∈ T[U ≺ ℓ]
and the result holds.
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Case (Iapp). Then tU = ε1(λg′′c xU11 .tU12 )g1 @U1
g′c−→gU2
εℓ ε2u andU = U2 ˜≺ g. Then
(Iapp)
D1
ϕ ▷ tU 12 ∈ T[U12] ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc
ϕ ▷ (λg′′c xU11 .tU12 )g1 ∈ T[U11
g′′c−→g1U12]
D2
ϕ ▷ u ∈ T[U ′2 ] ε2 ⊢ U ′2 ≲ U1
ε1 ⊢ U11
g′′c−→g1U12 ≲ U1
g′c−→gU2
εℓ ⊢ ‰ gc ≺ g ≼ g′c ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc
ϕ ▷ ε1(λg′′c xU11 .tU12 )g1 @U1
g′c−→gU2
εℓ ε2u ∈ T[U2 ˜≺ g]
If ε ′ = (ε2◦<: idom(ε1)) or ε ′r = (ϕ .ε˜≺ ilbl(ε1))◦≼ εℓ ◦≼ ilat(ε1) are not defined, then tU | µ ϕ−→ error,
and then the result hold immediately. Suppose that consistent transitivity does hold, then if
ϕ ′ = ⟨ϕ ′.ε(ϕ .gc ˜≺ g1), g′′c ⟩
ε1(λg′′c xU11 .tU12 )g1 @U1
g′c−→gU2
εℓ ε2u | µ
ϕ−→ protg,U2ilbl(ε1)g1ϕ ′(icod(ε1)([(ε ′u :: U11)/xU11 ]tU12 )) | µ
As ε2 ⊢ U ′2 ≲ U1 and by inversion lemma idom(ε1) ⊢ U1 ≲ U11, then ε ′ ⊢ U ′2 ≲ U11. Therefore
ϕ ▷ ε ′u :: U11 ∈ T[U11], and by Lemma E.11,
ϕ ▷ [(ε ′u :: U11)/xU11 ]tU12 ∈ T[U12].
We know that εℓ ⊢ ‰ gc ≺ g ≼ g′c . By inversion on the label of types, ilbl(ε1) ⊢ g1 ≼˜ g. Also by
monotonicity of the join, ϕ .ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1) ⊢ ϕ .gc ˜≺ g1 ≼˜ gc ˜≺ g. Then, by inversion on the latent effect
of function types, ilat(ε1) ⊢ g′c ≼˜ g′′c . Therefore combining evidences, as ϕ ′.ε = (ϕ .ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1)) ◦≼
εℓ ◦≼ ilat(ε1), we may justify the runtime judgment ϕ ′.ε ⊢ Â ϕ .gc ≺ g1 ≼ g′′c .
Let us call t ′U12 = [(ε ′u :: U11)/xU11 ]tU12 . By Lemma E.8, ϕ ′ ▷ t ′U12 ∈ T[U12]. Then
(Iprot)
ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc
ϕ ′ ▷ t ′U12 ∈ T[U12]
icod(ε1) ⊢ U12 ≲ U2 ilbl(ε1) ⊢ g1 ≼˜ g
ϕ ▷ protg,U2ilbl(ε1)g1ϕ
′(icod(ε1)(t ′U12 )) ∈ T[U2 ˜≺ g]
and the result holds.
Case (Iif-true). Then tU = ifg ε1bg1 then ε2tU2 else ε3tU3 ,U = (U2 ˜<:U3) ˜≺ g and
(If)
ϕ ▷ bg1 ∈ T[Boolg1 ] ε1 ⊢ Boolg1 ≲ Boolg
ϕ ′ = ⟨ϕ .ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1)(ϕ .gc ˜≺ g1),ϕ .gc ˜≺ g⟩ ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc
ϕ ′ ▷ tU2 ∈ T[U2] ε2 ⊢ U2 ≲ (U2 ˜<:U3)
ϕ ′ ▷ tU3 ∈ T[U3] ε3 ⊢ U3 ≲ (U2 ˜<:U3)
ϕ ▷ ifg ε1bg1 then ε2t
U2 else ε3tU3 ∈ T[(U2 ˜<:U3) ˜≺ g]
Therefore
if gε1bg1 then ε2t
U2 else ε3tU3 | µ ϕ−→ protg,(U2
˜ <:U3)
ilbl(ε1)g1 ϕ
′(ε2tU2 ) | µ
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But
(Iprot)
ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc
ϕ ′ ▷ tU2 ∈ T[U2]
ε2 ⊢ U2 ≲ U2 ˜<:U3 ilbl(ε1) ⊢ g1 ≼˜ g
ϕ ▷ protg,(U2
˜ <:U3)
ilbl(ε1)g1 ϕ
′(ε2tU2 ) ∈ T[(U2 ˜<:U3) ˜≺ g]
and the result holds.
Case (Iif-false). Analogous to case (if-true).
Case (Iref). Then tU = refU ′εℓ εu and
(Iref)
ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc ϕ ▷ u ∈ T[U ′′]
ε ⊢ U ′′ ≲ U ′ εℓ ⊢ gc ≼˜ label(U ′)
ϕ ▷ refU
′
εℓ εu ∈ T[Ref⊥ U ′]
If ε ′ = ε ˜≺ (ϕ .ε ◦≼ εℓ) is not defined, then tU ′ | µ ϕ−→ error, and then the result hold immediately.
Suppose that consistent transitivity does hold, then
refU
′
εℓ εu | µ
ϕ−→ oU ′⊥ | µ[oU
′ 7→ ε ′(u ˜≺ ϕ .gc) :: U ′]
where oU ′ < dom(µ).
We know that εℓ ⊢ gc ≼˜ label(U ′), therefore ϕ .ε ◦≼ εℓ ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ label(U ′). We also know that ε ⊢
U ′′ ≲ U ′. Therefore combining both evidences we can justify that ε ˜≺ (ϕ .ε ◦<: εℓ) ⊢ Â U ′2 ≺ ϕ .gc <: U ′.
But
(Il)
ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc
oU
′
⊥ ∈ T[Ref⊥ U ′]
Let us call µ ′ = µ[oU ′ 7→ ε ′(u˜≺ϕ .gc) :: U ′]. It is easy to see that freeLocs(oU ′) = oU ′ and dom(µ ′) =
dom(µ) ∪ oU ′ , then freeLocs(oU ′) ⊆ dom(µ ′). Given that tU ′ ⊢ µ then freeLocs(u) ⊆ dom(µ), and
therefore ∀ v ∈ cod(µ ′) = cod(µ) ∪ (ε ′(u ˜≺ ϕ .gc) :: U ′), freeLocs(v ′) ⊆ dom(µ ′). Finally as tU ′ ⊢ µ
and µ ′(oU ′) = ε ′(u ˜≺ ϕ .gc) :: U ′ ∈ T[U ′] then we can conclude that lU ′ ⊢ µ ′ and dom(µ) ⊆ dom(µ ′),
and the result holds.
Case (Ideref). Then tU = !Refg U ′εoU ′′g′ ,U = U ′ ˜≺ g and
(Ideref)
ϕ ▷ oU
′′
g′ ∈ T[Refg′ U ′′]
ε ⊢ Refg′ U ′′ ≲ Refg U ′
ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc
ϕ ▷ !Refg U ′εoU ′′g′ ∈ T[U ′ ˜≺ g]
Then for ϕ ′ = ⟨(ϕ .ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε))(ϕ .gc ˜≺ g′),ϕ .gc ˜≺ g⟩
!Refg U ′εoU ′′g′ | µ
ϕ−→ protg,U ′ilbl(ε )g′ϕ ′(iref (ε)v) | µ
where µ(oU ′′) = v . As the store is well typed, thereforeϕ ▷v ∈ T[U ′′]. By Lemma E.9,ϕ ′▷v ∈ T[U ′′].
By inversion lemma on references, ilbl(ε) ⊢ g′ ≼˜ g and iref (ε) ⊢ U ′′ ≲ U ′
(Iprot)
ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc ϕ ′ ▷ v ∈ T[U ′′]
iref (ε) ⊢ U ′′ ≲ U ′ ilbl(ε) ⊢ g′ ≼˜ g
ϕ ▷ protg,U
′
ilbl(ε )g′ϕ
′(iref (ε)v) ∈ T[U ′ ˜≺ g]
and the result holds.
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Case (Iassgn). Then tU = ε1o
U ′1
g′
g,U1:= εℓ ε2u and
(Iassgn)
ε1 ⊢ Refg′ U ′1 ≲ Refg U1 ϕ ▷ oU
′
1
g′ ∈ T[Refg′ U ′1 ]
ε2 ⊢ U2 ≲ U1 ϕ ▷ u ∈ T[U2]
ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc εℓ ⊢ Â ϕ .gc ≺ g ≼ label(U1)
ϕ ▷ ε1o
U ′1
g′
g,U1:= εℓ ε2u ∈ T[Unit⊥]
If ε ′ = (ε2◦<: iref (ε1))˜≺ ((ϕ .ε˜≺ ilbl(ε1))◦≼ εℓ ◦≼ ilbl(iref (ε1)) is not defined, then tU ′ | µ ϕ−→ error,
and then the result hold immediately. Suppose that consistent transitivity does hold, then
ε1o
U ′1
g
g,U1:= εℓ ε2u | µ
ϕ−→ unit⊥ | µ[oU 7→ ε ′(u ˜≺ (ϕ .gc ˜≺ g)) :: U ′1 ]
We know that εℓ ⊢ Â ϕ .gc ≺ g ≼ label(U1). Then by inversion on reference evidence types and
inversion in the label of types, ilbl(iref (ε1)) ⊢ label(U1) ≼˜ label(U ′1 ). But ilbl(ε1) ⊢ g′ ≼˜ g, using
monotonicity of the join, ϕ .ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1) ⊢ Â ϕ .gc ≺ g′ ≼ ϕ .gc ≺ g. Therefore
((ϕ .ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1)) ◦≼ εℓ) ◦≼ ilbl(iref (ε1)) ⊢  ϕ .gc ≺ g′ ≼ label(U ′1 ). We also know that if u ∈ T[U2], then
(ε2 ◦<: iref (ε1)) ⊢ U2 ≲ U ′1 . Combining both evidences, ε ′ = (ε2 ◦<: iref (ε1)) ˜≺ (((ϕ .ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1)) ◦≼
εℓ) ◦≼ ilbl(iref (ε1))), and by Proposition 6.13 we can then justify that ε ′ ⊢ Â U2 ≺ (ϕ .gc ≺ g) <: U ′1 and
therefore justify the ascription in the heap.
Let us call µ ′ = µ[oU ′1 7→ ε ′(u ˜≺ (ϕ .gc ˜≺ g)) :: U ′1 ]. As freeLocs(unit⊥) = ∅ then
freeLocs(unit⊥) ⊆ µ ′.
As tU ⊢ µ then freeLocs(u) ∈ dom(µ), and as dom(µ) = dom(µ ′) then it is trivial to see that
∀ v ′ ∈ cod(µ ′), freeLocs(v ′) ⊆ dom(µ ′), and the result holds.
□
Proposition E.13 ( 7−→ is well defined). If tU | µ ϕ7−→ r and tU ⊢ µ , then r ∈ ConfigU ∪
{ error } and if r = t ′U | µ ′ ∈ ConfigU then also t ′U ⊢ µ ′ and dom(µ) ⊆ dom(µ ′).
Proof. By induction on the structure of a derivation of tU | µ ϕ7−→ r .
Case (R−→). tU | µ ϕ−→ r . By well-definedness of −→ (Prop E.12), r ∈ ConfigT˜ ∪ { error } and if
r = t ′U | µ ′ ∈ ConfigU then also t ′U ⊢ µ ′ and dom(µ) ⊆ dom(µ ′).
Case (Rprot). tU = protg,U
′
εg′ ϕ
′(εtU ′′1 ) and
(Iprot)
ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc ε ′r ⊢Â gr ≺ g′ ≼ g′c
ϕ ′ ▷ tU ′′1 ∈ T[U ′′]
ε ⊢ U ′′ ≲ U ′ εℓ ⊢ g′ ≼˜ g
ϕ ▷ protg,U
′
εg′ ϕ
′(εtU ′′1 ) ∈ T[U ′ ˜≺ g]
Using induction hypothesis on the premise of (Rprot()), then
(Rprot()) t
U ′′
1 | µ
ϕ′7−→ tU ′′2 | µ ′
protg,U
′
εg′ ϕ
′(εtU ′′1 ) | µ
ϕ7−→ protg,U ′εg′ ϕ ′(εtU
′′
2 ) | µ ′
where ϕ ′ ▷ tU ′′2 ∈ T[U ′′], tU ′′2 ⊢ µ ′ and dom(µ) ⊆ dom(µ ′). Therefore
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(Iprot)
ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc ε ′r ⊢Â gr ≺ g′ ≼ g′c
ϕ ′ ▷ tU ′′2 ∈ T[U ′′]
ε ⊢ U ′′ ≲ U ′ εℓ ⊢ g′ ≼˜ g
ϕ ▷ protg,U
′
εg′ ϕ
′(εtU ′′2 ) ∈ T[U ′ ˜≺ g]
and the result holds.
Case (Rf ). tU = f [tU ′1 ], ϕ ▷ f [tU ′] ∈ T[U ], tU ′1 | µ
ϕ7−→ tU ′2 | µ ′, and consider F : T[U ′] → T[U ],
where F (ϕ ▷ tU ′) = ϕ ▷ f [tU ′]. By induction hypothesis, ϕ ▷ tU ′2 ∈ T[U ′], so F (ϕ ▷ tU ′2 ) = ϕ ▷ f [tU ′2 ] ∈
T[U ].
By induction hypothesis we also know that tU ′2 ⊢ µ ′.
If freeLocs(tU ′2 ) ⊆ µ ′, freeLocs(f [tU1 ]) ⊆ µ , and dom(µ) ⊆ dom(µ ′), then it is easy to see that
freeLocs(f [tU ′2 ]) ⊆ µ ′, and therefore conclude that f [tU2 ] ⊢ µ ′.
Case (Rf err, Rherr, Rprot()f err, Rprot()herr). r = error.
Case (Rh). tU = h[et],ϕ ▷h[tU ′] ∈ T[U ], and considerG : EvLabel×GLabel×GLabel×EvTerm→
T[U ], G(ϕ, et) = ϕ ▷ h[et] and et −→c et ′. Then there exists Ue ,Ux such that et = εetUee and
εe ⊢ Ue ≲ Ux . Also, te = εvv :: Ue , with v ∈ T[Uv ] and εv ⊢ Uv ≲ Ue .
We know that εc = εv ◦<: εe is defined, and et = εete −→c εcv = et ′. By definition of ◦<: we have
εc ⊢ Uv ≲ Ux , so G(ϕ, et ′) = ϕ ▷ h[et ′] ∈ T[U ].
As freeLocs(et) = freeLocs(et ′) and µ ′ = µ then it is easy to conclude that h[et ′] ⊢ µ .
Case (Rprot()h). Similar case to (Rh) case, using P : EvTerm→ T[U ], P(et) = ϕ ▷ protg,Uεg′ ϕ ′(et).
□
Now we can establish type safety: programs do not get stuck, though they may terminate with
cast errors. Also the store of a program is well typed.
Proposition E.14 (Type Safety). If ϕ ▷ tU ∈ T[U ] then either tU is a value v ; tU | µ ϕ7−→ error;
or if tU ⊢ µ then tU | µ ϕ7−→ t ′U | µ ′ for some term ϕ ▷ t ′U ∈ T[U ] and some µ ′ such that t ′U ⊢ µ ′
and dom(µ) ⊆ dom(µ ′).
Proof. By induction on the structure of ϕ ▷ tU .
Case (Iu,Il, Ib, Ix, Iλ). tU is a value.
Case (Iprot). tU = protg,Uεg′ ϕ ′(εtU
′), and
(Iprot)
ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc ε ′r ⊢Â gr ≺ g′ ≼ g′c
ϕ ′ ▷ tU ′ ∈ T[U ′]
ε ⊢ U ′ ≲ U εℓ ⊢ g′ ≼˜ g
ϕ ▷ protg,Uεg′ ϕ
′(εtU ′) ∈ T[U ˜≺ g]
By induction hypothesis on tU ′ , one of the following holds:
(1) tU ′ is a simple value , then by (R−→), tU | µ ϕ7−→ v | µ , and by Prop E.13, ϕ ▷ v ∈ T[U ] and
the result holds.
(2) tU ′ is an ascribed value v , then, εtU ′ −→c et ′ for some et ′ ∈ EvTerm ∪ { error }. Hence
tU | µ ϕ7−→ r for some r ∈ ConfigU ∪ { error } by Prop E.13 and either (Rg), or (Rgerr).
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(3) tU ′ | µ ϕ7−→ r1 for some r1 ∈ T[U1] ∪ { error }. Hence tU | µ ϕ7−→ r for some r ∈ ConfigU ∪
{ error } by Prop E.13 and either (Rprot()), or (Rprot()ferr).
Case (I::). tU = ε1tU1 :: U2, and
(I::)
ϕ ▷ tU1 ∈ T[U1]
ε1 ⊢ U1 ≲ U2 ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc
ϕ ▷ ε1t
U1 :: U2 ∈ T[U2]
By induction hypothesis on tU1 , one of the following holds:
(1) tU1 is a value, in which case tU is also a value.
(2) tU1 | µ ϕ7−→ r1 for some r1 ∈ T[U1] ∪ { error }. Hence tU | µ 7−→ r for some r ∈ ConfigU ∪
{ error } by Prop E.13 and either (Rf ), or (Rf err).
Case (IU if). tU = ifg ε1tU1 then ε2tU2 else ε3tU3 and
(If)
ϕ ▷ tU1 ∈ T[U1] ε1 ⊢ U1 ≲ Boolg ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc
ϕ ′ = ⟨(ϕ .ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1))(ϕ .gc ˜≺ label(U1)), gc ˜≺ g⟩
ϕ ′ ▷ tU2 ∈ T[U2] ε2 ⊢ U2 ≲ (U2 ˜<:U3)
ϕ ′ ▷ tU3 ∈ T[U3] ε3 ⊢ U3 ≲ (U2 ˜<:U3)
ϕ ▷ ifg ε1tU1 then ε2tU2 else ε3tU3 ∈ T[(U2 ˜<:U3) ˜≺ g]
By induction hypothesis on tU1 , one of the following holds:
(1) tU1 is a value u, then by (R−→), tU | µ ϕ7−→ r and r ∈ ConfigU ∪ { error } by Prop E.13.
(2) tU1 is an ascribed value v , then, ε1tU1 −→c et ′ for some et ′ ∈ EvTerm ∪ { error }. Hence
tU | µ ϕ7−→ r for some r ∈ ConfigU ∪ { error } by Prop E.13 and either (Rg), or (Rgerr).
(3) tU1 | µ ϕ7−→ r1 for some r1 ∈ T[U1] ∪ { error }. Hence tU | µ 7−→ r for some r ∈ ConfigU ∪
{ error } by Prop E.13 and either (Rf ), or (Rf err).
Case (Iapp). tU = ε1tU1 @
U11
g′c−→gU12
εℓ ε2t
U2
(Iapp)
ϕ ▷ tU1 ∈ T[U1] ε1 ⊢ U1 ≲ U11
g′c−→gU12
ϕ ▷ tU2 ∈ T[U2] ε2 ⊢ U2 ≲ U11
εℓ ⊢ ‰ gc ≺ g ≼ g′c ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc
ϕ ▷ ε1t
U1 @U11
g′c−→gU12
εℓ ε2t
U2 ∈ T[U12 ˜≺ g]
By induction hypothesis on tU1 , one of the following holds:
(1) tU1 is a value (λxU ′11 .tU ′12 )g′ (by canonical forms Lemma E.10), posingU1 = U ′11
g′′c−→g′U ′12.
Then by induction hypothesis on tU2 , one of the following holds:
(a) tU2 is a value u, then by (R−→), tU | µ ϕ7−→ r and r ∈ ConfigU ∪ { error } by Prop E.13.
(b) tU2 is an ascribed value v , then, ε2tU2 −→c et ′ for some et ′ ∈ EvTerm ∪ { error }. Hence
tU | µ ϕ7−→ r for some r ∈ ConfigU ∪ { error } by Prop E.13 and either (Rg), or (Rgerr).
(c) tU2 | µ ϕ7−→ r2 for some r2 ∈ ConfigU2 ∪ { error }. Hence tU | µ
ϕ7−→ r for some r ∈
ConfigU ∪ { error } by Prop E.13 and either (Rf ), or (Rf err). Also by Prop E.13, if r =
t ′U | µ ′ ∈ T[U ] then dom(µ) ⊆ dom(µ ′).
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(2) tU1 is an ascribed value v , then, ε1tU1 −→c et ′ for some et ′ ∈ EvTerm ∪ { error }. Hence
tU | µ ϕ7−→ r for some r ∈ ConfigU ∪ { error } by Prop E.13 and either (Rg), or (Rgerr).
(3) tU1 | µ 7−→ r1 for some r1 ∈ ConfigU1∪{ error }. Hence tU | µ
ϕ7−→ r for some r ∈ ConfigU ∪
{ error } by Prop E.13 and either (Rf ), or (Rf err). Also by Prop E.13, if r = t ′U | µ ′ ∈ T[U ]
then dom(µ) ⊆ dom(µ ′).
Case (I⊕). Similar case to (Iapp)
Case (Iref). tU = refU ′εℓ εt
U ′′ and
(Iref)
ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc ϕ ▷ tU ′′ ∈ T[U ′′]
ε ⊢ U ′′ ≲ U ′ εℓ ⊢ gc ≼˜ label(U ′)
ϕ ▷ refU
′
εℓ εt
U ′′ ∈ T[Ref⊥ U ′]
By induction hypothesis on tU ′′ , one of the following holds:
(1) tU ′′ is a value v , then by (R−→), tU ′ | µ ϕ7−→ r and r ∈ ConfigU ′ by Prop E.13. Also by
Prop E.13, if r = t ′U | µ ′ ∈ T[U ] then dom(µ) ⊆ dom(µ ′).
(2) tU ′′ is an ascribed value v , then, εtU ′1 −→c et ′ for some et ′ ∈ EvTerm ∪ { error }. Hence
tU
′ | µ ϕ7−→ r for some r ∈ ConfigU ′ ∪ { error } by Prop E.13 and either (Rg), or (Rgerr).
(3) tU ′′ | µ ϕ7−→ r1 for some r1 ∈ ConfigU ′′ ∪ { error }. Hence tU ′ | µ ϕ7−→ r for some r ∈
ConfigU ′ ∪ { error } by Prop E.13 and either (Rf ), or (Rf err). Also by Prop E.13, if r =
t ′U | µ ′ ∈ T[U ] then dom(µ) ⊆ dom(µ ′).
Case (Ideref). tU = !Refg U ′εtU ′′
(Ideref)
ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc
ϕ ▷ tU
′′ ∈ T[U ′′] ε ⊢ U ′′ ≲ Refg U ′
ϕ ▷ !Refg U ′εtU ′′ ∈ T[U ′ ˜≺ g]
By induction hypothesis on tU ′′ , one of the following holds:
(1) tU ′′ is a value lU ′′′ (by canonical forms Lemma E.10), whereU ′′ = Refg′ U ′′′, then by (R−→),
tU | µ ϕ7−→ r and r ∈ ConfigU by Prop E.13.
(2) tU ′′ is an ascribed value v , then, εtU ′′ −→c et ′ for some et ′ ∈ EvTerm ∪ { error }. Hence
tU | µ ϕ7−→ r for some r ∈ ConfigU ∪ { error } by Prop E.13 and either (Rg), or (Rgerr).
(3) tU ′′ | µ ϕ7−→ r1 for some r1 ∈ ConfigU ′′ ∪ { error }. Hence tU | µ ϕ7−→ r for some r ∈
ConfigU ∪ { error } by Prop E.13 and either (Rf ), or (Rf err). Also by Prop E.13, if r =
t ′U | µ ′ ∈ T[U ] then dom(µ) ⊆ dom(µ ′).
Case (IU assign). tU = ε1tU
′′
1
g,U1:= εℓ ε2tU2 and
(Iassgn)
ε1 ⊢ Refg′ U ′1 ≲ Refg U1 ϕ ▷ tU ′′1 ∈ T[Refg′ U ′1 ]
ε2 ⊢ U2 ≲ U1 ϕ ▷ tU2 ∈ T[U2]
ϕ .ε ⊢ ϕ .gc ≼˜ ϕ .gc εℓ ⊢ Â ϕ .gc ≺ g ≼ label(U1)
ϕ ▷ ε1t
U ′′1
g,U1:= εℓ ε2tU2 ∈ T[Unit⊥]
By induction hypothesis on tU ′′1 , one of the following holds:
(1) tU ′′1 is a value lU ′′′1 (by canonical forms Lemma E.10), whereU ′′1 = Refg′ U ′′′1 . Then by induction
hypothesis on tU2 , one of the following holds:
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(a) tU2 is a value u, then by (R−→), tU | µ ϕ7−→ r and r ∈ ConfigU ∪ { error } by Prop E.13.
Also by Prop E.13, if r = t ′U | µ ′ ∈ T[U ] then dom(µ) ⊆ dom(µ ′).
(b) tU2 is an ascribed value v , then, ε2tU2 −→c et ′ for some et ′ ∈ EvTerm ∪ { error }. Hence
tU | µ ϕ7−→ r for some r ∈ ConfigU ∪ { error } by Prop E.13 and either (Rg), or (Rgerr).
(c) tU2 | µ ϕ7−→ r2 for some r2 ∈ ConfigU2 ∪ { error }. Hence tU | µ
ϕ7−→ r for some r ∈
ConfigU ∪ { error } by Prop E.13 and either (Rf ), or (Rf err). Also by Prop E.13, if r =
t ′U | µ ′ ∈ T[U ] then dom(µ) ⊆ dom(µ ′).
(2) tU ′′1 is an ascribed value v , then, ε1tU1 −→c et ′ for some et ′ ∈ EvTerm ∪ { error }. Hence
tU | µ ϕ7−→ r for some r ∈ ConfigU ∪ { error } by Prop E.13 and either (Rg), or (Rgerr).
(3) tU ′′1 | µ ϕ7−→ r1 for some r1 ∈ ConfigU ′′1 ∪ { error }. Hence tU | µ
ϕ7−→ r for some r ∈
ConfigU ∪ { error } by Prop E.13 and either (Rf ), or (Rf err). Also by Prop E.13, if r =
t ′U | µ ′ ∈ T[U ] then dom(µ) ⊆ dom(µ ′).
□
Proposition E.15 (Static terms do not fail). Let us define StaticTerm the set of evidence
augmented terms with full static annotations. Then consider ts ∈ StaticTerm, ϕ = ⟨εℓ′c , ℓc ⟩, and µs ,
such that ε = IJℓ′c ≼˜ ℓcK, ϕ ▷ ts ∈ T[S], and that ∀vs ∈ cod(µs ), vs ∈ StaticTerm. Then either ts is a
value, or
ts | µs
ϕ7−→ t ′s | µ ′s
Proof. We know that if you follow AGT to derive the dynamic semantics of a gradual language,
then by construction the resulting language satisfy the dynamic conservative extension property.
As we follow AGT to derive the dynamic semantics, we get this property by construction, save
for the assignment elimination reduction rule. In this rule we add an extra check of the form
ϕ .ε ⌊≤⌋ ilbl(ε). So if we prove that the extra check is always satisfied, then the result holds.
Let us consider a t ′1 fully static like so:
(Iassgn)
ε1 ⊢ Refℓ′ S ′1 ≲ Refℓ S1 ϕ ▷ oS
′
1
ℓ′ ∈ T[Refℓ′ S ′1]
ε2 ⊢ S2 ≲ S1 ϕ ▷ u ∈ T[S2]
ϕ .ε ⊢ ℓ′c ≼˜ ℓc εℓ ⊢ Â ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ label(S1)
ϕ ▷ ε1o
S ′1
ℓ′
ℓ,S1:= εℓ ε2u ∈ T[Unit⊥]
By inspection of the reduction rules we have to prove that ϕ .ε ⌊≤⌋ ilbl(ε). ϕ .ε ⌊≤⌋ ilbl(ε). We know
by definition of interior between two static labels that ε = IJℓ′c ≼˜ ℓcK = ⟨[ℓ′c , ℓ′c ], [ℓc , ℓc ]⟩. Also, ff
µs (oS
′
1 ) = εu ′ :: S ′1, as everything is static, ilbl(ε) have to have the form ⟨[ℓu , ℓu ], [label(S ′1), label(S ′1)]⟩,
for some ℓu . Then we have to prove that ℓc ≼ label(S ′1), but notice that as everything is static,
εℓ ⊢ Â ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ label(S1) is equivalent to εℓ ⊢ ℓc ≺ ℓ ≼ label(S1), therefore we know that ℓc ≼ label(S1)
and the result holds.
□
E.5 Dynamic Gradual Guarantee
In this section we present the proof the Dynamic Gradual Guarantee for GSLRef without the specific
check in rule (r7).
Definition E.16 (Intrinsic term precision). Let
Ω ∈ P(V[∗] ×V[∗]) ∪P(Loc∗ × Loc∗) be defined as Ω ::= { xUi1 ⊑ xUi2,oUi1 ⊑ oUi2 } We define
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Ω ∪ { xU1 ⊑ xU2 } ⊢ xU1 ⊑ xU2
g1 ⊑ g2
Ω ⊢ bg1 ⊑ bg2
g1 ⊑ g2
Ω ⊢ unitg1 ⊑ unitg2
g1 ⊑ g2
Ω ∪ { oU1 ⊑ oU2 } ⊢ oU1g1 ⊑ oU2g2
U11 ⊑ U12 gc1 ′ ⊑ gc2 ′ g1 ⊑ g2
Ω ∪ { xU11 ⊑ xU12 } ⊢ tU12 ⊑ tU22
Ω ⊢ (λgc1′xU11 .tU12 )g1 ⊑ (λgc2′xU21 .tU22 )g2
g1 ⊑ g2
g′1 ⊑ g′1 ϕ ′1 ⊑ ϕ ′2 ε1 ⊑ ε2
U1 ⊑ U2 Ω ⊢ tU ′1 ⊑ tU ′2 εℓ1 ⊑ εℓ2
Ω ⊢ protg1,U1εℓ1g′1 ϕ ′1(ε1tU
′
1 ) ⊑ protg2,U2εℓ2g′2 ϕ ′2(ε2tU
′
2 )
Ω ⊢ tU11 ⊑ tU21
U12 ⊑ U22 ε1 ⊑ ε2
(ε1tU11 :: U12) ⊑ (ε2tU21 :: U22)
gc1 ⊑ gc2 Ω ⊢ tU11 ⊑ tU21 Ω ⊢ tU12 ⊑ tU22
ε11 ⊑ ε21 ε12 ⊑ ε22 εℓ1 ⊑ εℓ2
U1 ⊑ U3 U2 ⊑ U4 g1 ⊑ g2
Ω ⊢ ε11tU11 @U1
gc1−→g1U2
εℓ1 [12]tU12 ⊑ ε21tU21 @U3
gc2−→g2U4
εℓ2 [22]tU22
g1 ⊑ g2
Ω ⊢ tU11 ⊑ tU21 ε11 ⊑ ε21
Ω ⊢ tU12 ⊑ tU23 ε12 ⊑ ε22
Ω ⊢ tU13 ⊑ tU23 ε13 ⊑ ε23
Ω ⊢ ifg1 ε11tU11 then ε12tU12 else ε13tU13 ⊑
ifg2 ε21tU21 then ε22tU22 else ε23tU23
Ω ⊢ tU11 ⊑ tU21 Ω ⊢ tU12 ⊑ tU22
ε11 ⊑ ε21 ε12 ⊑ ε22 g1 ⊑ g2
Ω ⊢ (ε11tU11 ⊕g1 ε12tU12 ) ⊑ (ε21tU21 ⊕g2 ε22tU22 )
U1 ⊑ U2 εℓ1 ⊑ εℓ2 gc1 ⊑ gc2
ε1 ⊑ ε2 Ω ⊢ tU ′1 ⊑ tU ′2
Ω ⊢ refU1εℓ1 ε1tU
′
1 ⊑ refU2εℓ2 ε2tU
′
2
Ω ⊢ tU11 ⊑ tU21
U1 ⊑ U2 ε1 ⊑ ε2
Ω ⊢ !U1ε1tU11 ⊑ !U2ε2tU21
Ω ⊢ tU11 ⊑ tU21 Ω ⊢ tU12 ⊑ tU22
ε11 ⊑ ε21 ε12 ⊑ ε22 ε1 ⊑ ε2 g1 ⊑ g2 U1 ⊑ U2
Ω ⊢ ε11tU11 g1,U1:= ε1 ε12tU12 ⊑ ε21tU21
g2,U2:= ε2 ε22tU22
∀oU1 ∈ dom(µ1).∃oU2 ∈ dom(µ2) s .t .
Ω ⊢ oU1 ⊑ oU2 Ω ⊢ µ1(lU1 ) ⊑ µ2(lU2 )
Ω ⊢ µ1 ⊑ µ2
where ϕ1 ⊑ ϕ2 ⇐⇒ ϕ1.ε ⊑ ϕ2.ε ∧ ϕ1.gc ⊑ ϕ2.gc ∧ ϕ1.gc ⊑ ϕ2.gc
Fig. 39. Intrinsic term precision
an ordering relation (· ⊢ · ⊑ ·) ∈ (P(V[∗] × V[∗]) ∪ P(Loc∗ × Loc∗)) × T[∗] × T[∗] shown in
Figure 39.
Definition E.17 (Well Formedness of Ω). We say that Ω is well formed iff ∀ { lUi1 ⊑ lUi2 } ∈ Ω.Ui1 ⊑
Ui2
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Before proving the gradual guarantee, we first establish some auxiliary properties of precision.
For the following propositions, we assume Well Formedness of Ω (Definition E.17).
Proposition E.18. If Ω ⊢ tU1 ⊑ tU2 for some Ω ∈ P(V[∗]×V[∗])∪P(Loc∗×Loc∗), thenU1 ⊑ U2.
Proof. Straightforward induction on Ω ⊢ tU1 ⊑ tU2 , since the corresponding precision on types
is systematically a premise (either directly or transitively). □
Proposition E.19. Let д1,д2 ∈ EvFrame such that ϕ1 ▷д1[ε11tU11 ] ∈ T[U ′1 ], ϕ2 ▷д2[ε21tU21 ] ∈ T[U ′2 ],
withU ′1 ⊑ U ′2 . Then if д1[ε11tU11 ] ⊑ д2[ε21tU21 ], ε12 ⊑ ε22 and tU12 ⊑ tU22 , then д1[ε12tU12 ] ⊑ д2[ε22tU22 ]
Proof. We proceed by case analysis on дi .
Case (□@Uε et). Then for i ∈ { 1, 2 } дi must have the form □@U
′′
i
εi ε
′
i t
U ′i for some U ′′i , ε ′i and tU
′
i .
As д1[ε11tU11 ] ⊑ д2[ε21tU21 ] then by ⊑APP ε1 ⊑ ε2, ε ′1 ⊑ ε ′2,U ′′1 ⊑ U ′′2 and tU ′1 ⊑ tU ′2 .
As ε12 ⊑ ε22 and tU12 ⊑ tU22 , then by ⊑APP ε12tU12 @U
′′
1
ε1 ε
′
1t
U ′1 ⊑ ε22tU22 @U
′′
2
ε2 ε
′
2t
U ′2 , and the result
holds.
Case (□ ⊕g et, ev ⊕g □, ev @Uεℓ □,□ :: U , !U□,□
g,U1:= εℓ et,
ev
g,U1:= εℓ □, ifg □ then et else et). Straightforward using similar argument to the previous case.
□
Proposition E.20. Let д1,д2 ∈ EvFrame such that ϕ1 ▷ д1[ε1tU1 ] ∈ T[U ′1 ], ϕ2 ▷ д2[ε2tU2 ] ∈ T[U ′2 ],
withU ′1 ⊑ U ′2 . Then if д1[ε1tU1 ] ⊑ д2[ε2tU2 ] then tU1 ⊑ tU2 and ε1 ⊑ ε2.
Proof. We proceed by case analysis on дi .
Case (□@Uε et). Then there must exist some εℓ i ,Ui , ε ′i and tU
′
i such that д[ε1tU1 ] = ε1tU1 @U
′′
1
ε1 ε
′
1t
U ′1
and д[ε2tU2 ] = ε2tU2 @U
′′
2
εℓ2 ε
′
2t
U ′2 . Then by the hypothesis and the premises of (⊑APP ), tU1 ⊑ tU2 and
ε1 ⊑ ε2, and the result holds immediately.
Case (□ ⊕g et, ev ⊕g □, ev @Uεℓ □,□ :: U , !U□,□
g,U1:= εℓ et,
ev
g,U1:= εℓ □, ifg □ then et else et). Straightforward using similar argument to the previous case.
□
Proposition E.21. Let f1, f2 ∈ EvFrame such that ϕ1 ▷ f1[tU11 ] ∈ T[U ′1 ], ϕ2 ▷ f2[tU21 ] ∈ T[U ′2 ], with
U ′1 ⊑ U ′2 . Then if f1[tU11 ] ⊑ f2[tU21 ] and tU12 ⊑ tU22 , then f1[tU11 ] ⊑ f2[tU21 ]
Proof. Suppose fi [tU11 ] = дi [εitUi1 ]. We know that ϕ1 ▷ д1[ε1tU11 ] ∈ T[U ′1 ], ϕ1 ▷ д2[ε2tU21 ] ∈ T[U ′2 ]
and U ′1 ⊑ U ′2 . Therefore if д1[ε1tU11 ] ⊑ д1[ε1tU21 ], by Prop E.20, ε1 ⊑ ε2. Finally by Prop E.19 we
conclude that д1[ε1tU12 ] ⊑ д1[ε1tU22 ]. □
Proposition E.22. Let f1, f2 ∈ EvFrame such that ϕ1 ▷ f1[tU1 ] ∈ T[U ′1 ], ϕ2 ▷ f2[tU2 ] ∈ T[U ′2 ], with
U ′1 ⊑ U ′2 . Then if f1[tU1 ] ⊑ f2[tU2 ] then tU1 ⊑ tU2 .
Proof. Suppose fi [tU1 ] = дi [εitUi1 ]. We know that ϕ1 ▷ д1[ε1tU11 ] ∈ T[U ′1 ], ϕ1 ▷ д2[ε2tU21 ] ∈ T[U ′2 ]
andU ′1 ⊑ U ′2 . Therefore if д1[ε1tU11 ] ⊑ д[ε2tU21 ], then using Prop E.20 we conclude that tU1 ⊑ tU2 .
□
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Proposition E.23 (Substitution preserves precision). If Ω ∪ {xU3 ⊑ xU4 } ⊢ tU1 ⊑ tU2 and
Ω ⊢ tU3 ⊑ tU4 , then Ω ⊢ [tU3/xU3 ]tU1 ⊑ [tU4/xU4 ]tU2 .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of tU1 ⊑ tU2 , and case analysis of the last rule used in the
derivation. All cases follow either trivially (no premises) or by the induction hypotheses. □
Proposition E.24 (Monotone precision for ◦<:). If ε1 ⊑ ε2 and ε3 ⊑ ε4 then ε1 ◦<: ε3 ⊑ ε2 ◦<: ε4.
Proof. By definition of consistent transitivity for <: and the definition of precision. □
Proposition E.25 (Monotone precision for ◦≼). If ε1 ⊑ ε2 and ε3 ⊑ ε4 then ε1 ◦≼ ε3 ⊑ ε2 ◦≼ ε4.
Proof. By definition of consistent transitivity for ≼ and the definition of precision. □
Proposition E.26 (Monotone precision for join). If ε1 ⊑ ε2 and ε3 ⊑ ε4 then ε1 ˜≺ ε3 ⊑ ε2 ˜≺ ε4.
Proof. By definition of join and the definition of precision. □
Proposition E.27. If Ref U1 ⊑ Ref U2 thenU1 ⊑ U2.
Proof. By definition of precision we know that
{ Ref T | T ∈ γ (U1) } ⊆ { Ref T | T ∈ γ (U2) }. This relation is true only if γ (U1) ⊆ γ (U2) which is
equivalent toU1 ⊑ U2. □
Proposition E.28. IfU11 ⊑ U12 andU21 ⊑ U22 thenU11 ˜<:U21 ⊑ U12 ˜<:U22.
Proof. By induction on the type derivation of the types and consistent join. □
Lemma E.29. If ε1 ⊢ Refg11 U11 ≲ Refg12 U12 and ε2 ⊢ Refg21 U21 ≲ Refg22 U22, and ε1 ⊑ ε2, then
iref (ε1) ⊑ iref (ε2).
Proof. By definition of precision and iref . □
Proposition E.30 (Dynamic guarantee for −→). Suppose Ω ⊢ tU11 ⊑ tU21 , ϕ1 ⊑ ϕ2, and
Ω ⊢ µ1 ⊑ µ2. If tU11 | µ1
ϕ1−→ tU12 | µ ′1 then tU21 | µ2
ϕ2−→ tU22 | µ ′2 where Ω′ ⊢ tU12 ⊑ tU22 and
Ω′ ⊢ µ ′1 ⊑ µ ′2, for some Ω′ ⊇ Ω.
Proof. By induction on the structure of tU11 ⊑ tU21 . For simplicity we omit the Ω ⊢ notation on
precision relations when it is not relevant for the argument.
Case (−→ ⊕). We know that tU11 = (ε11(b1)g11 ⊕g1 ε12(b2)g12 ) then by (⊑⊕) tU21 = (ε21(b1)g21 ⊕g1
ε22(b2)g22 ) for some ε21, ε22, g21, g22 such that ε11 ⊑ ε21, ε12 ⊑ ε22, g11 ⊑ g21 and g12 ⊑ g22.
If tU11 | µ1
ϕ1−→ b3 | µ1 where b3 = (ε11 ˜≺ ε12)(b1 J⊕K b2)(g11˜ ≺g21) :: Boolg1 , then
tU21 | µ2
ϕ2−→ b ′3 | µ2 where b ′3 = (ε21 ˜≺ ε22)(b1 J⊕K b2)(g21˜ ≺g22) :: Boolg2 . By Lemma E.26, (ε11 ˜≺ ε12) ⊑(ε21 ˜≺ ε22). Also (g11 ˜≺ g21) ⊑ (g21 ˜≺ g22).
(g11 ˜≺ g21) ⊑ (g12 ˜≺ g22)
Ω ⊢ (b1 J⊕K b2)(g11˜ ≺g21) ⊑ (b1 J⊕K b2)(g21˜ ≺g22)
Boolg1 ⊑ Boolg2 (ε11 ˜≺ ε12) ⊑ (ε21 ˜≺ ε22)
(ε11 ˜≺ ε12)(b1 J⊕K b2)(g11˜ ≺g21) :: Boolg1 ⊑(ε21 ˜≺ ε22)(b1 J⊕K b2)(g21˜ ≺g22) :: Boolg2
Therefore tU12 ⊑ tU22 . As Ω′ = Ω, µ ′1 = µ1 and µ2 = µ ′2 then Ω′ ⊢ µ ′1 ⊑ µ ′2.
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Case (−→prot). We know that tU11 = protg1,U1εℓ1g′1 ϕ ′1(ε1u1), then by (⊑prot()) t
U2
1 = prot
g2,U2
εℓ2g′2
ϕ ′2(ε2u2) , and
therefore
g1 ⊑ g2
g′1 ⊑ g′1 ϕ ′1 ⊑ ϕ ′2 ε1 ⊑ ε2
U1 ⊑ U2 Ω ⊢ u1 ⊑ u2 εℓ1 ⊑ εℓ2
Ω ⊢ protg1,U1εℓ1g′1 ϕ ′1(ε1u1) ⊑ prot
g2,U2
εℓ2g′2
ϕ ′2(ε2u2)
for some ε2,u2,U2 and εℓ2, where u1 ∈ T[U ′1 ] and u2 ∈ T[U ′2 ]. If
tU11 | µ1
ϕ1−→ (ε1 ˜≺ εℓ1)(u1 ˜≺g′1) :: U1 ˜≺g1 | µ1. Therefore, tU21 | µ2 ϕ2−→ (ε2 ˜≺ εℓ2)(u2 ˜≺g′2) :: U2 ˜≺g2 | µ2.
By Lemma E.26, (ε1˜≺εℓ1) ⊑ (ε2˜≺εℓ2), and as join is monotoneU1˜≺g1 ⊑ U2˜≺g2 and (u1˜≺g′1) ⊑ (u2˜≺g′2).
Therefore by ⊑::, (ε1 ˜≺ εℓ1)(u1 ˜≺ g′1) :: U1 ˜≺ g1 ⊑ (ε2 ˜≺ εℓ2)(u2 ˜≺ g′2) :: U2 ˜≺ g2. As Ω′ = Ω, µ ′1 = µ1 and
µ2 = µ
′
2 then Ω′ ⊢ µ ′1 ⊑ µ ′2.
Case (−→app). We know that
tU11 = ε11(λxU11 .tU12 )g′1 @
U1
g′c1−→g1U2
εℓ1 ε12u then by (⊑app ) tU21 must have the form
tU21 = ε21(λxU21 .tU22 )g′2 @
U3
g′c2−→g2U4
εℓ2 ε22u2 for some ε21, xU21, tU22,U3,U4, ε22, g′c2, g2 and u2.
Let us pose ε1 = ε12 ◦<: idom(ε11) and ε ′r1 = (ϕ1.ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε11)) ◦≼ εℓ1 ◦≼ ilat(ε11),
ϕ ′1 = ⟨ε ′r1(g′1 ˜≺ ϕ1.gc), g1 ˜≺ ϕ1.gc⟩. Then
tU11 | µ1
ϕ1−→ protg1,U2ilbl(ε11)g′1ϕ ′1(icod(ε11)t ′1) | µ1 with t ′1 = [(ε1u1 :: U11)/xU11 ]tU12 .
Also, let us pose ε2 = ε22 ◦<: idom(ε21) and ε ′r2 = (ϕ2.ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε21)) ◦≼ εℓ2 ◦≼ ilat(ε21), ϕ ′2 =
⟨ε ′r2(g′2 ˜≺ ϕ2.gc), g2 ˜≺ ϕ2.gc⟩. Then
tU21 | µ2
ϕ2−→ protg2,U4ilbl(ε21)g′2ϕ ′2(icod(ε21)t ′2) | µ2 with t ′2 = [(ε2u2 :: U21)/xU21 ]tU22 .
As Ω ⊢ tU11 ⊑ tU21 , then u1 ⊑ u2, ε12 ⊑ ε22 and idom(ε11) ⊑ idom(ε21) as well, then by Prop E.24
ε1 ⊑ ε2. Then ε1u1 :: U11 ⊑ ε2u2 :: U21 by (⊑::).
We also know by (⊑APP ) and (⊑λ) that Ω ∪ {xU21 ⊑ xU21 } ⊢ tU12 ⊑ tU22 . By Substitution preserves
precision (Prop E.23) t ′1 ⊑ t ′2, therefore icod(ε11)t ′1 :: U2 ⊑ icod(ε21)t ′2 :: U4 by (⊑::). Also g1 ⊑ g2,
ilbl(ε11) ⊑ ilbl21, g′1 ⊑ g′2 and by Lemma E.24 and E.26, ε ′r1 ⊑ ε ′r2. Also, as ϕ1.gc ⊑ ϕ2.gc by mono-
tonicity of the join g1 ˜≺ ϕ1.gc ⊑ g2 ˜≺ ϕ2.gc , and as ϕ1.gc ⊑ ϕ2.gc also by monotonicity of the join
g′1˜≺ϕ1.gc ⊑ g′2˜≺ϕ2.gc . Then by (⊑prot()) tU12 ⊑ tU22 . As Ω′ = Ω, µ ′1 = µ1 and µ2 = µ ′2 then Ω′ ⊢ µ ′1 ⊑ µ ′2.
Case (−→if-true). tU11 = ifg1 ε11trueg′1 then else ε12tU12ε13tU13 then by (⊑i f ) tU21 has the form
tU21 = if
g2 ε21trueg′2 then else ε22t
U22ε23t
U23 for some
ε21, ε22, t
U22, ε23, and tU32 . Then
tU11 | µ1
ϕ1−→ protg1,(U12˜ <:U13)ilbl(ε11)g′1 ϕ ′1(ε12tU12 ) | µ1, and
tU21 | µ2
ϕ2−→ protg2,(U22˜ <:U23)ilbl(ε21)g′2 ϕ ′2(ε22tU22 ) | µ2.
Where ϕ ′i = ⟨(ϕi .ε ˜≺ ilbl(εi2)(g′i ˜≺ ϕi .gc),ϕi .gc ˜≺ gi ]⟩. Using the fact that tU11 ⊑ tU22 we know that
ε12 ⊑ ε22, tU12 ⊑ tU22 , g′1 ⊑ g′2, as ϕ1.gc ⊑ ϕ2.gc and g1 ⊑ g2, and as join is monotone, ϕ1.gc ˜≺ g1 ⊑
ϕ2.gc ˜≺ g2. Also as ϕ1.gc ⊑ ϕ2.gc and g′1 ⊑ g′2, and as join is monotone, ϕ1.gc ˜≺ g′1 ⊑ ϕ2.gc ˜≺ g′2. By
Prop E.18, we know thatU12 ⊑ U22 andU13 ⊑ U23. Therefore by Prop E.28 (U12 ˜<:U13) ⊑ (U22 ˜<:U23).
Also as ϕ1.ε ⊑ ϕ2.ε and ilbl(ε12) ⊑ ilbl(ε22) then by Lemma E.26 (ϕ1.ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε12)) ⊑ (ϕ2.ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε22)).
Then using (⊑prot()), tU12 ⊑ tU22 . As Ω′ = Ω, µ ′1 = µ1 and µ2 = µ ′2 then Ω′ ⊢ µ ′1 ⊑ µ ′2.
Case (−→if-false). Same as case −→if-true, using the fact that ε13 ⊑ ε23 and tU13 ⊑ tU23 .
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Case (−→ref). We know that tU11 = refU
′′
1
εℓ1 ε1u1, then by (⊑r ef ) tU21 = refU
′′
2
εℓ2 ε2u2 , and therefore
U ′′1 ⊑ U ′′2 εℓ1 ⊑ εℓ2 gc1 ⊑ gc2
ε1 ⊑ ε2 Ω ⊢ u1 ⊑ u2
Ω ⊢ refU ′′1εℓ1 ε1u1 ⊑ refU
′′
2
εℓ2 ε2u2
for some ε2,u2,U ′′2 and εℓ2, where u1 ∈ T[U ′1 ] and u2 ∈ T[U ′2 ]. If
tU11 | µ1
ϕ1−→ oU ′′1⊥ | µ1[lU ′′1 7→ v ′1], for some lU ′′1 < µ1 and where v ′1 = ε ′1(u1 ˜≺ gr1) :: U ′′1 , ε ′1 =
ε1 ˜≺ (ϕ1.ε ◦≼ εℓ1). Therefore, tU21 | µ2 ϕ2−→ oU ′′2⊥ | µ2[lU ′′2 7→ v ′2], for some lU ′′2 < µ2 and where
v ′2 = ε ′2(u2 ˜≺ gr2) :: U ′′2 , ε ′2 = ε2 ˜≺ (ϕ2.ε ◦≼ εℓ2). By Lemma E.26 and E.24, ε ′1 ⊑ ε ′2. Also as ϕ1.ε ⊑ ϕ2.ε
and U1 ⊑ U2, then by definition of rf , ε ′′1 ⊑ ε ′′2 . Then using Ω′ = Ω ∪ { lU ′′1 ⊑ lU ′′2 } and that ⊥ ⊑ ⊥,
by (⊑l ) we can see that Ω′ ⊢ lU
′′
1⊥ ⊑ lU
′′
2⊥ . As gr1 ⊑ gr2, by monotonicity of the join, u1 ˜≺gr1 ⊑ u2 ˜≺gr2.
Therefore using ⊑::, Ω′ ⊢ v ′1 ⊑ v ′2. Also because Ω ⊆ Ω′, then by the fact that Ω ⊢ µ1 ⊑ µ2, it is easy
to see that Ω ∪ { lU ′′1 ⊑ lU ′′2 } ⊢ µ1[lU ′′1 7→ v ′1] ⊑ µ2[lU ′′2 7→ v ′2], i.e. Ω′ ⊢ µ ′1 ⊑ µ ′2.
Case (−→deref). We know that tU11 = !Refg1 U
′
1ε1l
U ′′1
g′1
, tU21 = !Refg2 U
′
2ε2l
U ′′2
g′2
and so
Ω ⊢ !Refg1 U ′1ε1lU
′′
1
g′1
⊑ !Refg2 U ′2ε2lU
′′
2
g′2
. As Ω ⊢ µ1 ⊑ µ2, using (⊑µ ) then Ω ⊢ µ1(lU ′′1 ) ⊑ µ2(lU ′′2 ). Then
!Refg1 U ′1ε1l
U ′′1
g′1
| µ ϕ1−→ protg1,U ′1ε ′1g′1 ϕ ′1(iref (ε1)µ1(oU
′′
1 )) where ε ′1 = ilbl(ε1). Therefore
!Refg2 U ′2ε2l
U ′′2
g′2
| µ ϕ2−→ protg2,U ′2ε ′2g′2 ϕ ′2(iref (ε2)µ2(oU
′′
2 )) where ε ′2 = ilbl(ε2).
Where ϕ ′i = ⟨(ϕi .ε ˜≺ ε ′i )(ϕi .gc ˜≺ g′i ),ϕi .gc ˜≺ gi ⟩. By monotonicity of the join ϕ1.gc ˜≺ g1 ⊑ ϕ2.gc ˜≺ g2,
ϕ1.gc˜≺g′1 ⊑ ϕ2.gc˜≺g′2 and (ϕ1.ε˜≺ε ′1) ⊑ (ϕ2.ε˜≺ε ′2). As ε1 ⊑ ε2, then by Lemma E.29, iref (ε1) ⊑ iref (ε2).
Then Using (⊑prot()) we can conclude that Ω ⊢ tU12 ⊑ tU22 . As Ω′ = Ω, µ1 = µ ′1 and µ2 = µ ′2 then also
Ω′ ⊢ µ ′1 ⊑ µ ′2.
Case (−→assign). We know that tU11 = ε11lU11g1
g1,U ′1:= εℓ1 ε12u1, t
U2
1 = ε21l
U21
g2
g2,U ′2:= εℓ2 ε22u2 and so
Ω ⊢ ε11lU11g1
g1,U ′1:= εℓ1 ε12u1 ⊑ ε21lU21g2
g2,U ′2:= εℓ2 ε22u2. Then
tU11 | µ1
ϕ1−→ unit⊥ | µ1[lU11 7→ v1], wherev1 = ε ′1(u1 ˜≺ (gr1 ˜≺g1)) :: U11, and ε ′1 = (ε12 ◦<: iref (ε11))˜≺
((ϕ1.ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε11)) ◦≼ εℓ1 ◦≼ ilbl(iref (ε11)). Similarly, then
tU21 | µ2
ϕ2−→ unit⊥ | µ2[lU21 7→ v2], wherev2 = ε ′2(u2 ˜≺ (gr2 ˜≺g2)) :: U21, and ε ′2 = (ε22 ◦<: iref (ε21))˜≺
((ϕ2.ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε21))◦≼ εℓ2 ◦≼ ilbl(iref (ε21)). We need to prove that µ ′1 = µ1[lU11 7→ v1] ⊑ µ ′2 = µ2[lU21 7→
v2]. Because Ω ⊢ µ1 ⊑ µ2 then Ω ⊢ lU11 ⊑ lU21 by (⊑µ ). By well formedness of Ω we also know that
U11 ⊑ U21. Therefore, by Lemmas E.24, E.25 and E.26 ε ′1 ⊑ ε ′2. Then using ⊑::, v1 ⊑ v2, following
that Ω′ = Ω ⊢ µ ′1 ⊑ µ ′2.
□
Proposition E.31 (Dynamic guarantee). Suppose tU11 ⊑ tU21 ,ϕ1 ⊑ ϕ2, and µ1 ⊑ µ2. If tU11 | µ1
ϕ17−→
tU12 | µ ′1 then tU21 | µ2
ϕ27−→ tU22 | µ ′2 where tU12 ⊑ tU22 and µ ′1 ⊑ µ ′2.
Proof. We prove the following property instead: Suppose Ω ⊢ tU11 ⊑ tU21 , ϕ1 ⊑ ϕ2, and Ω ⊢ µ1 ⊑
µ2. If tU11 | µ1
ϕ17−→ tU12 | µ ′1 then tU21 | µ2
ϕ27−→ tU22 | µ ′2 where Ω′ ⊢ tU12 ⊑ tU22 and Ω′ ⊢ µ ′1 ⊑ µ ′2, for
some Ω′ ⊇ Ω.
By induction on the structure of a derivation of tU11 ⊑ tU21 . For simplicity we omit the Ω ⊢
notation on precision relations when it is not relevant for the argument.
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Case (R−→). Ω ⊢ tU11 ⊑ tU21 , Ω ⊢ µ1 ⊑ µ2 and
tU11 | µ1
ϕ1−→ tU12 | µ ′1. By dynamic guarantee of −→ (Prop E.30), tU21 | µ2
ϕ2−→ tU21 | µ ′2 where
Ω′ ⊢ tU12 ⊑ tU22 , Ω′ ⊢ µ ′1 ⊑ µ ′2 for some Ω′ ⊇ Ω. And the result holds immediately.
Case (Rf ). tU11 = f1[tU
′
1
1 ], tU21 = f2[tU
′
2
1 ]. We know that Ω ⊢ f1[tU
′
1
1 ] ⊑ f2[tU
′
2
1 ]. By using Prop E.18,
U ′1 ⊑ U ′2 . By Prop E.22, we also know that Ω ⊢ tU
′
1
1 ⊑ tU
′
2
1 . By induction hypothesis, t
U ′1
1 | µ1
ϕ17−→
t
U ′1
2 | µ ′1, tU
′
2
1 | µ2
ϕ27−→ tU ′22 | µ ′2, Ω′ ⊢ tU
′
1
2 ⊑ tU
′
2
2 and Ω′ ⊢ µ ′1 ⊑ µ ′2 for some Ω′ ⊇ Ω.
Then by Prop E.21 then Ω′ ⊢ f1[tU
′
1
2 ] ⊑ f2[tU
′
2
2 ] and the result holds.
Case (Rprot). Then tU11 = prot
g1,U1
εℓ1g′1
ϕ ′1(ε1tU
′
1
1 ) and tU21 = protg2,U2εℓ2g′2 ϕ ′2(ε2t
U ′2
1 )
As tU11 ⊑ tU21 then by (⊑prot()), tU
′
1
1 ⊑ tU
′
2
1 ,ϕ1 ⊑ ϕ2, εℓ1 ⊑ εℓ2, g1 ⊑ g2, g′1 ⊑ g′2, and ε1 ⊑ ε2. By
(Rprot), tU
′
i
1 | µ
ϕ′i7−→ tU ′i2 | µ ′ and by induction hypothesis, tU
′
1
2 ⊑ tU
′
2
2 and Ω′ ⊢ µ ′1 ⊑ µ ′2 for some
Ω′ ⊇ Ω.
But then by (⊑prot()),
Ω′ ⊢ protg1,U1εℓ1g′1 ϕ ′1(ε1t
U ′1
2 ) ⊑ protg2,U2εℓ2g′2 ϕ ′2(ε2t
U ′2
2 ) and the result holds.
Case (Rд). tU11 = д1[et1], tU21 = д2[et2], where Ω ⊢ д1[et1] ⊑ д2[et2]. Also et1 −→c et ′1 and
et2 −→c et ′2.
Then there exists U1, ε11, ε12 and v1 such that et1 = ε11(ε12v1 :: U1). Also there exists U2, ε21, ε22
and v2 such that et2 = ε21(ε22v2 :: U2). By Prop E.20, ε11 ⊑ ε21, and by (⊑::) ε12 ⊑ ε22, v1 ⊑ v2 and
U1 ⊑ U2. Then as et1 −→c (ε12 ◦<: ε11)v1 and et2 −→c (ε22 ◦<: ε21)v2 then, by Prop E.24 we know
that ε12 ◦<: ε11 ⊑ ε22 ◦<: ε21. Then using this information, and the fact that v1 ⊑ v2, by Prop E.19, it
follows that Ω ⊢ д1[et ′1] ⊑ д1[et ′2]. As Ω′ = Ω, µ ′1 = µ1 and µ2 = µ ′2 then Ω′ ⊢ µ ′1 ⊑ µ ′2.
Case (Rprotg). Analogous to (Rprot) case but using −→c instead.
□
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E.6 Noninterference
In this section we present the proof of noninterference for GSLRef. We use a logical relation that
is more general than the one presented in the paper. The main difference (beside using intrinsic
terms), is that the logical relation is no longer indexed by a static security effect. As ϕ embeds the
static security effect information, we generalize the logical relation to also relate two different static
security effects as well. Section E.6.1 present some auxiliary definitions. Section E.6.2 presents the
proof of Noninterference (Prop E.65), which implies Security Type Soundness (Prop 5.5) presented
in the paper.
E.6.1 Definitions. We introduce a function uval, which strips away ascriptions from a simple
value:
uval : GType→ SimpleValue
uval(u) = u
uval(εu :: U ) = u .
In order to compare the observable results of program, we introduce the rval(v) operator, which
strips away any checking-related information like labels or evidence-carrying ascriptions:
rval : Value→ RawValue
rval(bg) = b
rval(εbg :: U ) = b
rval(unitg) = unit
rval(εunitg :: U ) = unit
rval(oUg ) = o
rval(εoU ′g :: U ) = o
rval((λg′xU1 .tU2 )g) = (λg′xU1 .tU2 )
rval(ε(λg′xU1 .tU2 )g :: U ) = (λg′xU1 .tU2 )
Definition E.32 (Gradual security logical relations). For an arbitrary element ℓo of the security
lattice, the ℓo-level gradual security relations are step-indexed and type-indexed binary relations on
tuples of security effect, closed terms and stores defined inductively as presented in Figure 40. The
notation ⟨ϕ1,v1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2,v2, µ2⟩ : U indicates that the tuple of security effect ϕ1, value v1 and
store µ1 is related to the tuple of security effect ϕ2, value v2 and store µ2 at typeU for k steps when
observed at the security level ℓo . Similarly, the notation ⟨ϕ≈ℓo , t≈ℓo , µ≈ℓo ⟩k ⟨ϕ:, t:, µ:⟩ C(U ) indicates
that the tuple of security effect ϕ1, term t1 and store µ1, and the tuple of security effect ϕ2, term t2
and store µ2 are related computations for k steps, that produce related values and related stores
at typeU when observed at the security level ℓo . Notation µ1 ≈kℓo µ1 relates stores µ1 and µ2 for k
steps when observed at security level ℓo . Finally, notation ϕ1 ≈ℓo ϕ2, relates security effect ϕ1 and
ϕ2 for any number of steps at security level ℓo .
We say that a value is observable at level ℓo if, given a security effect ϕ , the value is typeable,
the security effect is observable, and the label of the value is sublabel of ℓo . Also, as value v can
be a casted value, we need to analyze if its underlying evidence justifies that the security level
of the bare value is also subsumed by the observer security level. We do this by demanding that
the underlying evidence and label is also observable. We say that a security effect is observable
if its underlying evidence and static label is also observable. We say that an evidence and label
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⟨ϕ1,v1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2,v2, µ2⟩ : U ⇐⇒ ϕ1 ≈ℓo ϕ2 ∧ µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 ∧ ϕi ▷ vi ∈ T[U ]∧
obsEqℓo (ϕ1 ▷ v1,ϕ2 ▷ v2)∧Ä
obsℓo (ϕi ▷ vi ) =⇒ obsRelUk ,ℓo (ϕ1,v1, µ1,ϕ2,v2, µ2)
ä
obsRelUk ,ℓo (ϕ1,v1, µ1,ϕ2,v2, µ2) ⇐⇒ (rval(v1) = rval(v2)) ifU ∈ {Boolg,Unitg,Refg U }
obsRel
U1
g′1−→g1U2
k ,ℓo
(ϕ1,v1, µ1,ϕ2,v2, µ2) ⇐⇒ ∀j ≤ k .∀U ′ = U ′′1
g′′2−→g′2U ′′2 ,U ′1 ,∀ϕ ′i ,ϕ ′1 ≈ℓo ϕ ′2 s.t. ϕi ≤ℓo ϕ ′i ,
ε ′1 ⊢ U1
g′1−→g1U2 ≲ U ′, and ε ′2 ⊢ U ′1 ≲ U ′′1 , ε ′′i ⊢ Â ϕ ′i.gc ≺ g′2 ≼ g′′2 , we have:
∀v ′i , µ ′i , ⟨ϕ1,v ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ϕ2,v
′
2, µ
′
2⟩ : U ′1 , dom(µi ) ⊆ dom(µ ′i ),
⟨ϕ1, (ε ′1v1 @U
′
ε ′′1 ε
′
2v
′
1), µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ϕ2, (ε
′
1v2 @U
′
ε ′′2 ε
′
2v
′
2), µ ′2⟩ : C(U ′′2 ˜≺ g′2)
⟨ϕ1, t1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, t2, µ2⟩ : C(U ) ⇐⇒
ϕ1 ≈ℓo ϕ2 ∧ µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 ∧ ∀ϕ ′i ,ϕ ′1 ≈ℓo ϕ ′2 s.t. ϕi ≤ℓo ϕ ′i and ϕ ′i ▷ ti ∈ T[U ] we have ∀j < k(
ti | µi
ϕ′i7−→ j t ′i | µ ′i =⇒ µ ′1 ≈k−jℓo µ
′
2∧
(irred(t ′i ) =⇒ ⟨ϕ1, t ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−jℓo ⟨ϕ2, t
′
2, µ
′
2⟩ : U )
)
µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 ⇐⇒ ∀ϕi ,ϕ1 ≈ℓo ϕ2, j < k,∀oU ∈ dom(µ1) ∩ dom(µ2)
⟨ϕ1 ▷ µ1(oU ), µ1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ϕ2 ▷ µ2(oU ), µ2⟩ : U
ϕ1 ≈ℓo ϕ2 ⇐⇒ obsℓo (ϕi .εϕi .gc) ∨ ¬obsℓo (ϕi .εϕi .gc)
ϕ1 ≤ℓo ϕ2 ⇐⇒ obsℓo (ϕ2.εϕ2.gc) ⇒ obsℓo (ϕ1.εϕ1.gc)
µ1 _ µ2 ⇐⇒ dom(µ1) ⊆ dom(µ2)
obsℓo (ϕ ▷ v) ⇐⇒ ϕ ▷ v ∈ T[U ] ∧ obsℓo (ϕ ) ∧ obsℓo (ev(v)U )
obsℓo (ϕ ) ⇐⇒ obsℓo (ϕ .εϕ .gc)
obsℓo (εU ) = ⇐⇒ obsℓo (εU )
obsℓo (εg) = ⇐⇒ ε ◦≼ ε ′ is defined,where ε ′ = I≼(g, ℓo )
obsEqℓo (ϕ1 ▷ v1,ϕ2 ▷ v2) = ⇐⇒ ϕ1 ≈ℓo ϕ2 ∧ (obsℓo (ϕi ) ⇒ ev(v1) ≈ℓo ev(v2))
ε1 ≈ℓo ε2 ⇐⇒ ∀Ui ,U ′i , εi ⊢ U ′i ≲ Ui ,
(
obsℓo (εiUi ) ∨ ¬obsℓo (εiUi )
)∧
obsℓo (εiUi ) ⇒

idom(ε1) ≈ℓo idom(ε2) if defined
icod(ε1) ≈ℓo icod(ε2) if defined
iref (ε1) ≈ℓo iref (ε2) if defined
where
ev(εu :: U ) = ε
ev(u) = I<:(u)
Fig. 40. Gradual security logical relations
are observable, if any value with that underlying evidence and static label, can be used used as
argument of a function that expects a value with security level ℓo . If the consistent transitivity check
of the reduction of the application does not hold, then it is not plausible that the security level of
the value is subsumed by ℓo , and therefore is not observable. For instance, consider ℓo = L, evidence
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ε = ⟨[H,⊤], [⊥,⊤]⟩ and static label g = ?. We can construct any value such as v = εtrue? :: Boolg.
The level of the value and the bare value are sublabel of ℓo . But the evidence describes that at some
point during reduction, the security level of the bare value was required to be at least as high as H.
Therefore, v is not observable at level L (considering L ≼ H), because as I≼(?, ℓo) = ⟨[⊥, L], [L, L]⟩,
the consistent transitivity operation ⟨[H,⊤], [⊥,⊤]⟩ ◦<: ⟨[⊥, L], [L, L]⟩ does not hold.
Two stores are related at k steps if each value in the heap of the locations they have in common,
are related at j < k steps for any related security effects. We say that store µ2 is the evolution of
store µ1, annotated µ1 _ µ2 if the domain of µ1 is a subset of µ2.
Two tuples of security effects, values and stores are related for k steps at type Boolg if the security
effects are related, the stores are related for k steps, the values can be typed as Boolg using the
security effects as context (any security effect will do, given that the typing of values do not depend
on the security effect). Additionally, both security effect and values must both be either observable
or not observable. If the security effect and values are observable then the raw values are the same.
Two tuples are observables at type Unitg and Refg U analogous to booleans.
Pairs are related at function types similarly to booleans. The difference is that functions can not
be compared as booleans. Two functions are related if, given two related values and stores for j ≤ k
steps at the argument type, the application of those function to the related values are also related
for j steps at at the return type.
Two tuples of terms and stores are related computations for k steps at typeU , first, if the security
effects are related, and the stores are related for k steps. Second the terms must be typed asU using
a observationally higher security effect. Third, if for any j < k both terms can be reduced for at
least j steps, then the resulting stores are related for the remaining k − j steps Finally, if after at
least j steps the resulting terms are irreducible, then the resulting terms are also related values for
the remaining k − j steps at typeU . Notice that the logical relation also relates programs that do
not terminate as long as after k steps the new stores are also related.
To define the fundamental property of the step-indexed logical relations we first define how to
relate substitutions:
Definition E.33. Let ρ be a substitution and Γ a type substitution. We say that substitution ρ
satisfy environment Γ, written ρ |= Γ, if and only if dom(ρ) = Γ.
Definition E.34 (Related substitutions). Tuples ⟨ϕ1, ρ1, µ1⟩ and ⟨ϕ2, ρ2, µ2⟩ are related on k steps
under Γ, notation Γ ⊢ ⟨ϕ1, ρ1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, ρ2, µ2⟩, if ρi |= Γ, µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 and
∀xU ∈ Γ. ⟨ϕ1, ρ1(xU ), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, ρ2(xU ), µ2⟩ : U
E.6.2 Proof of noninterference.
Lemma E.35 (Noninterference for booleans). Suppose k > 0, and
• an open term ϕ ▷ tU ∈ T[Boolℓo ] where FV (t) = { xU1 } with label(U1) /˜≼ ℓo
• two compatible valid stores tU ⊢ µi , µ1 ≈kℓo µ2
Then for any j < k , v1,v2 ∈ T[U1], if both
• tU [v1/xU1 ] | µ1 ϕ7−→ jv ′1 | µ ′1
• tU [v2/xU1 ] | µ2 ϕ7−→ jv ′2 | µ ′2
we have that rval(v ′1) = rval(v ′2), and µ ′1 ≈kℓo µ ′2.
Proof. The result follows as a special case of Proposition E.65 below. □
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In this theorem, we treat tU as a program that takes xU1 as its input. Furthermore, the security
level g′ = filabel(U1) of the input is not subsumed by the security level ℓo of the observer. As such,
noninterference dictates that changing non-observable input must not change the observable
value of the output (i.e., change true to false or vice-versa). However, this theorem is technically
termination-insensitive in that it is vacuously true if a change of inputs changes a program that
terminates with a value into one that either terminates with an error, or does not terminate at all.
If a program does not terminate after any number of steps, then at least the stores are related at
observation level ℓo .
Note that we compare equality of raw values at first-order type. Restricting attention to first-
order types (i.e., Bool) is common when investigating observational equivalence of typed languages.
We strip away security information because a person or client who uses the program ultimately
observes only the raw value that the program produces.
Also, gradual security dynamically traps some information leaks, so a change in equivalent
inputs may cause a program that previously yielded a value or diverged to now produce an error.
This change in behavior falls under the notion of termination-insensitive, since yielding an error is
simply a third form of termination behavior (in addition to producing a value and diverging).
Finally, we use notation tS | µ ϕ7−→
k
t ′S | µ ′ to describe that configuration tS | µ reduces, in at
most k steps, to configuration t ′S | µ ′.
Lemma E.36. Consider ε1 ⊢ g ≼˜ g′. If ∀ε2 such that ε2 ⊢ g′ ≼˜ ℓo , ε1 ◦≼ ε2 ⊢ g ≼˜ ℓo is not defined.
Then if ε3 ⊢ g′ ≼˜ g′′, then ∀ε4 such that ε4 ⊢ g′′ ≼˜ ℓo ,
then (ε1 ◦≼ ε3) ◦≼ ε4 ⊢ g ≼˜ ℓo is not defined
Proof. Applying associativity: (ε1 ◦≼ ε3) ◦≼ ε4 = ε1 ◦≼ (ε3 ◦≼ ε4), but (ε3 ◦≼ ε4) ⊢ g′ ≼˜ go , and we
know that ε1 ◦≼ ε2 is not defined ∀ε2 such that ε2 ⊢ g′ ≼˜ ℓo . Therefore (ε1 ◦≼ ε3) ◦≼ ε4 ⊢ g ≼˜ ℓo is
not defined and the result holds. □
Lemma E.37. Consider ε1 ⊢ g ≼˜ g′. If ∀ε2 such that ε2 ⊢ g′ ≼˜ ℓo , ε1 ◦≼ ε2 ⊢ g ≼˜ ℓo is not defined.
Also ε0 ⊢ g1 ≼˜ g2, if ε3 ⊢Â g2 ≺ g′ ≼ ℓo , then (ε0 ˜≺ ε1) ◦≼ ε3 ⊢ ‰ g1 ≺ g ≼ ℓo is not defined
Proof. Let us prove that if (ε0 ˜≺ ε1) ◦≼ ε3 ⊢ ‰ g1 ≺ g ≼ ℓo is defined, then ε1 ◦≼ ε2 is defined.
As join is monotone ∃ε ′0 such that ε ′0 ⊢Â g′ ≼ g2 ≺ g′.
Suppose ε1 = ⟨[ℓ11, ℓ12], [ℓ21, ℓ22]⟩, ε0 = ⟨[ℓ31, ℓ32], [ℓ41, ℓ42]⟩, ε ′0 = ⟨[ℓ51, ℓ52], [ℓ61, ℓ62]⟩, and ε3 =
⟨[ℓ71, ℓ72], [ℓ81, ℓ82]⟩.
As ε0 ˜≺ ε1 = ⟨[ℓ11 ≺ ℓ31, ℓ12 ≺ ℓ32], [ℓ21 ≺ ℓ41, ℓ22 ≺ ℓ42]⟩ is defined, then ℓ11 ≺ ℓ31 ≼ ℓ12 ≺ ℓ32 and
ℓ21 ≺ ℓ41 ≼ ℓ22 ≺ ℓ42. Also as
(ε0 ˜≺ ε1) ◦≼ ε3 = ⟨[ℓ11 ≺ ℓ31, (ℓ12 ≺ ℓ32) ≺ ((ℓ22 ≺ ℓ42) ≺ ℓ72) ≺ ℓ82],
[ℓ11 ≺ ℓ31 ≺ ℓ21 ≺ ℓ41 ≺ ℓ72 ≺ ℓ81, ℓ82]⟩
is defined then ℓ21 ≺ ℓ41 ≺ ℓ71 ≼ (ℓ22 ≺ ℓ42) ≺ ℓ72, ℓ11 ≺ ℓ31 ≼ (ℓ22 ≺ ℓ42) ≺ ℓ72, ℓ11 ≺ ℓ31 ≼ ℓ82, and
ℓ21 ≺ ℓ41 ≺ ℓ71 ≼ ℓ82.
If we choose ε ′0 as the interior of the judgment, then we do not get new information, therefore
[ℓ21, ℓ22] ⊑ [ℓ51, ℓ52], i.e. ℓ51 ≼ ℓ21 and ℓ22 ≼ ℓ52. Using the same argument ℓ61 ≼ ℓ71 and ℓ72 ≼ ℓ62.
Then
ε ′0 ◦≼ ε3
= △≼([ℓ51, ℓ52], [ℓ61, ℓ62] ⊓ [ℓ71, ℓ72], [ℓ81, ℓ82])
= △≼([ℓ51, ℓ52], [ℓ61 ≺ ℓ71, ℓ62 ≺ ℓ72], [ℓ81, ℓ82])
= △≼([ℓ51, ℓ52], [ℓ71, ℓ72], [ℓ81, ℓ82])
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which is defined if ℓ51 ≼ ℓ72, ℓ71 ≼ ℓ82 and ℓ51 ≼ ℓ82. But ℓ51 ≼ ℓ21 ≼ ℓ21 ≺ℓ41 ≺ℓ71 ≼ (ℓ22 ≺ ℓ42) ≺ ℓ72 ≼
ℓ72, ℓ51 ≼ ℓ21 ≼ ℓ21 ≺ ℓ41 ≺ ℓ71 ≼ ℓ82 and ℓ71 ≼ ℓ21 ≺ ℓ41 ≺ ℓ71 ≼ ℓ82.
Therefore
ε ′0 ◦≼ ε3 = ⟨[ℓ51, ℓ52 ≺ ℓ72 ≺ ℓ82], [ℓ51 ≺ ℓ71 ≺ ℓ81, ℓ82]⟩
Using the same method, ε1 ◦≼ (ε ′0 ◦≼ ε3) is defined if ℓ21 ≺ ℓ51 ≼ ℓ22 ≺ (ℓ52 ≺ ℓ72 ≺ ℓ82), ℓ11 ≼
ℓ22
≺ (ℓ52 ≺ ℓ72 ≺ ℓ82), and ℓ11 ≼ ℓ82.
But by definition of ı ℓ21 ≼ ℓ22, also ℓ21 ≼ ℓ22 ≼ ℓ52, ℓ21 ≼ ℓ21 ≺ ℓ41 ≺ ℓ71 ≼ (ℓ22 ≺ ℓ42) ≺ ℓ72 ≼ ℓ72,
ℓ21 ≼ ℓ21 ≺ ℓ41 ≺ ℓ71 ≼ ℓ82, and ℓ51 ≼ ℓ71 ≼ ℓ72, therefore ℓ21 ≺ ℓ51 ≼ ℓ22 ≺ (ℓ52 ≺ ℓ72 ≺ ℓ82).
Also ℓ11 ≼ ℓ22 ≼ ℓ52, ℓ11 ≼ ℓ11 ≺ ℓ31 ≼ (ℓ22 ≺ ℓ42) ≺ ℓ72 ≼ ℓ72, and ℓ11 ≼ ℓ11 ≺ ℓ31 ≼ ℓ82, therefore
ℓ11 ≼ ℓ22
≺ (ℓ52 ≺ ℓ72 ≺ ℓ82), and ℓ11 ≼ ℓ82.
Then as ε1 ◦≼ (ε ′0 ◦≼ ε3) is defined then if we choose ε2 = (ε ′0 ◦≼ ε3) ⊢ g′ ≼ ℓo , the result holds.
□
Lemma E.38 (Associativity). Consider ε1, ε2 and ε3, such that ε1 ⊢ g1 ≼ g2, ε2 ⊢ g2 ≼ g3 and
ε3 ⊢ g3 ≼ g4. (ε1 ◦≼ ε2) ◦≼ ε3 = ε1 ◦≼ (ε2 ◦≼ ε3)
Proof. Suppose ε1 = ⟨[ℓ11, ℓ12], [ℓ21, ℓ22]⟩, ε2 = ⟨[ℓ31, ℓ32], [ℓ41, ℓ42]⟩, and ε3 = ⟨[ℓ51, ℓ52], [ℓ61, ℓ62]⟩
Then
(ε1 ◦≼ ε2) ◦≼ ε3
= △≼([ℓ11, ℓ12], [ℓ21, ℓ22] ⊓ [ℓ31, ℓ32], [ℓ41, ℓ42]) ◦≼ ε3
= △≼([ℓ11, ℓ12], [ℓ21 ≺ ℓ31, ℓ22 ≺ ℓ32], [ℓ41, ℓ42]) ◦≼ ε3
= ⟨[ℓ11, ℓ12 ≺ (ℓ22 ≺ ℓ32) ≺ ℓ42], [ℓ11 ≺ (ℓ21 ≺ ℓ31) ≺ ℓ41, ℓ42]⟩
◦≼ ⟨[ℓ51, ℓ52], [ℓ61, ℓ62]⟩
= △≼([ℓ11, ℓ12 ≺ (ℓ22 ≺ ℓ32) ≺ ℓ42], [ℓ11 ≺ (ℓ21 ≺ ℓ31) ≺ ℓ41, ℓ42]⊓
[ℓ51, ℓ52], [ℓ61, ℓ62])
= △≼([ℓ11, ℓ12 ≺ (ℓ22 ≺ ℓ32) ≺ ℓ42],
[ℓ11 ≺ (ℓ21 ≺ ℓ31) ≺ ℓ41 ≺ ℓ51, ℓ42 ≺ ℓ52],
[ℓ61, ℓ62])
= ⟨[ℓ11, ℓ′21], [ℓ′61, ℓ62]⟩
where ℓ′21 = ℓ12
≺ (ℓ22 ≺ ℓ32) ≺ ℓ42 ≺ ℓ52 ≺ ℓ62 and ℓ′61 = ℓ11 ≺ (ℓ21 ≺ ℓ31) ≺ ℓ41 ≺ ℓ51 ≺ ℓ61. But
ε1 ◦≼ (ε2 ◦≼ ε3)
= ε1 ◦≼ △≼([ℓ31, ℓ32], [ℓ41, ℓ42] ⊓ [ℓ51, ℓ52], [ℓ61, ℓ62])
= ε1 ◦≼ △≼([ℓ31, ℓ32], [ℓ41 ≺ ℓ51, ℓ42 ≺ ℓ52], [ℓ61, ℓ62])
= ⟨[ℓ11, ℓ12], [ℓ21, ℓ22]⟩◦≼
⟨[ℓ31, ℓ32 ≺ (ℓ42 ≺ ℓ52) ≺ ℓ62], [ℓ31 ≺ (ℓ41 ≺ ℓ51) ≺ ℓ61, ℓ62]⟩
= △≼([ℓ11, ℓ12], [ℓ21, ℓ22]⊓
[ℓ31, ℓ32 ≺ (ℓ42 ≺ ℓ52) ≺ ℓ62], [ℓ31 ≺ (ℓ41 ≺ ℓ51) ≺ ℓ61, ℓ62])
= △≼([ℓ11, ℓ12],
[ℓ21, ℓ22 ≺ (ℓ32 ≺ ℓ42) ≺ ℓ52 ≺ ℓ62],
[ℓ31 ≺ (ℓ41 ≺ ℓ51) ≺ ℓ61, ℓ62]
= ⟨[ℓ11, ℓ′21], [ℓ′61, ℓ62]⟩
where ℓ′21 = ℓ12
≺ (ℓ22 ≺ ℓ32) ≺ ℓ42 ≺ ℓ52 ≺ ℓ62 and ℓ′61 = ℓ11 ≺ (ℓ21 ≺ ℓ31) ≺ ℓ41 ≺ ℓ51 ≺ ℓ61, and the result
holds. □
Lemma E.39. Consider ε1, ε2 and ε3 such that ε1 ⊢ g1 ≼ g2, ε2 ⊢ g2 ≼ g3 and ε3 ⊢ g3 ≼ g4. If
ε1 ˜≺ (ε2 ◦≼ ε3) is defined, then (ε1 ˜≺ ε2) ◦≼ (ε1 ˜≺ ε3) is defined
Proof. By definition of join and consistent transitivity, using the property that the join operator
is monotone. □
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Lemma E.40. If ε1, such that ε1 ⊢ g1 ≲ g2, then ε2, such that ε2 ⊢Â g1 ≺ g3 ≼ g2.
Proof. By definition of join and consistent transitivity, using the property that the join operator
is monotone. □
Lemma E.41. Consider stores µ1, µ2, µ ′1, µ ′2 such that µi _ µ ′i , and substitutions ρ1 and ρ2, such that
Γ ⊢ ⟨ϕ1, ρ1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, ρ2, µ2⟩, then if ∀j ≤ k , if µ ′1 ≈
j
ℓo
µ ′2 then Γ ⊢ ⟨ϕ1, ρ1, µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ϕ2, ρ2, µ ′2⟩
Proof. By definition of related computations and related stores. The key argument is that given
that µi _ µ ′i then µ ′i have at least the same locations of µi and the values still are related as well
given that they still have the same type. □
Lemma E.42 (Substitution preserves typing). Ifϕ ▷tU ∈ T[U ] and ρ |= FV (tU ) thenϕ ▷ρ(tU ) ∈
T[U ].
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ϕ ▷ tU ∈ T[U ] □
Lemma E.43 (Reduction preserves relations). Consider ϕi ≤ℓo ϕ ′i , ϕ ′i ▷ ti ∈ T[U ], µi ∈ Store,
ti ⊢ µi , and µ1 ≈kℓo µ2. Consider j < k , posing ti | µi
ϕ′i7−→ jt ′i | µ ′i , we have
⟨ϕ1, t1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, t2, µ2⟩ : C(U ) if and only if ⟨ϕ1, t ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈
k−j
ℓo
⟨ϕ2, t ′2, µ ′2⟩ : C(U )
Proof. Direct by definition of
⟨ϕ1, t1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, t2, µ2⟩ : C(U ) and transitivity of
ϕ′7−→ j . □
Lemma E.44 (Ascription preserves relation). Suppose ε ⊢ U ′ ≲ U .
(1) If ⟨ϕ1,v, µ⟩ 1 ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2,v, µ⟩ 2 : U ′ then
⟨ϕ1, εv1 :: U , µ1⟩ ≈k+1ℓo ⟨ϕ2, εv2 :: U , µ2⟩ : C(U ).
(2) If ⟨ϕ1, t, µ⟩ 1 ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, t, µ⟩ 2 : C(U ′) then
⟨ϕ1, εt1 :: U , µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, εt2 :: U , µ2⟩ : C(U ).
Proof. Following Zdancewic [2002], the proof proceeds by induction on the judgment ε ⊢ U ′ ≲
U . The difference here is that consistent subtyping is justified by evidence, and that the terms
have to be ascribed to exploit subtyping. In particular, case 1 above establishes a computation-level
relation because each ascribed term (εvi :: U ) may not be a value: each value vi is either a bare
value ui or a casted value εiui :: Ui , with εi ⊢ Si ≲ U . In the latter case, (ε(εiui :: Ui ) :: U ) either
steps to error (in which case the relation is vacuously established), or steps to ε ′ui :: U , which is a
value. Next if both values were originally observables, then whatever the label ofU both values are
going to be related. If both values were originally not observables, then by Lemma E.44 both values
are going to be still non observables.
□
Lemma E.45. Consider ε1i ⊢ U1 ≼˜ U2, ε2i ⊢ U2 ≼˜ U3, and ε3i = ε1i ◦≼ ε2i such that ε3i ⊢ U1 ≼˜ U3.
Then if ε11 ≈ℓo ε12 and ε21 ≈ℓo ε22, then ε31 ≈ℓo ε32.
Proof. By induction on ε11 ≈ℓo ε12.
□
Lemma E.46. If ⟨ϕ1,v1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2,v2, µ2⟩ : U and, ϕi ▷ uval(vi ) ∈ T[Ui ] where Ui ≲ U , then∀U ′, ε1 ≈ℓo ε2, εi ⊢ U ≲ U ′,vi = ε ′iui :: U , εi = ε ′i ◦ εi , we know that
⟨ϕ1, ε ′′1 uval(v1) :: U ′, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, ε ′′2 uval(v2) :: U ′, µ1⟩ : U ′.
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Proof. The result follows by induction on relation ⟨ϕ1,v1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2,v2, µ2⟩ : U using Lem-
mas E.43, E.45, and observational monotonicity of the transitivity (Lemma E.52).
□
Lemma E.47 (Downward Closed / Monotonicity). If
(1) ⟨ϕ1,v1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2,v2, µ2⟩ : U then
∀j ≤ k, ⟨ϕ1,v1, µ1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ϕ2,v2, µ2⟩ : U
(2) ⟨ϕ1, tU1 , µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, tU2 , µ2⟩ : C(U ) then
∀j ≤ k, ⟨ϕ1, tU1 , µ1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ϕ2, tU2 , µ2⟩ : C(U )
(3) µ1 ≈kℓo µ2 then ∀j ≤ k, µ1 ≈
j
ℓo
µ2
Proof. By induction on typeU and the definition of related stores. □
Lemma E.48. Consider ε1 ⊢ g′1 ≼˜ g1 and ε2 ⊢ g′2 ≼˜ g2. Then (¬obsℓo (ε1g1) ∧ ε1 ⌊≤⌋ ε2) ⇒
¬obsℓo (ε2g2).
Proof. Suppose ε1 = ⟨[ℓ11, ℓ12], [ℓ13, ℓ14]⟩ and ε2 = ⟨[ℓ21, ℓ22], [ℓ23, ℓ24]⟩.
Also consider ε ′1 = I≼(g1, ℓo) = ⟨[ℓ′11, ℓ′12], [ℓo, ℓo]⟩ and ε ′2 = I≼(g2, ℓo) = ⟨[ℓ′21, ℓ′22], [ℓo, ℓo]⟩.
If ε1 ◦≼ ε ′1 = △≼([ℓ11, ℓ12], [ℓ13 ≺ ℓ′11, ℓ14 ≺ ℓ′12], [ℓo, ℓo]) is not defined then
(1) ℓ13 ≺ ℓ′11¬ ≼ ℓ14 ≺ ℓ′12,
(2) ℓ11¬ ≼ ℓ14 ≺ ℓ′12, or
(3) ℓ13 ≺ ℓ′11¬ ≼ ℓo or
(4) ℓ11¬ ≼ ℓo .
By construction we know that ℓ11 ≼ ℓ14. By ε1 ⌊≤⌋ ε2 we know that ℓ13 ≼ ℓ23.
If g1 = ℓ, then [ℓ′11, ℓ′12] = [ℓ13, ℓ14] = [ℓ, ℓ], therefore ℓ ≼ ℓ23. If ℓ¬ ≼ ℓo , then ℓ23 ≺ ℓ′21¬ ≼ ℓo and
the result holds immediately. If ℓ ≼ ℓo , by construction of evidence we know that it must be the
case that ℓ11 ≼ ℓ13, then either
(1) ℓ ≺ ℓ¬ ≼ ℓ ≺ ℓ (which is impossible),
(2) ℓ11¬ ≼ ℓ ≺ ℓ (which is a contradiction by construction of evidence), or
(3) ℓ ≺ ℓ¬ ≼ ℓo (which contradicts ℓ ≼ ℓo ) or
(4) ℓ11¬ ≼ ℓo .
so the only possibility is that ℓ11¬ ≼ ℓo , but we know that ℓ11 ≼ ℓ13, i.e. ℓ11 ≼ ℓ and that ℓ ≼ ℓo ,
then by transitivity ℓ11 ≼ ℓo which is a contradiction so ℓ ≼ ℓo case cannot happen.
If g1 = ?, then [ℓ′11, ℓ′12] = [⊥, ℓo].
If (1) holds, i.e. ℓ13¬ ≼ ℓ14 ≺ ℓo , by construction we know that ℓ13 ≼ ℓ14, therefore it must be the
case that ℓ13¬ ≼ ℓo , but ℓ13 ≼ ℓ23 and the result holds because (3) does not hold for ε2.
If (2) holds, i.e. ℓ11¬ ≼ ℓ14 ≺ ℓo , by construction we know that ℓ11 ≼ ℓ14, therefore it must be the
case that ℓ11¬ ≼ ℓo . We also know by construction that ℓ11 ≼ ℓ13, then ℓ13¬ ≼ ℓo . As ℓ13 ≼ ℓ23, then
ℓ23 ≼ ℓo , and therefore (3) does not hold for ε2, i.e. ℓ23 ≺ ℓ′21 ¬ ≼ ℓo . If (3) holds, i.e. ℓ13 ≺ ⊥¬ ≼ ℓo ,
then ℓ13¬ ≼ ℓo , but ℓ13 ≼ ℓ23 and the result holds because (3) does not hold for ε2.
If (4) holds, i.e. ℓ11¬ ≼ ℓo , as ℓ11 ≼ ℓ13 ≼ ℓ23 then ℓ23¬ ≼ ℓo , and therefore (3) does not hold for ε2,
i.e. ℓ23 ≺ ℓ′21 ¬ ≼ ℓo . □
Lemma E.49. Consider ε1 ⊢ g′1 ≼˜ g1, ε2 ⊢ g′2 ≼˜ g2, and ε3 = ε1 ˜≺ ε2 such that ε3 ⊢ Â g′1 ≺ g′2 ≼ g1 ≺ g2.
Then (obsℓo (ε1g1) ∧ obsℓo (ε2g2)) ⇒ obsℓo (ε3(g1 ˜≺ g2)).
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Proof. Suppose ε1 = ⟨[ℓ11, ℓ12], [ℓ13, ℓ14]⟩ and ε2 = ⟨[ℓ21, ℓ22], [ℓ23, ℓ24]⟩.
Then ε1 ˜≺ ε2 = ε3 = ⟨[ℓ11 ≺ ℓ21, ℓ12 ≺ ℓ22], [ℓ13 ≺ ℓ23, ℓ14 ≺ ℓ24]⟩. Also consider ε ′1 = I≼(g1, ℓo) =
⟨[ℓ′11, ℓ′12], [ℓo, ℓo]⟩ , ε ′2 = I≼(g2, ℓo) = ⟨[ℓ′21, ℓ′22], [ℓo, ℓo]⟩, and ε ′3 = I≼(g2˜≺g3, ℓo) = ⟨[ℓ′31, ℓ′32], [ℓo, ℓo]⟩.
If g1 = ℓ1 and g2 = ℓ2, then ℓ′32 = ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2, ℓ′22 = ℓ2 and ℓ′12 = ℓ1. Also ℓ′31 = ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2, ℓ′21 = ℓ2 and
ℓ′11 = ℓ1.
If g1 = ? or g2 = ℓ2 (the other case is analogous) then ℓ′32 = ℓo and, ℓ′12 = ℓo and ℓ′22 = ℓ2 such that
ℓ2 ≼ ℓo . Also ℓ′11 = ⊥, ℓ′21 = ℓ2, but ℓ′31 = ⊥. Therefore ℓ′32 = ℓ′12 ≺ ℓ′22 and ℓ′31 ≼ ℓ′11 ≺ ℓ′21.
We know that
(1) ℓ13 ≺ ℓ′11 ≼ ℓ14 ≺ ℓ′12,
(2) ℓ11 ≼ ℓ14
≺
ℓ′12, or
(3) ℓ13 ≺ ℓ′11 ≼ ℓo or
(4) ℓ11 ≼ ℓo .
(5) ℓ23 ≺ ℓ′21 ≼ ℓ24 ≺ ℓ′22,
(6) ℓ21 ≼ ℓ24
≺
ℓ′22, or
(7) ℓ23 ≺ ℓ′21 ≼ ℓo or
(8) ℓ21 ≼ ℓo .
We have to prove
(10) (ℓ13 ≺ ℓ23) ≺ ℓ′31 ≼ (ℓ14 ≺ ℓ24) ≺ ℓ′32,
(11) (ℓ11 ≺ ℓ21) ≼ (ℓ14 ≺ ℓ24) ≺ ℓ′32, or
(12) (ℓ13 ≺ ℓ23) ≺ ℓ′31 ≼ ℓo or
(13) (ℓ11 ≺ ℓ21) ≼ ℓo .
(13) follows directly by (4) and (8).
(12) follows from (3) and (7) and monotonicity of the join.
By definition of evidence and interior, ℓ′32 ≼ ℓo and ℓ′31 ≼ ℓ′32. Therefore, from (1) ℓ13 ≼ ℓ14,
from (5) ℓ23 ≼ ℓ24 and therefore ℓ13 ≺ ℓ23 ≼ ℓ14 ≺ ℓ24. Also as ℓ13 ≼ ℓ′12 and ℓ23 ≼ ℓ′12, then
ℓ13 ≺ ℓ23 ≼ ℓ′12 ≺ ℓ′22 = ℓ′32. By similar argument ℓ′31 ≼ (ℓ14 ≺ ℓ24), and also ℓ′11 ≺ ℓ′21 ≼ ℓ′32. But then
ℓ′31 ≼ ℓ′11 ≺ ℓ′21 ≼ ℓ′32 and (10) holds. □
Lemma E.50. Consider ε1 ⊢ g1 ≼˜ g2, ε2 ⊢ g2 ≼˜ g3, and ε3 = ε1 ◦≼ ε2 such that ε3 ⊢ g1 ≼˜ g3. Then
obsℓo (ε3(g3)) ⇒ (obsℓo (ε1g2) ∧ obsℓo (ε2g3)).
Proof. Suppose ε1 = ⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ3, ℓ4]⟩, ε2 = ⟨[ℓ5, ℓ6], [ℓ7, ℓ8]⟩.
ε1 ◦≼ ε2 = △≼([ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5, ℓ4 ≺ ℓ6], [ℓ7, ℓ8]) = ⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4 ≺ ℓ6 ≺ ℓ8], [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5 ≺ ℓ7, ℓ8]⟩
Notice that as ℓ3 ≼ ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5 ≺ ℓ7 then ε1 ⌊≤⌋ ε3, and as ℓ7 ≼ ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5 ≺ ℓ7 then ε2 ⌊≤⌋ ε3.
What we have to prove is equivalent to prove that
(¬obsℓo (ε1g2) ∨ ¬obsℓo (ε2g3)) ⇒ ¬obsℓo (ε3(g3))
If ¬obsℓo (ε1g2) and as ε1 ⌊≤⌋ ε3, then by Lemma E.48 ¬obsℓo (ε3(g3)) and the result holds. Similarly,
if ¬obsℓo (ε2g3) and as ε2 ⌊≤⌋ ε3, then by Lemma E.48 ¬obsℓo (ε3(g3)) and the result holds.
□
Lemma E.51. Consider ε1 ⊢ g1 ≼˜ g2, ε2 ⊢ g2 ≼˜ g3, and ε3 = ε1 ◦≼ ε2 such that ε3 ⊢ g1 ≼˜ g3. Then
(obsℓo (ε1g2) ∧ obsℓo (ε2g3)) ⇒ obsℓo (ε3(g3)).
Proof. Suppose ε1 = ⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ3, ℓ4]⟩, ε2 = ⟨[ℓ5, ℓ6], [ℓ7, ℓ8]⟩.
ε1 ◦≼ ε2 = △≼([ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5, ℓ4 ≺ ℓ6], [ℓ7, ℓ8]) = ⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ4 ≺ ℓ6 ≺ ℓ8], [ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5 ≺ ℓ7, ℓ8]⟩
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By definition of the transitivity operator, ℓ1 ≼ ℓ8, ℓ1 ≼ ℓ4
≺
ℓ6, and ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5 ≼ ℓ8.
Let us consider ε ′1 = I≼(g2, ℓo) = ⟨[ℓ′1, ℓ′2], [ℓo, ℓo]⟩, ε ′2 = ε ′3 = I≼(g3, ℓo) = ⟨[ℓ′5, ℓ′6], [ℓo, ℓo]⟩ We
know that
(1) ℓ3 ≺ ℓ′1 ≼ ℓ4 ≺ ℓ′2,
(2) ℓ1 ≼ ℓ4
≺
ℓ′2, or
(3) ℓ3 ≺ ℓ′1 ≼ ℓo or
(4) ℓ1 ≼ ℓo .
(5) ℓ7 ≺ ℓ′5 ≼ ℓ8 ≺ ℓ′6,
(6) ℓ5 ≼ ℓ8
≺
ℓ′6, or
(7) ℓ7 ≺ ℓ′5 ≼ ℓo or
(8) ℓ5 ≼ ℓo .
We have to prove
(10) (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5 ≺ ℓ7) ≺ ℓ′5 ≼ ℓ8 ≺ ℓ′6,
(11) ℓ1 ≼ ℓ8
≺
ℓ′6, or
(12) (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5 ≺ ℓ7) ≺ ℓ′5 ≼ ℓo or
(13) ℓ1 ≼ ℓo .
Notice that if g3 = ? then ℓ′6 = ℓo and therefore by (4) ℓ1 ≼ ℓ′6, and by (3), ℓ3 ≼ ℓ′6. Also ℓ′5 = ⊥
and therefore ℓ′5 ≼ ℓ7 ≼ ℓ8. If g3 = ℓ, then ℓ′5 = ℓ′6 = ℓ and ℓ7 = ℓ8 = ℓ, but we know that ℓ1 ≼ ℓ8,
and therefore ℓ1 ≼ ℓ′6 and ℓ′5 ≼ ℓ8. Also as ℓ3 ≼ ℓ8 then ℓ3 ≼ ℓ′6.
We also know that ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5 ≼ ℓ8 and by definition of intervals ℓ7 ≼ ℓ8. We know that ℓ1 ≼ ℓ′6. By
(5) ℓ7 ≺ ℓ′5 ≼ ℓ′6. By (6) ℓ5 ≼ ℓ′6. Also ℓ3 ≼ ℓ′6 and (10) follows.
We know that ℓ1 ≼ ℓ8 and that ℓ1 ≼ ℓ′6 therefore (11) holds. By (4), (3), (7), (8) and because ℓ′5 ≼ ℓo
by definition of interior, (12) holds. Finally (13) holds by (4).
□
Lemma E.52. Consider ε1 ⊢ g1 ≼˜ g2, ε2 ⊢ g2 ≼˜ g3, and ε3 = ε1 ◦≼ ε2 such that ε3 ⊢ g1 ≼˜ g3.
Then (¬obsℓo (ε1g2) ∨ ¬obsℓo (ε2g3)) ⇐⇒ ¬obsℓo (ε3(g3)).
Proof. Direct by Lemmas E.50 and E.51 . □
Lemma E.53. Consider ε1 and ε ′1 = ε2 ˜≺ (ε1 ◦≼ ε3), for some ε2 and ε3. Then ε1 ⌊≤⌋ ε ′1
Proof. Suppose ε2 = ⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ3, ℓ4]⟩, ε1 = ⟨[ℓ5, ℓ2], [ℓ7, ℓ8]⟩, and ε3 = ⟨[ℓ9, ℓ10], [ℓ11, ℓ12]⟩.
ε1 ◦≼ ε3 = △≼([ℓ5, ℓ6], [ℓ7 ≺ ℓ9, ℓ8 ≺ ℓ10], [ℓ11, ℓ12]) = ⟨[ℓ5, ℓ6 ≺ ℓ8 ≺ ℓ10 ≺ ℓ12], [ℓ5 ≺ ℓ7 ≺ ℓ9 ≺ ℓ11, ℓ12]⟩
ε2 ˜≺ (ε1 ◦≼ ε3) = ⟨[ℓ1 ≺ ℓ5, ℓ2 ≺ (ℓ6 ≺ ℓ8 ≺ ℓ10 ≺ ℓ12)], [ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5 ≺ ℓ7 ≺ ℓ9 ≺ ℓ11, ℓ4 ≺ ℓ12]⟩.
But ℓ7 ≼ ℓ3 ≺ ℓ5 ≺ ℓ7 ≺ ℓ9 ≺ ℓ11 and therefore, ε1 ⌊≤⌋ ε ′1.
□
Lemma E.54. Consider ε1 ⊢ g′1 ≼˜ g1 and ε ′1 = ε2 ˜≺ (ε1 ◦≼ ε3) such that ε ′1 ⊢ g′2 ≼˜ g2.
Then ¬obsℓo (ε1g1) ⇒ ¬obsℓo (ε ′1g2).
Proof. By Lemma E.53 and Lemma E.48 the result holds immediately. □
Lemma E.55. Consider ε1 ⊢ g′1 ≼˜ g1, ε2 ⊢ g′2 ≼˜ g2, and ε3 = ε1 ˜≺ ε2 such that ε3 ⊢ Â g′1 ≺ g′2 ≼ g1 ≺ g2.
Then ε1 ⌊≤⌋ ε3.
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Proof. Suppose ε1 = ⟨[ℓ1, ℓ2], [ℓ3, ℓ4]⟩, ε2 = ⟨[ℓ5, ℓ6], [ℓ7, ℓ8]⟩, then
ε3 = ⟨[ℓ1 ≺ ℓ5, ℓ2 ≺ ℓ6], [ℓ3 ≺ ℓ7, ℓ4 ≺ ℓ8]⟩.
As ℓ3 ≼ ℓ3 ≺ ℓ3 ≺ ℓ7 therefore, ε1 ⌊≤⌋ ε3 and the result holds. □
Lemma E.56. Consider ε1 ⊢ g′1 ≼˜ g1, ε2 ⊢ g′2 ≼˜ g2, and ε3 = ε1 ˜≺ ε2 such that ε3 ⊢ Â g′1 ≺ g′2 ≼ g1 ≺ g2.
Then (¬obsℓo (ε1g1) ∨ ¬obsℓo (ε2g2)) ⇐⇒ ¬obsℓo (ε3(g1 ˜≺ g2)).
Proof. First we prove the⇒ direction. By Lemma E.55, ε1 ⌊≤⌋ ε3. Suppose obsℓo (ε1g1) does not
hold (the other case is analogous). Then by Lemma E.48 the result holds immediately. Then for the
⇐ we use Lemma E.49 and the result holds immediately. □
Lemma E.57. Consider ϕ ′ ▷ tU ∈ T[U ], and µ , such that tU ⊢ µ and ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′), and ∀k > 0, such
that tU | µ ϕ
′
7−→ kt ′U | µ ′, then ∀ϕ ,
(1) ∀oU ′ ∈ dom(µ ′)\ dom(µ), ¬obsℓo (ϕ ▷ µ ′(oU ′)).
(2) ∀oU ′ ∈ dom(µ ′) ∩ dom(µ) ∧ µ ′(oU ′) , µ(oU ′),
(a) ¬obsℓo (ϕ ▷ µ(oU ′)) , and
(b) ¬obsℓo (ϕ ▷ µ ′(oU ′)) .
Proof. We use induction on the derivation of tU . The interest cases are the last step of reduction
rules for references and assignments.
Case (t = ε1oUg′
g,U1:= εℓ ε2u). We are only updating the heap so we only have to prove (a) and (b).
Then
ε1o
U
g′
g,U1:= εℓ ε2u
ϕ′7−→ unit⊥ | µ[oU 7→ ε ′(u ˜≺ (ϕ ′.gc ˜≺ g′)) :: U ′]
where ε ′ = (ε2 ◦<: iref (ε1)) ˜≺ ((ϕ ′.ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1)) ◦≼ ε3 ◦≼ ilbl(iref (ε1)) and if µ(oU ′) = εu :: U ′, then
ϕ ′.ε˜≺ilbl(ε1)⌊≤⌋ε . For simplicity let us call ε ′2 = (ε2◦<:iref (ε1)) and ε ′3 = ε3◦≼ ilbl(iref (ε1)). We have to
prove that (b) ¬(obsℓo (ε ′filabel(U ′)). As ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′), by Lemma E.56, ¬obsℓo ((ϕ ′.ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1))(ϕ ′.gc ˜≺g)).
Then by Lemma E.54, ¬(obsℓo (ε ′filabel(U ′)). Next we have to prove that (a) obsℓo (ϕ ▷ µ(oU ′)) is not
defined. Consider that µ(oU ′) = εu :: U ′. We know that obsℓo (ϕ ′.εϕ ′.gc) is not defined, and that
ϕ ′.ε ⌊≤⌋ ε , therefore by Lemma E.48, obsℓo (εU ′) is not defined, concluding that obsℓo (ϕ ▷ µ(oU ′)) is
not defined as well and the result holds.
Case (t = refU ′εℓ εsu). We are extending the heap, so we need to only prove (1). Then
refUεℓ εsu | µ
ϕ′7−→oU ′⊥ | µ[oU
′ 7→ ε ′(u ˜≺ ϕ ′.gc) :: U ′]
where oU ′ < dom(µ), ε ′ = εs ˜≺ (ϕ ′.gc ◦≼ εℓ). We need to prove that obsℓo (ϕ ▷ ε ′(u ˜≺ ϕ ′.gc) :: U ′) does
not hold. In order to do so, we will show that obsℓo (ilbl(ε ′)filabel(U ′)) does not holds, which follows
directly by Lemma E.54.
□
Lemma E.58. Consider ϕ ′, such that obsℓo (ϕ ′.εϕ ′.gc) does not hold, then then ∀k > 0, such that
tUi | µi
ϕ′7−→ kt ′Ui | µ ′i , then if µ1 ≈kℓo µ2, then µ ′1 ≈kℓo µ ′2
Proof. By Lemma E.57 we know three things:
(1) ∀oU ′ ∈ dom(µ ′i )\ dom(µi ), obsℓo (ϕ ▷ µ ′i (oU ′)) does not hold, i.e. new locations are not observ-
able.
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(2) ∀oU ′ ∈ dom(µ ′i ) ∩ dom(µi ) ∧ µ ′i (oU ′) , µ(oU ′),
(a) obsℓo (ϕ ▷ µi (oU ′)) does not hold, and
(b) obsℓo (ϕ ▷ µ ′i (oU ′)) does not hold.
i.e. for all updated references they have to be previously not observable, and by definition
therefore related, and second they are still non observable after the update, and by definition
those locations are still related under ϕ .
Therefore µ ′1 ≈kℓo µ ′2 and the result holds. □
Lemma E.59. Consider simple values ui ∈ T[Ui ] and
⟨ϕ1, ε ′1u1 :: U , µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, ε ′2u2 :: U , µ2⟩ : U .
If ε1 ≈ℓo ε2 : g′ where εi ⊢ g ≲ g′, then
⟨ϕ1, (ε ′1 ˜≺ ε1)(u1 ˜≺ g) :: U ˜≺ g′, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, (ε ′2 ˜≺ ε2)(u2 ˜≺ g) :: U ˜≺ g′, µ2⟩ : U ˜≺ g′
Proof. By induction on relation ⟨ϕ1, ε ′1u1 :: U , µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, ε ′2u2 :: U , µ2⟩ : U and Lemma E.56
(observational-monotonicity of the join), considering that the label stamping can make the new
values non observable and that join of evidences does not introduce imprecision. □
Lemma E.60. Suppose that ϕi ≤ℓo ϕ ′i , ϕ ′i ▷ protg,Uε ′ig′iϕ ′′i (εitUi ) ∈ T[U ˜≺ g], for i ∈ {1, 2}, where¬obsℓo (ϕ ′′i .εϕ ′′i .gc), and either ¬obsℓo (ϕi .εϕi .gc) or ¬obsℓo (ε ′ig). Also consider two stores µi such that
µ1 ≈kℓo µ2.
Then ⟨ϕ1, protg,Uε ′1g′1ϕ ′′1 (ε1tU1 ), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, prot
g,U
ε ′2g′2
ϕ ′′2 (ε2tU2 ), µ2⟩
Proof. Suppose that after at least j more steps, where j < k , both subterms reduce to a value
(let us assume no cast errors are produced, otherwise the lemma vacuously holds):
tUi | µi
ϕ′′i7−→ j ε ′ivi | µ ′i
Therefore:
protg,Uε ′ig′iϕ
′′
i (εitUi ) | µ ′i
ϕ′i7−→ j protg,Uε ′ig′iϕ ′′i (ε ′′i ui ) | µ ′i
ϕ′i7−→ 1 (ε ′′i ˜≺ ε ′i )(ui ˜≺ g′i ) :: U ˜≺ g | µ ′i
As the values can be radically different we have to make sure that both values are not observables.
If obsℓo (ϕi .εϕi .gc) does not hold then the values are not observables because the security context is
not observable. Let us assume that obsℓo (ϕi .εϕi .gc) holds, but obsℓo (ε ′ig) not. Then by Lemma E.56,
obsℓo ((ε ′′i ˜≺ ε ′i )(filabel(U )˜≺ g)) does not hold, and therefore obsℓo (ϕi ▷ (ε ′′i ˜≺ ε ′i )(ui ˜≺ g′i ) :: U ˜≺ g) does
not hold, and by definition of related evidences (ε ′′1 ˜≺ ε ′1) ≈ℓo (ε ′′2 ˜≺ ε ′2).
Now we have to prove that the resulting stores are related. But by Lemma E.58 the result
immediately.
□
Lemma E.61. Suppose that ϕi ≤ℓo ϕ ′i , ϕi ≤ℓo ϕ ′′i , ⟨ϕ1, t1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, t2, µ2⟩ : C(U ′), and that
ϕ ′i ▷ prot
g,U
ε ′ig′i
ϕ ′′i (εitUi ) ∈ T[U ˜≺ g], for i ∈ {1, 2}. If ε1 ≈ℓo ε2 : U , ϕ1 ≈kℓo ϕ2,ϕ ′1 ≈kℓo ϕ ′2,ϕ ′′1 ≈kℓo ϕ ′′2 ,
and ε ′1 ≈ℓo ε ′2 : g,
then ⟨ϕ1, protg,Uε ′1g′1ϕ ′′1 (ε1tU
′
1 ), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, prot
g,U
ε ′2g′2
ϕ ′′2 (ε2tU ′2 ), µ2⟩ : C(U ˜≺ g)
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Proof. In case that combining evidence may fail, then the Lemma vacuously holds. Let us
assume that combining evidence always successes. Consider j < k , we know by definition of related
computations that
tU
′
i | µi
ϕ′′i7−→ jt ′U ′i | µ ′i
then µ ′1 ≈jℓo µ ′2, and by Lemma E.62 µi _ µ ′i . If t ′Ui are reducible after k − 1 steps, then the result
holds immediately by (Rprot()). The interest case if t ′Ui are irreducible after j < k steps:
Suppose that after j steps t ′U ′i = vi , then ⟨ϕ1,v1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−jℓo ⟨ϕ2,v2, µ ′2⟩ : U ′.
Therefore:
protg,Uε ′ig′iϕ
′′
i (εitU ′i ) | µ ′i
ϕ′i7−→ j protg,Uε ′ig′iϕ ′′i (ε ′′i ui ) | µ ′i
ϕ′i7−→ 1 (ε ′′i ˜≺ ε ′i )(ui ˜≺ g′i ) :: U ˜≺ g | µ ′i
We know by Lemma E.46 that ⟨ϕ1, ε ′′1 u1 :: U , µ ′1⟩ ≈k−jℓo ⟨ϕ2, ε ′′2 u2 :: U , µ ′2⟩ : U .
If ¬obsℓo (ϕi ▷vi ) or ¬obsℓo (εi filabel(U )), then by Lemma E.64, obsℓo (ϕi ▷ ε ′′i ui :: U ) also does not
hold. Finally by Lemma E.56 obsℓo (ϕi ▷ (ε ′′i ˜≺ ε ′i )(filabel(U )˜≺ g)) does not hold and therefore the final
values are related.
Let us consider that obsℓo (ϕi ▷vi ), obsℓo (εi filabel(U )), and that obsℓo (ϕi ▷ε ′′i ui :: U ) holds (otherwise
we follow by the previous argument).
Let us assume that ¬obsℓo (ε ′ig). Then by Lemma E.56, ¬obsℓo (ϕi ▷ (ε ′′i ˜≺ ε ′i )(filabel(U ) ˜≺ g)), and
therefore ¬obsℓo (ϕi ▷ (ε ′′i ˜≺ ε ′i )(ui ˜≺ g′i ) :: U ˜≺ g).
If obsℓo ((ε ′′i ˜≺ ε ′i )(filabel(U ) ˜≺ g)) hold, then the result follows by Lemma E.59, and by backward
preservation of the relations (Lemma E.43).
□
Lemma E.62. Consider term ϕ ▷ tU ∈ T[U ], store µ and j > 0,
such that tU | µ ϕ7−→ jt ′U | µ ′. Then µ _ µ ′.
Proof. Trivial by induction on the derivation of tU . The only rules that change the store are the
ones for reference and assignment, neither of which remove locations. □
Lemma E.63. If ϕ ≤ℓo ϕ ′ and ϕ ′ ≤ℓo ϕ ′′, then ϕ ≤ℓo ϕ ′′.
Proof. Trivial because if ϕ is not observable, then ϕ ′ is not observable as well by definition of
≤ℓo , and therefore ϕ ′′ must also be not observable. □
Lemma E.64. Consider ϕi ▷ v ∈ T[U ], and ε ⊢ U ≲ U ′. Suppose εv :: U ′ i7−→ ε ′u :: U ′. If
¬obsℓo (ϕi ▷ v) ∨ ¬obsℓo (εU ′) ⇐⇒ ¬obsℓo (ϕi ▷ ε ′u :: U ′).
Proof. Direct by Lemma E.52. □
MT ▶NEW PROOF HERE◀
Next, we present the Noninterference proposition, which naturally implies the Security Type
Soundness proposition (Prop 5.5) presented in the paper.
Proposition E.65 (Noninterference). If ϕ ′i ▷ tˇ ∈ T[U ], µi ∈ Store, tˇ ⊢ µi , Γ = FV (tˇ), and
∀k ≥ 0,ϕi ≤ℓo ϕ ′i , Γ ⊢ ⟨ϕ1, ρ1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, ρ2, µ2⟩ , then ⟨ϕ1, ρ1(tˇ), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, ρ2(tˇ), µ2⟩ : C(U ).
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Proof. By induction on the derivation of term tˇ ∈ T[U ]. Let us take an arbitrary index k ≥ 0.
Case (x ). tˇ = xU so Γ = {xU }. Γ ⊢ ⟨ϕ1, ρ1, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, ρ2, µ2⟩ implies by definition that
⟨ϕ1, ρ1(xU ), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, ρ2(xU ), µ2⟩ : U , and the result holds immediately.
——–
Case (b). tˇ = bg. By definition of substitution, ρ1(bg) = ρ2(bg) = bg. By definition, ⟨ϕ1,bg, µ1⟩ ≈kℓo⟨ϕ2,bg, µ2⟩ : Boolg as required.
——–
Case (o). tˇ = oU1g1 where U = Refg1 U1. By definition of substitution, ρ1(oU1g1 ) = ρ2(oU1g1 ) = oU1g1 . We
know that ϕi ▷ oU1g1 ∈ T[Refg1 U1]. By definition of related stores, ⟨ϕ1,oU1g1 , µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2,oU1g1 , µ2⟩ :
Refg1 U1 as required, and the result holds.
——–
Case (λ). tU = (λg′cxU1 .tU2 )g. ThenU = U1
g′c−→gU2.
By definition of substitution, assuming xU1 < dom(ρi ), and Lemma E.42:
ϕ ′i ▷ ρi (tU ) = ϕ ′i ▷ (λg
′
cxU1 .ρi (tU2 ))g ∈ T[U ]
Consider j ≤ k , µ ′1, µ ′2 such that µi _ µ ′i and µ ′1 ≈jℓo µ ′2, and assume two valuesv1 andv2 such that
⟨ϕ1,v1, µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ϕ2,v2, µ ′2⟩ : U ′1 . Consider U ′ = U ′′1
g′′c−→g′′U ′′2 , ε11 ≈ℓo ε12, ε21 ≈ℓo ε22, εℓ1 ≈ℓo εℓ2,
such that ε1i ⊢ U1
g′c−→gU2 ≲ U ′, that ε2i ⊢ U ′1 ≲ U ′′1 , and that εℓi ⊢ Â ϕ ′.gc ≺ g′′ ≼ gc ′′
For simplicity, let us annotateU ′2 = U ′′2 ˜≺ g′′. We need to show that:
⟨ϕ1, ε11(λg′cxU1 .ρ1(tU2 ))g @U ′εℓ1 ε21v1, µ ′1⟩
≈jℓo ⟨ϕ2, ε12(λg
′
cxU1 .ρ2(tU2 ))g @U ′εℓ2 ε22v2, µ ′2⟩ : C(U ′2 )
Each vi is either a bare value ui or a casted value εuiui :: U ′1 . In the latter case, the application
expression combines evidence, which may fail with error. If it succeeds, we call the combined
evidence ε ′2i . The application rule then applies: it may fail with error if the evidence ε ′2i cannot be
combined with the evidence for the function parameter. Every time a failure is produced product of
evidence combination, then the relation vacuously holds. We therefore consider the only interesting
case, where reductions always succeed. Then:
ε1i (λg′cxU1 .ρi (tU2 ))g @U ′ ε ′2iui | µ ′i
ϕ′i7−→ protg′′,U ′′2εl ig ϕ ′′i (εpi ([εaiui :: U1/xU1 ]ρi (tU2 ))) | µ ′i
ϕ′i7−→
∗
protg
′′,U ′′2
εl ig ϕ
′′
i (εpi ([εaiui :: U1/xU1 ]ρi (tU2 ))) | µ ′i
where ϕ ′′i = ⟨ε ′r , (ϕ ′i.gc ˜≺ g), g′c ⟩, ε ′r = (ϕ ′i.ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε1)) ◦≼ εℓi ◦≼ ilat(ε1i ).
Notice that ilat(ε11)gc ′ ≈ℓo ilat(ε11)gc ′, also εℓ1gc ′′ ≈ℓo εℓ2gc ′′. If obsℓo (ϕ ′i ) do not hold, then by
Lemma E.56, obsℓo (ϕ ′′i ) do not hold. Then ϕ ′i ≤ℓo ϕ ′′i , and by Lemma E.63, ϕi ≤ℓo ϕ ′′i . Also by
Lemmas E.52 and E.56, ϕ ′′1 ≈ℓo ϕ ′′2 .
εl i , εpi and εai are the new evidences for the label, return value and argument, respectively. We
then extend the substitutions to map xU1 to the casted arguments:
ρ ′i = ρi {xU1 7→ εaiui :: U1}
We know that ⟨ϕ1,v1, µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ϕ2,v2, µ ′2⟩ and consider ϕ ▷ ui ∈ T[Uui ] then εai ⊢ Uui ≲ U1
and εai = (εui ◦<: ε2i ) ◦<: idom(ε1i ). As ε21 ≈ℓo ε22 and idom(ε11) ≈ℓo idom(ε12), therefore using
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Lemma E.46 ⟨ϕ1, (εa1u1 :: U1), µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ϕ2, (εa2u2 :: U1), µ ′2⟩ : U1
So as µi _ µ ′i then by Lemma E.41, Γ, xU1 ⊢ ⟨ϕ1, ρ ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈jℓo ⟨ϕ2, ρ ′2, µ ′2⟩.
We also know that ϕ ′′i ▷ ρi (tU2 ) ∈ T[U2]. Then by induction hypothesis:
⟨ϕ1, ρ ′1(tU2 ), µ ′1⟩ ≈j−1ℓo ⟨ϕ2, ρ ′2(tU2 ), µ ′2⟩ : C(U2)
Finally, as εpi = icod(ε1i ), we know that icod(ε11) ≈ℓo icod(ε12), also εl i = ilbl(ε1i ), we know that
ilbl(εl1) ≈ℓo ilbl(εl2) then by Lemma E.61:
⟨ϕ1, protg
′′,U ′′2
εl1g ϕ
′′
1 (εp1ρ ′1(tU2 )), µ ′1⟩
≈jℓo ⟨ϕ2, prot
g′′,U ′′2
εl2g ϕ
′′
2 (εp2ρ ′2(tU2 )), µ ′2⟩ : C(U ′2 )
and finally the result holds by backward preservation of the relations (Lemma E.43).
——–
Case (!). tU = !Refg U1εtU ′1 . ThenU = U1 ˜≺ g.
By definition of substitution:
ρi (tU ) = !Refg U1ερi (tU ′1 )
We have to show that
⟨ϕ1, !Refg U1ερi (tU ′1 ), µ1⟩
≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, !Refg U1ερi (tU
′
1 ), µ2⟩ : C(U1 ˜≺ g)
By Lemma E.42:
ϕ ′i ▷ !Refg U1ερi (tU
′
1 ) ∈ T[U1 ˜≺ g]
By induction hypotheses on the subterm:
⟨ϕ1, ρ1(tU ′1 ), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, ρ2(tU
′
1 ), µ2⟩ : C(U ′1 )
Consider j < k , then by definition of related computations
ρi (tU ′1 ) | µi
ϕ′i7−→ jtU ′1i | µ ′i =⇒ µ ′1 ≈k−jℓo µ ′2 ∧ (irred(t
U ′1
i ) ⇒ ⟨ϕ1, tU
′
1
1 , µ
′
1⟩ ≈k−jℓo ⟨ϕ2, t
U ′1
2 , µ
′
2⟩ : U ′1 )
WhereU ′1 = Refg′ U ′′1 . If terms t
U ′1
i are reducible after j = k − 1 steps, then
!Refg U1ερi (tU ′1 ) | µi
ϕ′i7−→ j !Refg U1εt ′U ′1i | µ ′i and the result holds.
If after at most j steps tU
′
1
i is irreducible it means that for some j ′ ≤ j, !Refg U1ερi (tU ′1 ) | µi
ϕ′i7−→
j′!Refg U1εvi | µ ′i . If j ′ = j then we use the same same argument for reducible terms and the result
holds.
Let us consider now j ′ < j . Then ⟨ϕ1,v1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−j
′
ℓo
⟨ϕ2,v2, µ ′2⟩ : U ′1 . By Lemma E.10, eachvi is either
a location (oiU
′′
i
g′i
) or a casted location εi (oiU
′′′
i
g′′i
) :: U ′1 . Let us assume they both are a casted location
(the other cases are analogous). In case a value vi j is a casted value, then the whole term ρi (tU ) can
take a step by (Rд), combining ε with εi . Such a step either fails, or succeeds with a new combined
evidence. Therefore, either:
ρi (tU ) | µi
ϕ′i7−→ j′error
in which case we do not care since we only consider termination-insensitive noninterference, or:
ρi (tU ) | µ
ϕ′i7−→ j′+1 !Refg U1ε ′ioiU
′′′
i
g′′i
| µ ′i
ϕ′i7−→ 1 protg,U1ilbl(ε ′i )g′′i ϕ ′′i (iref (ε ′i )v ′i ) | µ ′i
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with v ′i = µ ′i (oiU
′′′
i
g′′ ) = εuiu ′i :: U ′′′i , ϕ ′′i = ⟨(ϕ ′i.ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε ′i ))(ϕ ′i.gc ˜≺ g′′i ),ϕ ′i.gc ˜≺ g⟩. Notice that as
⟨ϕ1,v1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−j
′
ℓo
⟨ϕ2,v2, µ ′2⟩ : U ′1 and as ε ≈ℓo ε , then by Lemma E.46,
⟨ϕ1, ε ′1o1U
′′′
1
g′′1
, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−j
′
ℓo
⟨ϕ2, ε ′2o2U
′′′
2
g′′2
, µ ′2⟩ : Refg U1, therefore ε ′1 ≈ℓo ε ′2, i.e. ilbl(ε ′1) ≈ℓo ilbl(ε ′2) and
iref (ε ′1) ≈ℓo iref (ε ′2).
By Lemma E.56, if ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′i ) then ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′′i ). Then by Lemma E.63, ϕi ≤ℓo ϕ ′′i . Also by
Lemma E.56, either obsℓo (ϕ ′′i ) or ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′′i ), therefore ϕ ′′1 ≈ℓo ϕ ′′2 .
If both locations are related but not observable because ¬obsℓo (ϕi ), then the resulting values
also are not related and the result hold immediately. If both locations are related but not observable
because ¬obsℓo (ilbl(ε ′i )), then by Lemma E.56 ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′′i ), and the result holds by Lemma E.60.
If both locations are observables, then as ⟨ϕ1,v ′1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−j
′
ℓo
⟨ϕ2,v ′2, µ ′2⟩ : U ′1 , by Lemma E.61,
⟨ϕ1, protg,U1ilbl(ε ′1)g′′1 ϕ ′′1 (iref (ε ′1)v ′1), µ ′1⟩
≈jℓo ⟨ϕ2, prot
g,U1
ilbl(ε ′2)g′′2 ϕ
′′
2 (iref (ε ′2)v ′2), µ ′2⟩ : C(U ′2 )
and finally the result holds by backward preservation of the relations (Lemma E.43).
——–
Case (:=). tU = ε1tU11
g,U ′1:= εℓ ε2t
U2
2 . ThenU = Unit⊥.
By definition of substitution:
ρi (tU ) = ε1ρi (tU1 ) g,U
′
1:= εℓ ε2ρi (tU2 )
and Lemma E.42:
ϕ ′i ▷ ε1ρi (tU1 )
g,U ′1:= εℓ ε2ρi (tU2 ) ∈ T[Unit⊥]
We have to show that
⟨ϕ1, ε1ρ1(tU1 ) g,U
′
1:= εℓ ε2ρ1(tU2 ), µ1⟩
≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, ε1ρ2(tU1 )
g,U ′1:= εℓ ε2ρ2(tU2 ), µ2⟩ : C(U )
By induction hypotheses
⟨ϕ1, ρ1(tU1 ), µ1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, ρ2(tU1 ), µ2⟩ : C(U1)
Suppose j1 < k , and that ρi (tU1 ) are irreducible after j1 steps (otherwise, similar to case !, the
result holds immediately). Then by definition of related computations:
ρi (tU1 ) | µi
ϕ′i7−→ j1vi | µ ′i =⇒ µ ′1 ≈k−j1ℓo µ ′2 ∧ ⟨ϕ1,v1, µ ′1⟩ ≈
k−j1
ℓo
⟨ϕ2,v2, µ ′2⟩ : U1
By Lemma E.62 µi _ µ ′i , and µ ′1 ≈k−j1ℓo µ ′2 then by Lemma E.41, ⟨ϕ1, ρ1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−j1ℓo ⟨ϕ2, ρ2, µ ′2⟩. By
induction hypotheses:
⟨ϕ1, ρ1(tU2 ), µ ′1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, ρ2(tU2 ), µ ′2⟩ : C(U2)
Again, consider j2 = k − j1, if after j2 steps ρ1(tU2 ) is reducible or is a value, the result holds
immediately. The interest case if after j ′2 < j2 steps ρ1(tU2 ) reduces to values v ′i :
ρi (tU2 ) | µ ′i
ϕ′i7−→ j′2v ′i | µ ′′i =⇒ µ ′′1 ≈k−j1−j
′
2
ℓo
µ ′′2 ∧ ⟨ϕ1,v ′1, µ ′′1 ⟩ ≈k−j1−j
′
2
ℓo
⟨ϕ2,v ′2, µ ′′2 ⟩ : U2
Then
ρi (tU ) | µi
ϕ′i7−→ j1+j′2ε1vi g,U
′
1:= εℓ ε2v ′i | µ ′′i ∧ µ ′′1 ≈k−j1−j
′
2
ℓo
µ ′′2
Now vi and v ′i can be bare values or casted values. In the case of casted values we can combine
evidence, which may fail with error. We assume that all evidence combinations succeed, otherwise
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the relation vacuously holds. As both valuesvi are related at some reference type, then by canonical
forms (Lemma E.10) they both must be locations oU
′
i
i for someU ′i ≲ U1.
ε1vi
g,U ′1:= εℓ ε2v ′i | µ ′′i
ϕ′i7−→ 2 ε ′1ioU
′′
1
ig′
g,U ′1:= εℓ ε ′2iu ′i | µ ′′i
ϕ′i7−→ 1 unit⊥ | µ ′′′i
Where µ ′′′i = µ ′′i [oU
′′
1
i 7→ ε ′′1i (u ′i ˜≺ (ϕ ′.gc ˜≺ g)) :: U ′′1 ]. Notice that ε1 ≈ℓo ε1 and ε2 ≈ℓo ε2. As
⟨ϕ1,v ′1, µ ′′1 ⟩ ≈k−j1−j
′
2
ℓo
⟨ϕ2,v ′2, µ ′′2 ⟩ : U2 then by Lemma E.46,
⟨ϕ1, ε ′21u ′1 :: U ′1 , µ ′′1 ⟩ ≈k−j1−j
′
2
ℓo
⟨ϕ2, ε ′22u ′2 :: U ′1 , µ ′′1 ⟩ : U ′1 . Similarly as ⟨ϕ1,v1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−j1ℓo ⟨ϕ2,v2, µ ′2⟩ : U1,
then by Lemma E.46
⟨ϕ1, ε ′11oU
′′
1
ig′ :: Refg′ U ′1 , µ ′1⟩ ≈k−j1ℓo ⟨ϕ2, ε ′12o
U ′′1
ig′ :: Refg′ U ′1 , µ ′2⟩ : U1.
We consider first when the values are observable and the locations are identical: As iref (ε ′11) ≈ℓo
iref (ε ′12) then either obsℓo (iref (ε ′1i )U ′1 ) or ¬obsℓo (iref (ε ′1i )U ′1 ). Also as ϕ ′1.ε ≈ℓo ϕ ′2.ε , then either
obsℓo (ϕ ′i.ε) or ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′i.ε).
Notice that ε ′′1i = (ε ′2i ◦<: iref (ε ′1i )) ˜≺ ε ′i ), where ε ′i = ((ϕ ′i.ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε ′1i )) ◦<: εℓ ◦<: ilbl(iref (ε ′1i )). By
Lemma E.46, ⟨ϕ1, (ε ′21 ◦<: iref (ε ′11))u ′1 :: U ′′1 , µ ′′1 ⟩ ≈k−j1−j
′
2
ℓo
⟨ϕ2, (ε ′22 ◦<: iref (ε ′11))u ′2 :: U ′′1 , µ ′′1 ⟩ : U ′′1 .
• Suppose obsℓo (ϕ ′i.εϕ ′i.gc)∧obsℓo (ilbl(ε ′1i )g′), εs1i = ϕ ′i.ε˜≺ilbl(ε ′1i ), then by LemmaE.56, obsℓo (εs1i (g′˜≺
ϕ ′i.gc)).
– If obsℓo (εℓfilabel(U ′1 )), εs2i = (εs1i ◦<: εℓ) then by Lemma E.52 obsℓo (εs2i filabel(U ′1 )),
∗ Suppose obsℓo (iref (ε ′1i )U ′′1 ). As obsℓo (ilbl(iref (ε ′1i )filabel(U ′′1 ))),
then by Lemma E.52 obsℓo (ε ′i filabel(U ′′1 ))).
∗ If ¬obsℓo (iref (ε ′1i )U ′′1 ) then by Lemma E.52, ¬obsℓo (ε ′i filabel(U ′′1 ))).
– If ¬obsℓo (εℓfilabel(U ′1 )), εs2i = (εs1i ◦<: εℓ) then by Lemma E.52 ¬obsℓo (εs2i filabel(U ′1 )), and
by Lemma E.52 ¬obsℓo (ε ′i filabel(U ′′1 ))).
• Suppose¬obsℓo (ϕ ′i.εϕ ′i.gc)∨¬obsℓo (ilbl(ε ′1i )g′), then by Lemmas E.56 and E.56¬obsℓo (ε ′i filabel(U ′′1 )).
Therefore ε ′1 ≈ℓo ε ′2, then by Lemma E.59,
⟨ϕ1, ε ′′11(u ′1 ˜≺ (ϕ ′.gc ˜≺ g)) :: U ′′1 , µ ′′1 ⟩
≈k−j1−j′2ℓo ⟨ϕ2, ε ′′12(u ′2 ˜≺ (ϕ ′.gc ˜≺ g)) :: U ′′1 , µ ′′1 ⟩ : U ′′1
Also if ¬obsℓo (ϕi ) ⇒ ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′i ) and therefore by monotonicity of the join ¬obsℓo (ε ′′1i filabel(U ′′1 )).
Therefore if the values where different but context not observables, now the new values are going
to be not observable as well, independently of the context. Then ∀,ϕ ′′1 ≈kℓo ϕ ′′2 ,
⟨ϕ ′′1 , ε ′′11(u ′1 ˜≺ (ϕ ′.gc ˜≺ g)) :: U ′′1 , µ ′′1 ⟩
≈k−j1−j′2ℓo ⟨ϕ ′′2 , ε ′′12(u ′2 ˜≺ (ϕ ′.gc ˜≺ g)) :: U ′′1 , µ ′′1 ⟩ :: U ′′1
As every values are related at type Unit, we only have to prove that µ ′′′1 ≈k−j1−j
′
2−3
ℓo
µ ′′′1 , but using
monotonicity (Lemma E.47), it is trivial to prove that because either both both stores update the
same location oU
′′
1
1 to values that are related, therefore the result holds.
We consider now when the values are not observable and the locations may be different:
Suppose that µ ′′i (oU
′′
1
1 ) = εo1iu ′′1i :: U ′′1 such that ⟨ϕ1, εo11u ′′11 :: U ′′1 , µ ′′1 ⟩ ≈k−j1−j
′
2
ℓo
⟨ϕ2, εo12u ′′12 :: U ′′1 , µ ′′2 ⟩ :
U ′′1 , then we know that ϕ ′i.ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε ′11) ⌊≤⌋ ilbl(εo11). As ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′i ▷vi ), by Lemma E.64, ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′i ▷
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ε ′1io
U ′′1
g :: RefgU ′i ). Then by definition of obsℓo , either¬obsℓo (ϕ ′i.εϕ ′i.gc) or¬obsℓo (ilbl(ε ′1i )g) therefore,
by Lemma E.56, ¬obsℓo ((ϕ ′i.ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε ′1i ))(ϕ ′i.gc ˜≺g)), then by Lemma E.48, ¬obsℓo (ilbl(εo11)filabel(U ′′1 )),
and finally by definition of related values ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′i ▷ εo1iu ′′1i :: U ′′1 ). Analogously, suppose that
µ ′′i (oU
′′
2
2 ) = εo1iu ′′2i :: U ′′1 , then ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′i ▷ εo2iu ′′2i :: U ′′1 ).
Notice that ε ′′1i = (ε ′2i ◦<: iref (ε ′1i )) ˜≺ ε ′i ), where ε ′i = ((ϕ ′i.ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε ′1i )) ◦<: εℓ ◦<: ilbl(iref (ε ′1i )). As
¬obsℓo (ϕ ′i.εϕ ′i.gc)∨¬obsℓo (ilbl(ε ′1i )g′), then by Lemmas E.56 and E.56 ¬obsℓo (ε ′i filabel(U ′′1 )), therefore
by Lemma E.56 ¬obsℓo (ε ′′1iU ′′1 ), and then by definition of observable ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′i ▷ ε ′′1iu ′i :: U ′′i ). Finally
as ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′1 ▷ ε ′′1 u ′′1 :: U ′′1 ) and ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′2 ▷ ε ′′o12u ′12 :: U ′′1 ), then
⟨ϕ1, µ ′′1 (oU
′′
1
1 ), µ ′′1 ⟩ ≈k−j1−j
′
2
ℓo
⟨ϕ2, µ ′′2 (oU
′′
1
1 ), µ ′′2 ⟩ : U ′′1 .
Analogously, as ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′1 ▷ ε ′′o21u ′21 :: U ′′1 ) and ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′2 ▷ ε ′′2 u ′′2 :: U ′′1 ) then
⟨ϕ1, µ ′′1 (oU
′′
1
2 ), µ ′′1 ⟩ ≈k−j1−j
′
2
ℓo
⟨ϕ2, µ ′′2 (oU
′′
1
2 ), µ ′′2 ⟩ : U ′′1 , and the result holds.
——–
Case (ref ). tU = refU1εℓ εt
U ′1 . ThenU = Ref⊥ U1.
By definition of substitution:
ρi (tU ) = refU1εℓ ερi (tU
′
1 )
and Lemma E.42:
ϕ ′i ▷ ref
U1
εℓ ερi (tU
′
1 ) ∈ T[Ref⊥ U1]
We have to show that
⟨ϕ1, refU1εℓ ερ1(tU
′
1 ), µ1⟩
≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, refU1εℓ ερ2(tU
′
1 ), µ2⟩ : C(Ref⊥ U1)
By induction hypotheses:
⟨ϕ1, ρ1(tU ′1 ), µ⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, ρ2(tU
′
1 ), µ⟩ : C(U ′1 )
Consider j < k , by definition of related computations
ρi (tU ′1 ) | µi
ϕ′i7−→ jtU ′1i | µ ′i =⇒ µ ′1 ≈k−jℓo µ ′2 ∧ (irred(t
U ′1
i ) ⇒ ⟨ϕ1, tU
′
1
1 , µ
′
1⟩ ≈k−jℓo ⟨ϕ2, t
U ′1
2 , µ
′
2⟩ : U ′1 )
If terms tU
′
1
i are reducible after j = k − 1 steps, then
refU1εℓ ερi (tU
′
1 ) | µi
ϕ′i7−→ j refU1εℓ εt
′U ′1
i | µ ′i and the result holds.
If after at most j steps tU
′
1
i is irreducible, it means that for some j ′ ≤ j refU1εℓ ερi (tU
′
1 ) | µi
ϕ′i7−→
j′refU1εℓ εvi | µ ′i . If j ′ = j then we use the same same argument for reducible terms and the result
holds.
Let us consider now j ′ < j. By Lemma E.10, each vi is either a base value ui or a casted base value
εiui :: U ′1 . In case a value vi j is a casted value, then the whole term ρi (tU ) can take a step by (Rд),
combining ε with εi . Such a step either fails, or succeeds with a new combined evidence. Therefore,
either:
ρi (tU ) | µi
ϕ′i7−→ j′error
in which case we do not care since we only consider termination-insensitive noninterference, or:
ρi (tU ) | µ
ϕ′i7−→ j′+1 refU1εℓ ε ′iui | µ ′i
ϕ′i7−→ 1 oU1⊥ | µ ′′i
with, µ ′′i = µ ′i [oU1 7→ ε ′i (ui ˜≺ ϕ ′i.gc) :: U1]. Where ε ′′i = ε ′i ˜≺ (ϕ ′i.ε ◦≼ εℓ). Notice that ϕ ′1.ε ≈ℓo ϕ ′2.ε ,
and εℓ ≈ℓo εℓ therefore by Lemma E.52. We know that if ui ∈ T[Ui ], then εi ⊢ Ui ≲ U1. Also, as
Type-Driven Gradual Security with References 139
⟨ϕ1,v1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−j
′
ℓo
⟨ϕ2,v2, µ ′2⟩ : U ′1 then by Lemma E.46,
⟨ϕ1, ε ′1u1 :: U1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−j
′
ℓo
⟨ϕ2, ε ′2u2 :: U1, µ ′2⟩ : U ′1 and as (ϕ ′.ε ◦≼ εℓ) ⊢ ϕ ′.gc ≼˜ label(U1), then by
Lemma E.59, Lemma E.54, and Lemma E.47,
⟨ϕ1, ε ′′1 (u1 ˜≺ ϕ ′1.gc) :: U1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−j′−2ℓo ⟨ϕ2, ε ′′2 (u2 ˜≺ ϕ ′2.gc) :: U1, µ ′2⟩ : U ′1 .
Also if ¬obsℓo (ϕi ) ⇒ ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′i ) and therefore by monotonicity of the join ¬obsℓo (ε ′′i filabel(U1)).
Therefore if the values where different but context not observables, now the new values are going
to be not observable as well, independently of the context. Then
∀,ϕ ′′1 ≈kℓo ϕ ′′2 , ⟨ϕ ′′1 , ε ′′1 (u1 ˜≺ ϕ ′1.gc) :: U1, µ ′1⟩ ≈k−j′−2ℓo ⟨ϕ ′′2 , ε ′′2 (u2 ˜≺ ϕ ′2.gc) :: U1, µ ′2⟩ : U ′1 .
By definition of related stores µ ′′1 ≈k−j
′
ℓo
µ ′′2 . Then by Monotonicity of the relation (Lemma E.47)
µ ′′1 ≈k−j
′−2
ℓo
µ ′′2 and the result holds.
——–
Case (⊕). tU = ε1tU1 ⊕g ε2tU2
By definition of substitution:
ρi (tU ) = ε1ρi (tU1 ) ⊕g ε2ρi (tU2 )
and Lemma E.42:
ϕ ′i ▷ ε1ρi (tU1 ) ⊕g ε2ρi (tU2 ) ∈ T[U ]
We use a similar argument to case := for reducible terms. The interest case is when we suppose
some j1 and j2 such that j1 + j2 < k − 3 where:
ρi (tU1 ) | µi
ϕ′i7−→ j1vi1 | µ ′i =⇒ µ ′1 ≈k−j1ℓo µ ′2 ∧ ⟨ϕ1,v11, µ ′1⟩ ≈
k−j1
ℓo
⟨ϕ2,v21, µ ′2⟩ : U1
ρi (tU2 ) | µ ′i
ϕ′i7−→ j2vi2 | µ ′′i =⇒ µ ′′1 ≈k−j1−j2ℓo µ ′′2 ∧ ⟨ϕ1,v12, µ ′′1 ⟩ ≈
k−j1−j2
ℓo
⟨ϕ2,v22, µ ′′2 ⟩ : U2
By Lemma E.10, each vi j is either a boolean (bi j )gi j or a casted boolean εi j (bi j )g′i j :: Uj . In case a
value vi j is a casted value, then the whole term ρi (tU ) can take a step by (Rд), combining εi with
εi j . Such a step either fails, or succeeds with a new combined evidence. Therefore, either:
ρi (tU ) | µi
ϕ′i7−→ j1+j2error
in which case we do not care since we only consider termination-insensitive noninterference, or:
ρi (tU ) | µ ′′i
7−→j1+j2+2 ε ′i1(bi1)g′i1 ⊕g ε ′i2(bi2)g′i2 | µ ′′i
7−→1 ε ′i (bi )g′i :: Boolg | µ ′′i
with bi = bi1J⊕Kbi2, ε ′i = ε ′i1 ˜≺ ε ′i2, and g′i = g′i1 ˜≺ g′i2. It remains to show that:
⟨ϕ1, ε ′1(b1)g′1 :: Boolg, µ ′′1 ⟩ ≈k−j1−j2−3ℓo ⟨ϕ2, ε ′2(b2)g′2 :: Boolg, µ ′′2 ⟩ : Boolg
If ¬obsℓo (ϕi ), then the result is trivial because the resulting booleans are also related as they are
not observable.
If obsℓo (ϕi ), then by Lemma E.46, ⟨ϕ1, ε ′11(b11)д′11 :: Boolд, µ ′′1 ⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, ε ′21(b21)д′21 :: Boolд, µ ′′2 ⟩. If¬obsℓo (ilbl(ε ′i1)д) or ¬obsℓo (ilbl(ε ′i2)д), then by Lemma E.56, ¬obsℓo (ε ′iд) and the result holds. If
both obsℓo (ilbl(ε ′i2)д) then b11 = b21 and b12 = b22, so b1 = b2, and the result holds.
——–
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Case (app). tU = ε1tU1 @
U11
g′c−→gU12
εℓ ε2t
U2
with ε1 ⊢ U1 ≲ S11 →g S12, ε2 ⊢ U2 ≲ U11, andU = U12 ˜≺ g.
We omit the @U11
g′c−→gU12
εℓ operator in applications below.
By definition of substitution:
ρi (tU ) = ε1ρi (tU1 ) ε2ρi (tU2 )
and Lemma E.42:
ϕ ′i ▷ ε1ρi (tU1 ) ε2ρi (tU2 ) ∈ T[U ]
We use a similar argument to case := for reducible terms. The interest case is when we suppose
some j1 and j2 such that j1 + j2 < k where by induction hypotheses and the definition of related
computations:
ρi (tU1 ) | µi
ϕ′i7−→ j1vi1 | µ ′i =⇒ µ ′1 ≈k−j1ℓo µ ′2 ∧ ⟨ϕ1,v11, µ ′1⟩ ≈
k−j1
ℓo
⟨ϕ2,v21, µ ′2⟩ : U1
ρi (tU2 ) | µ ′i
ϕ′i7−→ j2vi2 | µ ′′i =⇒ µ ′′1 ≈k−j1−j2ℓo µ ′′2 ∧ ⟨ϕ1,v12, µ ′′1 ⟩ ≈
k−j1−j2
ℓo
⟨ϕ2,v22, µ ′′2 ⟩ : U2
Then
ρi (tU ) | µi
ϕ′i7−→ j1+j2ε1v11 ε2v12 | µ ′′i
If obsℓo (ϕi ▷ vi1) then, by definition of ≈ℓo at values of function type, using ε1 and ε2 to justify
the subtyping relations, we have:
⟨ϕ1, (ε1v11 ε2v12), µ ′′1 ⟩
≈k−j1−j2ℓo ⟨ϕ2, (ε1v21 ε2v22), µ ′′2 ⟩ : C(U12 ˜≺ g)
Finally, by backward preservation of the relations (Lemma E.43) the result holds.
If ¬obsℓo (ϕi ▷ vi1), and we assume by canonical forms that vi1 = εi1(λд′ix .ti )дi :: U1 and that
vi2 = εi2ui2 :: U2 (and that evidence combination always succeed or the result holds immediately),
then,
(ε1vi1 ε2vi2) | µ ′′1
ϕ′i7−→ 1 (ε ′i1(λд′ix .ti )дi ε ′i2ui2) | µ ′′1
ϕ′i7−→ 1 protgc ′,U12ilbl(ε ′i1)giϕ ′′i (icod(ε ′i1)t ′i ) | µ ′′1
Where ε ′i1 = εi1 ◦≼ ε1, ε ′i2 = εi2 ◦≼ ε2, and ϕ ′′i = ⟨ε ′′i (ϕ ′i.gc ˜≺ gi ), g′i ⟩, ε ′′i = (ϕ ′i.ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε ′i1)) ◦≼ εℓ ◦≼
ilat(ε ′i1)).
As ¬obsℓo (ϕi ▷ vi1), then either ¬obsℓo (ϕi ) or ¬obsℓo (ilbl(εi1)filabel(U1)). If ¬obsℓo (ϕi ) then
¬obsℓo (ϕ ′i ) and by Lemma E.56 and E.54, ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′′i ). As ε ′i1 = εi1 ◦≼ ε1, by Lemma E.52, either both
ilbl(ε ′i1) are observable or not (the latter when¬obsℓo (ilbl(εi1)filabel(U1))). If¬obsℓo (ilbl(εi1)filabel(U1))
then similar to the context case, ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′′i ). Also by Lemma E.52, ¬obsℓo (ilbl(εi1filabel(U1))).
Finally by Lemma E.60,
⟨ϕ1, protgc
′,U12
ilbl(ε ′11)g1ϕ
′′
1 (icod(ε ′11)t ′1), µ ′′1 ⟩
≈k−j1−j2ℓo ⟨ϕ2, prot
gc
′,U12
ilbl(ε ′21)g2ϕ
′′
2 (icod(ε ′21)t ′2), µ ′′2 ⟩ : C(U12 ˜≺ g)
Finally, by backward preservation of the relations (Lemma E.43) the result holds.
——–
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Case (if). tU = ifg ε1tU1 then ε2tU2 else ε3tU3 , with ϕ ′i ▷ tU1 ∈ T[U1], g′ = label(U1), ε ′r i = (ϕi .ε ˜≺
ilbl(ε1)), ϕ ′′i = ⟨ε ′r (ϕ ′i.gc ˜≺ g′), (ϕ ′i.gc ˜≺ g)⟩, ϕ ′′i ▷ tU2 ∈ T[U2], ϕ ′′i ▷ tU3 ∈ T[U3], ε1 ⊢ U1 ≲ Boolg, and
U = (U2 ˜<:U3) ˜≺ g
By definition of substitution:
ρi (tU ) = ifg ε1ρi (tU1 ) then ε2ρi (tU2 ) else ε3ρi (tU3 )
We use a similar argument to case := for reducible terms. The interest case is when we suppose
some j1 and j2 such that j1 + j2 < k where by induction hypotheses and related computations we
have that:
ρi (tU1 ) | µi
ϕ′i7−→ j1vi1 | µ ′i =⇒ µ ′1 ≈k−j1ℓo µ ′2 ∧ ⟨ϕ1 ▷ v11, µ ′1⟩ ≈
k−j1
ℓo
⟨ϕ2 ▷ v21, µ ′2⟩ : U1
By Lemma E.10, each vi1 is either a boolean (bi1)gi1 or a casted boolean εi1(bi1)g′i1 :: U1. In either
case, U1 ≲ Boolg1 implies U1 = Boolg′1 . In case a value vi1 is a casted value, then the whole term
ρi (tU ) can take a step by (Rд), combining εi with εi1. Such a step either fails, or succeeds with a
new combined evidence. Therefore, either:
ρi (tU ) | µi
ϕ′i7−→ j1+1error
in which case we do not care since we only consider termination-insensitive noninterference, or:
ρi (tU ) | µi
ϕ′i7−→ j1+1ifg ε ′i1(bi1)g′i1 then ε2ρi (tU2 ) else ε3ρi (tU3 ) | µ ′i
If ¬obsℓo (ϕi ▷ vi1), then by Lemma E.64 ¬obsℓo (ϕi ▷ ε ′i1bi1 :: Boolд). Without loosing generality,
let us assume the worst case scenario and that both execution reduce via different branches of the
conditional.
Consider ϕ ′′i = ⟨(ϕ ′i.ε ˜≺ ilbl(ε ′i1))(ϕ ′i.gc ˜≺ g′i1), (ϕ ′.gc ˜≺ g)⟩. It is easy to see that if ϕi is not observable,
then as ϕi ≤ℓo ϕ ′i ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′i ), and therefore by Lemma E.56, ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′′i .εϕ ′′i .gc). Therefore ϕi ≤ℓo ϕ ′′i .
If ¬obsℓo (ε ′i1Boolд), then also by Lemma E.56, ¬obsℓo (ϕ ′′i .εϕ ′′i .gc). Then
ρ1(tU ) | µ1
ϕ′i7−→ j1+2protg,Uilbl(ε ′11)g′11ϕ
′′
1 (ε2ρ1(tU2 )) | µ ′1
ρ2(tU ) | µ2
ϕ′i7−→ j1+2protg,Uilbl(ε ′21)g′21ϕ
′′
2 (ε3ρ2(tU3 )) | µ ′2
But because ¬obsℓo (ϕ ▷ ε ′i1bi1 :: Boolд) then either ¬obsℓo (ϕ .εϕ .gc) or ¬obsℓo (ilbl(ε ′i1g)). Then
as ϕi ≤ℓo ϕ ′′i by Lemma E.60,
⟨ϕ1, protg,Uilbl(ε ′11)g′11ϕ
′′
1 (ε2ρ1(tU2 )), µ ′1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, protg,Uilbl(ε ′21)g′21ϕ
′′
2 (ε3ρ2(tU3 )), µ ′2⟩ : C(U )
and the result holds by backward preservation of the relations (Lemma E.43).
Now consider if obsℓo (ϕ ▷vi1), then obsℓo (ϕ ▷ε ′i1bi1 :: Boolд)may hold or not. If its not observable
we proceed like we just did for the non-observable case. Let us consider that obsℓo (ϕ ▷ε ′i1bi1 :: Boolд)
holds.
Then by definition of ≈ℓo on boolean values, b11 = b21 Because b11 = b21, both ρ1(tU ) and ρ2(tU )
step into the same branch of the conditional. Let us assume the condition is true (the other case is
similar):
Then by induction hypotheses ⟨ϕ1, ρ1(tU2 ), µ ′1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, ρ2(tU2 ), µ ′2⟩ : C(U2). Also we know
that ilbl(ε ′11) ≈ℓo ilbl(ε ′21), and as ϕ ′1 ≈ℓo ϕ ′2, by Lemma E.56, ϕ ′′1 ≈ℓo ϕ ′′2 , then as ϕi ≤ℓo ϕ ′′i , by
Lemma E.61,
⟨ϕ1, protg,Uilbl(ε ′11)g′11ϕ
′′
1 (ε2ρ1(tU2 )), µ ′1⟩ ≈kℓo ⟨ϕ2, protg,Uilbl(ε ′21)g′21ϕ
′′
2 (ε2ρ2(tU2 )), µ ′2⟩ : C(U )
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and the result holds by backward preservation of the relations (Lemma E.43).
Case (prot()). Direct by using Lemma E.61.
□
